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Summary 
This thesis explores the EU-GCC relationship and tests the hypothesis that if 
the EU and the GCC states share interests and grand goals, to the extent that 
these are prioritised by the EU and its member states, then value-driven 
differences are subordinated to interests and as a result (i) the EU and the GCC 
states enhance their relationship towards a “strategic partnership” and (ii) the 
EU’s (self-) image as a foreign policy actor is weakened in terms of its normative 
(self-)image and enhanced in terms of its effectiveness as a useful ‘strategic 
partner’ in a multipolar and interdependent world. 
In doing so, the thesis attempts to provide a comprehensive conceptualisation of 
a ‘strategic partnership’ and to test it within the broader context of EU foreign 
policy, exploring the role of interests, values and (self-)images in the shaping of 
EFP. The framework of ‘strategic partnership’ is applied in two case studies of 
economics and politics; the EU-GCC negotiations for establishing a Free Trade 
Area and the cooperation of the EU and the GCC states in dealing with the 
crises in Yemen. 
The findings of the research suggest that the EU and the GCC states, to the 
extent that they prioritise their common interests and respond to each other’s 
(self-) images deriving from the current symmetrical power balance, are moving 
towards a strategic partnership. Despite the wide gap in the value systems of 
the parties, this factor has not been the most decisive for the development of 
this relationship. This conclusion calls for further exploration of the shaping and 
application of EFP, especially having in mind on one hand the ‘normative power’ 
argument and on the other hand the need of the EU to negotiate interests, 
values and perceptions when dealing with emerging powers. 
Regarding the concept of ‘strategic partnerships’ the research confirms the 
central role of the symmetrical power balance between the parties and their 
interdependency. It has identified a level of division of labour between the EU 
and the GCC states regarding regional challenges and it has highlighted the role 
of non state actors. It has also underlined the need for flexibility, questioning the 
role of cohesiveness and institutionalisation of interactions as prerequisites for a 
‘strategic partnership’.   
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EU-GCC1 RELATIONS: INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has always had major stakes in the Persian Gulf (in 
the fields of economy, energy and security) even though its relations with the 
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have not been wide-ranging and 
the negotiations in the framework of the Cooperation Agreement for a Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) have experienced significant delays and adversities 
until 2002. The GCC states, on the other hand, welcome a greater EU role in 
the region but their policies have been, at some points at least, counter-
productive. In the context of the new momentum created by the international 
environment of the 21st century, new expectations  have arisen and, during the 
last ten years, the interdependency in the fields mentioned have become even 
more complex. EU – GCC relations encountered new opportunities and 
challenges because of the global political environment and the diversification 
projects of the GCC economies. However, the relationship between the EU and 
the GCC states in this new political and economic setting is still understudied.  
The aim of this thesis is therefore to address this relationship, which has been 
understudied, especially in light of the recent developments in the region. This is 
the first study which approaches the EU-GCC relationship in the framework of a 
‘strategic partnership’. This is important as this thesis will argue that a ‘strategic 
partnership’ needs to address the relations from a multidimensional, 
multilayered and multileveled perspective, incorporating actors from different 
fields of cooperation and different strata of the two regions and explaining the 
effects of the relationship at national, regional and international levels. 
Therefore, this research will build upon the unique character of the EU and it will 
                                                          
1 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is also known as the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf 
(CCASG). It was formed in 1981, by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE). It is an inter-governmental organisation and its Secretariat General which is based in 
Riyadh, KSA, has limited authorities. In 2003 the GCC custom union was introduced. In 2008 the GCC states 
established a common market and in 2009 they created a Monetary Council in view of the desire of the GCC states 
(excluding UAE and Oman) to introduce a single currency. The GCC also has a military leg, the Peninsula Shield 
Force. The Secretary General is chosen by consensus while the presidency of the council is rotating on an annual 
basis among the members. 
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explore two cases in which economic and political aspects are interwoven. 
Moreover, addressing another shortcoming of the current literature, the thesis 
will assess the relationship in a dynamic way throughout the last ten years, in an 
attempt to evaluate the development of the relationship in relation to the 
developments both within the two regions and at regional and global levels. 
Furthermore, it will attempt to put emphasis on the symmetrical character of the 
relationship and the way this has influenced the development of the bi-regional 
relations. In addition, it will test the various arguments for the value and (self-) 
image factors of the European Foreign Policy (EFP). In order to assess this 
relationship, the thesis will provide a comprehensive model for approaching the 
concept of the EU‘s ‘strategic partnerships’. This research aims at bridging the 
academic debate and the understanding EU policymakers have developed 
regarding the elements that form a ‘strategic partnership’. It will assess these 
elements and attempt to provide an inclusive methodological plan. This 
approach is important since the EU explicitly presented its own views of how it 
deals with the foreign policy tool of ‘strategic partnerships’, in September 2010. 
Moreover, it should be pointed out that this is the first time that the framework of 
‘strategic partnerships’ will be applied in relation to another regional organisation 
and not a single state. For all these reasons, this thesis aims at contributing to a 
better understanding of the dynamics and the outcomes of the EU-GCC 
relationship, as well as to the better understanding of the way the EU has 
applied ‘strategic partnerships’ in pursuing its foreign policy goals. 
The aim of this chapter is to highlight the central issues and challenges in EU – 
GCC relations in order to provide a context for understanding the central aims, 
research questions and structure of this thesis. Thus, it will proceed in the 
following way. First, it will provide a brief history of EU-GCC relations and review 
the economic interdependency of the two regions. It will also describe the 
phases of the FTA negotiations and the economic interests of the two parties in 
enhancing their relations in trade, investments and finance, within the new 
economic context of the 21st century. Second, it will present the establishment 
of a broad political dialogue based on the common interests for security and 
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stability in the wider Middle East and the Gulf region. It will also review recent 
developments of the EU's involvement in the security issues of the area and the 
bilateral security agreements between EU and GCC member states. Third, it will 
outline the aims and key questions for the thesis, in context, before finally, 
ending with a brief presentation of the structure of the thesis.  
 
The broader historic context  
Europe had limited historic links with the Arabian Peninsula, in contrast to the 
Mediterranean states of the Arab world. The presence of Portuguese colonial 
forces lasted only for 150 years and ended in 1648 when local Arab tribes 
pushed them out of the region. In 1892 the Gulf tribes signed a defence treaty 
with the United Kingdom which ended in the early 1970s. The UK was 
responsible for the security of the region, albeit respecting the sovereignty of the 
sheikhdoms on internal affairs. Generally though, there was a lack of common 
historic ties between the two regions and a gap of communication and 
cooperation between the Gulf states and Europe for centuries. Nevertheless, 
world and European economies were both influenced by the policies and the 
political situation in the oil-producing countries during the last few decades of 
the 20th century. Because of the oil crises of the 1970s, the Europeans felt very 
acutely the dependency of their economies on the oil producing countries of the 
Gulf. The realisation of the fact that the political developments in the Middle 
East had a direct impact on the European economy encouraged the Europeans 
to get involved in the region, as verified by the initiative for the Euro-Arab 
Dialogue (1973) and the Declaration of Venice (1980)2. The Euro-Arab Dialogue 
was the first group-to-group approach with the initiative of the European states, 
which aimed at building a relationship with the Arab world through economic 
cooperation, the creation of a political forum and more importantly by securing 
the smooth flows of low-priced oil. However, the initiative provided no tangible 
results, as: there were politically different approaches within the two groups; 
                                                          
2 Fawcett, Louise, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford; New York, Oxford University Press, 2005 
p.322   
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political cooperation within the EC was still underdeveloped; and the negotiating 
strategies of the two parties were not mutually understood as they used different 
patterns of behaviour and, economically speaking, oil prices, which were the 
main driving force for this European initiative, were back in decline3. It was no 
surprise then that the Euro-Arab Dialogue was abandoned by the 1990s. 
Additionally, the Europeans also discarded the idea for a more comprehensive 
relationship with the Arabs and they prioritised sub-regional approaches, which 
became the pattern for enhancing relations with the southern neighbours4. As a 
result, the EU-Arab relations were reshaped into three different frameworks; EU-
GCC negotiations, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and bilateral relations 
and/or agreements with Yemen and Iraq.  
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council 
In the 1970s, the withdrawal of the British from the small states of the Gulf, the 
Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war 
alarmed the conservative monarchies of the Gulf region. The royal families 
understood that the maintenance of the status quo could only be achieved 
through regional security and economic cooperation5 and the formation of a 
third coherent pole in the region, next to Iraq and Iran. Indeed, in 1981 they 
established the GCC, with a permanent Secretariat in Riyadh. The central aim 
was to protect their economies and enhance the security of their states6. The 
GCC states sought cooperation with the European Community almost 
immediately after the establishment of the Council and as early as in 1983 the 
                                                          
3 Al-Mani, Saleh A., The Euro-Arab dialogue : a study in associative diplomacy, London, Pinter, 1983, pp. 7-9 
4 Baabood, Abdullah, EU-Gulf Political and Economic Relations, Assessment and Policy Recommendations, Dubai, 
Gulf Research Center, 2006, p. 28  
5 Kechichian, Joseph A., "The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Security", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 4., 
Oct., 1985, pp. 853-881  
6 ‘The European Community and the Gulf Co-Operation Council’, Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3., Aug., 1987, pp. 
323-327 
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first technical assistance agreement was signed. They also initiated a dialogue 
for establishing a Cooperation Agreement.  
 
Cooperation Agreement 
The Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1988, ratified in 1989, and came into 
force in 1990. It aimed at building a ‘contractual’ relationship between the EC 
and the GCC states by providing the first framework for further development of 
EU-GCC economic relations. Based on the agreement, the EU granted the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) status for trade to the GCC states. The EU granted 
preferential access to its market, according to its Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP)7. The agreement called the two parties to "enter into 
discussions concerning the negotiation of an agreement aimed at the expansion 
of trade" and "to promote the development and diversification of the reciprocal 
commercial exchanges"8. The Agreement was set, however, within the 
framework of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, to which it functioned as complementary 
instead of an alternative9, at the time. 
Following the agreement, a 'Joint Council' and a 'Joint Cooperation Committee' 
were created in order to take decisions and promote the objectives of biregional 
cooperation. One of the objectives described was the signing of an FTA. Since 
then, there have been ongoing negotiations between the EU and the GCC for 
this FTA, which has been the focal point of biregional talks. Because of this 
dialogue, EU-GCC relations have been institutionalised through the 
negotiations, the regular meetings and the transfer of technical expertise in 
                                                          
7 Maalouf, Beatrice, Re-Thinking the GCC & EU - Assessing the Possible Strategies to Achieve a Security Counter-
Balance in the Arab Peninsula, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, 2007, pp. 11, 13-14 
8 EU/ GCC, Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community, on the one part, and the countries 
parties to the Charter of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (the State of the United Arab 
Emirates, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar and the State 
of Kuwait) of the other part, 1989, Retrieved on 21 July 2010 from 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=tru
e&treatyId=232  
9 Wilson, Rodney, 'EU-GCC relations: towards a free trade agreement and beyond' in Hanelt, Christian-Peter, et. al., 
eds., Future Perspectives for European-Gulf Relations, Munich, CAP and Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research, 
2000, pp. 93-94 
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economics from Europe to the Gulf area. Nevertheless, EU-GCC relations have 
also been developing in other fields mentioned in the agreement, with 
investments, education and environment gaining new dynamics during the last 
few years. Also, since 2001 security clauses have increased in importance and 
depth. In any case, EU-GCC relations have not been a story of smooth 
development and enrichment of biregional relations towards a clearly defined 
end. On the contrary, they went through different phases and met difficulties 
before reaching new momentum for a closer partnership in the 21st century. Yet, 
even in this revitalised process, political and economic interests have not been 
translated easily into policies and agreements. Moreover, the two blocs face 
‘internal institutional constraints’10. The dualistic system of sharing competence 
between the supranational and inter-governmental bodies of the EU have added 
to the complexity of the discussions, while the GCC Secretariat General is 
weak, without independent budget and without authority over the member states 
in many of the issues discussed11. This lack of authority of the GCC Secretariat 
General has led to inconsistency of approaches from the GCC states and in 
some cases delays in the implementation of intra-GCC decisions12. Despite the 
aforementioned difficulties, the EU – GCC relationship has been developing 
since 1990 due to the economic interdependency of the two regions and their 
shared need to advance security in their wider common neighbourhood. During 
the last decade in particular, the broader political context has produced new 
opportunities for cooperation and has highlighted even more their common 
interests in economics and politics.   
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Nonneman, Gerd, EU-GCC Relations: Dynamics, Patterns & Perspectives, Dubai, Gulf Research Center, 2006, p. 
15 
11 Wilson, Rodney, 'EU-GCC relations: towards a free trade agreement and beyond' in Hanelt, Christian-Peter, et. al., 
eds., Future Perspectives for European-Gulf Relations, Munich, CAP and Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research, 
2000, p.96 
12 Aluwaisheg, Abdel Aziz Abu Hamad, ‘The EU-GCC Free Trade Area Negotiations: the Home Stretch or First 
Base?’, The GCC – EU Research Bulletin No. 2 (June 2005), pp 7-9 
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Economic interdependence 
The EU and the GCC share a relationship of interdependency in economics, 
since the Gulf region has always been the major source of oil energy for 
Europe, and a wealthy market in which the European producers and exporters 
of manufactured products are highly interested13. The GCC states have been on 
the list of the top six destinations of the European exported products for a large 
part of the last twenty years14, while the EU has been the first importer of GCC 
products. As shown in the table below15, since the Cooperation Agreement of 
1990, there has been a constant increase in the total sum of EU-GCC trade in 
favour of the EU, with a minor decline in total volume amidst the global 
economic crisis.  
 
Table 1.1 
EU-GCC trade in € millions 
1990 1994 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
26,965 32,527 38,124 51,415 66,700 90,740 107,467 100,432 144,572 
 
However, the history of EU-GCC relations in trade and investments goes back to 
the 1970s. During the period of high oil prices in the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
gained petrodollars of the Arab royal families were not guided to investments in 
their countries, in structural reforms and the local infrastructure but the vast 
                                                          
13 Hollis, Rosemary, ‘Europe and the Middle East: Power by Stealth?’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 73, No. 1., Jan., 1997, pp. 15-29 
14 Hertog Steffen, EU-GCC Relations in the Era of the Second Oil Boom, Center for Applied Policy Research; 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, December 2007 
15 European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation, "European Union, evolution of EU-
GCC trade", Retrieved on 21 July 2010 from http://www.medea.be/en/countries/arab-world-general/gcc-gulf-
cooperation-council/ ; European Commission (DG Trade), ‘GCC, EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World’, 8 
June 2011, Retrieved on 08 June 2013 from 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113482.pdf. 
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majority of these (at least 80% of foreign direct investments) were placed in the 
western economies16. Therefore, when the oil revenues decreased in 1985, the 
income per capita and the gross national income in the GCC states declined17. 
Population growth impacted negatively on the economic situation of these 
countries and added to the concerns about the political consequences 
associated with the internal security of the Gulf states. From the rise of the oil 
price in 1999, the royal families sought to seize the opportunity to diversify their 
economies, by building the necessary domestic infrastructure and by integrating 
into the world economy. The EU appeared, then, as the reliable partner, which 
could provide the needed technology, knowledge and support for accomplishing 
their goals. Europe has its own interests in the diversification of the GCC states 
as this is associated with the prosperity of the Middle East in general. This 
interdependency explains the desire of the two parties to enhance their 
interaction in the field of economy.   
 
The first years of the negotiations for the FTA 
The procedure adopted at the early stages of the negotiations and the 
unwillingness of the two parties to compromise on issues relevant to measures 
of protectionism in interregional trade, the political conditionalities the EU 
wanted to attach to the FTA and the lack of common custom laws in the Gulf, 
led to an early stalemate. The two parties had been reluctant to abandon 
protectionist policies over a number of trade issues and the EU wanted to add 
human right clauses into the text, as it had done with all the FTAs under 
negotiation. On the other hand the GCC states did not have a custom union 
before 2003, which further complicated the negotiations. Therefore it was 
unlikely that the results could have been positive. Nevertheless, the two parties 
agreed on technical assistance in custom union laws and practices. A 
                                                          
16 Hinnebusch, Raymond, The international politics of the Middle East, Manchester; New York, Manchester University 
Press, 2003, p. 48 
17 Hinnebusch, Raymond and  Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, eds., The foreign policies of Middle East states, Boulder; 
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp. 63-64 
EU-GCC relationship: Introduction 
 
Angelos Lenos  9 
consortium of EU custom services trained GCC officials for the planned -at the 
time- GCC custom union18. In addition, the EU and the GCC states did not want 
to abandon the whole procedure of direct negotiations and the annual meetings 
that had been taking place. Thus, they decided to re-launch the EU-GCC 
dialogue and broaden the scope including “decentralised cooperation”. The 
decision was taken during the EU-GCC Ministers Summit in Granada, Spain, 
which aimed at boosting mutual understanding, interaction and cooperation 
between societies of the two regions. Decentralised cooperation introduced 
cooperation in education, media and business. These fields became vital for the 
economic development and diversification of the GCC states. In any case, this 
phase of the dialogue may have not produced astonishing results but it eased 
the way for the third stage of the negotiations that were officially launched in 
200219. 
 
The momentum of the 9/11 era 
A critical moment and a certain momentum for the EU-GCC negotiations 
emerged with the beginning of the new century. Oil prices reached new heights, 
which accelerated the diversification process of the GCC economies and 
enhanced the need for technological equipment and transfer of expertise. At the 
level of the political context, the new US governmental narrative, that was 
identified with that of the Christian right, highlighted the intra-West differences in 
tackling security issues in the Middle East. Even though the latter is a matter of 
political interest and not an issue of economic negotiations, it helped the 
development of a stronger political will among the states of the two regions to 
underpin their biregional relations. Moreover, the economic relations between 
the two blocs were enriched by the transnational flows of capital and by the new 
transnational investments that were made in Europe and the Persian Gulf.  The 
                                                          
18 EU/ GCC, ‘Joint Communiqué’, 5th EU GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting, 8 May 1994  
19 European Commission (DG Trade), “Gulf Region”, Retrieved on 08 July 2011 from 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/gulf-region/index_en.htm 
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US investments in petrochemicals notwithstanding, the EU has been the most 
important foreign investor for GCC states and its role has become more 
essential since the investments were placed in a wide range of industry sectors. 
The EU has also been a receiver of foreign investments from the GCC states. 
Between 2002 and 2006 around 55% of the GCC’s total foreign direct 
investments and 20% of the overall portfolio investment were placed in the 
European economy20 
The EU has also been interested in helping the GCC states to get integrated 
into the global economy, since this would eliminate the risk for higher oil prices 
and push for liberalisation reforms in the field of economy and finance within the 
GCC. In fact, the EU reached a compromise with the KSA and signed a bilateral 
agreement supporting the KSA’s accession to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO)21. The KSA was the last of the GCC states to join the WTO, in 2005. By 
being integrated into the global economy, the Arab states of the Gulf have 
actually promoted internal liberalisation policies and a number of economic 
fields have been opened to private investors22. The new economic reforms, the 
regulations, and generally the transparent environment and the opening of the 
local economies to international business would help the investments from 
European companies in local infrastructure projects as well as imports of 
technology and skills to the region, accelerating the diversification process of 
the Gulf economies23. 
Furthermore, the EU has been an advocate of the promotion of the regional and 
economic integration of the Gulf. The creation of the GCC customs union was a 
precondition for the third phase of the negotiations and the GCC customs union 
was established in 2003 giving new dynamics to EU-GCC negotiations. In 2008, 
                                                          
20 Biberovic, Nermina, ‘A common European Approach to sovereign wealth funds – continuity of the status quo?’, EU-
GCC Research Bulletin, 10, June 2008, p. 6 
21 European Commission, Accession of Saudi Arabia to the WTO: Conclusion of the EU-Saudi Arabia bilateral market 
access deal, DG Tade, 30 August 2003, Brussels. Available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/october/tradoc_114038.pdf (Last accessed: 31/08/2011)  
22 Biberovic, Nermina, ‘A common European Approach to sovereign wealth funds – continuity of the status quo?’, EU-
GCC Research Bulletin, 10, June 2008, p. 11 
23 Rutledge, Emile, ‘Quantifying the GCC’s expected economic gains’, The GCC – EU Research Bulletin, No. 2, June 
2005, p. 14 
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the GCC common market also came into force24. This path of regional economic 
integration cannot be seen outside the framework of the negotiations with the 
EU, as the Europeans have provided vital technical support to the GCC states, 
and they keep doing so in regards to the plan for a monetary union25 as well. 
This institutional integration has also been accompanied by intensified 
transnational intra-GCC investments26 leading to greater intraregional 
cooperation, which the EU considers as a tool for stability and peace27.  
The new economic growth in the Gulf has also generated huge surpluses, a 
large part of which have been invested in the European economy, as already 
mentioned. GCC investors have acquired companies in heavy industry, banks, 
ports, real estates, telecommunications, heavy industry and tourism28. The total 
assets of GCC entrepreneurs in Europe are estimated to be over $400 billion29, 
of which $100 billion were acquired just within a timeframe of four years, namely 
in the 2002-06 period.  European commercial interests in the Gulf have also 
been obvious in bilateral policies, with the United Kingdom, France30 and 
Germany31 (and Italy to a smaller degree) increasing their shares in the local 
markets or by directly investing in projects and in the local financial sector. What 
is more, in some cases GCC funds were placed in European companies that 
were already doing business in the Gulf, enhancing the interdependence of the 
economic actors from the two regions32. The joint funded projects were in the 
fields of electrical power, water infrastructures, education, transportation, 
                                                          
24 James, Bowman, 'GCC common market comes into effect', Arabian Business, 01 January 2008, Retrieved 07 July 
2008 on http://www.arabianbusiness.com/gcc-common-market-comes-into-effect-122387.html 
25 Walter, Norbert, ‘EU-GCC Cooperation in Money and Finance’, The GCC – EU Research Bulletin No. 7, April 2007, 
p. 12 
26 Luciani, Giacomo and Neugart, Felix, eds., The EU and the GCC. A new partnership, Center for Applied Policy 
Research and Berelsmann Stiftung, 2005, p. 31 
27 Genand, Lore, ‘A view of the FTA from an EU perspective’, The GCC – EU Research Bulletin No. 2, June 2005, p. 
11 
28 Habibi, Nader, 'Managing the oil Wealth', Crown Paper 1, Brandeis University, Crown Center for Middle East 
Studies, June 2008, p. 32 
29 Hertog Steffen, EU-GCC Relations in the Era of the Second Oil Boom, Center for Applied Policy Research; 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, December 2007, p. 9 
30 Heliot, Jacques, ‘France and the Arabian Gulf’, The GCC – EU Research Bulletin No. 5, July 2006, pp.11-13 
31 Koch, Christian, 'A Pivotal Visit at a Critical Time', The GCC - EU Research Bulletin, No. 7, Gulf Research Center, 
p. 8 
32 Habibi, Nader, 'Managing the oil Wealth', Crown Paper 1, Brandeis University, Crown Center for Middle East 
Studies, June 2008, p. 29 
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petrochemicals and mining. In addition, in July 2008 under the initiative of the 
Qatari government, a new EU-GCC Industrial Forum was launched in 
Barcelona, aiming to promote general industrial and subcontracting cooperation 
between the EU and the GCC states33. However, trade relations have not 
always been smooth and without complaints from the GCC states which feel 
disadvantaged with the trade balance being exclusively in favour of the EU. The 
public comments by European leaders on the role and the possible restrictions 
applied on the Sovereign Wealth Funds, many of which are based in the Gulf 
region, have also been an issue of concern for the Gulf investors34.  
In this context, the EU and the GCC states have reached an agreement on 99% 
of the issues discussed during the FTA talks. The two remaining issues, 
according to the official language of the two sides, were the export duties which 
GCC states impose on petrochemical products manufactured in the Gulf region 
and the human rights clauses that the EU wants to add to the FTA. These 
issues led to the suspension of the talks in December 2008, by the GCC 
presidency.  
To sum up, there is a constantly deepening economic interdependency of the 
two regions which shapes the relationship of the EU and the GCC. In this 
framework, the EU has promoted the integration of the Gulf economies into the 
world economic system, regional stability through regional integration and, 
domestically, it has favoured economic liberalisation and diversification projects. 
By attaching ‘decentralised cooperation’ to the EU-GCC relationship, the two 
sides have engaged in a wider spectrum of fields for cooperation and they have 
taken on board actors from different layers of the bureaucracy and the societies 
of the two regions, namely inter-governmental actors, supranational bodies of 
the EU and the business communities. Nevertheless, in spite of this wider and 
deeper relationship, twenty years after the two parties agreed to begin the 
negotiations for a FTA, there is still no conclusion. This is striking, especially 
                                                          
33 Ammari, Siba Sami, 'Al-Sada launches the 1st GCC-EU Forum in Barcelona', AMEinfo, 06 July 2008, Retrieved 07 
July 2008 at http://www.ameinfo.com/162606.html 
34 Biberovic, Nermina, ‘An approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds, Continuity of the Status Quo?’, The EU-GCC 
Research Bulletin, No. 10, June 2008, p. 6 
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bearing in mind that the USA finalised their FTA with Bahrain, within a time 
period of few months35.   
 
Political Dialogue 
 
Establishing the political dialogue in the early years of the relationship 
The Middle East has been characterised as the backyard of Europe36 and as a 
result the political interest of the EU in the political stability of the region is 
natural. From this viewpoint, the interest of the EU to develop relations with the 
Arab world beyond the Mediterranean can be explained as expanding stability in 
its neighbourhood. It is also understandable why the EU attempts to project 
some of the political principles (for internal reforms and political liberalisation) of 
the EuroMed policy of cooperation and partnership for the creation of a “New 
Middle East” on its relations with the GCC37.  The decline of oil revenues in the 
mid-1980s shook the ‘rentier state’38 model of the societal organisation of the 
Arabian Peninsula, according to which the non-democratic ruling elites (royal 
families in these cases) buy legitimacy through the distribution of wealth and 
social goods. Due to the new situation, youth unemployment reached 30%-
50%39 in some cases, while the decrease of living standards for the large 
majority of the population in the Middle East gave space to radical Islamist 
movements which claimed to represent a social and cultural revolt40, becoming 
influential in the wider region. Therefore, de-radicalisation of the Arab societies 
and sustainable development that would minimise the possibilities for violent 
political movements in the region, are in the best interests of the Europeans.  
                                                          
35 Ibid, p. 22 
36 Ibid  
37 Hollis, Rosemary, ‘Europe and the Middle East: Power by Stealth?’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 73, No. 1., Jan., 1997, pp. 15-29 
38 Luciani, Giacomo, ed., The Arab state, London: Routledge, 1990 
39 Heradstveit, Daniel and Hveem, Helge , eds., Oil in the Gulf: obstacles to democracy and development, Aldershot, 
Hants, Burlington, Ashgate, 2004, p. 20 
40 Ibid, pp. 23-25 
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From the Arab perspective, the states of the Persian Gulf have sought greater 
involvement of the European states in regional politics in order to counterweight 
the US policy in the wider region of the Middle East41 and more specifically in 
the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab leaders recognise that the 
proximity of the EU to the Gulf region and its dependency on their oil supplies 
have made the region of paramount significance for the Europeans42. In 
addition, as their initial contacts immediately after the establishment of the GCC 
indicates, the GCC states are interested in the assistance the EU can provide 
for their own regional integration process, since they perceive the EU as the 
model they would like to apply43, at least to a certain extent. Moreover, 
developments in Iran, Iraq and Yemen raised shared concerns for the stability of 
the region and for peace in the wider Middle East. It is for these reasons that the 
EU and the GCC have been in a constant dialogue, exchanging ideas and 
sharing information about their political interests on major developments in the 
Middle East. The desire of the two parties to institutionalise an exchange of 
views on regional matters can be seen in all the Joint Communiqués which 
follow the annual Joint Ministerial Councils. Political issues are always present 
and shared outlooks are always mentioned, in a relatively extensive way. As 
early as 1994, the EU and the GCC leaders stated the fact that they reviewed “a 
series of international and regional political issues of mutual interest in an open 
and cordial manner”44. However, in spite of the common interests, during these 
early years of the EU-GCC relationship, the EU did not become an influential 
player in the Middle East Peace Process nor in the Gulf area’s politics. Indeed, 
for a long time the Gulf was not a region of priority for the EU, which was more 
focused on its own enlargement and its relations with the Arab states of the 
                                                          
41 ibid 
42 Fürtig, Henner, ‘GCC-EU Political Cooperation: Myth or Reality?’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 
31, No. 1., May, 2004, pp. 25-39.  
43 Weisweiller, Flo, ‘Partnership with the EU: What the GCC should look out for’, The GCC – EU Research Bulletin 
No. 9, December 2007, p. 10 
44 EU/ GCC, ‘Joint Communiqué’, 5th EU GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting, 8 May 1994  
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Mediterranean Basin45. The problems of the FTA talks, even though they are 
related to economic issues, were interpreted as a lack of political will for the 
conclusion of the agreement. Additionally, despite the obvious interdependence 
and the benefits from this relationship, there has been almost no long-term 
strategic thinking and goal setting in the political sphere. This lack of a concrete 
strategy by the EU has encouraged the existence of different views and policies 
on a large spectrum of issues at an intra-EU level46. Within this context and 
because of the dominant role of the United States in the area, the first years of 
the EU-GCC dialogues on political and security issues provided no specific 
agreements or schemes for cooperation, even though it did feed the biregional 
dynamics and kept the negotiations going, at a time when the FTA talks were 
facing fundamental difficulties. 
 
The new momentum of the 21st century 
In the post-9/11 era, because of the new international political environment, a 
new momentum emerged for the EU-GCC relationship. In its document 
‘Strengthening EU’s Relations with the Arab World’,  the European Commission 
suggested that the EU - GCC relationship becomes part of a broader regional 
strategy for the ‘wider Middle East’, next to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
and the EU policies for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict over the 
creation of the Palestinian state47. Moreover, the European Commission 
recognised that the existing relations with the Gulf region do not reflect the 
strategic importance of the GCC states for Europe and through its document 
‘Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East’, the EU 
endorsed the political goal of forging a strategic partnership with the Middle 
East, including the Gulf region, with which consultations on the issue had 
                                                          
45 Baabood, Abdullah and Edwards, Geoffrey, ‘Reinforcing Ambivalence: The Interaction of Gulf States and the 
European Union’, European Foreign Affairs Review Vol. 12, no.4, 2007, p. 4 
46 Youngs, Richard, Europe and the Middle East: in the shadow of September 11, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2006, p. 227 
47 European Commission, ‘Strengthening the EU's Partnership with the Arab World’ (D 2003 10318), 2003 
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already taken place48. In the same document, a shift towards a more bilateral 
approach was identified as it was clearly stated that the EU and its members 
would consider bilateral political engagement with the GCC states that may 
want a more rapid agreement on specific issues49. The UK, France, Italy and 
Germany have been advancing their own bilateral relations with the Gulf states 
via joint transnational investments and projects in Europe and the Gulf, energy 
cooperation, and  more interestingly, through arm sales50 and security 
agreements.  
In any case, almost ten years after the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of 
the second pillar of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU 
became a more active player in the region. The role of the EU as a source of 
stability in the Middle East was highlighted in its relations with Iran. While the 
US has declined any offer for rapprochement with Tehran with which there is a 
mutual hostility, the EU preferred a pattern of ‘critical dialogue’ with Iran. EU-
Iran relations were producing results regarding the issue of human rights and 
regional stability, until hard-liners came to power in 2005. Nevertheless, despite 
this development, the EU and its member states had a fundamental role in 
overcoming (even temporarily) the 2003 crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme. 
The EU3 (the UK, France and Germany) and the EU’s High Representative paid 
a visit to Tehran and were able to persuade the Iranian leadership to suspend 
their uranium enhancement programme51. However, because of the rejection of 
the EU proposals from the Iranian government and the continuation of the 
uranium enrichment during the last few years, core EU members have 
approached the US position and adopted stricter policies by agreeing on the 
imposition of new sanctions against the Islamic regime of Tehran52. In any case, 
the EU and its member states demonstrated a clear interest in placing political 
                                                          
48 EU, Final Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Brussels, 2004, p5 
49 Ibid, p9 
50 Youngs, Richard, Europe and the Middle East: in the shadow of September 11, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2006, p. 173 
51 Baabood, Abdullah, EU-Gulf Political and Economic Relations, Assessment and Policy Recommendations, Dubai, 
Gulf Research Center, 2006, p. 15  
52 BBC, 'EU expands Iran nuclear sanctions', Retrieved on 17 September 2008 from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7549879.stm 
EU-GCC relationship: Introduction 
 
Angelos Lenos  17 
resources and political will in dealing with a regional issue of security, in the 
sphere of immediate interest for the Gulf states. At the same time, the role of the 
GCC states in regional stability was highlighted. The GCC states aimed at 
having a say in the political events of their region that followed the 9/11 events, 
namely the war in Iraq, the Iranian nuclear programme,  Saudi mediation in the 
Hamas - Fatah conflict,  Qatari mediation in ending the latest crisis in Lebanon, 
as well as the Qatari and Saudi mediations for ending internal crises in Yemen.  
Within this framework, the EU pursued closer relations with the GCC states as 
well, on biregional, bilateral and multilateral (international) levels. Since 2002 
the Middle East, including the GCC states and especially the KSA, became a 
central issue in the antiterrorist policies of the EU. The Union initiated a dialogue 
on anti-terrorism policies with the GCC states by: providing assistance at the 
national level; engaging in biregional seminars and workshops; establishing 
regional organisations like the Middle East and the North Africa Financial Action 
Task Force (MENAFATF) against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in 
November 2004 and in the dialogue for the role of the United Nations in anti-
terrorism policies. Moreover, in the security field, the French president Nicolas 
Sarkozy travelled to the Gulf in January 2008 where he signed a series of deals 
with the KSA, among which were contracts on defence as well as agreements 
on exporting technology for nuclear power in Qatar and the UAE53. France also 
agreed with Abu Dhabi (UAE) to establish a military base in the Emirates and 
monitor the Straits of Hormuz from where almost half of the oil production 
passes on a daily basis. It might host a mission of just 500 permanent military 
personnel54, but it is a clear indication of the ambitions of individual European 
states in the region. In addition, in 2007 Spain and Saudi royal families, and 
other officials, exchanged official visits. King Juan Carlos of Spain and King 
Abdullah of KSA agreed on a programme for exchanging information on anti-
terrorist policies, for exchanging training programs between the security bodies 
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of the two countries, and established a common fund of $5 billion for joint 
investments in projects in their two countries55. As a collective entity, the EU can 
also work as a mediator between regional actors and in this respect either 
promote multilateralism or help in confidence-building measures, both among 
the GCC states and between the GCC states and external actors, like Iran, the 
USA56 and Yemen. In the case of Yemen, especially, the EU has been 
encouraging greater involvement of the GCC states in dealing with the 
economic, political and security challenges that the Yemeni authorities and 
society faced. The EU promoted the idea of Yemen accessing the GCC, 
replicating the model EU has adopted in order to deal with the challenges in its 
immediate neighbourhood in the early 1990s. Moreover, EU member states 
initiated the ‘Consultative Group for Yemen’ and the ‘Friends of Yemen’ 
meetings which became platforms for broader cooperation between states of 
the EU, the GCC and other international actors in coordinating their policies on 
Yemen. What is more, when the youth uprising erupted in the country on 11th of 
February 2011, the EU and the GCC states initiated a new channel of direct 
communication for coordinating their actions.  
Nevertheless, the EU and its member states have been facing the challenge of 
the expectations from the GCC states which on the one hand have sought a 
greater involvement of the European states in the security of the region as a 
balancing power against American hegemony, and on the other hand have set 
their own limitations in this relationship. It can be said that the EU member 
states agreements with the GCC states during the last few years as well as the 
more active EU role in the region is a clear indication of the willingness of the 
Europeans to seize the opportunity and respond to  GCC expectations. 
However, how the EU can advance a political and security dialogue with the 
GCC states when the latter are resisting the discussion on EU values, a central 
aspect of EFP, in such a dialogue, is deemed questionable. Moreover, it should 
                                                          
55 Qusti, Raid, Kingdom, Spain to Exchange Security Info, Arab News, 17 December 2007, Retrieved from  
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56 Koch, Christian, 'Effective European role in Gulf Security', The GCC-EU Research Bulletin, No. 4,  
February 2006, pp. 6-7  
EU-GCC relationship: Introduction 
 
Angelos Lenos  19 
be pointed out that both regions are characterised by their economic might and 
their less strong military capabilities, which add a certain level of complications 
to the security discussion. In any case, the political – security cooperation of the 
EU and the GCC states remains an issue which is understudied, in particular in 
the context of recent developments since the popular uprisings in the Middle 
East after January 2011.  
 
The Aims, Central Questions and Structure of the Thesis 
As demonstrated in this brief introduction, there have been new opportunities for 
the EU to become more active in the security of the region. The EU and the 
member states have responded to the new political climate by signing 
agreements and introducing new levels of cooperation with the GCC on security 
matters of the wider Middle East. However, at the same time, political 
antagonism is becoming more obvious, as the GCC states feel more confident 
in working with existing regional dynamics in order to gain greater autonomy 
from the United States, to enhance their relations with Europe and to establish a 
greater political role in the wider region of the Middle East. The question is, 
therefore, whether the EU and the GCC states can work through their common 
interests taking advantage of the new political dynamics in the Gulf region, and 
overcome their different approaches and structures by transforming the EU-
GCC relationship into a concrete pole for promoting stability and regional 
security. 
The EU and the GCC have developed a complex interdependency in trade and 
investments and that they share common interests in the stability of the GCC 
states and in the security of the Persian Gulf. The new political and economic 
dynamics of the 21st century have added new potential to EU – GCC relations. 
The GCC states welcome the engagement of the EU in the new context since 
they need the technological support and expertise in managing their national 
projects for sustainable development. The EU has also been eager to take 
advantage of the new climate in order to enhance its presence in the region, 
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both economically and politically, and to advance its relationship with the GCC 
states. 
It is unquestionable that both in economics and politics, the EU has become 
more active in the Gulf region compared to the past and that there has been 
some important steps towards more concrete results from the European 
presence in the region. The EU has been the primary trade partner for the GCC 
states and one of the most significant providers of technical assistance. It has 
been in favour of regional and international integration of the Gulf economies 
and it is a major partner in their diversification processes as well. Furthermore, 
the EU has promoted security cooperation with the GCC states and it has 
developed a political dialogue for regional matters of concern, such as Iraq, Iran 
and more actively, Yemen. However, the presence of the EU in the region and 
its political actions are subject to the GCC aspiration (and sensitivities) to 
advance the EU-GCC relationship. Thus, EU-GCC relations should be seen in 
the context of the regional and international developments which have an 
impact on the policies of the GCC states.  
What is more, when exploring the EU-GCC relationships we should keep in 
mind the special characteristics of the two regions, both in political terms as well 
as in terms of the institutionalisation of their regional integration processes. In 
addition, the EU-GCC relationship has been widened by ‘decentralisation 
cooperation’. Thus, the actions that have been taken place in different areas of 
cooperation as well as from the several levels of the economic, political and 
social strata of the two regions should also be taken into consideration.  
Since the interdependency of the two regions has been demonstrated within the 
context of the new regional and international environment which has generated 
new opportunities and challenges for the two blocs, the question is how this bi-
regional relationship has developed. The EU has called for a strategic 
partnership with the Middle East, including the GCC states. Is the EU-GCC 
relationship developing into a strategic partnership? Is this partnership pursued 
only at economic or at political levels as well, despite the different political 
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structures and approaches? If the EU and the GCC states are moving towards a 
strategic partnership, what is their understanding of this development in terms of 
form and function? In addition, how have ambitions and (self-)images been 
affected by this evolution of the relationship into a strategic partnership? What 
sort of strategic partnership has been developed between the EU and GCC 
states? Why has this development not been officially recognised?  
The aim of the thesis is to explore the development of this relationship in the 
framework of the EU’s ‘strategic partnerships’. It will test whether this 
relationship is transforming into a strategic partnership between the EU and the 
GCC states, based on interests, values and (self-)images, and if so, what type 
of strategic partnership. It will do this by providing a comprehensive conceptual 
approach of ‘strategic partnerships’ and by assessing the EU-GCC relationship 
in comparison to the suggested definition of ‘strategic partnerships’. 
In order to achieve its aims and address the central questions, the thesis will 
proceed in the following way.  
Chapter 2 will review the current literature on the existing academic work on the 
EFP. The study of the EFP will attempt to outline the special characteristics of a 
foreign policy actor like the EU which is sui generis in the international 
community because of the co-existence of bilateral, inter-governmental and 
supranational procedures of policy making. It will highlight the capabilities, the 
priorities and the tools of the EFP in terms of values and interests, taking into 
consideration, also, EU (self-)images. 
Chapter 3 will review the existing literature, albeit briefly, of the EFP in the 
Middle East. It will identify an approach based on the model of traditional EU 
relationships and the EU’s economic and political superiority, which leads to 
unbalanced relationships. The EU is the dominant pole which promotes its 
interests and values. Obviously this pattern is not suitable for tackling the 
characteristics and the dynamics of a much more balanced relationship between 
the EU and the GCC states. 
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Chapter 4 will, thus, explore the existing academic debate on ‘strategic 
partnerships’, given that this will be the central analytical framework for the 
thesis. It will incorporate EU policymakers’ understandings of the term into the 
academic debate in order to assess the elements that compose the concept of 
‘strategic partnership’, the rationales that have led to the establishment and the 
development of this foreign policy tool, and the various categorisations of 
‘strategic partnerships’. It will, then, propose a definition for this notion in order 
to accommodate a more comprehensive approach of the concept of ‘strategic 
partnerships’.  
Chapter 5 will provide a methodological plan according to which the case 
studies will be examined. It will present the hypothesis and set the research 
questions, based on which the hypothesis will be examined. In addition, it will 
present the case studies, the timeframe of the research, the material and the 
limitations of the research. 
Chapters 6 and 7 will seek to operationalise the framework, and assess the EU-
GCC strategic partnership through the case studies of the FTA negotiations and 
the crises in Yemen, which were derived from the two broader fields of 
economics and politics. They take into consideration the special character of the 
EFP and they also address the fact that the EU-GCC relationship extends to 
various levels of cooperation and engages actors from different layers of the two 
regions. They also incorporate the dynamics of regional and international 
politics, as well as the impact that the interdependency factor of this relationship 
has on the shaping and development of policies between the EU and the GCC 
states. The interaction of interests, values and (self-)images will be examined in 
order to assess the EU-GCC relationship and how this has evolved in the fields 
of the two case studies.  
Finally, chapter 8 will draw the empirical and conceptual implications together 
reflecting on the specific research questions utilised to assess the EU-GCC 
strategic partnership and the implications of the findings for the main hypothesis 
of the thesis. It will offer concluding thoughts on whether the EU-GCC bi-
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regional relationship is developing into a strategic partnership, the type of 
partnership that it is leading to and the implications of this for the concept of a 
‘strategic partnership’ in the EU-GCC context and beyond. It will also provide 
suggestions regarding the evolution of the EFP itself.  
The thesis aims to contribute to the body of knowledge on EU-GCC relations 
which have been understudied in the EU and International Relations studies 
fields. Recent developments in the Middle East have made the study of this 
relationship even more imperative. What is important is that this is the first time 
that the EU-GCC relationship is explored in the framework of a ‘strategic 
partnership’. By applying this concept, the thesis treats the EU-GCC relationship 
as a dynamic, multilevel, multidimensional and multilayered relationship which 
develops in time according to internal and external factors, and which 
incorporates the actions of governmental, regional and non-state actors in 
economics and politics.   
Moreover, academic understanding of ‘strategic partnerships’ is still vague, due 
to the fact that the EU itself has not been very clear on the use of this concept 
as a foreign policy tool. This thesis aims at presenting the recent developments 
within the EU regarding the notion of ‘strategic partnership’. Thus, it tries to 
define the elements that shape a strategic partnership according to EU officials. 
Following that, it will attempt to bridge the understanding of the concept by 
scholars and by EU policymakers, providing a comprehensive approach. The 
next chapter will review the current literature of the EFP.  
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THEORISING EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY  
Introduction 
In the early 1950s European integration focused mainly on economic 
cooperation and has only evolved into a more political project with dimensions 
of foreign policy during the last two decades. Indeed, major steps towards 
European integration in the realm of foreign policy have been made since the 
Treaty of the European Union (TEU) in 1992.  
Even earlier though and particularly in 1970 the member states of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) agreed to establish the first mechanism that would 
facilitate  the co-ordination and co-operation of national foreign policies toward 
common objectives, European Political Cooperation (EPC). The EPC remained 
an inter-governmental body and although the range of matters of concern was 
widened, the Council of Ministers held the power for initiatives and for 
coordinating foreign policies. From this point of view, the distinction between the 
role and the decision making processes between the External Trade Relations 
of the Commission and the Political Foreign Affairs of the EPC was still clearly 
evident. Although Europe was already in the process of deeper integration, the 
geopolitical environment at the end of the 1980s and the crises in the early 
1990s (fall of socialist regimes, reunification of Germany, Gulf war and crisis in 
Yugoslavia) accelerated the activities that led to the creation of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of the TEU. The CFSP 
was still based on an intergovernmental structure and its military functions 
remained within the framework of NATO and the Western European Union 
(WEU). Thus, the distinction between the two processes (External Relations 
remained under the umbrella of the supranational Commission and traditional 
foreign policy was managed by the inter-governmental Council) was confirmed. 
Nevertheless, expectations from within and outside the EU had risen, as the 
issue of security was formally incorporated into the EU’s competence and it was 
governed by the Council of the European Union. After the creation of the EU 
and the second pillar, the Union broadened the spectrum of its foreign relations, 
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signing partnership agreements with third parties and strengthening its image as 
an international player.  Indeed, the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) introduced the 
position of a ‘Secretary General/ High Representative of the CFSP’ in order to 
give a figurehead and greater visibility to the EU’s foreign policy. The political 
and security environment that followed the attacks at the Twin Towers in New 
York in September 2001 and the spread of the ‘war on terror’ alarmed the EU, 
which reconsidered its role in world politics. In the European Security Strategy 
(2003) the European Council used the term 'global player' for the EU and set the 
goals for a more active role in pursuing strategic objectives, for increasing the 
Union's capabilities, pursuing coherent policies and working with its partners57. 
In 2009 and in accordance to the Lisbon Treaty, the External Relations of the 
European Commission merged with the CFSP. The co-existence of three 
representatives of the foreign policy of the EU58 was replaced by the new 
position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy. 
These developments in European Foreign Policy (EFP) have been the subject 
of much academic debate over the years in the European Studies and 
International Relations literature.  This chapter will provide a review of the 
existing works on EFP emphasizing the endogenous complexity of the EFP and 
the need to reflect the sui generis character of this international actor in the way 
it conducts foreign policy. It will explore the academic debate of the first wave 
shaped by the realist challenge of the existence of a common foreign policy and 
the responses by academics that placed primacy on the political goals of the 
external relations of the European Community.  It will then provide an overview 
of the  debate over the nature and the instruments of the EU’s common foreign 
policy, and in particular the  differing conceptualisations offered by various 
academics  on the EU as a ‘civilian power’ and as a ‘normative power’. Indeed 
this latter literature is particularly fundamental to this thesis in its discussion and 
incorporation of the role of norms and values, identities and self-images as well 
                                                          
57 European Council, A secure Europe in a better world - European security strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003. 
58 The EU troika was previously composed by the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, the European 
Commissioner for External Relations and the Foreign Minister of the country in the rotating presidency 
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as interests. The chapter will then further elaborate on the tools used by the EU 
in order to build upon its distinctive identity and promote these interests, values 
and images through the engagement with third parties, through bilateral 
agreements which entails political conditionality, assistance for region building 
processes in the rest of the world and promotion of multilateralism.  
 
Theoretical approaches in European Foreign Policy  
In the academic community, the debate of the first wave focused on the 
question whether the European Union can have a common European Foreign 
Policy (EFP), while the second series of academic questions were associated 
with the lack of military capabilities and the nature of the new ‘post-modern’ 
Union and its foreign policy.  
 
Is there a European Foreign Policy?  
Due to the structure of the European Union and its second pillar, in the pre-
Lisbon Treaty era, the capability of the Union to have its own common foreign 
policy was challenged, from scholars who follow the realist approach in 
International Relations studies. The idea of an EFP clashed with the state-
centrism of the realist school and received strong criticism especially during the 
first years that followed the TEU. The non-state entity of the Union and the fact 
that nation states still retained sovereignty in this field, leading to a lack of 
cohesiveness in foreign policies, were the main arguments of this school. First 
of all, realists build on the assumption of the key role of the nation state, which 
has a ‘relatively exclusive claim’59 over foreign policy. From this perspective, 
since the European Union is not a state, even if it has developed some aspects 
of governance in particular fields, it cannot claim any control in foreign policy; its 
actions are dependent on the consensus of sovereign nation states in the 
European Council. By placing importance on the inter-governmental framework 
                                                          
59 Allen, David, 'Who speaks for Europe?' in Peterson, John and Sjursen, Helene, eds., A Common foreign policy for 
Europe? : competing visions of the CFSP, Routledge, London, 1998, p. 43 
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of cooperation within the CFSP, they argue that the nation state remains the 
dominant actor in international politics, even within the framework of the most 
successful regional integration project thus far, in the EU. It is argued from this 
perspective that nation states remain the only source of legitimacy for foreign 
policy and even states that have been keen on developing common foreign 
policies, like France, are reluctant in giving up their sovereignty and their 
independence in shaping their own policies in this domain according to their 
own national interests60. Scholars draw attention to these different approaches 
and interests of the member states and the fact that a consensus through a 
process of inter-state bargaining61 is needed. In this way, they emphasise the 
specific interests of the individual states, an argument founded on the large 
number of embassies and national European visits and deals with third 
countries, which are not always coordinated at the European level or in 
accordance to the broader EU goals in a particular country or region62. Thus, 
they reinforce the conclusion that without cohesiveness (due to this internal 
bargaining) and continuity in foreign policies (as in the case of the states), the 
EU is ‘paralyzed’63 and incapable of true strategic action.   
In response to these arguments, scholars from the pluralist school of 
International Relations claim that the EU is a unique political entity and even 
though it is not a state, it can conduct foreign policy and actually provide some 
tangible outcomes. They suggest that the realist criticisms derive from the fact 
that foreign policy is identified solely with the (pre-Lisbon Treaty) second pillar of 
the EU and as a result a more encompassing definition of the EFP is needed. 
According to Brian White, foreign policy “refers to actions (broadly defined) 
taken by governments which are directed at the environment external to their 
state with the objective of sustaining or changing the environment in some 
way”64. Therefore, Carlsnaes identifies a three-layered structure in European 
                                                          
60 Gordon, Philip H. ‘Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter, 1997-1998), 
p. 88 
61 Cameron, Fraser, An introduction to European foreign policy. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 189 
62 Ibid, p. 16 
63 Zielonka, Jan, ed., 'Paradoxes of European foreign policy', Kluwer Law International, London, 1998, p.11 
64 White, Brian, Understanding European foreign policy, London: Macmillan, 2001, p.11 
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Foreign Policy; the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Security 
and Defence Policy and the European Community Foreign Policy (pre-Lisbon 
first pillar)65. Adding to this, Ginsberg notes that EFP actions can come from any 
of these structures of the EU/EC or be a mixture of actions from these66. Hill 
attaches the role of the member states to these approaches and concludes that 
EFP is “the sum of what the EU and its member states do in international 
relations”67. Responding to the analyses about the lack of sovereignty, Michael 
Smith characterises the EU as a ‘post-modern’ entity and in contrast to the 
‘modernist’ instruments of the nation states on which realists insist, he argues 
that EFP is ‘post-modern’ and ‘extra-national’.68 By accommodating the interests 
and preferences of the member states and with the collective legitimacy of the 
sovereign states, the Union conducts a ‘post—sovereign’ foreign policy 
“alongside or beyond the confines of national foreign policies”69. It is this dual 
level that makes the EFP a sui generis case. The supranational and 
intergovernmental frameworks of the European decision making process 
combine simultaneously the foreign policy goals of the Union and the interests 
of the nation member states. This procedure may generate an image of 
inconsistency and internal contradictions but the final outcome is the promotion 
of an EFP and at the same time the independence of the member states as 
sovereign states is respected70. This complexity and the multilayered structure 
on which the EU is based, has led the Union to be characterised as a strange 
animal71; although the EU is based on nation states, it has more powers than 
most of its member states on the international political scene and it is more 
resourceful in the means it can adopt to promote its objectives. Moreover, Hazel 
                                                          
65 Carlsnaes, Walter, Sjursen, Helen  and White, Brian, eds., Contemporary European foreign policy, London: SAGE, 
2004, p. 1 
66 White, Brian, Understanding European foreign policy, London: Macmillan, 2001, p.15 
67 Hill, Christopher, 'Closing the ‘capabilities - expectation gap’? in Peterson, John and Sjursen, Helene, eds., A 
Common foreign policy for Europe?: competing visions of the CFSP, Routledge, London, 1998. p. 18 
68 Smith, Michael, The framing of European foreign and security policy: towards a post-modern policy framework?, 
Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 10, Number 4, August 2003, p. 558 
69 Ibid, p. 570 
70 Whitman, Richard G., From civilian power to superpower? : the international identity of the European Union, 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1998, p. 238 
71 Cameron, Fraser, An introduction to European foreign policy. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 5 
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Smith argues that the indeed slow in pace and in need of compromise decision 
making system may create difficulties but in the end the EU presents a body of 
decisions that are related to long-term involvements in peace-building and 
peace-keeping projects. In any case, she adds, these difficulties ‘do not 
constitute a conceptual difficulty in the notion of the EU’72.  
Twenty years after the establishment of the EU and the introduction of the 
CFSP, the EU cannot be ignored in the international political arena, despite its 
unique structure and its complicated decision making process. Its presence with 
delegations and offices in most of the countries in the world and the most 
important international organisations, its agreements with states from around 
the globe, its bi-lateral and bi-regional cooperation forums and its initiatives in 
environmental policies and the international Criminal Court of Justice provide a 
great amount of evidences about the recognition of the EU as a global political 
player. Even in more moderate analyses, in which the role of the nation-states is 
still considered central in international relations, the EFP is seen as having “an 
extra dimension”73 able to impact third parties in the world system. In the post-
Lisbon era, analysing EFP becomes relatively less complicated, as European 
policy makers have made a step forward in coordinating their external actions 
and foreign policies, with the creation of the European External Action Service 
and the relative autonomy the new robust position of the “High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” entails. The new position 
combines the responsibilities previously held separately by the High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
Commissioner for External Relations74. Nevertheless, the questions regarding 
the nature and the way EU is conducting its foreign policy remain valid and 
current. 
                                                          
72 Smith, Hazel, European Union foreign policy : what it is and what it does, London: Pluto, 2002, p. 4 
73 Piening, Christopher, Global Europe : the European Union in world affairs, Lynne Rienner, London, 1997, p. 195 
74 Even though this development is of great significance for the future of the EU and its role in the world, this study 
will not focus on this, for two reasons. First of all, this thesis has no ambition to analyse the internal dynamics that 
exist at an intra-European level. It is more interested in exploring the actions of the EU as such and their impact on 
third parties, in this case the GCC states. Second, for the largest part of the timeframe of this study, the first decade 
of the new century, the three-pillar system was in place. It was only during the last couple of years that the EU 
merged external (economic) relations and foreign policies. 
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Endogenous complexity and EU foreign policy? 
Having established through this brief overview that the EU constitutes  an 
international player in world politics, the question remains as to how its multi-
layered structure and its internal limitations, given the co-existence of 
supranational and inter-governmental decision making processes as well as  the 
lack of independent powerful military capacities, affect the EFP. This has 
generated a second wave of academic debate which evolves around the nature 
of the EFP.  
A central point of criticism from a realist perspective is the absence of a set of 
powerful instruments of coercive (military) power. By focusing on the 
military/security aspect of EU common actions, they question the effectiveness 
of the second pillar. The poor – if any - autonomous military presence of the EU 
in times of crises, even within the European continent (especially with regards to 
the Balkans), has received harsh criticism75. To the extent that the EU has not 
been aiming at creating its own powerful army machinery with the force of which 
to help the implementation of its foreign policy objectives, the Union will remain 
no more than a “subordinate partner to the US”76. Thus, realists challenge the 
capacities of the intergovernmental institutions within the second pillar of the 
Union, because of their military dependence on non-EU institutions and 
organisations. 
However, as already shown, the foreign policy of the Union was not solely 
shaped within the context of the CFSP, but it was based, for the largest part 
since 1993, on a three-layered structure including also the External Relations of 
the European Community and the European Security and Defence Policy. 
Despite the fact that activities of the first pillar could be added to the notion of 
the EFP, Karen Smith points out a significant distinction that has to be made. 
Not all external relations of the EC are part of the EFP. Economic relations with 
                                                          
75 Knodt, Michèle and Princen, Sebastiaan, eds., Understanding the European Union's external relations, London: 
Routledge, 2003, p. 3 
76 Gordon, Philip H. ‘Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter, 1997-1998), 
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third countries can be seen as economic instruments of the foreign policy field to 
the extent that their goals are related to the political and security environment of 
the third party and the objectives are not just economic77. One example of 
pursuing foreign policy through the external relations of the EC is the use of 
political conditionality in economic agreements78. In relation to the arguments 
about capacities, the EU may not have a powerful military arm, but it has its own 
sources of power for extracting leverage over third parties. Ginsberg argues that 
as an ‘economic superpower’ the EU uses its trading activities in order to 
promote its pivotal role in shaping development policies and uses the ‘stick and 
carrot’ approach (with financial tools) for promoting its value in the world79. It is 
therefore not just aiming at financial gains, and as a result, the external 
economic relations of the EC can be legitimately considered as part of the 
broader EU foreign policy framework, especially since the EU has made its 
presence more obvious in the international arena due to its economic weight in 
the international economy80. Hence, it is argued that the EU has utilised the 
potential that the EC has offered in foreign policy. The negotiation power the EC 
has as an economic superpower, the fact that the field of economic policies is 
the most integrated in the EU, and the advantage that the EU is taking of the 
channels established through the economic – developing policies for pursuing 
the strategic goals of the Union, have all transformed the EC into a ‘strategic 
agent’ and the EU into a ‘strategic actor’ in international politics81.  
The academic community then has, over the years, acknowledged the potential 
foreign policy capacities of the EU, despite its non-military power and because 
of its economic weight and its wide network of agreements with countries and 
organisations beyond its own borders. This analysis of the political role of the 
EC’s external relations, therefore, leads to the conclusion that we should not 
                                                          
77 Smith, Karen E, European Union foreign policy in a changing world. Cambridge: Polity, 2003, p. 1 
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narrow our focus solely to the CFSP and subsequently to the intergovernmental 
decision making process, when referring to the EFP. On the contrary, this 
approach calls for research on the role of the influence of the EC’s external 
relations in the EFP. Having also in mind Hill’s definition of EFP, as “the sum of 
what the EU and its member states do in international relations”82, the scope of 
the research needs to be broad, including the role of EU member state national 
actors in the shaping and promotion of EFP. 
However, since the EU is seen as a sui generis case, a question should also be 
posed about the way its foreign policy is affected by its unique characteristics. 
Indeed, scholars have attempted to analyse EU as a foreign policy actor 
building upon its distinctive structure, as a regional project with no strong 
military capabilities. 
 
The EU as a ‘civilian power’ 
This focus on the non-military aspect of foreign policy has led to the 
conceptualisation of the EU as a ‘civilian power’, a notion which is, nonetheless, 
still debatable. Is the EU, indeed, a ‘civilian power’ and if so how does this 
shape its foreign policies?  
This notion was introduced by Duchêne, who tagged the EC as a ‘civilian power’ 
because it was weak in military terms and based the promotion of its interests 
on the diffusion of civilian values and economic cooperation. In addition, it 
attempted to domesticate international relations issues, making peace, security 
and development matters of the shared responsibility of international actors. 
The main concern of foreign policy, as conducted by the Europeans, he argued, 
is not associated with the power balance of states but with the ability of the EFP 
to domesticate common responsibility for international problems. Therefore 
issues previously reserved for the national domain of sovereign states became 
                                                          
82 Hill, Christopher, 'Closing the ‘capabilities - expectation gap’? in Peterson, John and Sjursen, Helene, eds., A 
Common foreign policy for Europe?: competing visions of the CFSP, Routledge, London, 1998. p. 18 
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fields of the international relations order83. In this way the model of European 
cooperation and integration which brought stability and peace could be exported 
to the world. Maull also defined as ‘civilian power’ the actor that acknowledges 
and pursues international goals in a framework of multilateral cooperation, using 
usually non-military means whilst the use of force is just a ‘residual instrument in 
order to safeguard other means of international interaction’84. Another feature is 
the tendency to promote the idea of global governance through the creation of 
supranational bodies in order to manage critical international issues. However, 
at a time when the EU has obtained its own military wings (even with restricted 
capabilities) the argument has become much more debated. Karen Smith 
introduces four elements which she applies as criteria for assessing the role and 
the policies of an international actor as civilian power. These are the (i) means 
and (ii) ends of the policies which should be strictly civilian, the (iii) use of 
persuasion instead of imposing policies to third parties and the (iv)civilian 
control over foreign and defence policy. She argues that the co-existence of 
civilian and military means is in contradiction to the civilian international identity 
the EU has developed for itself and the use of military forces (even in cases of 
peace-keeping missions) and thus does not fit into the criteria of the ideal 
civilian model. Moreover, making use of the notions of ‘power bloc’ (introduced 
by Christopher Hill) and ‘command power’ (defined by Nye) she suggests that 
the EU promotes its self-interests by acting as the powerful pole in a hierarchical 
relationship demanding for its partner to adopt its own proposals and conditions. 
The development of this argument from Smith is interesting as it provides us 
with specific criteria for assessing ‘civilian power’ entities, and also begs the 
question about the role and the power of the EU within the context of 
partnership and co-operation. Particularly important in this context is Smith’s 
emphasis on the EU’s “civilian international identity” and the fact that EU is 
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acting as “the powerful pole in a hierarchical relationship” (a point I will return to 
below).  
Moreover, because of the development of the EU’s military institutional capacity 
and processes scholars have suggested that these developments are 
incompatible with the ‘civilian’ arguments of the EFP. The "EU is breaking 
through that so called glass ceiling that ensured that it would not adopt military 
policy instruments"85 and thus the EU cannot be seen anymore stricto sensu as 
a civil power86. Telo argues that a ‘civilian power’ is an entity which cannot 
become a politico-military power, according to the traditional terms but it 
pursues its peaceful foreign policy goals using other methods than military 
action87, and he therefore  insists that the EU is a developing collective ‘civilian 
power’. This is true especially because the European integration process has 
aimed at cooperation, stability and human and social rights and the accession 
process is directly linked to democratisation. In addition, in international 
relations the EU promotes multilateralism using its economic tools, and it 
exports its civilizing capacity to third countries either in the near abroad or 
elsewhere. He responds to the criticism that the EU is not a civilian power 
because of its participation in military peacekeeping missions by arguing that 
these missions should be considered as parts of its civilian power system, given 
that the aim of them is to safeguard peace. McCormick does not find any 
difficulties in approving the European ‘civilian power’ argument either, despite its 
recent military developments, but he also points out that it is because the EU, 
even though it has developed military institutions and it could use this force for 
its foreign policy, insists on its ‘soft security’ tools that makes it a ‘civilian power’. 
It is a ‘civilian power’ by choice he argues and comparing the EU to the USA he 
adds that the civilian character of EFP is a matter of identity, culture and 
preferences. 
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In this debate, it is interesting that even in critical assessments of the 
relationship between the ‘civilian power’ notion and the EFP, it is not rejected 
that in the largest part of its activities, the EU has been a driving force in a 
series of initiatives and projects (e.g. for the International Criminal Court, global 
environmental policy, the promotion of human rights) that encourage peaceful 
solutions to conflicts through multilateralism and long-term economic 
cooperation88. Scholars have also acknowledged that the EU is pursuing this 
kind of foreign policy because of its internal structure as well as because of its 
own identity. As argued, the EU is a ‘civilian power’ by choice, because of the 
way it perceives itself and/or the way it wants to project itself in the international 
political system. 
 
Is the EU a normative power? 
Scholars such as Ian Manners in an attempt to move beyond the civilian versus 
military power Europe debate put forth the notion of the EU is a normative 
power, reasoning that it aims at exporting its own value system and norms to its 
partners and consequently reshaping politics at the international level. He 
argued that in the context of the global civilizing process the EU sought to 
promote not only its structures but most importantly the values that have shaped 
its own identity and the notion of moral responsibility in international affairs. 
According to Manners, the EU is a normative power because feeling the 
obligation deriving from its own self-image, identity and normative basis which 
originates from the EU’s “historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal 
constitution” 89, it attempts to structure its foreign policy in a normative way and 
thus diffuse the acceptance of universal values and principles in its relations 
with its partners and the international political system, in general90. The EU is 
aiming to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations, challenging 
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the state-centric political culture of the Westphalian system, in which state 
sovereignty is primary91. In this sense, the EU’s normative power is an 
ideological power, which shapes the framework of the international dialogue 
over issues linked to principles and values92 because its own normative basis 
“predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics”93. This normative 
characteristic of the EU and its foreign policy is a result of its own composition 
but also of its desire for greater legitimacy, both internally and externally. 
Because of this process, the EFP is “informed by and conditional on” the 
constitutive norms of the EU94, which are also seen as universal. Manners 
grouped these norms by suggesting a list of five major and four minor values 
that are central to the normative aspects of the EFP. In the first group he 
included sustainable peace (conflict prevention, peace keeping and post-conflict 
stabilisation) liberty as social freedom (freedoms of thought, expression, 
assembly, association, as well as freedoms related to market economy), 
consensual democracy (through participatory democratic processes in a power-
sharing system), supranational rule of law (for effective multilateralism based on 
the EU –so called universal - values) and human rights (individual and collective 
human rights of various groups within a state). In the latter he included social 
solidarity (solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, 
eradication of poverty), anti-discrimination (against discrimination on the ground 
of sex, race, ethnic or social origin, belief or political opinion; equality of all 
citizens), sustainable development (as a balance of unrestrained economic 
growth and preserving the eco-environment) and good governance 
(participation of the civil society in the decision making process, transparency, 
accountability and multilateralism)9596. Using the case of the abolishment of the 
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death penalty, he suggests that the EU is an ethical international actor as it 
pursues these universal norms even when the EU has no obvious material 
gain97. In the reflections of the ethics of 'normative power' Manners 
distinguishes between the coercive versus the non-coercive means of the EFP98 
and he focuses on the procedure followed by the EU towards normative goals99. 
He also suggests that normative ethics are identified in the way EFP applies its 
normative principles to different contexts around the world, by ‘live by example’, 
‘be reasonable’ and ‘do least harm’. In doing so the EU needs to keep 
reconsidering what is normative and normative power, “outside of the values 
systems of particular political communities”100, even though the general aim is 
the construction of a world which is based on a universally accepted values. 
However, ‘normative power Europe’ is not unchallenged and it is certainly not 
disengaged from the EU’s self-interests and equally important from its own 
understanding and representation of its role in world politics101. Even though 
Youngs accepts that there is a normative aspect in the EFP, he asserts that 
alongside norms, the EU promotes its strategic interests102. The EU, in a realist 
international environment, calculates its interests and promotes norms in a way 
that these are instrumental to the goals of its foreign policy103. Thus  norms, as 
described in Youngs’ work, are not universal (contrary to Manners’ argument) 
but they are specific EU norms which aim to both advance EU norms and 
material interests abroad, by changing the context in which third states take 
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their decisions. Therefore, the EFP is at the same time normative and realist. 
Exploring the way the EU has promoted human rights, he suggests that in spite 
of the fact that the EU has indeed promoted human rights (which are at the core 
of EU norms) in the world and more specifically in its neighbourhood, these 
norms also relate to the material interests that the EU has promoted in a parallel 
way104.  
Additionally, comparing the normative aspects of the foreign policy of the USA, 
Sjursen challenges the unique normative character of the EFP. She suggests 
that US foreign policy is also based on norms and values and therefore what 
should be explored is whether the EU is a normative power out of necessity 
because it lacks the power to impose its strategic interests or otherwise105. 
Indeed, if normative power is a way for the EU to promote legitimacy for its own 
role in international politics as well as for its foreign policy, then it should be put 
into question whether the EU is promoting universal values and thus being an 
ethical power, or using these norms in order, primarily, to serve its own strategic 
interests, among which is to advance its own actorness in the international 
system. Moreover, Sjursen questions the way the EU promotes norms. She 
asks whether the EU is acting out of firm belief in the principles vested in these 
norms as well as whether promoting these specific norms “is the right thing to 
do in a particular or concrete context or situation”106. Even though Sjursen 
acknowledges that human rights values are at the core of the EFP, she points 
out that human rights lack “legal backing in a multilateral system”, and by 
promoting human rights, the EU is putting emphasis on individuals and not the 
states which claim exclusive sovereignty over their territory. In this respect, it is 
accepted that the EU promotes a post-modern system of governance in 
international relations moving away from the Westphalian system, but at the 
same time it is argued that the EU does not promote universal values but rather 
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its own European values, based on its own structure, history and identity107. To 
the extent that the EU is promoting its own values as universal, the EU’s 
normative power may cross into the field of cultural imperialism. She also adds 
the negative effects of sanctions and exclusion from cooperation schemes, 
suggesting that if these coercive measures are not used for legally binding 
norms in international politics, then these means do not coincide with an ethical 
reading of the EU normative power108. 
Adding to the criticisms of the ‘normative power’ argument of the EFP, due to 
the very specific content of EU norms, Michelle Pace (exploring the case of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict) asserts that for EU to be able to enhance its role in 
international political affairs and more specifically, in conflicts, it needs to prove 
that it can deal with major issues in its neighbourhood effectively. She discusses 
the relationship between the very specific norms of the EU (which are of a 
liberal narrative of the EFP) and the impartiality that an honest mediator needs. 
She suggests that due to the biased approach of the EU embedded in  its own 
values and norms which prescribe its policies, the EU lacks the ‘ethos of 
impartiality’109 and as a result it cannot be an effective broker. 
In order to promote its role as a peace making actor, the EU works (i) bilaterally, 
by engaging with the parties (gaining leverage) and by attempting to bring the 
parties in conflict into direct talks and (ii) regionally, by the establishment of 
regional fora110 in which the parties socialise and build networks for exchanging 
ideas in a more neutral environment. Thus, through dialogue the EU aims at 
transforming violent conflicts into negotiations engaging actors from various 
ranks of political elites and civil societies. It aims at building trust between them, 
based on the model the EU has constructed after the Second World War. 
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Because of this normative approach in e EFP,  EU policymakers insist that the  
Union as a whole is  ‘a force for good’ while academics have already recognised 
a process by which  EU policymakers construct themselves as ‘model reference 
points’, to which the outsiders need to adopt111.   
Pace argues that the ‘normative power’ aspects of the EFP have been 
ineffective in the case of the Middle East Peace Process, and as such they limit 
the posture that the EU can claim at a global level as a peace maker based on 
its normative foreign policy. Inconsistencies regarding normative aspects in the 
EFP making system because of (national) interests as well as because the EU 
‘evades its responsibility’ by not taking the required political measures when 
these entail coercive action have weakened the ‘normative power’ aspects of 
the EFP. Moreover, when the outcome of the application of its norms does not 
comply with the EU’s interests or understanding as to what is good for the EU 
and outsider actors, then the EU reshapes its priorities. Thus, there is a 
restrictive interpretation of what is ‘normative’. More specifically, in the case of 
Hamas, the fact that the EU was in favour of democratisation and therefore of 
free and fair elections seems incompatible with the reaction of the EU to the 
election results. The EU refused to interact with a main political party which won 
the elections in Palestine in 2006, demonstrating that the EU is willing to engage 
only with those who agree with its prescribed notions of what is good and 
normative. Thus, it lacks the necessary impartiality. 
Once again, the argument about the ‘normative power’ of the EFP is that of the 
EU policymakers constructing for themselves a very ethical-based reading of 
EU norms and values which they want to project to outsider players, but which 
ends up being a very biased approach, since this very positive reading of the 
EFP disregards the inconsistencies that Pace has identified. Moreover,  EU 
norms predetermine the EU’s foreign policy approaches to an extent that these 
cannot be seen as impartial but it is a constant attempt of the EU to impose on 
external players its own value system and thus its own interests. It is extremely 
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important for this thesis to underline this co-existence of values and interests in 
the policy making system as well as the fact that the departure point for the EFP 
is the self-image that the EU policymakers have constructed for themselves and 
the Union as a whole. 
Applying a structural realist approach, Adrian Hyde-Price attempts to 
deconstruct the argument of ‘normative power’ in the case of the EU, suggesting 
that in the context of post-Cold war Europe, there is a system of balanced 
multipolarity112. Member states are therefore aiming at maximising security for 
them and their neighbourhood rather than competing in maximizing their own 
power against each other. It is for this reason they can cooperate and that they 
have done so in the past. Nevertheless, due to the fact that the most powerful of 
the member states are not willing to relinquish their sovereignty, it is of no 
surprise that the second pillar of the pre-Lisbon Era Union was structured on an 
intergovernmental level113. External security is considered to be, according to 
Hyde-Price, the grand goal of the EU member states, while ethical concerns 
(e.g. human rights and environmental policies) are “second-order concerns”114. 
What is particularly interesting is his suggestion that the EU will only be allowed 
to pursue ethical concerns in a collective way to the extent these do not conflict 
with “core national interests” of the member states115116. He also rejects the 
universality of EU norms and he advocates that “an ethical foreign policy will 
tend to degenerate into a crusading moralism”117. He does accept that 
normative concerns are primary in the EFP decision making process but that 
they are subordinated to core national interests. 
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Identity and self-image in the EFP 
As already summarised above, it has been argued that the EFP is a result of the 
structure and the history of the EU and consequently the EU is acting as a 
normative power in an attempt to export its own model to the world (Manners, 
Telo). Moreover, it has been suggested that EFP is shaped (to a certain extent) 
by the image the EU holds for itself and how it projects itself in its external 
relations (K. Smith, Pace, McCormick). Consequently, the self-image of the EU 
and the model it represents in international relations has been an integral part of 
the EFP making system. In a more critical approach of the “EU normative 
power” argument, Thomas Diez118 claims that the EU is applying its norms, 
which it understands as universal, in order to build its own identity in comparison 
to the “Others”. The EU underlines its self-imagined superiority, it portraits itself 
as a carrier and a promoter of the universal norms to the rest of the world and it 
simultaneously sets the boundaries against the “Others”. Therefore, the EU 
uses both the accession process of candidate states and its relations with third 
parties in a way to better construct its own identity119. 
Building upon the identity discourse of International Relations studies, Elisabeth 
Johnasson - Nogues characterises as "collective agency" the sense of 
belonging to the same group because of shared sentiments (bond, cause, 
threat, and fate) that are commonly shaped among the various actors of a 
community which is transformed into a specific outcome in relation to the 
outsiders, the "Others". To the extent that the outsiders accept this "collective 
agency", the collective actor is successful in transmitting its own distinctive 
identity120. In the case of the EU, the EFP identity is “constructed on a set of 
positive self-attributions”, based on its own structure and integration. Thus EFP 
aims to promote regional multilateralism (a reflection of its own integration path 
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in  the EFP)121, multi-sectoral cooperation (as “an apolitical positive sum game” 
both for the EU in terms of engaging actors from the various pillars of the EU as 
well as in providing social and economic benefits to its neighbours)122 and 
interventionism (through a post-modern, cosmopolitan approach according to 
which independent actions deriving from national sovereignty need to bear  in 
mind the restrictions of the regional, shared regulations for common 
interests)123. However, as Johnasson–Nogues argues after exploring the cases 
of the Union for the Mediterranean and the Northern Dimension of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, this EFP identity has become an obstacle for the EU in 
promoting its foreign policy. She recognises that the EU lacks the ability to 
adjust in the context of the neighbourhood provoking a more reserved response 
by its neighbours, but at the same time she points out that “promotion of 
regionalism and the EU's conditionality [...] have become such pillars of the EU's 
international identity that compromising much on these principles might unravel 
the whole concept of European collective agency and an EU foreign policy”124.  
More comprehensively, Knud Erik Jørgensen and Katie Laatikainen125 apply a 
model of sociological constructivism, in which identity, interests and policy are 
all accommodated. According to this model which serves as a starting point for 
their analysis, culture and institutional setup shape the identity of the actor, 
based on which interests are articulated. Once interests are articulated, then the 
policy follows accordingly.  Policies then provide feedback to the environment 
(of cultural preferences and institutional constraints and predispositions). 
Jørgensen and Laatikainen argue that the "EU's self-image is characterised by 
a curious blindness to own interests. Instead the Union tends to present itself as 
a force of goodness in international society". This is due to a range of issues: (i) 
the fact that the EU should promote the interests of its member states, which is 
considered to be the driving force behind the EU's external relations with third 
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parties (ii) sometimes the EU lacks a precisely defined understanding and/or 
expression of its interests and (iii) the prioritisation of interests may be 
considered contradictory to the EU’s self-image126. However, they reach the 
conclusion that the EU does have interests which it pursues both bilaterally as 
well as in multilateral fora, but it prefers to be silent on its interests and to 
window-dress them in terms of international policies. Therefore, and in 
contradiction to their starting point, they suggest that the EU has interests which 
it articulates into policies before the identity factor is also included in the policy 
making system. Identity, as the result of values and norms, are only added 
afterwards127 in what might be considered to be an instrumentalist approach.  
With regard to the aims of this thesis, the approach of Ulrich Sedelmeier 
appears to be highly relevant in addressing the co-existence of values, interests 
and self-images in EFP. He asserts that in the case of the accession process of 
the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) into the EU, both the 
realist approach of the materialist understanding of EFP in terms of security and 
commercial interests, as well as the social constructivist approach which 
emphasises the norms on which the EU has been shaped have limitations in the 
understanding and analysis of EFP. The CEECs accession process impacted 
on the EU's identity and that affected the EFP at the same time as a promoter of 
human rights and democracy128. He claims that the EU’s identity has become an 
integral part of the EFP, which goes beyond the materialist interests of the 
member states as presented by the rationalist school of thought in International 
Relations.  The EFP is also affected by the self-image that policy makers have 
developed within the EU institutions which limit the “appropriate” options the EU 
has in its foreign policy. Thus, EU identity can be seen as the platform on which 
EU policy actors legitimatise and validate their proposed options for the EFP, 
even if these options are shaped by the materialist interests of member 
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states129. The contrary might also be true, of course. Because of this self-image, 
which is based on EU norms, EU member states may even have to adopt 
decisions which at the core are against their own material interests in order to 
safeguard the shared EU identity130. However, not all actors are equally 
sensitive in the EU self-image during policy shaping and the final outcome of 
EFP through the various sectional departments of the EU institutions. This 
depends on the desire, ability and effectiveness of the self-image sensitive 
actors in successfully influencing the policy making process131. It should be 
noted, though, that the normative approach of these actors cannot be taken for 
granted. Material interests may be found behind the normative self-image 
argument they advocate. 
 It has become clear from the abovementioned discussion that the way the EU 
perceives itself as well as the way it wants to project itself to the international 
community influences its foreign policy making system. The EU perceives itself 
as an actor who has already adopted and developed norms and values (which 
lead to security and prosperity) as its standard procedure and it aims to export 
these norms to outsiders. However, the extent to which this self-image 
influences the final outcome of EFP policy making varies due to the internal 
structure of the EU, the norms associated with certain foreign policy options, the 
efficiency of various actors, as well as material interests. It is suggested that, at 
the same time that he EFP sets constraints for EU member state (re-)actions 
with third countries, this process reinforces the EU self-image. Therefore it is a 
two way process. Thus, the following questions call for further analysis of the 
role of the self-image in EFP: How do internal actors influence the EFP, based 
on the EU self-image? How are norms incorporated into the self-image and how 
do they subsequently influence the appropriate options for EFP actors? How 
does the EFP provide feedback to the EU self-image construction? More 
importantly, how are Arab norms, self-images and interests accommodated in 
the EFP? Are self-image and identity prioritised as suggested to a degree by 
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Sedelmeier, or can identities be used instrumentally for the EU’s interests as 
implied by Jorgensen and Laatikainen? How is the EU’s image perceived by 
third parties and does this image indeed hinder EFP aims, as Nogues has 
explicitly argued? Having in mind the fact that this thesis will explore the 
relationship with the GCC states, whose value systems for their internal political 
system as well as for their foreign policies are fundamentally different from that 
of the  EU  and the fact that the economic abilities of the GCC states provide 
them with significant negotiating power, it is vital to consider the above 
questions because they will test (i) the role of values in the EFP (ii) the 
effectiveness of the EFP in relation to an area which does not share (even in 
terms of declarations) the value systems of the EU (iii) the willingness and the 
ability of the EU to negotiate in terms of values in order to promote its interests 
and (iv) how the latter can affect the EU’s self-image (s). 
The next section will provide a brief description of the tools the EU has used in 
pursuing its foreign policy objectives, within the conceptual framework of the 
‘civilian’ and ‘normative’ arguments. The tools will test and (to a certain level) 
validate these arguments, since the EFP has  unfolded through multilateral 
cooperation, assisting region building processes, and by making use of its 
economic weight, as suggested above. 
 
Non-military tools for political goals: political conditionality and 
multilateralism 
It has been shown that the EFP, composed of different levels of interests, norms 
and self-images, is pursued by non-military means, and by taking advantage of 
the economic power of the EU and its existence as a living example of 
spreading peace, security and development through regional cooperation. The 
question, consequently, is how the EU has used its external relations in order to 
pursue its own strategic interest, influence third parties’ policies and promote its 
own values? How does the EU as a ‘civilian power’ (and as argued by some 
scholars, a ‘normative power’) transform its important economic weight in global 
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economy into effective foreign policy tools? For the purposes of the current 
research it is important to identify the way the EU has been applying its foreign 
policy tools in order to promote its interests and norms, and at the same time 
reinforce its self-images as a ‘civilian’ and a ‘normative’ actor, This is particularly 
salient for the main argument of this thesis which is that the tools used in this 
traditional way of engagement are insufficient for the case of the EU-GCC states 
(for reasons that will be explained in detail in the next chapter). An analysis of 
these tools also demonstrates the necessity of developing the notion and 
concept of ‘strategic partnership’ in order to explain and understand EU-GCC 
relations. . 
 
Political conditionality 
One of the main arguments, in answering the above questions, is found in the 
tool of political conditionality. The EU has constructed a set of rules in relation to 
promotion of democracy, economic development and stability and has linked 
them with the rewards the EU has to offer or sanctions it can pose as an 
economic power. Political conditionality has been seen especially in the case of 
candidate states for EU accession. The European Agreements between the EU 
and post-communist states in the early 1990s, the Copenhagen Criteria for EU 
candidate member states that were adopted at the Copenhagen European 
Council of 1993 and the Commissions’ Opinions of 1997 are solid examples of 
the EU strategy to link trade and other cooperation agreements with the 
promotion of an open market economic system and democratic system of 
governance132. However, the EU has been keen on attaching conditions to the 
financial aid and technical assistance it has been offering to other countries as 
well, such as the Middle Eastern states within the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership/Union for the Mediterranean framework in particular, and more 
recently in dealing with developments of the so called “Arab Spring” with the 
“more for more” approach. The EU has called this an “incentive-based approach 
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based on more differentiation ("more for more"): those that go further and faster 
with reforms will be able to count on greater support from the EU. Support will 
be reallocated or refocused for those who stall or retrench on agreed reform 
plans”133. More explicitly, the EU left no room for misunderstanding when it 
stated that "increased EU support to its neighbours is conditional. It will depend 
on progress in building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of 
law. The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the 
more support it will get from the EU"134.  
In general, political conditionality is based on the logic of rewarding the states 
willing to adopt the criteria that the EU set for proving help and trade benefits 
and exclude the states that prefer to ignore EU norms. Moreover, these 
conditions can lead to prescriptive (asking for adoption of rules and laws), 
prohibitive (forbidding the adoption of rules) or framing policies (where the main 
interest is in changing the rationale and the priorities of the policy making 
system). However, building upon the debate about the character of the EFP, 
scholars have suggested that despite the non-military nature of political 
conditionality as a tool of the EFP, its essence is indeed coercive and as such, 
this aspect of EFP cannot be treated as normative. More specifically, Hyde-
Price argues that the fear of exclusion, either from the common European 
market or from the EU itself via accession is a “very tangible source of hard 
power”135, while Sjursen adds that “the use of non-military instruments cannot 
on its own be enough to identify a polity as a ‘normative’ power” since negative 
conditionality may affect civilians without discrimination136. 
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Nevertheless, the effectiveness of either of the two kinds of conditionality is 
strongly attached to various variables depending on the way the recipient 
country is organised internally, the stake involved and the power of the EU in 
relation to the third country. It also depends on the way internal systems in third 
countries are shaped, the rewards offered or sanctions threatened, the 
legitimacy of the rules the EU is promoting and the role of veto players in those 
third countries. More importantly, the power that the EU had in the case of the 
candidate states for accession because of their asymmetrical relationship and 
the strategic goal of these countries to reach an agreement on becoming part of 
the Union provided the basis for effective exertion of influence by the policy 
makers in Brussels137. At the same time, the lack of credibility with regards to 
the rewards or exclusion, the inability of the EU to provide a clear context of the 
linkage between the regulations asked to be applied and the rewards available 
and the inability to mobilise actors internally can become obstacles in 
implementing political conditionality. Even more important has been the political 
cost that the ruling elite has to face if it does not adopt the guidelines of the 
Union and it is argued that even in cases where material and political gains from 
building a relationship (of any kind) with the EU are of high level, the domestic 
political cost can counterbalance any desire to accept EU conditions. The most 
effective case of political conditionality has been the integration of CEECs into 
the EU. Even countries with relative power in relation to the EU, like Poland, 
adopted the rules and norms of the EU. In this case, however, the role of 
Europeanisation as a strategic goal for the post-communist governments has 
been a catalyst for accepting directives, while actions driving the candidate 
country away from the goal of accession could have generated reactions 
internally and political cost for these governments. It is because of this 
membership perspective that political conditionality for candidate states should 
be seen in a different context than political conditionality for third countries with 
no real opportunity of becoming an EU member state. In the case of external 
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relations, the EU can be less effective in using the tool of political conditionality, 
especially if it is used outside a coherent and consistent context with all third 
parties. Economic and other strategic considerations may prevail challenging 
simultaneously the EU’s credibility. In the case of the Middle East both in 
relation to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Union for the Mediterranean and 
economic aid to the Palestinian Authority the EU has already applied political 
conditionality, with different levels of success.  
In summary, political conditionality can be divided into two categories:  reward 
conditionality for technical and financial assistance and trade agreements; and 
negative conditionality, which involves the use of threats of sanctions and/or 
exclusion against third countries. This conditionality applies in the cases of the 
accession process for candidate member states, bilateral agreements with third 
parties and the establishment of regional projects. 
 
Regional integration - Multilateralism  
The EU has also used the policy of multilateralism at the regional and global 
level as a way of promoting regional integration and global governance138, to the 
extent that a ‘European model or doctrine of global policy based on 
interregionalism’ has been identified139.  
After the collapse of the bipolar world order, the international political 
environment has been experiencing a re-emergence of regionalism, described 
as a new wave140, generation141 or level142 of regional integration. The end of 
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the West – East antagonism reshaped the context in which political and 
economic actors have pursued their interests. International cooperation has 
become more feasible between countries that were seen previously as rivals, 
while the absence of a visible ‘other’ created the dynamics for intra-West/intra-
capitalist competition. What is more, ‘Third Worldism’143 retreated and generally 
states embarked on a new search for partnerships. In the sphere of economics, 
globalisation and the new model of outward-oriented policies (and the neo-
liberal economic agenda that prevailed in the 1990s) created new opportunities 
and challenges for the states that had a high opinion of the EU as a successful 
model of integration and cooperation in solving political and economic problems. 
In this respect, the ‘new regionalism’ has been more about economic 
interdependence, financial, cultural and social cooperation144 and less about the 
specific issues of hard security of the past. Moreover, it is multidimensional and 
it is not monopolised by states but rather, other actors have gained importance 
in this process with interactions from below145. 
It has been argued that the role of the EU in promoting this wave of ‘new 
regionalism’ has been decisive during the last two decades146. The EU has been 
seen as the most successful model of regionalisation and it has become ‘the 
paradigmatic case of regionalism’147. It is argued that the EU has been 
promoting regionalism since it legitimises its own ‘presence’ in world politics in 
contrast to the domination of the role of the nation-state. Thus it justifies its sui 
generis character, both internally and externally, by promoting its norms and by 
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enhancing, as a result, its civilian/ normative powers148. In addition, it promotes 
its efficiency as an international actor149 by assisting the regional integration 
processes elsewhere and it challenges criticisms that it lacks foreign policies by 
increasing the range of its external actions. It invests in more effective ways of 
influencing world politics and narrows the capabilities-expectation gap150. 
Furthermore, it boosts the status of other regions so that the (inter-)regional 
process reproduces itself through the formalisation and institutionalisation of this 
kind of international relations151.   
Even within official documents of the EU, and importantly within the 'European 
Security Strategy', one of the aims of the EFP is 'effective multilateralism'. This 
policy of multilateralism is a part of the 'civilian power' (and/or ‘normative power’) 
approach of the Union and it is achieved either with leading in attempts to build 
new supranational global bodies, or by helping and encouraging the creation of 
regional co-operation in other parts of the world. The EU itself initiated the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership/ Union for the Mediterranean and it holds meetings 
with the ASEAN, the Arab League, Mercosur, the African Union and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. It also provides technical assistance for their regional 
integration processes. It is exporting its own model of handling problems at the 
same time it invests in more effective ways of influencing world politics152.  
More specifically, in the Middle East, after the popular uprisings of 2011: 
“The EU has renewed its engagement with regional organisations. The 
EU took over the Northern Presidency of the Union for the Mediterranean 
in 2012. The EU-League of Arab States Ministerial in November 2012 
agreed a comprehensive political declaration and joint work programme. 
Last but not least, the EU has encouraged regional integration in the 
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Maghreb, including through a joint Communication by the Commission 
and the High Representative. The Commission has also indicated its 
readiness to support initiatives launched in the 5+5 context”153. 
Realists challenge the effectiveness of this approach, since in their readings of 
the international political system there can be a change in the balance of power, 
which will spark the reactions of the members of a specific system. Therefore 
the multilateral system will be shaken because (some of) its units will attempt to 
resort primarily to their own national capabilities and interests154. Even in cases 
in which it is accepted that the EU is promoting, with a certain level of success, 
(inter-)regionalism, there are criticisms regarding the way EU promotes 
regionalism. It is suggested that the EU has not been truthfully interested in 
promoting its norms, as officially explained in various bi-regional agreements, 
but since these are closely linked to economic liberalisation these values are 
just the language used for dressing its neo-liberal agenda155. In addition, the 
type of regionalism EU promotes is not addressing the real problems of its 
interlocutor, but imposes a new wave of domination of the West to its less 
developed partner, adding to North-South tensions156. Moreover, Federica 
Bicchi argues that the EU, due to institutional isomorphism, aims at the 
reproduction of its own model in other regions and promotes its own values and 
norms without leaving any space for reflection157.  
In summary, the EU has promoted (inter-)regionalism as a way of advancing its 
norms and interests at the same time it reinforces is own role and identity in 
world politics. The almost exclusive use of civilian means is a result of its own 
capabilities (technical/ financial assistance), and it is based on its self-
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perception. The EU exports norms and values and it promotes its interests in 
trade and economics, but also in security by minimizing the risk of conflicts in its 
periphery and beyond. Simultaneously, the image of the EU as a legitimate and 
capable actor in world politics is reinforced through interregional cooperation. 
This interregional interaction creates perceptions and expectations on the EU’s 
role in the world system, and the degree to which the latter can respond to 
these, impact on the EU’s identity and reputation. Of course there are 
arguments that refute the very normative approach of the EU as a promoter of 
regionalism and multilateralism, claiming that this EU policy is a tool for 
promoting its material interests (as a realist actor) and enhancing the 
accommodation of its unique character in world politics, on its own terms.  
 
Conclusions 
Not only does the EU have the ability to conduct foreign policy but due to its 
very distinctive character, with the coexistence of supranational, 
intergovernmental and national levels of policy making, EFP is the sum of the 
actions of the EU and its member states that are directed at third parties and 
aim at producing political outcomes.  
The unique character of the EU also affects the nature of EFP, which has been 
characterised as civilian and/or normative. The use of civilian means, due to the 
economic power of the Union, has been accepted to a large extent by the 
majority of  scholars, but the concept of ‘civilian power’ has been more 
contested, since the EU takes advantage of its economic superiority in order to 
exert influence and sometimes even to impose its policies on third parties. 
In the debate about the EU as a ‘normative power’, there have been strong 
arguments against the ethical reading of this notion, especially since the 
universality of EU norms has been challenged. In addition, there have been 
arguments that norms have been used in an instrumentalist approach in order 
for the EU to promote a more legitimate façade for pursuing its very strategic 
interests in security and economic gains. Nevertheless, scholars have reached 
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a level of agreement regarding various aspects of EFP. First, its focus is on non-
military tools. It has been also agreed that there is a normative aspect in the 
EFP at certain levels every time and that one of the goals of the EU’s normative 
agenda is to reshape the international political system, by promoting its own 
norms. In addition, the EU’s own structure and self perception influence the EFP 
and more specifically it generates the ambitions of its foreign policy at the same 
time it creates limitations due to its civilian and normative aspects. Furthermore, 
the EU, through its foreign policy, promotes its own interests as well as its own 
identity. What remains to be examined is how these elements (interests, norms 
and perceptions) interact in the context of the EFP. How do these balance in the 
shaping of the EU? How does the EU promote all these elements? Is there a 
sense of hierarchy or prioritisation in balancing these three factors?  By 
answering these questions, the research can go beyond the traditional 
relationships of the EU, which have mostly accommodated weaker partners with 
the result that the interests and values of the EFP could not be fundamentally 
challenged. The case of the GCC inserts the significant element of a more 
balanced relationship, and as such the EU needs to compromise in order to 
reach common understanding and produce concrete results in its foreign policy. 
However, the GCC states may have different interests, values and perceptions 
from those of the EU and as a result the EU will need to prioritise either its 
values and perceptions or its interests, if these are not all compatible. Either 
way, by pursuing a ‘strategic partnership’ with a partner that is able to resist EU 
leverage, it will challenge the effectiveness of the EFP and/or the (self-) image 
of the EU.  
There is an agreement between scholars that the EU mainly pursues its foreign 
policy using non-military means, building upon its distinctive character. It 
promotes economic and technical cooperation, it creates channels of 
interactions with third parties and it takes advantage of these cooperation 
schemes as well of its economic might in order to promote its values, interests 
and identities. Furthermore, the EU has been an active international actor in the 
establishment and the development of regional integration projects in the 
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various areas of the world. This is due to its own structure and its policies to 
promote multilateralism but also because it wants to reinforce its own unique 
character in the international community as ‘normal’. However, non-military 
instruments are not civilian and/or normative by definition. The conditionality 
applied against weaker interlocutors and the fact that the threat of negative 
application is used in order for the EU to exert influence over third parties should 
be taken into consideration.  
 
The EU has been using these tools in order to promote EFP (i) in shaping its 
immediate environment though the accession process (ii) in bilateral 
agreements (iii) in initiating regional projects and in assisting existing regional 
integration in other parts of the world and (iv) of course, in its strategic 
partnerships. The next chapter, based on the above-mentioned analyses, will 
discuss how the EU has been articulating its foreign policies in the Middle East 
and more specifically in the Arabian Peninsula, in order to explain how the goals 
of the EFP have been shaped and pursued in relation to the Gulf region and 
also to conclude on the most appropriate analytical framework in order to 
assess the EU-GCC relationship.  
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EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
Introduction 
Geographical proximity, fears of possible spillover effects of crises in the region 
and economic/ energy interests in the area led to the declaration of the 
Mediterranean region as a ‘zone of interest’ of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy158. Indeed important strategic stakes of the EU and its member 
states are invested in the stability of the Middle East and the Mediterranean 
basin. The danger of importing the outcomes of political crises in Middle Eastern 
states159, the concerns over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
the anxiety over the power of radical and/or violent political movements and 
networks, the consequences of failed states160; all provide the rationale for the 
EU’s constant effort to promote stability and prevent regional and intra-national 
conflicts. Middle Eastern states have also become one of the most significant 
markets for Europe and one of the main suppliers of energy to the European 
economy 161. Therefore the economic development and security of the region 
are of vital interest for the EU.  
This chapter will first present a brief history of EFP in the Middle East during the 
early years of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the EU. It will 
then  provide an overview of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the 
Union of the Mediterranean (UfM) in the context of the EFP, exploring at the 
same time the foreign policy tools the EU has been applying (discussed in the 
previous chapter). It will then present the most recent literature on the EU-GCC 
relationship, focusing on the work of Richard Youngs and Gerd Nonneman, 
which have given useful insights on the factors shaping EFP in the Middle East. 
Nevertheless, when exploring the EU-GCC relationship, they both work 
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exclusively on the role of the ruling elites and the bureaucracies in the field of 
political reform, and most importantly they do not place bi-regional interactions 
within the framework of a symmetrical partnership, since they have as starting 
points the patterns of the unequal partnership plans that the EU has applied in 
different parts of the Middle East. Moreover, their approach is more static, 
focusing on a short period of time and it cannot grasp the dynamism of the 
relationship due to changes in the internal and external environments of the two 
parties, which affect their interests, values and (self-)images. Overall, this 
chapter shall identify the pattern of the EFP in the Middle East, of relationships 
between non-equal partners, which however does not fit the case of the EU and 
the GCC states. It is for this reason that the argument is put forth in this thesis 
for a different methodological framework to anlayse EU-GCC relations:  that of 
‘strategic partnership’.  
 
A brief history of EU – Middle East relations 
During the Cold War, Europe had a secondary status in the region despite its 
historical and economic connections  because of (i) the logic of division between 
East and West and the primacy of the United States in the Western camp (ii) the 
colonial past of European powers in contrast to the US and the USSR which did 
not have to carry these negative images (iii) the lack of an integrated Europe to 
the extent that exists today and (iv) the credibility that the USA enjoyed among 
the political elites of the region as a political, military and economic power162. 
However, the collapse of the USSR led to the creation of a new regional context 
which called for the reassessment of the previous role of Europe, creating new 
sources of concern and providing new opportunities for EFP: Divergences 
among the Western partners became more feasible. The European Economic 
Community developed into a more comprehensive and political actor, the EU. 
The question of the credibility of the United States in the Middle East has 
become unquestionably evident. In terms of security, the collapse of the 
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socialist regimes in Eastern Europe turned the focus of the Europeans to the 
South and more specifically the Arab states of the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, the 
EU has developed policies for pursuing its own strategic interests through trade 
agreements and financial/technical assistance to the Arab states. From the point 
of view of the Arab states, their leaders have sought for new powers to get 
involved in the region in order to counterbalance American hegemony, 
especially since the US was seen as unable to promote peace agreements 
successfully in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is not to claim, nonetheless, that 
EU–Middle East relations have been merely a fact of the post-Cold years. 
On the contrary the interaction of the European Economic Community with its 
neighbours on the south shore of the Mediterranean Sea goes back to the first 
economic and technical agreements with individual states during the 1960s. In 
1972 the ECC launched the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) which became 
the umbrella for all bilateral relations between the North and the South. This was 
the first attempt for co-ordination of the relations of the EEC with the various 
Arab states, by providing similar agreements and by setting a common pattern 
of interaction163. Political and security issues were excluded from the GMP as 
they were discussed in the framework of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. By the end of 
the 1980s, both of these fora collapsed as they provided very poor results. In 
the aftermath of the first (Iraq-Iran) and the second (US-led alliance against 
Iraq) Gulf wars and the internal insecurity in some of the Arab states (in Algeria), 
the EEC acknowledged that the social and economic development of the 
Mediterranean Sea was linked to regional security and thus to its own security 
interests164. Thus, a new project was created to accommodate EU–MENA 
relations, the Renovated Mediterranean Policy. Despite the verbal recognition of 
the security interests of the EEC/EU in the development of the Mediterranean by 
European bodies, this new policy also failed to provide any specific political and 
security dimension or to locate financial and technical aid in a more political 
framework. At the same time, Italy and Spain proposed the creation of the 
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Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean which would 
potentially expand eastwards and reach the Persian Gulf. However, France 
prioritised a more sub-regional approach (with special interests in the Maghreb) 
at a time when the political environment that followed the Kuwait-Iraqi war and 
the subsequent invasion of Iraq generated new waves of mistrust in the 
region165. In brief, despite the fact that the EEC was not a mature political actor, 
it had already expressed some of the basic characteristics of EFP, as seen in 
the previous chapter. The European leadership attempted to frame the relations 
between the EEC and the Arab States based on economic and technical 
interactions in a group-to-group approach: the Europeans and the Arabs as two 
different blocs.  
 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership / Union for the Mediterranean 
After the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1992, 
when the EU articulated more coherent political policies for its external actions, 
the EU proposed the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995. 
The EMP consists of a political and security partnership (for peace and 
security), an economic partnership (toward the establishment of a Free Trade 
Area) and co-operation on human, social and cultural affairs166. From a security 
perspective, the EMP was innovative as it offered for the first time a 
comprehensive political-security dimension in the agreements between the two 
partners, it linked security with the rest of issues in the area (economic and 
social), and it established this new initiative in terms of a partnership, seeking to 
establish common interests in the area. The EMP has been seen as the tool by 
which the EU managed to limit to some extent uncertainty in its neighbourhood, 
by creating for its neighbours "an incentive to abide by agreements"167. Despite 
the reference to ‘partnership’ which could suggest equality, in the case of the 
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EMP a level of "leadership" of the process since it has the resources, both 
technically and financially was recognised. According to Emerson and 
Noutcheva the EMP had set liberalisation policies as a priority, both in terms of 
the political system and the economy of the Arab states. Therefore, it can be 
argued that this Partnership was actually a partnership of hierarchy, since the 
EU had the resources and dictated policies in which EU economic interests and 
values were interwoven. However, when it came to actually producing results 
within the security dimension of the EMP as well as to the field of Human 
Rights, the EMP was disappointing either because of the political context or due 
to the lack of coherent policies and mechanisms168 within the Partnership.  
Ricardo Gomez argues that the EMP emerged when "perceptions converged 
around the view that European states had to carry a bigger share of the burden 
of post-Cold War security in the Mediterranean"169. This is underpinned  by an 
interesting assumption that on the one hand the EU member states agreed on a 
common perception that they should assume responsibilities about events in 
their neighbourhood and thus act in a normative way, and on the other hand that 
the main interest of the member states was to defend their security. Moreover, 
he argues that the EU used the civilian power approach as the ideological basis 
for combining the security concerns of the EU member states and their neo-
liberal economic agenda170 in the shaping of the EMP. What is also interesting 
in Gomez's findings is the fact that (i) the EMP reconfirmed that "the European 
Commission is the primary agent for EU strategic action"171, (ii) as well as that 
the EU reaffirmed its leading role in its wider region172.  
Relevant to this leadership role of the EU in its neighbourhood is the approach 
of Thomas Diez. He suggests that given the Barcelona Declaration refers to 
values which the EU member states had already adopted, then the EMP is an 
expression of the EU as a normative power to promote its (‘universal’ as 
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perceived by the EU) values to the outsiders. The EU promotes these values 
through civilian means, and namely the agreements for cooperation at different 
levels, within this multilateral framework173. 
Commenting on the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), 
Kristina Kausch and Richard Youngs claim that the new organisation waters 
down the political aspects of the EMP and focuses on the more technical, low-
politics issues, for which channels of interactions between the EU and its 
southern neighbours have already been established174. In addition, the 
European Neighbourhood Policy of the EU and its bilateral approach, which was 
enacted simultaneously with the EMP/UfM has weakened the multilateral 
approach of the latter process, at the same time that the multilateral framework 
seems inflexible to adapt to the new realities of the region175. In an obvious case 
of the contradictions between  EU interests (in security) and values (in 
democracy), Kausch and Youngs point to the reluctance of  European officials 
to interact with the movements of  political Islam.  EU governments prioritise 
security which the regimes in the Middle East claimed they were providing 
against the possibility of a political openness that would have to include the 
Islamists176. 
It becomes evident from this brief description of the EMP/UfM, which have been 
the most comprehensive regional projects of the EU in the Middle East that the 
EU has been using its civilian means in order to engage with its neighbours and 
promote its policies. These foreign affairs policies are driven by the EU’s need 
to establish a less uncertain environment in its wider region and to advance its 
economic agenda to the markets that are closer to Europe, while it exports its 
values. Interests and values do not have clear distinctions and are interrelated. 
Moreover, beyond the interests that the EU may pursue in its foreign policy in 
the Middle East, what is quite apparent is the importance placed on the self-
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image for shaping the EU’s actions. On the one hand, the EMP was 
characterised by the sense of responsibility that the EU had in providing stability 
on its outside borders after the collapse of the security paradigm of the Cold 
War and on the other hand by using regional approaches as a reflection of its 
own composition and structure. The events that followed the popular uprisings 
in the Middle East in January 2011 reinforced this notion of the EU’s (self-
)image as a leading actor in assisting democratisation of its external 
environment, and as such in serving its long-term interests for security. The EU 
has been active in engaging with the new governments and the civil societies of 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, promoting its interests, norms, and self perception as 
a normative foreign policy actor. 
 
Instruments of the EFP in the Middle East  
As demonstrated  in the previous chapter, the EU has developed its foreign 
policy tools based on the economic and technical cooperation it can offer to third 
parties, associating this assistance to political (and economic) conditions and 
the promotion of the establishment and/ or development of regional 
organisations. The case of the EFP in the Middle East could not have been 
different. 
 
Economic modernisation and political conditionality 
During the Cold-War years, the ECC developed its relations with the Arab states 
of the Mediterranean Sea within the framework of Cooperation Agreements, 
signed with individual states on a bilateral basis. According to the ‘financial 
protocols’ the Arab regimes would state their needs and priorities and then they 
would request funding from the European Commission. This approach limited 
the political and strategic planning of the Community and in many cases the 
funds were exploited by the regimes for their own political purposes. This 
method of interaction barely changed in the Renovated Mediterranean Policy 
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(1990-1995). On the contrary, the new European policies (pursued within the 
EMP) were directed mostly to reforms in the public sector of the economy and 
the way local economies were governed. Hence, the funds provided to the Arab 
states mostly through the MEDA aid program were shaped in a strategic 
manner with specific targets to help the local government to make the transition 
to modern, open market economic models and to integrate into the world 
economic system, maintaining or even enhancing the social cohesion in these 
states177. The EU was keen on promoting the economic modernisation of the 
states of the Middle East in order to create new possibilities for local 
investments, promote their financial development and create new jobs for the 
youth in the Arab states. The starting point for this initiative was the need to 
ensure European security through the stabilisation and de-radicalisation of the 
neighbouring countries. For this to be achieved, genuine economic 
development, a real distribution of welfare and an increase in living standards in 
these countries was necessary. To what extent  EU policies derived from the 
genuine interest of the EU to promote its norms in order to create a regional 
environment of security or these policies prioritised the promotion of economic 
and other material interests is still debated. In any case, the realities on the 
ground showed that instead of creating new opportunities for youth the regimes 
have manipulated the reform programs and using established practices of 
clientelism have helped the elites within the regime to gain control over newly 
privatised or semi-privatised companies178. In addition, the goal of establishing a 
Free Trade Area in the Mediterranean would lead to great instability as one third 
of the local middle class business would be unable to compete with the 
multinational companies from Europe and would effectively be forced to shut 
down179. This was discussed at the same time that agricultural products were 
excluded from this FTA. What is more, despite its strategic aims and planning, 
the results of EU economic aid have been very modest in structural reforms and 
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boosting good governance, as implementation by the recipient states and  
monitoring of the progress by the EU have been insufficient180.    
The economic prosperity of the region, however, is not only associated with 
internal stability but also with democratisation. The EU approach was 
underpinned by the logic that if the economic reforms lead to the expanded role 
of private companies and thus a greater role for the civil society against the 
centralisation of the authoritarian regimes, then a gradual transition to 
democracy would be more feasible. In addition, democratisation would provide a 
context for regional cooperation and peace according to the liberal argument. 
However, economic transformation is not automatically translated into 
democratisation. In spite of the dynamics the ‘open economy’ model may 
generate, without political conditionality attached to the technical and financial 
aid provided it is very difficult to imagine why non-democratic regimes would 
pursue such reforms. This said, the EU was hesitant and cautious in setting 
strict political conditions to its funds and support, as it did not favour the idea of 
interaction with movements of political Islam, even if these groups were indeed 
moderate; as a result the EU did not provide any practical help to them181. 
Furthermore, in the post-9/11 era of securitisation, the priority of the EU was on 
its anti-terrorist policies. Therefore the ‘democratisation-stability’ dilemma the 
Europeans faced during the 1990s was clearly evident  but in favor of the short-
term aim of containment of (radical) political Islam and less on the long-term 
goal of stability through democratisation182. This provided the basis for the 
regimes to exploit the new international political situation to suppress any kind of 
political opposition, creating a vicious circle where authoritarian regimes and 
radical Islamic movements reinforced and fed each other’s extremism. 
Consequently, the EU had restricted itself to promoting democratisation 
progress through human rights clauses and ‘good governance’ reforms in the 
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judicial system and the civil service in a more politicised way. The forum for 
seeking this set of goals was the basket of social and cultural interaction of the 
EMP in which the EU attempted to sponsor bottom-up initiatives, once again 
avoiding Islamic groups, even though it was evident that they were the most 
dynamic powers in local communities183. The popular uprisings of 2011 have 
proved that the EU’s policies did not meet any real success in these fields. In 
any case, there have been criticism and arguments184 which challenge the 
European economic–political liberalisation argument. More critically, Amin and 
Kenz185 identify inconsistencies in the promotion of democracy by the EU in the 
region. Indeed they suggest that the intention of the EU in the region of the 
Middle East was not the promotion of political liberalisation as such but that this 
was used as a pretext for the pursuit of economic liberalisation and the opening 
of local markets to European products and investments. Hence, they claim, this 
neoliberal agenda “has nothing whatsoever of democracy about it”186. Thus, it 
can be argued there was a clear contradiction in the public speech of the EU 
which projected the promotion of its norms, and its strategic interests which 
were both economic and in the realm of security. The EU favoured controlled 
political reforms, to ensure that that the movement of political Islam did not 
become a new powerful political actor in the region.  The EU appeared to fear a 
greater political opening in the countries of the Middle East because of concerns 
over instability and thus its own  strategic (security and economic) interests; this 
clearly  however,  clashed  with the norms the EU claimed it was attempting to 
export in relation to   democracy and human rights. The question whether the 
political Islamists are genuine democratic players or they have been interested 
in democracy only as a way to reach state power has been revitalised. This is a 
new and a highly interesting debate following the popular uprisings in the Middle 
East in 2011, but this goes beyond the ambitions of this thesis. Yet, this debate 
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is central to the way EU is conducting a normative foreign policy, having in mind 
the abovementioned criticism for not engaging with actors originating from the 
movement of political Islam. 
 
Multilateralism – Region building 
The Europeans have shown a significant interest in establishing multilateral 
processes and organisations for dealing with regional issues in the 
Mediterranean. The Euro-Arab Dialogue, ‘5+5 Dialogue’ initiated by France in 
1983, the Mediterranean Forum proposed by Egypt which was received 
positively  by the EU southern members, and the Conference of Security and 
Cooperation of the Mediterranean already mentioned above, are examples of 
this approach. The EMP/UfM is the most comprehensive and multi-purposed 
multilateral body in this series. Because of its structure and the joint Euro-Arab 
approaches to problems, it is said that the EMP is a regional project, as the 
actions taken in this framework aim at responding to the threats and problems of 
the international environment that affect the states on both shores of the 
Mediterranean basin187. It might be argued that the principles and the 
aspirations of the EMP aimed to build a region with enhanced political, 
economic and cultural communication, but in reality this was seriously 
challenged. It has been suggested by some authors that the different sets of 
values and political practices between the EU Members and the Mediterranean 
states, as well as the colonial past, made it difficult to establish any form of 
cooperation given that a rationale of hierarchy would always prevail188. Added to 
this, economic development which was linked to security was clearly 
constrained by a European unwillingness to change the highly unbalanced trade 
relationship. Furthermore, the unresolved Arab/Israeli conflict made it difficult to 
imagine a co-existence of the two parties in some form of security co-
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operation189.  The fact that the two sub-regions, the Maghreb and the Mashreq, 
have been treated as one unit, a ‘single security complex’ has been 
unproductive as the countries in the Western and the Eastern Mediterranean do 
not share the same problems, threats and fears190. Nevertheless, these 
problems do not challenge the main argument that the EU attempted to export 
its own model of regional cooperation and to some extent regional integration. 
On the contrary, the fact that the EU, as the powerful pole of a hierarchical 
relationship aimed at exporting its norms in the name of reforms for economic 
development and regional security, reminds us of the accession process of the 
Eastern and Central Europe states. 
 
Military choices 
For the purpose of consistency, we should also refer briefly to the military 
choices of the EFP, even though as it has been demonstrated that the EU has 
primarily promoted its interests in the region (even the ones related to security) 
with civilian tools. This preference for civilian tools, nevertheless, does not 
exclude the existence of ‘hard security’ choices, which have been developed 
within the institutional structure of the Western European Union (WEU). During 
the Cold War years the attention paid to the Mediterranean Sea was minimal 
and it was only in 1986 that a forum called the ‘Mediterranean Sub-Group of 
experts’ was established. In 1992 a ‘Mediterranean Dialogue’ (MD) process was 
introduced, even though the primary interest was expressed in relation to the 
Arab states of Maghreb, rather in relation to the Mediterranean region as a 
whole. Due to the priority given to NATO’s ‘Mediterranean Dialogue’ and the 
preparations for the EMP, WEU MD provided no tangible results, not even after 
the EU – WEU institutional linkage with the launch of the ESDP  because of the 
lack of co-ordination within the EU/WEU bodies and processes. Nevertheless, 
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there are military units, like the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) and 
the European Deployment Force (EUROFOR), with forces provided from the 
national armies of France, Spain, Italy and Portugal191, under the umbrella of 
WEU. Being outside the EMP framework and seen as unilateral instruments 
(just European units without the participation of the Arabs) they have been 
treated with mistrust192, even though EUROMARFOR’s mission in Lebanon 
under a decision of the UN Security Council, is to help the UNIFIL forces and 
the Lebanese army to control Lebanon’s maritime borders193 and it has actually 
prevented a new sea blockage of the country by Israeli forces. Nevertheless, it 
should be pointed out that it is undeniable that in contrast to the US policy which 
favors rapid transformation of the region and the introduction of democratic 
systems even by the use of force, the EU has been more patient, and has 
invested on the gradual transformation of the political systems in Arab states 
with their immediate priority guided towards the resolution of conflicts in the area 
with civilian instruments194. This approach, nonetheless, reinforces the civilian 
(and in some cases normative) approach of the EU’s foreign policy which 
reflects also on its image, both in relation to itself as well as in relation to  
outsiders. 
 
Analyzing the EU-GCC relationship within the current literature 
EU-GCC relations have not been a central issue for EFP (EFP), despite the 
interdependency of the two regions in terms of trade and energy. The relations 
(financial and political) of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf with the European 
states are generally presented only as small parts of the broader research on 
the EU role in the Middle East. The little attention paid to these relations is due 
to the fact that the links of the European states with the region have been of a 
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lower intensity than with the Arab states of the Mediterranean195. There is a 
greater gap in cultural and political terms, while in the economic sphere the 
GCC states have a significantly wider range of commercial partners than the 
Mediterranean Arab states. The current literature on the Arab states of the Gulf 
and their links to Europe is limited, but to the extent that it does exist, it can be 
located in four themes: (i) the historical role of European powers and more 
specifically of the United Kingdom in the region (ii) the dependence of the 
European economy on the Gulf states as oil suppliers (iii) the strategic 
significance of the Gulf region for the West in general and (iv) in the post 9/11 
years, human rights and political reforms. In relation to the strategic role of the 
EU in the Gulf region, the role of the Europeans as alternative to US hegemony 
in the region was tested through the prism of realist theories comparing the 
interests, power and influence of the two transatlantic partners in the Persian 
Gulf, in the Middle East Peace Process and during the Gulf wars196. It was 
suggested that, at the time, there was a consensus between the Europeans and 
the United States on a division of labour, according to which the primacy of US 
foreign policy and its dominant role in the region was unquestioned197. In this 
context the Europeans had to take into consideration the interests and priorities 
of both the US and the GCC states198. Nevertheless, even in the time of the 
bipolar world setting, when EFP was less developed and the divergences of the 
EU-US policies were not emphasised, the first signs of challenging the dominant 
role of the US could be located in the internally destabilizing factor of the US 
presence in the area. The fragile domestic political environment faced an anti-
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American rhetoric from both the radical Arabs and conservative Islamists199. 
Thus the GCC states faced a security threat internally because of their 
attachment to the US.  
The developments that followed the 9/11 attacks brought about a new context in 
international politics which raised the question of a possible acceleration in the 
de-attachment (to the extent that this is possible) of the GCC states from the 
US. Academic researchers shifted their interest towards questions of whether 
and how the EU and its member states could respond to this new geo-strategic 
reality. In the 2000s, the EU promotion of human rights and political 
liberalisation – mainly but not exclusively through foreign economic policy 
instruments - dominated their academic interest. The existing literature in EU–
GCC relations falls into two categories. First, there is a series of publications (a 
journal called ‘The GCC-EU Research Bulletin’, working papers and books on 
various themes of the EU-GCC relations), published by research centres in 
Europe and the Gulf region, and most importantly by the Gulf Research Centre 
in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UEA). This series of analyses are largely 
explanations of the strategic interdependence of the EU and the GCC states 
and the potential gains from a deeper partnership in economy, energy and 
security. They also identify some of the major problems (the internal institutional 
constraints of the two blocs, the absence of a specific member state acting as 
the driving power towards a closer relationship and generally the lack of political 
will for compromises), which are associated with the weaknesses of an overall 
EU policy in the Persian Gulf region and the reluctance of the Arab leaders to 
get involved in projects which involve values and aim at the political 
liberalisation of their states. In this context, the researchers of the Gulf Research 
Centre provide suggestions to policy-makers that are engaged in EU-GCC 
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negotiations for overcoming the problems they encounter and spot the sensitive 
issues which require more delicate management. Although this research 
provides a large amount of useful data, facts and sources for scholarship on 
EU-GCC relations, these are empirically oriented and independent of any 
broader theoretical framework. The second category consists of academic 
research which focuses on the relations of the EU with the GCC countries in the 
new global political and economic environment of the 21st century, of which the 
most relevant and recent books are those of Youngs200 and Nonneman201. They 
look into EFP and the role of the EU in the Middle East in promoting 
democratisation and economic liberalisation in comparison to the military-force 
approach by US policy makers. 
 
Youngs: Identities – values - interests 
The study by Youngs discusses the role of the EU as an actor in the Middle 
East, in political reform policies, traditional counterterrorist and containment-
oriented cooperation and tests the role of the EU and its member states in 
promoting their interests and norms in the region. He emphasises the 
multidimensional foreign policy of the EU which derives from its own 
experiences and identities, aiming to promote its democratic norms and values 
through long-term engagement and partnership plans202. EU values and 
identities are projected as soft power tools for the gradual yet important 
transformation of the third parties’ internal structure in a wide range of issues. 
The foreign policies of the EU are pursued both by promoting bottom up 
approaches as well as in engaging with the ruling elites in the Arab states203. 
Therefore, he adds that the "EU could be seen as inching towards a concept of 
transformative power", adopting a broader approach including simultaneously 
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"material policy instruments, long term inducements and cognitive identity 
formation"204. Nevertheless, he questions whether the declared goals of 
promoting democratic norms via reforms reflected the genuine interests of EU 
actors. Economic reforms and policies of containment of the parties of political 
Islam were received with a great level of acceptance, contrary to the expressed 
aims of democratisation205.  
In the Arabian Peninsula, Youngs examines the assumption that “in the states of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council, the EU deliberated on a new strategic partnership 
aimed at correcting its erstwhile neglect of this region”206. Indeed he recognised 
an upgrading to the formal expression of interest by the EU for the specific sub-
region of the Middle East207. Nevertheless, the actual interest shown from the 
Arab Gulf states was more at a bilateral level by single member states due to 
their national interests208. To the extent that the EU was engaged in promoting 
democratic norms, it offered technical support to programmes of political reform 
in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. The EU and its member states 
prioritised, in any case, security concerns and they lacked the willingness or the 
means to exert effective influence over the issues of human rights and political 
liberalisation. More specifically, in the case of the GCC states, he argues that 
the economic and societal organisation of the Gulf states provides a context that 
differs to the rest of the Middle Eastern region. As a result the EU’s favoured 
tool of political conditionality could not be used effectively in this case. He pays 
attention to the defence links that have been shaping the area between the Arab 
and European states. The increased arm sales from the UK, France, Germany 
and Italy accompanied by defence agreements with the UK and France are 
seen as part of the ‘key strategic objective of GCC states to dilute US 
prevalence in the region’209. He also identifies an attempt from the GCC leaders 
to play the EU against the US. Overall, Youngs argues that although there was 
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a change in the EFP and the language that was used after the 9/11 attacks 
regarding the reform plans that were introduced for the Middle East, in the 
specific case of the GCC states, the role of the EU was restricted to the limited 
scope that GCC states had set in order to introduce other players into its 
regional issues and balance to some extent the US influence in the region. Thus 
the EU could not be significantly innovative or effective in the region and as a 
result EU policies have not shifted dramatically in the Middle East and especially 
in the GCC states. 
Youngs’ approach is significant in the sense that it provides an analytical 
framework which includes material interests, norms and identity factors, leading 
to the conclusion that in the EFP there was “a calibration of value-based EU 
strategy to material interest calculations, as opposed to a uniquely ideationally 
driven reproduction of European norms”210. Moreover, this approach also 
addresses the issue of the GCC’s goals of balancing external players against 
each other. This is an interesting point of departure, as interests, values and 
perceptions interact in the shaping of EFP while the reactions of third parties are 
incorporated within such an analysis. He also addresses the inability of the EU 
to apply political conditionality, implying the symmetry of the EU-GCC relations. 
Due to the fact that only a chapter of the book was devoted to the Gulf region, 
the issue of the symmetry of power between the two blocs has not been 
thoroughly explained, especially in a framework of partnership where actors of 
the two regions are in systematic communication. He might refer to the long-
term engagement of the EU and the partnership plans but the practical, 
empirical analysis of this relationship was very limited. Moreover, because his 
case study deals with the political reforms and the issue of human rights, he 
does not take into consideration the actions and the bi-regional cooperation of 
non-governmental actors, such as the business and academic communities. In 
addition, there is no analysis of whether the limited role of the EU in political 
reforms and human rights is repeated in other highly politicised matters of hard 
security. This is one way in which this research aims to contribute, asking 
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questions such as whether European influence is limited in all high profile EU-
GCC cases or only in the human rights/political reforms case. If the EU and the 
GCC have met relative success in their relationship in other fields, why is there 
a differentiation? How do interests, norms and self-images - as Youngs tested in 
his own case study - become factors in the other cases? What is more, Youngs 
tests the EU’s role in comparison to the US policies in the region but he does 
not place emphasis on the GCC internal or regional policies, which should be 
fundamental to the analysis of a symmetrical partnership between two regional 
organisations.  
 
Nonneman: A ‘multi-level, multi-causal and contextual’ analysis 
Nonneman's contribution to the literature is important as he rejects the 
monopoly of realism and he applies a ‘multi-level, multi-causal and contextual’ 
explanation of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) system, with variables of 
constructivism. Although he accepts the centrality of ‘power’ and ‘security’ in 
international relations, he rejects the rational – monolithic actor approach of the 
realist school. Instead, he argues that there are multiple interests within a state 
which cannot be seen in isolation either from the international system or the 
perceptions, ideas and identities that are carried into the decision making 
process. In his analysis, the foreign policy attitude of the Middle Eastern states 
is formed by different factors: (i) the primacy they place in their quest for security 
(ii) the fact that these states are not monolithic (iii) which is also true for their 
'national interests'. Hence, there are various state actors who may pursue 
different options in foreign policy. (iv) The foreign policy making system is also 
influenced by the perceptions the states have regarding themselves, their 
environments and their policies as well as (v) by the external environments and 
the opportunities or challenges these environments pose211. In brief, Nonneman 
argues that the foreign policy of the Middle Eastern states are "defined through 
the lens of the leaderships' perceptions about the security of their regime, about 
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the opportunities and challenges presented by both their domestic and their 
external environments; and to varying extent, about their own identities"212. 
These identities are influenced by their domestic political culture shaped by 
transnational ideologies (Arabism and Islamism).  
More importantly, he identifies three levels of environment, which all interact 
with each other in the attempts of the Arab leaders to maximise their autonomy. 
The different levels are identified as: the national, in which the leaders seek 
autonomy from pressures coming from society; the regional, where the nation 
states look to enhance their autonomy from their neighbours; and the 
international, in which  states and the regional organisations (in this case the 
Gulf Cooperation Council) pursue autonomy from the patterns of superpower 
dominance. Building upon his assumptions, he suggests that the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) states have tried to develop long term foreign policy 
patterns which respond to pragmatism and can manipulate multi-dependence. 
The MENA states have been playing external players off against each other so 
that they avoid ‘mono-dependence’. However, in order for the rulers to be able 
to play off external players they must have relative autonomy, both domestically 
and regionally. There is, therefore, a complex interactivity of domestic, regional 
and international factors which all blend together reinforcing the game of 
(in)dependence. To the extent that the rulers manage to play their cards right, 
by playing different actors against each other (in international relations) or by 
granting benefits in areas in which they feel more comfortable and resisting any 
demands on sensitive issues (granting economic support to the business class 
in the Gulf region, but with minor or cosmetic reforms in political liberties) they 
can gain autonomy on all three levels. Thus on the one hand they gain 
legitimacy internally, and on the other hand, they achieve regional and 
international independence. However, it should be made clear that autonomy, 
according to Nonneman, is always relative. None of the actors can be truly 
independent, but the essence of autonomy is about the balance and the position 
of the actors in cases of interdependence (either between society and the 
                                                          
212 Ibid, p. 10 
EU-GCC relationship: EFP in the Middle East 
 
Angelos Lenos  77 
elite/rulers, and the state with its partners)213. Placing the EU-MENA relations 
into this framework of analysis he suggests that the foreign policies of the 
Middle Eastern states, including the GCC states, in relation to EFP (i) are 
pragmatic rather than ideological, (ii) are related to the view of the EU as a 
source of (economic and technical) assistance, (iii) to the reservations towards 
Western international actors because of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict and (iv) 
the possibility of the EU to counter-balance US hegemony in the area. They also 
take into consideration (v) the colonial past of some EU member states (vi) the 
differences in the economic and political relations at bilateral level (vii) the 
perceptions and needs of the MENA states (viii) the EU stance on economic 
relations with MENA states and (ix) the regional dynamics, among MENA states 
as well as the relations between EU and MENA states at a bilateral level. 
Therefore, he emphasises the role of the recipient party in accommodating the 
outcomes of the EFP. It is indeed interesting to incorporate the responses of the 
third parties (the GCC states in this case) to the EFP, in the analysis of the EU-
GCC relations.  
Nonneman’s approach is a model, as is Youngs’ approach, accommodating 
material interests as well as values, perceptions and cultural aspects of the 
policy-making system. Nonneman rejects the notion of a state as a monolithic 
actor and broadens the spectrum of other possible actors that might be involved 
beyond the ruling elite. In this sense he analyses the role of actors associated 
with the government, such as the administrative machinery and the state 
bureaucracy. There still is, therefore, a gap in the study of the role of non-state 
actors, such as business or educational communities. It is also important that he 
introduces the level of internal politics, which is associated with the decision-
making system of foreign affairs. Even though the autocratic regimes of the Gulf 
are not accountable to their people and they enjoy relative domestic autonomy, 
the GCC states have to face the competition and dominant aspirations among 
themselves at the regional level and challenges from outside their region at the 
international level. Therefore, taking into consideration the ideas of ‘autonomy’ 
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and ‘multi-dependence’ can be extremely useful, especially in the case of a 
relationship between the EU and a regional emerging power, like the GCC. 
These two notions (‘autonomy’ and ’multi-dependence’) can prove to be useful 
tools in exploring the way in which political conditionality is applied, especially in 
a case where symmetry of power becomes a fundamental characteristic of the 
relationship. Moreover, and as shown, the role of interests, perceptions and 
values of the GCC states themselves are as important as the norms and goals 
of the EU. On this basis, it will be enlightening to explore the dynamics and the 
weight of all these elements in the EU-GCC relationship. Although Nonneman 
sheds light on the interests and the norms of the Arab states and their partners 
and he offers a broad framework for explaining the way the GCC generally 
reacts on the foreign policies of third parties, including the EU, he does not 
explicitly refer to the issue of symmetry in the framework of this kind of 
relationship. Moreover, in the empirical chapter of the GCC foreign policy 
system by Abdulla Baabood it is argued that the “Gulf rulers [are] seeking 
protection from the most powerful external power while cultivating partially 
balancing relations with lesser, but still important, powers” 214. However, a more 
systematic examination of this statement with reference to different case 
studies, testing different aspects of the EU-GCC relationship, is missing. 
 
Values and Self-images of the EU and the GCC states 
The abovementioned approaches suggest that interests, values and self-images 
are the central elements of the inter-regional relations between the EU and the 
GCC states. The interests of the two parties were presented extensively in the 
introduction of this thesis, but the notions of values and self-images need a 
more precise definition and explanation. 
According to the EU “normative power” argument, the value factors are well 
vested in the EFP, either as expressions of the EFP or in terms of self-image 
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(as explained in the previous chapter).  In contrast to their European 
counterparts, which have been promoting democratic systems of rule internally 
and supranational cooperation at regional and global levels, the ruling elites of 
the Arab states have developed a normative position which makes them strive 
for independence from their people, their Arab neighbours and from global 
powers. Having as a primary goal to ensure internal stability and external 
security, the foreign policy of Middle Eastern countries is shaped based on the 
perceptions of their leaders regarding themselves as well as the perceptions of 
the dilemmas they face in the security realm at three levels; the national, the 
regional and the international215. 
On the more specific case of the GCC states, Joseph Kostiner216 further 
analyses these levels for which the Gulf ruling families seek autonomy. One of 
the most important challenges derives from the international level which is 
linked to the mutual resentment of Iran and the USA. On one hand, the GCC 
states need US security protection but on the other hand the more they rely on 
USA forces, the weaker they become in the face of Iranian accusations of 
cooperation with the USA, which can spark popular opposition among the Arab 
populations of the region.  At a more regional level, the GCC states (and most 
commonly KSA and Qatar) aim to become brokers in regional conflicts including 
those that are intra-Arab. Within the context of Arabism, the GCC states are 
legitimate mediators and thus they can pursue two of their main interests. First, 
they aim at stability in the region which brings stability in their internal 
environment and second, they challenge the historical role of Syria and Egypt 
as frontrunners of pan-Arabism. However, this application of pan-Arabism aims 
at keeping regional players out of the internal issues of the GCC states, since it 
is based on an pan-Arabism which promotes simultaneously Arab cooperation 
and respect of national sovereignty. The third level of security perceptions is the 
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and Policy Studies, No. 86, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 
September 2010 
EU-GCC relationship: EFP in the Middle East 
 
Angelos Lenos  80 
intra-GCC. The small states are wary of the dominant role of the KSA. Because 
of this, they have not allowed the creation of a joint military force or a joint 
military pact, other than the weak and decentralised Peninsula Shield, the 
military arm of the GCC which has been silent for most of the part of the life of 
the GCC. As it is becoming obvious, beyond hard security issues related to the 
perceptions of the GCC elites, there is also a very significant ideological and 
(self) perception aspect in this three-level context. It can be argued that due to 
this bipolar hostile relationship of Iran and the USA (especially during the 
presidency of George Bush and the very religious driven language used in the 
US foreign policy) the GCC states had to highlight their Islamic roots and defend 
their Islamic culture, despite the fact that they are still dependent on USA hard 
security capabilities. Furthermore, the “democratisation” of the Middle East 
added to the perceived threats against the unelected ruling families of the GCC 
states217. As a result the Gulf rulers had adopted more conservative approaches 
regarding the public – political domain, despite some window dressing 
announcement for reforms for which nevertheless reminded others of the 
cultural and religious differentiation of the Gulf region, compared to the West. At 
the same time the rulers have made the distinction between the Sunni majorities 
and the Shia minorities, which are most of the time absent from the national 
narratives of the GCC states but that gained global attention because of the 
“Shia Crescent” of the 2000s. The fears about the ideological influence of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and the minority issue have become prominent in the 
perceptions of the GCC rulers and as such they both feed the desire of the royal 
families to promote the dual identity of the GCC societies in terms of Islamism 
and Arabism. Moreover, the mediating role of the GCC states also aims  at 
tackling another double ideological challenge; from the traditional pan-Arab 
states which were socially radical and revisionist and more recently from the 
transnational ideological movements of conservative Islam which also aim at 
transforming the political and societal systems in the Middle East. In the name 
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of pan-Arabism the GCC states consolidate their regional status with the use of 
diplomacy, ideology and even with the allocation of funds to various actors in 
the region218. These multiple identities and affiliations are therefore interwoven 
and they become an integral part of the national and regional value systems of 
the GCC states because of the significance they carry for the security of these 
states. 
 This need of the GCC rulers for independence has also shaped their approach 
in the engagement with the international community during the last two 
decades. During this time, the main challenge and opportunity for the GCC 
states was to deal with globalisation. Mahmood Sariolghalam claims that 
globalisation can be distinguished between the economic and the political – 
cultural aspects. In terms of economy, he argues, the Middle Eastern states 
face no difficulty to engage with the international economy, even in the doctrines 
of the most conservative approaches of the political and religious leaders. This 
has been proven true, even in the case of parties of political Islam, where 
culturally conservative parties are in favour of neoliberal economic policies. 
However, when it comes to the political and cultural aspects of globalisation, 
there is resistance due to the fact that “values do matter in security and political 
cooperation in the Middle East”219. According to Sariolghalam this is the main 
differentiation between the western understanding of globalisation, where 
economics, culture and politics are packaged because of the “philosophical 
rationality” behind the western meaning of globalisation compared to the 
“instrumental rationality” of economic globalisation which the leaders in the 
Middle East have applied220, while avoiding cultural globalisation221. This is 
happening for two reasons. First, the cultural identity of the Middle Easterners is 
highly influenced by Islam which is a politicised religion and as such it shapes 
the notions of individuals, states and social interactions in a way which is 
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significantly different from the one in the western world. Second, there are 
different expectations and perceptions because of these two different 
approaches of globalisation; the philosophical and the instrumentalist. Thus, 
whilst the EU treats globalisation and global governance as a way of making 
concessions related to the relinquishment of nation-state sovereignty, in the 
case of the GCC states, globalisation does not entail these characteristics, since 
there is a clear distinction between the economic and the political/cultural 
aspects of globalisation. The GCC have engaged with the first aspect but not 
the latter222. In this approach, the GCC states seek to establish international 
cooperation with  Asian markets and states in order to prove their readiness to 
engage with the international system of governance, but at the same time to 
control the direction that the deepening of international cooperation is taking223. 
Even though the abovementioned approach can be criticised as being an 
attempt to explain (or even justify) the lack of more liberal social and cultural 
approaches from the elites, it does provide an interesting departure point for 
understanding the struggle for independence in the Gulf region. In order to 
achieve national and regional independence, the Gulf leaders apply a top down 
approach for a national and regional identity building process, which is 
composed of Arabic norms and Islamic values. The national narratives are 
rewritten and reinforced because of the “existential fears”, as Neil Patrick calls 
them224, of the ruling families, both in tackling first the internal socio-economic 
challenges of (i) a booming youth population and the subsequent youth 
unemployment and (ii) the sectarian minorities within the states and second the 
external threats, both in terms of movements of (radical) political Islam, anti-
American Arabism and the hegemonic aspirations of Iran. These new identities 
serve as defence mechanisms and as a source of legitimacy for the ruling elites 
in the GCC.   
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Consequently, when the EU (and the western world more generally) promotes 
globalisation and global governance, based on its own norms and values, the 
GCC states are finding new partners which reconfirm their own path to 
globalisation and accommodate their own perceptions about their rising role in 
world economy and politics. More specifically, the EU perceives itself as a 
civilian and normative actor which has built its own destiny of prosperity and 
security because of its own (universal) norms and values and wants to export 
this to the outside world. It pushes for its normative agenda on a civilian basis, 
by becoming a major global aid donor and it has called for the EU and its 
member states to take advantage of that in order to promote reforms through 
trade and development policies and by adding conditionality clauses to the aid 
provided, either as funds or as assistance programmes which need to be 
strategically aligned with the goals of the Union. Moreover, the EU sees itself as 
a leader for the “renewal of the multilateral order”225, with the assistance of its 
partners around the world. At the same time it recognises the fact that 
sustainable solutions call for the engagement of “all regional players with a 
common stake in peace. Sovereign governments must take responsibility for the 
consequences of their actions and hold a shared responsibility”226 to tackle 
common challenges and threats which have become “complex and 
interconnected”227 due to globalisation. In a comment that it is highly significant 
when dealing with the GCC states, which have developed a mentality of 
safeguarding their sovereignty, the EU deems that “sovereignty entails 
responsibility”228 because issues of human security and state security are trans-
boundary. The GCC are becoming “visible global actors” and attempt to develop 
deeper economic cooperation with the rest of the emerging powers with whom 
they share economic interests, but most importantly, similar perceptions about 
the shift of global economic weight from the West to the East. The GCC states 
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look with admiration at the Asian development model which is strictly economic 
driven without any political conditionality or any associated necessity for 
significant political reforms. Regarding the global political and economic system, 
the GCC states and Asia, unlike the West, are reformist actors. They are more 
eager to assume a greater role, receive recognition and thus achieve leverage 
at a global level229. The GCC states seek this enhanced role in international 
affairs, both in economics and in politics, as explicitly stated by their ruling elites, 
in many recent occasions in relation to the assistance provided for tackling the 
global financial crisis and for regulating global economic governance230. They 
have also reached certain levels of understanding with other emerging powers, 
mostly the BRICS, with which they are willing to jointly pursue structural reforms 
in the international regulatory system and the weight given to emerging powers 
in international governing bodies231. 
In this context, it can be suggested that EU value-driven goals are contested 
and it is a great challenge for the Europeans to promote their values and norms 
in the Gulf region, to the extent that these are associated with cultural 
predispositions. This argument is central in the analysis of the EU-GCC 
relationship within the framework of a ‘strategic partnership’ that will follow in the 
forthcoming chapters.  
 
Conclusions 
By using its civilian means, the EU has attempted to engage with the Middle 
Eastern states through multi-sectoral cooperation and by establishing regional 
projects in order to promote its values. The promotion of EU norms aimed, as 
officially declared, at the establishment of a secure and prosperous 
neighbourhood. Nevertheless, it has been argued that this normative language 
and the EU’s value-dressed goals have been the result of strategic planning by 
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the EU in order to advance its core economic and political interests. 
Furthermore the fact that the EU has applied civilian means, aiming at the 
gradual transformation of the internal (political and economic) structures of its 
Arab neighbours, as well as applying civilian instruments  for conflict resolution 
has reproduced the EU self-image as a ‘civilian’ and ‘normative power’. The EU 
has been seen, indeed, as a non-military actor by third parties leading to the 
reinforcement of this EU (self-)image to the extent that it affects the EFP making 
system. However, the ‘civilian’ and ‘normative’ power arguments have also 
received criticism, to the extent that the EU has been taking advantage of its 
(economic and political) superiority over its Arab neighbours in the 
Mediterranean Sea in order to export its norms, values and interests creating 
frustration among the Arab Mediterranean countries. The lack of this kind of 
primacy over its partners in the Gulf region is a fundamental difference for the 
EFP, which this thesis will address. 
Regarding the existing work on the EU-GCC relationship, in the most prominent 
work in this area, Youngs and Nonneman agree on the interaction of interests, 
norms, values, and perceptions and images in the shaping of EU foreign policy 
and that of GCC states. Youngs suggests that the values are strategically 
calculated so that they correspond to the interests of the EU and its member 
states, showing low levels of willingness in pushing for political conditionality or 
consuming political capital in order to promote the EU’s values in the Gulf 
region. To the extent that the EU exports its values, it does so at a gradual pace 
and by long-term engagement with various actors of the GCC states. 
Nonneman argues that the security related interests of the GCC states are 
tightly linked to the perceptions the Gulf rulers have developed for themselves 
and their three environments. Therefore they are more pragmatic in their foreign 
policy making system rather than ideological. The value system they have 
developed on the basis of the culture of ‘autonomy’ is the result of their interests 
and perceptions. Having in mind the different context in which the EFP has been 
shaped and applied in relation to the Mediterranean Basin and the Arabian 
Peninsula, understanding the coexistence of values, interests and perceptions, 
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as suggested by Youngs and Nonneman, becomes even more imperative to the 
analysis of the EU-GCC relationship, since the Gulf leaders have the economic 
and political power (especially in the 2000s) to negotiate effectively these 
elements with the EU. Since ‘autonomy’ and ‘multidependence’ are core notions 
at the centre of  the GCC foreign policy making system , this thesis will need to 
deal with the question of how the EU-GCC relationship has addressed these 
and to what extent  EU values and interests are compatible with this sense of 
‘autonomy’. Are the concerns, needs and expectations of the GCC states 
accommodated in the EU’s strategic calculation of values and interests?  
Moreover, the role of ‘political conditionality’ has been deemed, by Youngs, to 
be weak and for this reason different EFP approaches should be explored for 
promoting the EU’s values and interests in a way that  will not undermine its 
(self-)image. Youngs   analysed the relationship from bottom up and top down 
approaches before he concluded that in this case, it was top down. However, he 
opened a window for research regarding the role of actors in layers other than 
those of elites. Similarly, Nonneman introduced the role of different actors, 
rejecting the monolithic character of the state. However, they both focus on the 
role of actors which are directly related to the state. Nevertheless, as there is 
growing interdependency between the EU and the GCC states at economic and 
technical levels, at transnational, bilateral and bi-regional levels, it would be 
fruitful to explore the role of non state actors, next to those that are state related, 
within the various environments of the GCC states.  
In addition, the level of symmetry not only reflects on the bi-regional relationship 
but also on the role of parties within the broader international context. Thus, it 
becomes even more essential that this thesis address the relationship within all 
the environments (or levels of interactions); bilateral, bi-regional and 
international, in order to capture more efficiently the essence of the notions of 
‘symmetry’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘multi-dependence’ 
Furthermore, neither Youngs nor Nonneman  assess the EU-GCC relationship 
on cases other than political reforms, and most importantly they do not place the 
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bi-regional interactions within the framework of a symmetrical partnership, since 
they have as starting points the patterns of the unequal partnership plans that 
the EU has applied in different parts of the Middle East.  
Therefore, the current level of interactions of the EU and the GCC states call for 
a broader, more comprehensive model of analysis which will build upon the 
special character of the EU and GCC relations, namely the symmetrical power 
balance. Having in mind Youngs’ reference to the attempt of the EU to see this 
bi-regional cooperation through the lens of ‘strategic partnership’, this thesis 
shall apply the notion of ‘strategic partnership’, by incorporating the interests, 
values and perceptions of the two regions, in cases other than the promotion of 
human rights and democracy and by attempting to examine the role of various 
actors in all three environments: the national, the regional and the international. 
The next chapter shall provide an analysis of the notion of “strategic 
partnership” as a tool and a policy for EFP. 
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THE EU AND ITS PARTNERS 
Introduction 
The ambition of this thesis is to test the assumption that the EU-GCC 
relationship is evolving towards a strategic partnership, as the EU has called for 
partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East including the Gulf 
region232. In this context it is important to provide an outline of what ‘strategic 
partnership’ means in EFP studies and how it can be applied in our case 
studies. However, the theoretical debate about the EFP has been heavily 
influenced by the role of the EU in its neighbourhood, both in the east and in the 
south. Even when the EU was seen as a player in more remote regions, these 
usually involved the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries through the 
agreements of Cotonou and Lome, the ASEAN states and the countries of 
Mercosur in Latin America. During the last decade, however, new rising powers 
have gained significance in the world system creating new dynamics for 
international cooperation challenging the traditional pattern of EU relationships. 
The EU has to deal with the new world setting which challenges the primacy of 
the Western world in economics and politics, because of the role of China, 
Russia, India and the Gulf region in economic development, energy policies, 
global governance and security. The EU has acknowledged these challenges in 
the international setting. In the European Security Strategy it recognised itself as 
a ‘credible and effective actor’233 which can take advantage of new opportunities 
and tackle the new threats through international cooperation and more 
specifically, “through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and 
through partnerships with key actors”234 or ‘strategic partnerships’, the 
latter term  evolving during the last decade. 
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Indeed, the term ‘strategic partnership’ appeared in EU documents for the first 
time in 1999, in the EU-Russia Common Strategy235. Since then, the term has 
been used quite extensively but in a very vague context having different 
meanings pertaining to the specific time and case it was used. It is striking that 
for eleven years the notion of ‘strategic partnership’ was a notion empty of any 
substance since the EU had not reached an understanding about the term itself. 
Even the recent debate among EU policymakers about the concept of ‘strategic 
partnership’ did not deliver a clear definition of this term. It is for this reason that 
the debate on the specific concept of strategic partnership and on the way the 
EU applies this foreign policy tool, is an ongoing process. The aim of this 
chapter is to build upon the current literature on the EU’s strategic partnerships, 
incorporating the interesting material of the European Commission documents 
on ‘strategic partners’ and the latest reports prepared by the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) and presented by HR Ashton, in order to discuss the 
academic debate on this tool of EFP having in mind the perceptions of this 
notion by the EU policymakers themselves. Only after having a more 
comprehensive image of what ‘strategic partnerships’ are, will this thesis be able 
to provide a methodological plan for the exploration of EU-GCC relationship 
(which will follow in the next chapter).    
 This chapter, therefore, will show how the term has been developed over the 
last fifteen years, and it will present the new elements of ‘strategic partnerships’ 
compared to the most traditional tools of the EFP. Secondly by introducing the 
material that was produced by the EEAS during the intra-EU discussions in late 
2010 and by evaluating the approaches of the current academic debate about 
this concept, the ambition of this chapter is to interweave the theoretical 
approaches and EU practitioner understandings of the notion of strategic 
partnership. In this regard, it will assess the elements, criteria and hierarchy of 
these partnerships in order to shed light on ‘strategic partnership’ as a foreign 
policy tool for the EU, for managing its relations with rising powers, but also as a 
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set of predefined actions for addressing its needs and concerns as well as for 
promoting its interests, values and self-images. Based on that, it will also 
provide a single definition of “strategic partnerships”, which will be used for 
exploring the development of the EU-GCC relationship towards a ‘strategic 
partnership’. 
 
History of the ‘strategic partnership’ term 
The birth of the term by the European Commission 
Even though the term ‘strategic partnership’ has been used widely in EU 
documents during the last few years and EU policymakers have referred to this 
term very frequently, it still remains very vague as to what a ‘strategic 
partnership’ actually means. The history of the development of ‘strategic 
partnerships’ can explain, in a way, the lack of a very specific concept, whilst at 
the same time it provides an outline of the EU aims and tools that are 
accommodated within this term. 
Strategic partnerships emerged as a result of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
according to which the objectives of the EFP could be pursued by common 
strategies, joint actions and common positions as well as by strengthening intra-
EU cooperation in the conduct of foreign policy236. Even though common 
strategies were applied in relation to Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean, 
the EU abandoned this term soon after, and replaced it with ‘strategic 
partnerships’.  Nevertheless it should be noted that it was within this framework 
and more specifically within the document ‘Common Strategy on Russia’ that 
the term ‘strategic partnership’ was born. 
Indeed, the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia (1999) explicitly referred to the 
goal of strengthening the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia. 
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The European Council therefore adopts this Common Strategy to 
strengthen the strategic partnership between the Union and 
Russia at the dawn of a new century237. 
A few months later in the EU’s Common Strategy on Ukraine (1999), European 
policymakers stated: 
The strategic partnership between the European Union (EU) and 
Ukraine, based on shared values and common interests, is a vital 
factor enhancing peace, stability and prosperity in Europe238. 
Even though the two documents referred for the first time to the term of 
‘strategic partnership’, they did not provide any specific definition of this notion. 
Nevertheless in the case of Russia, it was unambiguously stated that this is a 
"relationship, based on shared democratic values [which] will help Russia to 
assert its European identity". The EU has the strategic goals of cooperating with 
a "stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Russia" for "promoting global 
security and responding to the common challenges of the continent through 
intensified cooperation with Russia". It also aimed at providing the necessary 
cooperation so that Russia could integrate socially and economically with 
Europe, which was in need of Russian energy sources. In the case of the 
relationship with Ukraine the main pillars of this partnership were (i) the 
democratisation process of Ukraine and the economic reforms of the country 
towards a more open -regionally and globally integrated- economy, (ii) the 
country’s role in the stability of its neighbourhood and (iii) Ukraine’s orientation 
of foreign policy towards a pro-EU stance. Therefore, according to the two 
abovementioned documents the relationships of ‘strategic partnerships’ were 
based on common interests, mainly economic and in security, as well as on the 
values and (self-)images the EU was promoting. Therefore, the first two 
documents on ‘strategic partnerships’ were revealed an attempt by the EU to 
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deal with two major EU neighbours by exporting its values and securing its 
interests in the EU’s immediate external environment. The EU was aimed at 
shaping the external and internal policies of these two countries (through 
reforms and identity building processes) in a way that Russia and Ukraine were 
integrated in the broader economic and geopolitical environment of Europe, as 
envisaged by the EU. This approach reflects the way the EU imagines itself and 
its neighbouring countries in the European continent. The EU becomes the 
model to be followed for the sake of development and security. The EFP was so 
confident in providing assistance in this direction, to the extent that it was ready 
to “help Russia to assert its European identity”. Of course, this identity was 
made of up of the EU’s values.. 
 
The first documents on ‘strategic partnerships’ 
In a more comprehensive way, the EU addressed the issue of ‘strategic 
partnerships’ in 2003, within the document ‘A secure Europe in a better world - 
the European Security Strategy’ (ESS)239.  After it described the key threats for 
the security of the EU, the document outlines the strategic objectives of the 
Union, which consist of tackling global threats and challenges through 
multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships 
with key actors. NATO, the USA and Russia were named as strategic partners 
of the EU, while the strategy paper called for developing strategic partnerships 
with “Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our 
goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support.”240 The ESS linked 
the common threats and challenges with the necessity of international 
cooperation and coordination with strategic partners. Thus, the rationale behind 
the ‘strategic partnerships’ was the need of the EU to engage with third parties 
in order to tackle common challenges, either bilaterally or multilaterally. In this 
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case the framework of ‘strategic partnerships’ appeared to be a tool of the EU to 
pursue its strategic interests.  
After the EU identified the goal of forming strategic partnerships with key actors 
in order to face the challenges at an international level,  the European 
Commission presented Communications for strategic partnerships with China 
(2003)241, India (2004)242, South Africa (2006)243, Brazil (2007)244 and Mexico 
(2008)245.  In December 2003 the European Council also adopted the 
“Strengthening the EU's Partnership with the Arab World”246 document, which 
describes a way of strengthening relations with the countries of the Middle East 
and for promoting the strategic goals of the EU in the Mediterranean basin and 
the Gulf region. 
A brief review of these documents reveals the rationale and the common 
components of this new foreign policy tool. This was a single and coherent 
framework (Brazil, South Africa) through which, the EU was going to “clearly 
and jointly define objectives” (South Africa) as well as formulate policies in a 
“coordinated” manner (Brazil). The selection of  ‘strategic partners’ was  made 
based on their “increasingly” important role in the economic and political system 
at a global level  or because of the potential they have at the global level 
doubled by their key role in regional politics. China was described as “an 
increasingly energetic player in world affairs” while India was identified as “an 
increasingly important international player and regional power”. Brazil was seen 
as “central to the success of the EU-Mercosur negotiations, an EU strategic 
objective”247 and “a pillar of South American stability”248. South Africa and 
Mexico were also described as key regional actors with important roles at the 
international level. The ‘strategic partnerships’ aimed  at enhancing the 
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cooperation of the EU and its partners at all three levels, bilateral, bi-regional 
and multilateral, in order to promote EU interests, values and its (self-)image. 
Furthermore, a process of institutionalisation was introduced in these 
partnerships since various bodies were established in order to promote 
cooperation. In the case of China, “all relevant players on both sides” were 
invited to participate in intensified sectional dialogues, as were those of South 
Africa and Brazil. In the case of India a Joint Action Plan249 was  introduced in 
order to engage civil societies and business communities in a wide range of 
fields, while the EU-Mexico Joint Executive Plan250 included an EU-Mexico 
Summit, a Joint Council, a Joint Committee, a Civil Society Dialogue Forum, a 
Joint Parliamentary Commission, next to sectional dialogue committees for 
Political Dialogue, Education, Science and Technology, Social Cohesion and 
Environment and of course the regular consultation meetings taking place at 
international organisations. Parallel procedures for Free Trade Agreements 
were also initiated. 
Despite the fact the EU was ready to accept, in its official narrative, that these 
partnerships were “enduring and mutually beneficial relationship[s] of equals” 
(China) and based on “mutual respect”251 between equal partners252 (India), the 
EU was still projecting itself as the provider of the necessary assistance to these 
countries, in order for them to become an integral part of the world system. In 
this process the EU was promoting its values and norms as if they were 
universal, advocating multilateral global governance in which all major players 
assumed equal responsibility and of course, it aimed  at advancing its economic 
interests. The EU committed itself in providing assistance to China’s “transition 
to a stable, prosperous and open country that fully embraces democracy, free 
market principles and the rule of law” and in “actively support[ing] China’s 
emergence as a successful and responsible member of the international 
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community”253. In addition, the EU-India partnership documents provided an 
explicit list of reforms requested by the EU   confirming the EU’s willingness to 
provide the necessary technical assistance for these to materialise. In the case 
of South Africa, it was suggested that the integration process of the EU could 
become a model for the national policies of South Africa in creating a more 
cohesive institutional and social framework and tackling the challenges of 
imbalances in the country. In all the documents of EU’s ‘strategic partnerships’, 
there were references to the need for the respect of democratic values, 
protection of human rights, and abolition of protectionism in favour of open 
market policies and good governance that would advance trade volumes. Even 
in the case of China, which has been the most powerful of these partners and 
the most different one in terms of political, economic and social organisation, the 
European Council did not fail to mention again the need for respect of human 
rights by the Chinese government, as well as the support for economic – trade 
cooperation “on the basis of open markets, fair competition and compliance with 
rules”. At the regional level, the EU-Mexico Joint Executive Plan reads that the 
EU “has important experience on institutional and capacity enhancement” and it 
is ready to share this “wealth of experience, especially in creating and 
implementing regional strategies”254, reaffirming the behaviour of the EU, which 
had been acting as the exporter of technical assistance as well as of norms and 
values. This interest of the EU to assist and promote regional approaches and 
projects, is repeated in the documents referring to ‘strategic partnerships’ with 
India, Brazil and South Africa. This inter-regional approach of the EFP 
corresponds to the normative agenda of the EU, to encourage supranational 
governance as a tool for development and stability, as well as its interests to 
support the creation and development of other regional organisations which will 
reflect its own structure and role, in a way that the EU’s presence and actorness 
in world politics is reinforced. In addition the EU, through these partnerships, is 
using civilian means in order to engage its partners in the promotion of its norms 
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at the international level. The EU has been willing, as seen, to assist the 
integration of its partners in the global system but in doing so it promotes a 
global, cosmopolitan system of law, which all the members of the international 
community should respect. Thus, the EU emphasises the component of “shared 
responsibility” in joint actions at a multilateral level, both in terms of global 
cooperation but also within their own regions. Therefore, the EU’s partners 
would need to adhere to these rules, assume their responsibilities as regional 
and international powers and jointly tackle challenges in regional and world 
security, in human security and in development. 
Despite the long list of new (to-become) strategic partners, the Communications 
did not provide any clear definition of ‘strategic partnership’ or any solid 
explanation on how the strategic partners are selected. The 2008 report for the 
implementation of the ESS255 only added more confusion to the issue. Beyond 
the fact that once again an EU document was referring to strategic partnership 
without any specific definition of the concept, this time the report was 
surprisingly naming Norway and Switzerland as EU partners, without any further 
explanation. In the whole document, the EU-NATO relationship was the only 
one clearly defined as a strategic partnership.  
 
Strategic Partnerships in the European External Action Service 
Even in the Lisbon Treaty, the concept of strategic partnership is extremely 
vague. The treaty has not been of any help in understanding the rationale and 
the criteria for this foreign policy tool. On the contrary, the Lisbon Treaty urged 
the EU to seek "partnerships with third countries and international, regional and 
global organisations which share the principles of democracy, the rule of law, 
the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect 
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for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law"256. Having 
in mind the ‘strategic partners’ already listed in this brief review, it is not very 
easy to understand how all of them match with these criteria.. Nevertheless, it is 
self-evident from the abovementioned description that the normative language 
prevails.  
It was only in 2010, following the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, that high-
level EU policymakers engaged seriously with the need to define ‘strategic 
partnerships’ and to name the ‘strategic partners’. From the early months of 
assuming his post, the first permanent President of the European Council, 
Herman Van Rompuy, emphasised the need for strategic planning and for 
engaging with ‘key partners’, namely the United States, Canada, Russia, China, 
Japan, India, Brazil according to a speech he gave in the College of Europe in 
Belgium in February 2010257. 
We have developed European instruments for real foreign policy. For 
instruments to work optimally, one needs to link them to a common 
strategic vision. Where do we go? Who are our partners? Where do we 
want to be in ten or twenty years’ time ahead?258 
In September 2010, after the invitation of both Herman van Rompuy and the 
High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
and the Vice President of the Commission, Catherine Aston, the European 
Council in the formation of the Heads of State or Government and the Gymnich 
meeting discussed, for the first time, the concept of ‘strategic partnerships’. 
Moreover, HR Ashton provided a presentation259 in which she named the 
‘strategic partners’ (Russia, US, Japan, Canada, China, India, South Africa, 
Brazil, Mexico). In a positive development towards clarifying who the EU truly 
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considers as strategic partners, this was the first time EU had provided such a 
list.  
In December 2010, HR Ashton presented her intermediate progress reports on 
the EU-USA260, EU-China261 and EU-Russia262 strategic partnerships. These 
reports provide the different rationales behind each partnership and at the same 
time the common elements of EU approaches and expectations. Nevertheless, 
while these reports provide useful material for the analysis of the term and EU 
approaches, they do not respond to the existing gap in the definition of the 
concept of ‘strategic partnerships’.   
 
The ‘European External Action Service unpacks strategic partnerships’ 
During the discussion on ‘strategic partners’ in the Gymnich meeting of 
September 2010, HR Ashton described as strategic partners those countries or 
organisations which “have the ability to influence, either negatively or positively, 
the lives of the Europeans, in politics and economy, as well as in other important 
fields”.  Even though this is a very vague and actually problematic definition, as 
many organisations (even multinational private firms) can influence either way 
the daily life of Europe, she went on to set further criteria for ‘strategic 
partners’263. 
In the slideshow that the EEAS presented during the Gymnich meeting, foreign 
policy and security, economic relations and global challenges were the three 
areas which were prioritised in order to identify strategic partners. There was 
also a  reminder that according to the Lisbon Treaty, the EFP should take into 
consideration the need for a long term and comprehensive approach, move 
from position to strategy and conduct foreign policy in a way that ‘economics 
meet politics’. Furthermore, working on the examples of China and India, the 
EEAS unpacked EU strategy setting the following goals. The EU should work in 
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a way that brings economics and politics together and thus develop a more 
complex network of interactions and interests. Thus, the EU should aim at 
strengthening its economic links through FTA agreements, and become partner 
with third parties on security challenges, either at a global level (China) or by 
starting within the region (India). It should aim to have a single voice in relation 
to partners and make the best use of tools in engaging with them. In addition the 
EU should be more result-oriented and look into ways of influencing its 
interlocutor with overall leverage and trade-offs, achieving real progress not only 
on economics and security but also on promoting rule of law and human rights.  
The reports that the EEAS provided to the member states in December 2010 
reflected the major points that were described in the previous paragraph. 
However, the emphasis and the role of these elements have been different in 
each case and the articulation of their importance was also diverse in the 
reports. Having in mind that these reports have not been made public by the EU 
and they are introduced in the debate by this thesis, it is deemed that brief 
analyses of the reports on the ‘strategic partnerships’ with USA, Russia and 
China are important, in order to highlight the way EU policymakers of the EEAS 
understand and apply this tool.  
 
EU-USA partnership 
The EU-USA partnership is based on a long and familiar list of shared interests 
and values, but the two partners need to work further on transforming their 
common objectives in economics and global security into a shared agenda and 
shared commitments. The share values serve as the basis for the relationship 
but due to this convergence on values, there is no need for them to be explicitly 
referred to in a lengthy way. On the contrary, “economics remains at the heart of 
the relationship”. Beyond commercial interests, the shared EU-US agenda 
consists of global challenges, the need for development and crisis management, 
tackling counter-terrorism and organised crime, working on their respective 
energy security and enhancing cyber security. 
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In addition, it should be underlined that this relationship does not  only does  aim 
at adding to the bilateral level of relations but most importantly it aims at 
articulating common approaches in regional policies and coordinating actions at 
the international level. Therefore, “the partnership has to go global if it is to be 
relevant and effective”. The EU aims at a strong and capable EU in the world 
system in order to achieve prosperity and security in its region and to enable 
itself to address global challenges. The US, in this respect, will continue to have 
an interest in a strong and capable EU.   
Regarding the available tools for this ‘strategic partnership’, the document calls 
the EU to strengthen its engagement with the USA beyond the federal 
government by maximising the potential of relations between USA 
constituencies and institutions within the EU, adding a strong legislative 
component in the overall strategy. In any case, the EU should underline the 
strategic character of the partnership. It should deal with summits in a more 
strategic manner. Beyond the Ministerial Political Dialogues, communication 
should be pursued at working-level contacts as well in order to maximise the 
informal nature and result-oriented character of the relationship. It should also 
aim at coordinating bilateral relationships after the EU identifies the core 
priorities and its strengths and defines the possible trade-offs by linking different 
issues.  
Although this is a brief and quite vague description of the EU-US ‘strategic 
partnership’, the fact that this relationship is “very natural” is indeed widely 
spread in the way the EU approaches its transatlantic partner in this document. 
Beyond the repetition about shared culture and history, it does not create any 
impression of competition between the two partners. On the contrary, the EU 
policymakers felt the need to clarify that in spite of how close the EU and the US 
views are, the EU needs “an independent approach, rather than assuming an 
EU-US consensus”. In the economic field the EU identifies itself in the same 
camp as the US and in contrast to the emerging economic powers. It is for this 
reason they need to work closer together in order to “fight protectionism, boost 
world trade and support structural and financial market reform”. 
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EU- Russia partnership 
This partnership matters enormously to the EU, but there is a great deal of 
untapped potential.  The EU and Russia share common challenges regarding 
security in their common neighbourhood and they have common interests in the 
economic development of the continent. Thus, strong cooperation for promoting 
bilateral relations in security and economics as well as international coordination 
for global challenges is needed. The EU’s overarching objective is to promote 
Russia’s full integration into international rules-based political and economic 
structures (WTO, energy security principles and security mechanisms). Russia 
needs EU support for its own modernisation needs, its economic integration with 
the EU market, and wants to become part of the common Eurasian security 
space, thus developing a dynamic relationship in relation to the US and China. It 
is already clear that the political and economic reforms of Russia are dealt from 
different points of view. Russia seeks modernisation and investments to support 
this process, while the EU underlines the need for Russia to “create attractive 
conditions” with transparency, liberalisation of market access in order to support 
Russia’s integration into the international rules-based system. Thus, the EU 
attempts to export its own model and to promote its own norms and interests, 
through reforms and multilateral engagement..  
Therefore, according to EEAS, what is needed is a more joined-up agenda, 
against the narrow compartmentalised approach in certain fields, which exists 
today. It is suggested that the post-Lisbon EU institutions allow a more strategic 
approach for the EU-Russia ‘strategic partnership’, by “identifying, agreeing and 
then respecting common positions”. In terms of institutions, the relationship is 
well developed but an overall goal should be to try to move away from over-
formalised, highly scripted meeting formats to more flexible, efficient, result-
oriented and focused ones. This framework also lacks problem-solving capacity. 
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In order for this relationship to become more effective, consistency needs to be 
strengthened in two dimensions: First, between the EU and its member states 
and second across the various strands of EU policies, against perceptions of 
internal contradictions. This is the way the EU can become more strategic 
regarding its partnership with Russia.  
It is interesting to note that regarding EU values, these are indeed mentioned 
but to a significantly shorter extent compared to common interests. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the fact visa liberalisation (which is Russia’s 
priority) “naturally ties in with [...] the effectiveness of the rule of law and the 
protection of human rights across Russia” is an obvious attempt to link 
concessions (of high priority) with political conditionality. The term “democracy” 
is not mentioned even once in this document, but there is a reminder that 
Russia can be “a reliable and responsible partner on the basis of the respect for 
the fundamental values that Russia has subscribed to as a member of the UN, 
the Council of Europe and the OSCE”. 
 
EU – China partnership 
The EU – China partnership is a mutually essential relationship for both partners 
to reach sustainable prosperity, despite the differences in political culture, 
political system and level of participation at international organisations. The EU 
stresses, however, the fact that this partnership entails duties as well and the 
fact that thus far the existing relations of the two parties falls short of its 
potential. The EU identifies that in major international issues China and the EU 
have reached common understanding and in some cases, this was transformed 
into concrete action (China’s participation in the ATALANTA operation against 
piracy). However, as the EEAS points out, the EU prioritises “inalienable and 
universal human rights” while China is not as ready as the EU to sacrifice trade 
and energy access in order to promote common interests in third countries and 
it prioritises development and stability instead of the values emphasised by the 
EU. However, the fact that the EU has presented the need for “free and fair 
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access to global markets” first in the list of its interests in this relationship can be 
associated with the economic-driven agenda of the Union, especially if we recall 
the criticism of scholars that democratic values and the human rights are 
strategically articulated in a way to promote business oriented goals. Indeed, the 
first short term priority is focusing on the “most developed area and strong 
basis” of the EU-China relationship, that of trade.  Further progress in this field 
could be achieved by “improving market access and investment conditions” and 
by “business to business integration”. Under the trade chapter the EU and China 
have also included issues which could fall under a more normative agenda for 
the EFP, that of climate change and energy, as well as the social challenges 
raised by massive urbanisation in China. There is also a section devoted to the 
rule of law, human rights, civil society and migration. Therefore, at a theoretical 
level at least, economic interests and values co-exist within this framework. 
Moreover, key security issues are addressed at regional and international level, 
with a special focus on Africa where China has focused a great volume of its 
interest in foreign policy. In this ‘strategic partnership’, multilateralism appears to 
be both a goal and a tool. On the one hand, multilateralism is a tool for engaging 
China in the field of human rights and world economic reforms, whilst on the 
other hand multilateralism and more specifically “rules-based global 
governance” are part of the defined EFP objectives within this relationship. 
Lastly, mutual understanding is considered to be a priority in order to correct 
distorted perceptions of each other, at political and public level.  
However, despite the positive language used in this document and the attempt 
to avoid stressing the strategic competition that may exist between the EU and 
China (politically and commercially), it is indeed acknowledged that the EU-
China relationship is “often dominated by periodic tension over trade and 
economic issues”, different approaches on security issues and also 
“divergences concerning different concepts of governance and human rights”. 
Therefore, this is a relationship which is shaped by common interests, which are 
not always transformed into common actions, but there are cases in which 
different approaches may create the impression of tensions between the two 
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partners. In terms of values, there is a lack of mutual understanding, but the EU 
insists on bringing human rights, democracy and good governance into the 
dialogue. In order to achieve this, the EU is applying both bilateral instruments 
(bilateral dialogues) as well as a multilateral approach. For example, the term 
“rules-based global governance” which is used in this document twice, highlights 
the agreement of the partners to pursue reforms of international organisations 
and the global economic system, but simultaneously leaves space for 
interpretation of the more specific positions of the two sides. Thus, it can be 
argued that this relationship, which is described as a necessary one so that the 
two parties can maintain prosperity and security, sets the framework for the 
inclusion of interests, values and for setting the basis for mutual understanding 
and aims at creating strategic patience (against any divergences), strategic trust 
(for transparency and for respecting each other key interests) and strategic 
interdependence (by learning to accept each other as indispensable). 
Moreover, what is important to note is the “architecture of the relationship”, 
which is defined in a more obvious way than in past cases: It entails high level 
dialogues, common guidelines at EU level for dealing with China, sectoral 
dialogues and working groups, the conclusion of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, the more strategic use of cooperation instruments, and 
public diplomacy. Beyond the EU-China level approach this partnership could 
be developed at bilateral level between China and single member states as well 
as at regional and multilateral level.  
 
The new elements of the ‘strategic partnerships’ in the EFP 
It is already obvious from the abovementioned descriptions of ‘strategic 
partnerships’ as presented in the EEAS documents, that there are important 
differences in the elements of these kind of relationships of the EU with third 
parties, compared to the more traditional cooperation and partnership 
agreements of the EFP, namely the ACP-EU agreement, the European 
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Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EuroMediterranean Partnership/ Union for 
the Mediterranean (EuroMed / UfM).  
First of all, there is a structural difference, which is undeniably the more 
symmetrical balance of power between Europe and the new rising powers which 
is determined by economic and political cooperation and competition 
simultaneously. As presented in detail in the last two chapters, the EU is taking 
advantage of its allure, and uses its economic weight in a strategic manner, 
promoting its economic and political interests as well as its norms in its external 
environment264. Its policies are articulated based on the perceptions of itself and 
the outsiders and they are applied either bilaterally or multilaterally by the use of 
political conditionality265 and the instrumental application of multilateralism. 
Consequently, the EU acts as the dominant party of the relationship and the 
conclusion of international agreements266 are mainly driven by the EU’s 
interests and values267 as well as perception rather than on the basis of the 
equal contribution of all parties in the shaping of the agreements.  
In the case of the rising powers, there is an interdependency factor which is 
crucial to the way EU and the third parties negotiate and perceive each other. 
                                                          
264 Holden, Patrick , ‘The European Community’s MEDA Aid Programme: A Strategic Instrument of Civilian Power?’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, Volume 8, Issue 3, 2003, pp 347-363; Keukeleire, Stephan and MacNaughtan, 
Jennifer, The foreign policy of the EU, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 204-5 
265 Political conditionality has been seen especially in the case of candidate states for EU accession, the ENP and the 
EuroMed / UfM/. The European Agreements between the EU and post-communist states in early 1990s, the 
Copenhagen Criteria for EU candidate member states that were adopted at the Copenhagen European Council of 
1993 and the Commissions’ Opinions of 1997 are solid examples of the EU strategy to link trade and other 
cooperation agreements with the promotion of an open market economic system and democratic system of 
governance. However, the EU has been keen on attaching conditions to the financial aid and technical assistance it 
has been offering to other countries as well, like the Middle Eastern states within the EuroMed / UfM framework in 
particular and the states participating in the ENP. The states participating in the ENP have to commit to a set of 
‘common values’ in order to participate in the European programmes. The case of the Cotonou Agreement with the 
ACP countries is also revealing. The political and economic inequality of the two sides is projected in the agreement, 
and while it was expected that the EU was going to tackle the resources of bad governance and poor development, 
the ACP states are facing new challenges, as the EU has been much more interested in promoting neo-liberal 
reforms, safeguarding its trade interests265.  The normative language on human rights and democracy interweaves 
with the commercial interests of the EU member states to the extent that the genuine interest in the social 
development of the ACP countries is questioned. As a result, the ACP bloc is facing the danger of losing even more 
from this agreement and consequently, “under the new partnership, the groups of African countries could no longer 
consider themselves as equal negotiating partners with the EU”. 
266 Smith, Hazel, EU foreign policy: what it is and what it does, London, Pluto Press, 2002, p.115. 
267 Grabbe, Heather, The EU's transformative power: Europeanization through conditionality in Central and Eastern 
Europe, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006 
 The EU and its Partners  
Angelos Lenos  p. 106 
Common interests in external security, energy security, the global economic 
stability and development alongside the desire for enhancing bilateral (trade) 
relations have formed the basis for the relations between the EU and the 
emerging powers. Indeed, in the case of the EU-China ‘strategic partnership’ 
report, the EEAS recognised that this relationship is essential for the sustainable 
prosperity and security of the two partners and in the case of Russia, the 
relationship “matters enormously” for the EFP. 
In addition, unlike in the case of the ENP and the EuroMed/UfM, in the case of 
the emerging powers the EU has to face both the demands for access to the 
European market and at the same time the competition of these states in world 
business268. The new important global players, which are a major trade partner 
of the EU, are undergoing a process of internal restructuring, which can create 
new opportunities for mutual bilateral benefits269 and for enhancing global 
development. On the other hand, the immense performance of their local 
economies has made them important competitors in world markets270. Thus, the 
EU has to balance between cooperation and protection against competition, 
taking into consideration both the economic and political aspirations of its new 
partners. At the same time, the EU appears ready to “sacrifice trade and energy 
access” than its partners (as explicitly said in the case of the EU-China ‘strategic 
partnership’ paper), for promoting broader regional and international interests as 
well as to promote its values. This reading of the situation reinforces the EU 
self-image as a foreign policy actor, but it also implies that due to the normative 
aspect of the EFP, an even fiercer level of competition is created, and as a 
result the partners do not play by the same rules. Therefore, it is only normal to 
ask whether these ‘strategic partnerships’ will allow the EU to engage its 
partners in a more normative way and therefore re-balance the rules of the 
game or if the EU will have to respond through these partnerships by watering 
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down its normative approach. In either case the EU self-image as well as the 
foreign policy making system of the Union will be affected accordingly.  
In the case of one of the EU norms, that is global governance (multilateralism), 
because of their new role in the world economy and international politics, all 
parties seek closer cooperation in global governance. Their point of departure, 
however, is different. As has been argued, the EU encourages a greater 
engagement through international and regional organisations for reasons which 
can be found in its interests, values and self-image concerns. Therefore, it 
seeks new partners which will take their own share of responsibility for tackling 
global challenges. Additionally, the EU is aiming at exporting its own model of 
cooperation and adaptation of European norms, making full use of its own 
experience during its own integration271 and projecting this experience on 
international politics. For their part, emerging powers want to boost their new 
world status272 and become important ‘stakeholders’ of the new world political 
map. Therefore, the European model can increase the role of the EU in 
international affairs, but it may also conflict with the non-European way of 
conducting diplomacy. The EU promotes global governance in the way the 
Union itself conducts supranational and intergovernmental governance but the 
rising powers have different understanding of this concept and they are powerful 
enough to set the standards and the limitations for the demands and 
preconditions they could accept from the Europeans.273. China’s foreign policy is 
‘based around different norms and priorities’274. Russia invests in its relations 
with the EU only to the extent that this relationship will strengthen its role in 
global politics275, but would not engage the country in a negotiation about 
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European norms in external relations276. In world security issues, China shares 
the same interests with the EU on major global issues277 and the need for 
cooperation at global levels, even though China places high importance on 
specific political notions and values, such as state sovereignty278. Russia can be 
a different case, as it claims a special status within the European 
neighbourhood, where the special interests and claims of Kremlin are 
understood and accepted by the EU, within a zone of vital Russian interests on 
its external borders279. Thus, the rising powers engage with the EU to the extent 
that this partnership meets their criteria and their expectations for increasing 
their weight in the global economic and political arena. The negotiation 
processes and the strategic partnerships or dialogues being held between the 
EU and these third countries reveal the perceptions of the two parties, 
especially when it comes to the resistance in the inclusion of any kinds of 
political clauses in trade agreements (e.g. human right clauses in FTA talks). 
Consequently, while the EU attempts to export its own norms in international 
affairs, often EFP is defied since Russia and China seem to have different 
objectives in their relations with the EU, deriving from their own interests, values 
and perception of their own role in international politics, which make 
compromise with EU difficult280. Therefore it can be argued that the broader, 
international or regional, context in which the EU-rising powers relationships 
have been shaping influences the role (perceived by themselves, the respective 
partner in this relationship and third parties), the objectives and the negotiating 
power of each partner. To what extent the influence of the broader context has 
determined the development of the strategic partnerships, still begs for further 
exploration.  
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In  summary, the EU has initiated strategic dialogues with these countries 
aiming to form strategic partnerships281, based on their shared interests in 
various fields, including trade (through the pursuit of FTA agreements) and 
broader framework agreements, which in any case include EU values, among of 
which are human rights clauses. The EU has also been willing to provide 
technical assistance for reform plans, technological advancement and the 
projects of sustainable development282. It is for this reason that the EU has 
supported the applications of some of these states for accession to the WTO283. 
Generally, the EU is in favour of a more structural relationship with these states 
which will lead to closer cooperation on matters of mutual interests which can 
also be expressed with the co-ordination of views and proposals in the world 
fora, for a shared responsibility for global development and security. In theory, 
the EU is following the same pattern in all cases as with more traditional 
cooperation agreements. Building upon its economic power and technical 
expertise, it uses carrots and sticks when interacting with its partners. Realities 
on the ground, however, reveal that the case of the emerging powers should be 
viewed differently. Political conditionality, even though applied to some extent to 
the Cooperation Agreements or ongoing Dialogues, cannot be a considered as 
a major source of leverage for applying EU interests or norms. The third 
countries have the power and the resources to resist the inclusion of political 
conditionality and it is argued that beyond the verbal use of political clauses in 
economic and strategic negotiations, in reality the EU is weak in this field. Even 
to the extent that the EU succeeds in adding political values, “the legally binding 
substance of the agreement”284 in this respect remains thin. What is more, 
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China and Russia have been developing special interests and links with single 
member states and they can manipulate the internal divisions of the European 
community in order to exert influence285. A major criticism, coming even from 
within the institutions of the EU, is based on the fact that the EU agreed to the 
accession of some of these new powers into the WTO, without making sure that 
these states would agree on human rights concession286. Nevertheless, this is 
exactly the difference of this group of countries with those with asymmetrical 
relations with the EU; the EU has to build its own channels of influence without 
investing heavily in the patterns of conditionality as with the ENP and the 
EuroMed/UfM.  
 
Conceptualising ‘strategic partnerships’ 
Having presented the various stages though which the ‘strategic partnership’ 
has passed and the way it has been  perceived by  EU policymakers, it is 
important to examine this term within  academic debate in order to define the 
analytical concept of this EFP tool. This section will begin by exploring the 
rationale behind this foreign policy tool, before examining the various attempts 
for defining ‘strategic partnerships’ and the various categories of these 
partnerships.  The rationale behind the ‘strategic partnership’ concept will help 
us to understand the way EFP goals are invested in this policy tool and the 
approaches towards partners are shaped. Moreover, one of the purposes of this 
thesis is to attempt to interweave the theoretical approaches suggested by 
scholars of EFP with the understanding and application of this notion by the 
EFP practitioners. 
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The rationale behind ‘strategic partnerships’ 
Analysing the EU-China partnership as a case study, Smith and Xie287 combine 
values, interests and identities into the analysis of ‘strategic partnership’ and 
they claim that the driving forces behind the ‘strategic partnerships’ are: (i) the 
integration logic, (ii) the external environment and (iii) the identity shaping 
process in which the EU is engaged regarding its own role in international 
relations288. The integration logic assumes that there is a spill over effect of the 
internal procedures of the EU, which enable the EU institutions and its member 
states to commit in various fields as the Union is becoming more mature and 
cohesive, while lack of consensus among EU constituent parties might lead to 
limitations and fragmentations regarding ‘strategic partnerships’. Indeed, a level 
of maturity can be claimed for ‘strategic partnerships’ and that was the 
understanding of the EEAS as well, referring to the need for long term and 
comprehensive approaches, based on the Lisbon Treaty stipulations. In 
addition, at the beginning the term was used for two countries, Russia and 
Ukraine, on the immediate periphery of the EU and it took a few years before 
this term was used in a more ambitious way for major powers outside Europe 
(e.g. USA, China) and for players which welcomed assistance for their own 
regional integration projects. Second, the external environment creates 
opportunities as well as limitations for the EU to be an international actor. The 
post-Cold War era created new dynamics for cooperation and it has also 
enabled the EU to seek a more autonomous international role, outside the EU-
US connection. The fact that the first three cases for which the EU aimed at 
applying this new policy tool were Russia, Ukraine and China reaffirms these 
new dynamics and opportunities. At the same time global developments have 
created new competitors in the changing international setting. The emerging 
powers seek a new, more advanced, role in politics and economics while the EU 
pursues partnerships with the emerging powers in order to reinforce its identity 
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as a “normative power” by influencing the  international system (which is being 
reshaped) and to reconfirm its international actorness. However, the 
approaches of the EU and its partners do not necessarily converge on the 
values governing the international system. Thus, a level of competition 
regarding the interests and the values of the various partners, as well as 
regarding their approach to the international community and their perceived role 
in this can be identified. Consequently, the driving forces behind ‘strategic 
partnerships’ have been the values, interests and (self-)perceptions of the EU, 
in order to address its internal and external changes as well as the development 
of the EU as a global actor.   
Also interested in the rationale of ‘strategic partnerships’ as an EFP tool, Susan 
Gratius289 begins her analysis by suggesting that, despite the fact that ‘strategic 
partnerships’ have some common characteristics (institutionalisation, multi-
dimensional cooperation, coexistence of bilateral, biregional and international 
interactions) there are no clear criteria that were applied for selecting the EU’s 
strategic partners because there was a different rationale behind each case.  
 “Selection criteria have been an ad hoc mix of EU member states’ 
interests (particularly Brazil), size (India, China, Russia, the United 
States), regional jealousies (Mexico), partner states’ interests 
(South Korea, Mexico), a special role in international politics 
(South Africa under Mbeki, Canada as a mediating power), shared 
values and interests (the like-minded SPs) and strong 
interdependences (the United States, China, Japan and Russia). 
Strategic partnerships respond to different and overlapping EU 
global options: band-wagoning (United States and China), 
balancing US hegemony (with Brazil, India and Russia), agenda 
setting (with new partners such as Mexico, South Africa and South 
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Korea), common identity (Canada, Japan, and the United States) 
and institutional-building (all)”290. 
Because of these differences in the goals and the characteristics of the 
relationships, Gratius argues that not all ‘strategic partnerships’ are the same or 
equal. On the contrary she argues that there is a distinction between three 
different generations of ‘strategic partnerships’: the traditional, the regional-
oriented and those pursued in the context of multipolarity.  
In the case of traditional partners, she included those  developed after World 
War II which were shaped in the context of the “Cold War”, namely the USA, 
Canada and Japan. In the regional partnerships she includes cooperation with 
regional organisations (Africa, Latin America, SAARC and NATO), while in the 
third and more recent generation the EU is more interested in  dealing with the 
new emerging powers (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Mexico, South 
Korea). Even though the conception of this differentiation based on generations 
can be appealing for analyzing the different approaches of the EU and the 
evolution of this tool of EFP, the categorisation provided by Gratius needs 
further exploration.  
Undoubtedly, the EEC (at that time) shared with the USA, Canada and Japan 
the same values and interests which were clearly defined in comparison with the 
rest of the world. In terms of identity, the division lines between the Western and 
Eastern blocs at the very early stage of European integration allowing only a 
minimal role for common foreign policy approaches, left little to debate.291  
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The ‘second generation’ is arguably associated with the identity of the EU and 
the development of divergences in the EU-US (and their allies) relationship. In a 
world where nation states  prevailed  (especially after new nation states became 
independent) and the EU was only taking shape (with its role in international 
system being still very debateable), it was plausible to expect that the EU would 
seek  partnerships with parties that had similar structure and development to 
itself. Indeed, in the EU documents, the selection of some of the ‘strategic 
partners’ was done specifically because of the influence they have in their 
region and the added value they could have in promoting inter-regional 
cooperation, through bilateral interactions. However, the cases in EU 
documents were not the cases referred to by Gratius. Thus, while the way 
Gratius conceptualised the needs and the expectations of the second 
generation of ‘strategic partnerships’ seems very relevant to the values, 
interests and (self-)images of the EU, it is still difficult to find correspondence 
between the cases referred to by the EU and Gratius. 
The third generation, as argued by Gratius, “reflects the limits of the inter-
regional approach” and the EU has turned to a more bilateral approach in order 
to “strengthen its new image as a power adapting multipolarity”292. It is indeed 
interesting to underline that in this argument the EU has been applying this EFP 
tool in connection to its self perception, a point to which Gratius agrees with Xie 
and Smith. However, even though the distinctions made by Gratius provide an 
interesting point of departure for the analysis of the ‘strategic partnerships’ and 
for explaining the logic behind them, it is important to note that important 
elements of the characteristics of this tool of EFP are missing. Namely, the 
fundamental elements of asymmetry of power, the co-existence of cooperation 
and competition and the interdependence of the EU and its ‘strategic partners’ 
are only implied in the context of ‘multipolarity’.  
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Therefore, instead of accepting these three different generations as presented 
above, focusing on the role of the self-image and external environment, we 
could also attempt to accommodate the role of asymmetry, interdependence 
and the competition-cooperation equilibrium, in the development of different 
waves of ‘strategic partnerships’ and as a way of addressing the relevance of 
the academic approach to actual EU practices. This thesis will suggest that 
there were four different ‘sets’ of ‘strategic partnerships’. It is very obvious that 
traditional partners (which were unofficial and unlabelled, according to Gratius) 
shared common interests and values. The EEC had a very specific role, mainly 
economic, while politically its interests and its space of manoeuvre were limited 
within the context of the western bloc and due to its embryonic steps in foreign 
policy integration. It can also be suggested that the EU was not the most 
powerful pole in this partnership, compared to its partners. 
The second set of ‘strategic partnerships’ during the first two years that the term 
appeared as a policy tool in the EU documents, referred to the European 
continent. Having in mind the ongoing negotiations with the CEEC states in the 
1990s, these partnerships targeted the immediate neighbours of the EU, and 
the ambitions of this EFP approach was to integrate Russia and Ukraine in the 
broader economic and geopolitical environment of Europe, parallel to the 
accession process taking place. The 'strategic partnerships' reflected the (self-) 
image of the EU, as a successful model, which could provide the necessary 
assistance to 'outsiders', albeit in a limited geographical scope, in order to 
benefit from the European experience. In this respect, the EU advocated for 
development and security, which could be achieved if the political, economic 
and social values and norms of the EU were adopted. Thus, the EU attempted 
to Europeanise its immediate external environment, promoting its own interests 
and reinforcing its image as a normative actor. 
In the third and fourth sets of ‘strategic partnerships’, the EU  applied civilian 
tools in what it considered  to be a comprehensive framework, through the 
institutionalisation of relations with rising powers in order to promote its norms, 
its interests and its self-image. The EU’s norms for the internal political structure 
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of the partners (with reference to democratic values and the respect for human 
rights) and their international behaviour (through multilateralism) were central to 
EU objectives. Moreover, the EU made a clear call for the advancement of 
bilateral economic relations which would be assisted by reforms in good 
governance but most importantly in opening the partners’ market in a manner 
compatible with the economic liberalism of the EU. The EU also worked in 
favour of its self-image. First as a regional organisation and a supranational 
actor by promoting regional integration and inter-regional approaches as well as 
a normative foreign policy actor by exporting its norms and values at bilateral, 
bi-regional and international levels. Despite the common elements, there has 
been a differentiation factor, which refers to the perceived role of the partners. 
Following Gratius proposal, we could agree that the third set of ‘strategic 
partnerships’ refers to a more inter-regional approach while the fourth set refers 
to the various poles of a multipolar global system. 
In the third set, in most of the cases, the EU was more powerful than its partners 
which were mostly in the phase of restructuring their states and economies and 
their influence, more often than not, did not reach beyond their own region. As a 
result it was easier for the EU to attempt to act as a ‘normative power’. The EU 
acted as a socialising actor with its partners in order to engage them into the 
regional and global environments and at the same time it hoped to influence the 
(re-)shaping of these environments. Affirming their growing interdependence, 
the EU was, also, in dialogue with regional players, providing assistance for 
their own regional projects but at the same time claiming legitimacy as a 
regional supranational organisation. It was becoming the most advanced of the 
new regions, as units of the international system. 
The fourth set of ‘strategic partnerships’ is a further development of the third, 
due to internal and external developments, with a sense of prioritisation. 
Because of the maturity of the EU as a foreign policy actor, as a result of its 
further political integration with the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of a 
fully fledged diplomatic service (EEAS) and its expanding global actorness, the 
EFP became more strategic with more long-term and comprehensive 
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approaches. This set of partnerships reflects the current phase, within which the 
EU faces economic and political competition and needs to engage with its 
partners in order to remain relevant in the international community. Therefore, a 
more symmetrical power balance of the two parties is highlighted within these 
‘strategic partnerships’. Through these kinds of partnerships, the EU has been 
motivated to advance its own image as an essential pole of the system but also 
to promote multilateralism as a way to manage the new realities of the 
international system293. Thus, the perception that the EU has of its “partner” and 
its status in world affairs (and its ability to advance EU interests) has become 
crucial. It is for this reason that within the EEAS there has been a sense of 
prioritisation. Even though the list of  ‘strategic partnerships’ has been  long, the 
EEAS has focused on the partnerships with the USA, Russia and China, whose 
status and importance has been weighted greater for the interests of the EU. 
Consequently, it could be argued that indeed the integration process of the EU, 
the external environment and the identity shaping process reflect on the 
‘strategic partnerships’ tool of EFP. The integration process of the EU is not only 
related to internal cohesiveness but also with the ability of the Union to act 
strategically, since the EU needs to provide concrete results for its partners and 
beyond especially in terms of interdependency in the fourth set of  ‘strategic 
partnerships’, when the EU cooperates  but also competes with its partners. If 
the EU cannot provide results in a world of interdependency it will eventually 
lose its significance. The external framework indeed influences the development 
of these partnerships but not only in the sense that it provides new opportunities 
and builds the boundaries of the EU role in international affairs: it also sets the 
level of asymmetrical relations between the partners. The level of asymmetry 
then affects the identity making process of the EU. While in the second and third 
set of ‘strategic partnerships’ as well as in the case of more traditional 
asymmetrical relations the EU could promote simultaneously its interests and 
values, in the case of the fourth set of ‘strategic partnerships’ the power balance 
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allows the EU’s partners to refute normative aspects of the EFP.. The partners 
have their own value systems and they have the negotiating power to defend it 
against the export of EU norms. Therefore the EU has to find the balance 
between values and interests in the shaping of its foreign policy. To the extent 
that the EFP chooses to focus on its values and miss opportunities for closer 
cooperation with the new emerging powers, it loses in terms of global relevance 
and in terms of interdependency. On the contrary, if the EU becomes more 
flexible in applying its values and norms in view of the possibly for more 
effective promotion of its interests, the EU image as a normative foreign actor is 
affected.  
In any case, even though it is important to understand the rationales behind the 
‘strategic partnership’ tool, in order to explore the objectives and the way this 
policy tool is applied, these approaches do not answer, directly at least, what 
these ‘strategic partnerships’ are and what they are composed of. Yet, this is 
significant in order to unpack this notion, to elaborate on its composition and 
development, and to provide a pattern and a set of benchmarks within the 
theoretical framework of ‘strategic partnerships’ in EFP in order to assess the 
EU-GCC relationship. 
 
What is a strategic partnership?  
According to Andrew Rettman294 the term ‘strategic partner’ still remains ill-
defined by the EU and its policymakers, even if they actually refer to this term 
often. For Rettman, a strategic partnership signifies a closer relationship with 
the EU (an enhanced diplomatic status) and it is expressed by the organisation 
of regular high profile meetings, but it can also be taken to mean an alternative 
to fully-fledged EU membership. This definition can be considered weak, despite 
references to the enhanced status of the relationship and the institutionalising 
element that needs to be incorporated, as suggested by the EEAS documents 
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on the issue. However, the reference to ‘strategic partnerships’ as an alternative 
to accession is problematic. It does not match the EU perception of this notion 
since nowhere in the EU documents is a link made (even in an indirect manner) 
between ‘strategic partnership’ and candidate states. Moreover, it does not 
make sense in terms of geography, culture/ norms, and size to compare the two 
tools of EFP. Their starting points, the processes themselves and the expected 
outcomes are all different. In any case, this is a very broad definition of ‘strategic 
partnerships’ lacking a more precise description of the rationale behind this kind 
of EU relationship with third parties. Therefore it can be suggested that this 
reference is inadequate. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this article raises 
the question whether the ‘partners’ consider and treat this relationship as a 
‘strategic partnership’ or if this is only an EU approach. Thus the perception 
factor of the relationship is reciprocated as implied, even though there is no 
further explanation. 
Sven Biscop and Thomas Renard295 claim that ‘strategic partnership’ is a 
‘fashionable’ term for EFP but it is still a very vague notion, which cannot give a 
substantial concept for the analysis of the EFP. They question the usefulness of 
strategic partnerships beyond the institutionalisation of bilateral or biregional 
relations since they challenge the existence of strategic planning in the strategic 
partnerships. As a result the term faces the danger of becoming quickly 
irrelevant. If the partnerships are going to become a powerful tool in the EFP 
they should be pragmatic, promote both interests and values and they should be 
‘limiting the margin of manoeuvre of individual member states’. These scholars 
recognise that the EU needs the partnership of emerging powers in order to 
promote effectively its agenda in world affairs, since economies are globalised 
and thus interrelated and all major global actors face common challenges. 
However, they do also acknowledge that the EU and the emerging powers also 
have "different worldviews and competing objectives". Consequently, the main 
challenge for the EU is to strategically manage interests, values and perceptions 
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in order to form ‘strategic partnerships’ with real substance. They suggest that 
the EU should work on easier issues, build connections with these emerging 
powers through mutually beneficial cooperation in specific issues where the 
interests of all parties converge and through these connections, either bilaterally 
or via multilateral organisations, the EU might be able to diffuse its values at a 
later stage. However, they set limitations as well. Despite the common interests 
and shared concerns, Biscop and Renard underline the role of competition in 
these kinds of relationship as well as the divergences in perceptions (and 
values, as implied already). Moreover, although they recognise that the regional 
leadership of emerging states  may provide the rationale for qualifying them as 
‘strategic partners’, at the same time they are doubtful if all partners enjoy the 
same level of leadership. Indeed, as already shown, there are different sets of 
‘strategic partnerships’, which correspond to the different needs of the EFP and 
the role of the EU’s partners in regional and global affairs. Lastly, they introduce 
the element of internal cohesiveness, as they stress the need for “limiting the 
margin of manoeuvre of individual member states” in the EU if it is going to have 
true strategic planning and thus ‘strategic partnerships’. In any case, Biscop and 
Renard provide some interesting starting points for assessing this EFP tool by 
pointing to some of its characteristics as already identified in the EU documents, 
but their attempt does not tackle many of the other issues raised in these 
documents (regarding interests and the objectives which should be pursued, the 
actors involved in these partnerships, the outcome of EFP) and most importantly 
it does not provide a definition of this term.  
A definition of a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ was provided by Barysch, 
Grant and Leonard in 2005, when they analysed the EU partnership with 
China296. According to their analysis a strategic partnership is ‘a relationship that 
is broad-based, focused on the long-term, and fuelled by common objectives 
and a sense of friendship’. An active cooperation in various fields (beyond the 
merely commercial ones) and the establishment of an institutional framework of 
                                                          
296 Barysch, Katinka et. al., Embracing the Dragon: The EU's partnership with China, London, Centre for European 
Reform, 2005, p.5 
 The EU and its Partners  
Angelos Lenos  p. 121 
interaction between the two partners are both required. Nevertheless, the new 
partnership emerges when new opportunities derive from changes domestically 
and in the international environment297. This definition is a useful departing point 
as it points out the long-term perspective of a relationship which goes beyond 
some short-term agreements. This refers to the strategic component of the 
partnership and it is extremely important for understanding and conceptualising 
‘strategic partnerships’. This element has been repeated by EU policymakers in 
all three EEAS documents. Shared interests which are articulated into common 
objectives are also needed in a number of issues coordinated and pursued by 
the official interactions of players of the two parties through the connections and 
institutions established for this reason. This seems to be the case with the 
specific relationship of the EU and China. The external variables shape the 
context in which the relations are formed and developed, either positively or 
negatively. For example, as already argued, the end of the Cold War enabled 
rapprochement between the two partners, which could not have happened 
before, even if the sensitivities of the EU’s partners (namely those of the USA) 
were taken into consideration. The internal changes are also necessary and 
more specifically internal reforms which could allow the EU to engage more 
actively with Chinese society, and of course the economic sector. However, the 
fact that this definition does not tackle the issue of values, but prefers the more 
neutral and vague term of friendship, is problematic. It could be suggested that 
friendship refers to mutual understanding and indeed this is important to 
overcome mistrust, to incorporate perceptions and values, but it is analytically 
challenging to conceptualise ‘friendship’ in international studies. What is 
important in this approach is the introduction of the need for a great change 
which will alter the environments in which interests and perceptions are 
accommodated, in order for ‘strategic partnerships’ to be put into the focus of 
interest of the two parties. 
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Evaluating the EU-China strategic partnership, Jonathan Hoslag298 attempts to 
give a new set of characteristics about the concept of 'strategic partnerships'. 
He introduces, interestingly enough, new factors about the global role of these 
partnerships and the different level of strategic partnership over any other form 
of relationship. He describes the five elements of 'strategic partnership' as: (i) 
explicitly identified interests and expectations, (ii) a long-term perspective, (iii) a 
multidimensional character with activities in economics, politics as well as 
military affairs, (iv) a global range in the relationship and (v) a relationship 
whose “incentives should be of such a nature that they cannot be achieved 
without the partnership and distinguish it from other relationships”299. 
Regarding the first element, that of common interests and expectations, Hoslag 
claims that EU cannot identify long-term interests and to transform them into 
sustainable policies, which is reflected in the way Chinese policymakers 
perceive the EU. Moreover, he suggests that the expectations of the EU are to 
engage China in a normative multilateral framework and as a result EU norms 
will be exported to China and these will affect Chinese foreign policy making. 
According to this article, this is the cornerstone of the failure of the EU and the 
fact that a ‘strategic partnership’ between the EU and China does not exist. 
Despite the criticism EFP receives in this article, the model of analysing 
‘strategic partnerships’ is on its own interesting. Hoslag introduces expectations 
alongside interests, which can be very useful since expectations shape the 
perceptions regarding the other party, form the actions and provoke re-actions 
from the respective partner. Therefore,  expectations (material, normative or as 
perceptions and images) feed the willingness or draw the limitations of the 
parties to reach compromises, whether these have to do with interests or 
values. The long-term perspective of ‘strategic partnership’ is once again 
repeated in this approach and it is becoming an indispensable element of this 
notion. The multidimensional character of the relationship has already been 
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seen in this debate but in this case is highlighted and it adds the need for 
cooperation even in military affairs. This is striking since as it has been shown 
and at large been accepted, that the EU is a post-modern entity which applies 
civilian means when conducting foreign policy. Even when it comes to the 
question of promoting security and stability, the EU usually does not resort to 
military means. However, it could be useful to add this level of security-oriented 
cooperation in the analysis of ‘strategic partnership’ beyond merely economic-
political cooperation. The global range of the partnership is also accepted by EU 
policymakers and scholars alike. In the EEAS documents for the USA, Russia 
and China, EU policymakers stress the need for these relationships to go global 
and to tackle global challenges, while in the case of scholars, Biscop and 
Renard focus on the regional leadership of the emerging powers and the fact 
that they can assist in promoting the EU global agenda. Therefore, there is a 
common understanding that  EU ‘strategic partnerships’ aim at dealing with 
issues beyond the bilateral, and making use of the capabilities of the partners in 
promoting solutions to challenges at regional and international levels. The 
question is, however, how this global factor is taken into consideration and how 
EU interests and values are accommodated. The way partners’ capabilities are 
accommodated in joint actions with the EU needs further explanation. Moreover 
it needs clarification when this synergy takes place at bilateral, bi-regional or 
multilateral levels and whether it is more specific issue-related or a broader 
one.. However, the issue of exclusivity of the partnership, which is implied, 
should be seriously questioned. Most states and leaderships invest in a 
multipolar world system and they pursue multiple partnerships with different 
players simultaneously. Whether the EU and its partners consider each other as 
their ‘main partner’300, should not be a central question of research. Even the 
EU itself rejects exclusivity but rather aims at a multilateral world order, in which 
its partnership with various actors can assist the Union to promote its interests, 
values and identity as an international actor. Nevertheless, the fact that a 
‘strategic partnership’ may become indispensable for dealing with a very specific 
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matter, especially having in mind the interdependency element of this kind of 
relationship, might add to the notion of ‘strategic partnerships’. It adds to the 
strategic approach of the EFP, since the EU would approach a partner, 
cooperate and coordinate actions which appear to be essential for its policies, at 
least regarding a specific country, region or issue. 
Annergret Bendiek and Heinz Kramer, analysing the EU strategic partnerships, 
both bilaterally and biregionally301, suggest that a strategic partnership is a 
relationship in within which a ‘clearly defined long-term goal’ is pursued or a 
long-term interest is promoted after a specific plan. The realisation of this goal/ 
interest is achieved through well-defined objectives, timeframes and action 
plans. They claim, though, that the EU is not acting strategically because (i) it 
lacks internal cohesiveness in terms of the European institutional framework 
which is inflexible and creates inconsistencies  in terms of different interests 
among member states, (ii) it does not pay attention to the needs of the other 
party and therefore it does not have a clear vision and plan about transforming 
effectively economic weight into real political gains and (iii) the fact that there is 
no hierarchy in these ‘strategic partnerships’. These shortfalls are coupled with 
the confusion created by the fact that the EU seeks partners both bilaterally as 
well as inter-regionally, according to Bendiek and Kramer. Internal cohesiveness 
could be assessed as a crucial part of the analysis of ‘strategic partnerships’ but 
it is interesting that in this approach cohesiveness is defined both as an 
institutional inflexibility of the EU as well as political differentiations among EU 
member states. The result-oriented reading of EU policies in order to asses 
‘strategic partnership’ derives from the broader debate of the effectiveness of 
the EU as an international actor, rather than from the more specific tool of 
‘strategic partnerships’. Therefore at this point it might be more productive to 
focus on what defines a ‘strategic partnership’. Aiming at expanding the debate, 
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by including a clause assessing the effectiveness of a relationship in order to 
categorise it as a ‘strategic partnership’ or not, might be too ambitious at this 
stage. The notion of hierarchy (or levels as previously suggested) for these 
partnerships arises as a central point for the analysis of this EFP tool and 
therefore it should be taken into consideration. However, the fact that the EU 
aims both at bilateral and biregional approaches does not seem to be conflicting 
to the notion of ‘strategic partnership’ or the EU goal for multilateralism. On the 
contrary, it has already been explained that there can be different sets of 
‘strategic partnerships’. The need for timeframes should also be viewed with 
scepticism, as this kind of limitation is conflicting to the long-term approach that 
a partnership should have. In any case, through ‘strategic partnerships’ they 
identify two aspects of the EFP: 1.The EU  acts  as a civilian power, due to the 
means it applies which  are almost exclusively civilian, avoiding any use of 
military means. 2. The EU attempts to become a normative power and promote 
its norms and values to the EU partners, but due to the resistance of the other 
parties and more specifically the emerging powers it becomes inefficient on the 
ground. At the same time, Bendiek and Kramer suggest that the normative 
approach of the EU within the context of its ‘strategic partnerships’ is actually 
driven from its selfish interests to impose, in a hegemonic manner, a new set of 
values and institutions which will promote its commercial and political interests, 
without taking into consideration the interests and the values of the other party. 
It should be noted, however, that there is no reference to the role of perceptions 
and (self-)images which can also be added to the limitations of this approach. 
Finn Laursen, who has analysed the partnership of the EU with China302, notes 
that strategic partnerships have been described as useful instruments based on 
mutual interests and benefits, both in economics and in promoting 
multilateralism. For Laursen, a strategic partnership can be formed when there 
are common European interests and a defined strategy within the EU. Beyond 
the issues of cohesiveness and strategic planning, he also points out the role of 
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possible leverages. Indirectly, he raises the issue of (a)symmetry and he places 
the questions regarding objectives in the framework of “interests against 
values”. Are they purely commercial or do they entail values as well? After 
analysing three case studies of EU-China relations, he concludes that 
“commercial and geopolitical interests have primacy whenever there is a conflict 
with values”303. “Ideas and values are second”304. Therefore, beyond the 
European continent the EU does not have ‘soft power’ and in East Asia, the EU 
is not generally considered a ‘normative power’. Laursen confronts the 
normative reading of the EFP and he argues that the EU prefers stability and 
economic interests over a genuine promotion of its values. It is also important to 
stress this addition by Laursen: geopolitical interests in a specific region. Even 
though the regional and global context of a strategic partnership has already 
been introduced in the academic debate, as well as the need for long-term 
strategies, Laursen gives a more strategic approach in the shaping of the EFP 
by emphasising the role of geopolitical interests, which in this case are 
considered to be stability and commercial access to the Chinese market. 
Giovanni Grevi305 begins with a description of the current international system 
which he describes as interpolar, where different poles (state and non-state 
actors) interact in multiple and multilevel ways. This interaction is the result of 
the balance that the various poles aim to achieve and the realisation that they 
need to cooperate in order to tackle challenges in terms of security and 
economic stability. Thus, different actors with a pivotal role, either the powers 
themselves or actors transcending these boundaries work together not out of 
belief in the normative approach of multilateralism but because they understand 
that global challenges cannot be dealt with without cooperation. In this interpolar 
system, the ‘status powers’ and the ‘emerging powers’ co-exist. While the first 
aim to keep the existing balance of powers within the international system, the 
latter aim at reforming this system. They engage with multilateral fora to the 
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extent that their national interests and values (including state sovereignty) are 
not challenged. They also seek reform of the system which will grant them a 
greater role in it and i enable them to pursue their own national interests. 
Therefore, the EU and some of its ‘strategic partners’ face normative 
divergences in the way they pursue multilateralism and reforms, either within 
their border or at a regional/ international level. Nevertheless, the emerging 
powers do have their own concerns for stability and security and as has been 
suggested by Grevi they realise the need to cooperate with other poles of the 
system, based on terms of interdependency. Grevi adds that this does not 
mean, however, that the EU is considered to be an undisputable “strategic 
partner” for the emerging powers. If this was the case, we could argue that the 
core elements of ‘strategic partnership’ is (i) the ability of the EU to project itself 
as a “strategic partner” and (ii) its ability to accommodate or discuss the 
interests and values of the partners as part of the interdependency factor that 
needs to be addressed. 
In an attempt to describe ‘strategic partnerships’, Grevi suggested that these are 
long-term, comprehensive (multi-dimensional) and multilevel (with the 
engagement of actors of different levels of society and the bureaucracy) since 
imperative interests fall in overlapping fields influencing various actors. He adds 
that ‘strategic partners’ should have the political authority to make commitments 
and provide concrete results from their strategies and at the same time they 
should demonstrate flexibility during hard bargaining negotiations. The EU 
needs to present a coherent policy supported both by the European 
supranational bodies and its member states. In addition, it is important to go 
beyond the official channels of communication and support the people-to-people 
interactions which create their own dynamics. Moreover, the EU bodies need to 
have the power to negotiate on behalf of the EU with flexibility and political 
authority, making use of all the available EU tools. Of course he points out that it 
is not easy to bridge values and interests on one hand and assertiveness due to 
its principles and flexibility on the other hand. Therefore, the EU may pursue its 
interests with strategic partnerships through a step by step approach engaging 
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with partners bilaterally or on an issue-related framework so that the EU and its 
partners work on areas with easier identified common interests in order to 
achieve tangible results. By achieving concrete results and building trust 
between the partners, the EU can move to advance its partnership into a more 
comprehensive form, taking into consideration global concerns. Thus, the EU 
would build mutual understanding between the partners and only then work on 
promoting its values and interests. At the same time it engages with partners 
bilaterally so it can keep promoting regional projects and thus regionalism and 
multilateralism. Grevi argues that the EU needs to engage with other regions 
and players as well, beyond the established partners in order to enhance its 
profile as a ‘strategic entrepreneur’ since the EU needs the acknowledgment of 
this role by the other parties, in the framework of interdependence. 
Consequently, for Grevi, an effective partnership is the partnership which 
engages actors from various levels and fields of cooperation of the two partners 
in bilateral relations and which develops into a more comprehensive 
partnership, dealing with broader, regional or global issues. Through this 
procedure the EU promotes its interests and values, convincing others that it 
can be an effective strategic partner. 
Thomas Renard who has been working extensively on the term 'strategic 
partnership'306 provides a substantive work on the elements that form a 
‘strategic partnership’ but what is more interesting is the differentiation he 
makes on the various types of partnerships. First of all, he distinguishes formal 
strategic partnerships from true strategic partnerships. The formal strategic 
partnerships are those announced by the EU itself, but he suggests that some 
of these countries became ‘strategic partners’ not because of the strategic 
importance the EU places on them, but rather out of compromises in the intra-
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EU political game. Therefore, an identification of the “true strategic partners” is 
essential and he suggests that  
“A true strategic partnership can be defined as a key global player 
which has a pivotal role in solving global challenges – in the sense 
that the EU cannot hope to solve these issues without the positive 
contribution of its partner- and which is centrally important to enhance 
effective multilateralism globally – e.g. by coordinating our position 
with those strategic partners in multilateral forums. The strategic 
partnerships in this sense go beyond bilateral relations and focus on 
the instrumentalisation of this bilateral relationship for broader ends” 
307. 
According to the above definition, the partner shall be considered as “key global 
player”. It is then expected that the perception EU has for its partners is 
fundamental, but more importantly it should be asked (having in mind also 
Grevi’s approach) if that perception of “key global player” exists also in the 
minds of the partners regarding the EU. Furthermore, what becomes central in 
the definition of Renard is the added value that the partner can bring into the 
relationship, either for a specific regional/global issue or for promoting 
multilateralism. Therefore, the relationship goes beyond bilateral relations but its 
importance reflects on the instrumentalisation of the partnership in order to deal 
with other regional or international issues. Indeed, the EU has acknowledged 
this added value of ‘strategic partnerships’ as a tool of the EFP when it 
approaches regional leading countries in order to enhance inter-regional 
relations but also to promote multilateralism. However, the question is how the 
broader ends are shaped. As already mentioned, most of the emerging powers 
are keen in promoting multilateralism, but their understanding of multilateralism 
is different from the way the EU perceives it. Therefore, the ‘strategic 
partnership’ should also become the tool with which the EU and its partners 
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communicate and negotiate their interests and values regarding bilateral, 
regional and international affairs. To the extent that this is fruitful, then ‘strategic 
partnerships’ can become an instrument for the broader EFP goals. However, 
these negotiations of interests and values must inevitably have  in mind the 
interdependency of the two partners and the level of symmetry of the 
relationship. These will set the limits for promoting values and interests and in 
this respect it will also influence the self-image of EU as a “normative power” 
and the perception of EU as an international actor among its partners as well. 
Renard reiterates that by applying the tool of ‘strategic partnership’ the EU can 
promote its values by focusing on specific issues and little by little convey its 
norms to its partners. This can be done by engaging with them gradually 
through a larger scope of issues at a multilateral level instead of trying to 
impose its values across the board of bilateral issues, which can actually lead to 
the opposite outcome than the one desired. However, Renard criticises the EU 
for its inability to act as a true “strategic partner” because it lacks cohesiveness 
and because the EU member states have not invested sufficiently in the EU 
institutions and the Union’s role regarding its bilateral relations with third parties.   
Renard and Laursen have explored the ‘value’ factor of strategic partnerships 
but it is Stanzel Volker who has set it to the center of academic research. He 
addresses the question of whether the EU and its partners can go beyond the 
‘interest partnership’ (which he claims that already exists) and become ‘values 
partners’ as well308. Even though he recognises the difficulties in understanding 
and dealing with ‘alien ways of thinking and behaving’ he emphasises the role of 
mutual understanding in the development of strong political and economic 
ties309. The starting points of Volker’s approach are (i) the shaken cognitive 
maps of world politics, according to which international actors perceive the 
system and the ‘other’ players in this and (ii) the intensification of globalisation, 
with the spread of materials and ideas around the globe, which challenge the 
known international environment, the national institutions and the values of the 
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global system. He suggests that common interests can be found both in 
economics and politics but the deciding factor for the quality of the relationship 
is the willingness and the readiness of the two partners to go beyond these 
interests and to reach mutual understanding regarding the values of each of the 
partner in these relations as well as the values and the rules that should prevail 
in the new global system. The growing significance of China in world economics 
and politics (should) reflect on its identity, as perceived both by itself and by 
others. As a result China has to assume its own share of responsibility in world 
affairs. Therefore, the ‘strategic partnership’ of the EU and China will be tested 
in a field where they both seem to agree on principles, namely the need for a 
greater level of multilateralism and their actions regarding UN reform. Then, the 
EU and China could work bilaterally in bridging the existing gap in the role of 
values and culture in their own partnership. In this aspect, the role of civil 
society is crucial since the new globalised world system calls for the 
engagement of all actors in building and developing a true strategic 
partnership310. In this approach, it becomes clear that interests are not enough 
for shaping a strategic partnership, but values and identities (which interact) are 
essential. The way the two partners work in order to reach mutual 
understanding and agreement on the new set of norms that will shape the new 
international environment will actually classify this partnership as a value 
partnership as well and thus as a true strategic partnership, like the partnership 
the EU and the USA share311. Therefore, we can identify again the different 
level of partnerships, the interest-based strategic partnership, and the more 
comprehensive partnership, which also includes values and which can be 
described as the true ‘strategic partnership’. It is important to underline here that 
a negotiation on values is implied. The two partners need to reach mutual 
understanding through cultural exchanges, and the EU will needs to negotiate 
and compromise for its values, which are of course non-universal. This notion of 
the EU exporting its norms (because it is a normative power) is put in a different 
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framework. The EU can be, to some extent, a normative power and export its 
norms but only to the extent that the EU is simultaneously willing to make 
concessions on the normative aspect of EFP in order for a new value-driven 
international framework to be set up. Without question, the decision of the EU to 
compromise or not, will affect its identity as a foreign policy actor at the 
international level.  
 
Definition of a ‘strategic partnership’ 
Analyzing the elements of ‘strategic partnership’, the academic debate has 
placed importance on the role of cohesiveness, which has been interpreted as 
the ability of the EU to coordinate its various institutions and policy tools towards 
the same direction of strategic goals and the commitment of the member states 
to support and invest in the collective EFP, so that third parties cannot 
manipulate internal divisions. However, there has been criticism regarding the 
divergence of opinions and actions within the EU and lack of cohesiveness was 
pointed out by Renard as well as Bendiek and Kramer. The question of the 
cohesiveness of EFP is not new and these arguments have validity, yet we 
should have in mind the broader debate regarding EFP, in which the question 
about the ability of the EU to have foreign policy despite its intergovernmental 
approaches and internal limitations was addressed. Therefore, it is too easy and 
simplistic to discredit the ability of the EU to develop ‘strategic partnerships’ 
because of its lack of a unified stance on various issues. What could be more 
productive is the question of whether the EU has been able to coordinate its 
actions to the extent of providing concrete outcomes in these relationships. 
Beyond the fact that actual results will judge if there has been an effective 
partnership, it will also touch upon the role of interdependency, which has been 
identified in the previous sections as a key element. Moreover, in order to 
address the issue of cohesiveness, but without being axiomatic against the 
ability of EFP to be strategic, and recalling the integration logic suggested by 
Smith and Xie, we should ask what the spill-over effects of the integration path 
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of the EU are regarding ‘strategic partnerships’. Has the EU been engaging 
more actors towards its strategic goals and has it been moving towards a more 
integrated and coordinated stance on grand goals? 
In this endeavour the role of various actors should be highlighted.  Grevi has 
already called for multilevel and multidimensional cooperation in order to 
explore interactions which are more broad-based and engage not only high level 
politicians and bureaucrats but also actors from various fields (multidimensional) 
and more importantly from different levels of hierarchy (multilevel) of partners’ 
societies, and in order to be relevant and legitimate in relation to  the people. 
Indeed this have been one of the limitations presented earlier in the approach of 
Nonneman, who had introduced the different layers of hierarchy in the decision 
making system, but limited the scope of his interest in the bureaucracies and the 
ruling elites. Hoslag, also, agrees on the multidimensional character of the 
partnership, but the fact that he has included military cooperation is striking. In 
the context of the ‘civilian power’ self-image of the EFP, it seems more relevant 
to ask whether cooperation in hard security issues can be achieved, despite the 
non-use of military tools. If not, then maybe the argument can be re-introduced 
and assessed. Nevertheless, in spite of the introduction of  non-state actors in 
the analysis by Grevi, and the agreement of Hoslag as well as Barysch, Grant 
and Leonard on the multidimensional character of the ‘strategic partnerships’, 
due to the fact that in this partnership involves two regional organisations, this 
thesis will propose a minor, yet important, differentiation from the 
abovementioned terms. In order to accommodate the different levels of 
cooperation (bilateral, inter-regional and multilateral), it is deemed that it will be 
more accurate to call the ‘strategic partnerships’ multidimensional (with 
engagement of various fields with economics and politics being the priority), 
multilayered (engaging different layers of the hierarchy of bureaucracies and 
societies), and multileveled (addressing issues in bilateral, inter-regional and 
multilateral approaches). However, when it comes to the mutli-dimensional 
character of the partnerships, it is important that the activities of various players 
do not undermine a cohesive approach by the two partners, and in this sense a 
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level of systematic channels of interactions which will set the frameworks are 
needed.  
It has also been seen that institutionalisation of the broad based interactions 
was, commonly, seen by scholars as a necessary tool to shape long-lasting 
channels of communication between the partners and to create more systematic 
cooperation. This is to accommodate the long-term perspective of cooperation 
and the formalisation of the agreement on common objectives first among the 
EU member states and then between the EU and its partners. More specifically, 
Bendiek and Kramer suggest that clearly defined long-term goals and well 
defined action plans and time-frames are essential. Even though it can be 
claimed that the formalisation of  ‘strategic partnerships’ addresses the self-
images that the partners want to project (especially in the case of inter-regional 
cooperation as well as in the case of the rising powers who want to enhance 
their global image) and provides interesting insights into the way interests and 
values are reflected in the shaping of the channels of cooperation and the 
language adopted in the official documents, we cannot examine 
institutionalisation outside the framework of the criticisms of inflexibility from the 
side of the EU. Is institutionalisation truly an indicator of the improvement and 
development of ‘strategic partnerships’? Are long-term goals transformed into 
institutionalised joint actions? What are the spill-over effects of 
institutionalisation in the interactions of various actors? To what extent does 
institutionalisation limit the flexibility that the partners can show through 
formalised channels of cooperation? How has the further integration of the EFP 
led to the more flexible (or inflexible) action of EU actors within the established 
institutions of interaction? Having in mind these questions, the role of 
institutionalisation of the partnership begs further exploration, rather than taking 
for granted that institutionalised cooperation is a sign of a deeper relationship 
and an essential element for an effective partnership. 
Moreover, it has become obvious in our analysis of the key elements of 
‘strategic partnerships’ in the EU documents that this notion of EFP has different 
characteristics which lead to a different type of cooperation, in comparison to 
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the more traditional EU relationships. In “strategic partnerships” the EU is not 
anymore the dominant party which can provide political, economic and technical 
guidance and assistance to its interlocutors. These are relationships with 
established or emerging powers which are prominent in the international 
economic and political system and they can develop resistance to EU attempts 
to impose its own interests, values and practices. This power balance reflects 
on the level of the asymmetrical character of the relationship and as a result on 
the ability of the EU to promote its foreign policies. 
This symmetrical character of the relationships does not only affect the 
negotiating power of the EFP but it also means that the EU is not solely a 
provider in this partnership. Indeed, due to the changes in the external 
environment, the rising powers raise their expectations and their demands while 
the new challenges call for a coordinated response, in the context of the 
globalised and multi-polar world system. Thus, the EU is in need of its partners, 
especially in order to tackle common global challenges. In some cases the role 
of the partners’ becomes pivotal in addressing common concerns or promoting 
shared interests. This has been explicitly acknowledged by EU policy makers, 
while scholars have pointed to the added value that partners bring into “strategic 
partnerships”. Therefore, a level of interdependency is also accommodated in 
these relationships. 
Having in mind the interdependency factor, Rettman asks whether third parties 
consider the EU as a strategic partner as well, but without elaboration. This 
already introduces the role of perceptions, expectations and identities into the 
relationship, since it is of vital interest for the EU to be perceived as an 
important international actor and thus make itself an essential partner to the 
emerging powers as well. Thus, the EU needs to provide concrete outcomes 
through its EFP if it is going to be perceived as an indispensable actor in global 
affairs by its “strategic partners”. 
Moreover, as has been shown, in this framework of symmetrical relations and 
interdependence, the partners cooperate but they also compete. Regarding 
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cooperation they need to produce concrete results and consequently it is 
important to assess how they manage expectations and common interests (for 
security and development) into specific objectives. The common objectives will 
also reveal the character of the relationship; its depth and its nature addressing 
the question of whether it takes into consideration only interests or values as 
well, especially within a long-term perspective as suggested both by EU policy 
makers and scholars. The level to which these interests go beyond economy 
and tackle thorny political issues and the outreach of the objectives (bilateral, bi-
regional and international) describe the substance of the partnership. From this 
point of view, it is interesting to point out that the way the EU addresses security 
issues or military-related affairs affects its own posture in international relations 
as a ‘civilian’ and a ‘normative power’. 
In any case, as the issue of multilateralism has revealed, common interests, 
even when they are articulated in specific goals (e.g. reforms of the international 
system) may be interpreted differently by partners. Despite the fact that Biscop 
and Renard, as well as Grevi propose gradual diffusion of EU norms, it should 
be noted that while the EU seeks to engage emerging powers in the global 
system and promote EU values at the multilateral level, the emerging powers 
are revisionist players312 and they aim at changing significantly the system itself 
by accommodating their own priorities. Therefore, the expectations arising from 
their self-images and values need to be taken into consideration rather than 
implying that softer issues can lead to gradual export of EU norms to third 
parties. 
Thus, the partners compete in material interests, in the norms that shall prevail 
in international relations in politics and economics, and in the field of values. 
Especially in values, the question is whether the EU is ready to accept the 
different approaches from its partners and act accordingly. How does the EU 
react to the limitations that the new status and confidence of its partners set in 
                                                          
312 Gratius, Susanne, ‘Can EU Strategic Partnerships deepen multilateralism?’, FRIDE Working Paper No 109, 
September 2011, Retrieved 22 September 2011 from http://www.fride.org/publication/943/can-eu-strategic-
partnerships-deepen-multilateralism, p. 5; Renard Thomas, 'The Treachery of Strategies: A Call for Ture EU Strategic 
Partnerships', Egmont Paper 45, April 2011, Retrieved on 29 April 2011 from http://aei.pitt.edu/32321/1/ep45.pdf, p.3 
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relation to the European demands for a value dialogue and for exporting the EU 
values into the new global system? It is argued that despite the new 
developments, the EU is still not treating them as equal partners313 but it “wants 
to appease their ambitions through conditional engagement”314. It is important to 
understand whether the suggested gap in mutual understanding and 
acceptance of the different ways of conducting (foreign) policies has been 
feeding strategic partnerships with serious setbacks or if the EU has become a 
more pragmatic actor, less rigid regarding values and ready to negotiate its 
norms with its partners. In any case, this unquestionably affects the EU’s role in 
international relations, its identity and its self-image either as a “normative 
power” or as a less value-driven player with a more interest-driven rationale and 
a more result-oriented focus. 
Given the above review of the literature, the aim in this thesis is to construct a 
comprehensive definition of strategic partnership in order to guide the analysis 
in subsequent chapters. As a result, I argue that a ‘strategic partnership’, in the 
context of the EFP framework, is the symmetrical relationship of 
interdependency, where the role of the partner is pivotal for joint action and for 
producing concrete results in tackling common challenges and in promoting 
common interests, at a bilateral, regional and global level. The partnership is a 
multilayered (and not a relationship of the ruling elites without popular support 
but rather with the engagement of different actors from the bureaucracies, the 
business communities, academics), multidimensional (from different dimensions 
of the interactions and most importantly in economics and security) and 
multileveled (aiming at bilateral, bi-regional and international levels) relationship. 
The character of the partnership is that of long-term institutionalised 
relationship, which is yet dynamic and flexible enough to adjust to changes in 
order to address the simultaneous cooperation and competition of the partners. 
Accommodation of the mutual understanding of the perceptions, expectations 
                                                          
313 Leal-Arcas, Rafael, 'The EU and Russia as Energy Trading Partners: Friends or Foes?', European Foreign Affairs 
Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2009, pp. 337-366 
314 Hoslag, Jonathan, 'The EU and China, The Great Disilussion', European Foreign Afffairs Review, 2006, Vol. 11, 
No. 4. p. 564 
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and values the partners invest in this relationship is a fundamental aspect of this 
partnership, as it creates the context in which  interests are shaped and 
pursued.  
 
What kind of ‘strategic partnership’ 
It is interesting to note that beyond the attempts to academically define ‘strategic 
partnerships’, scholars have turned their interest also in categorising the various 
‘strategic partnerships’, in a way that may prove to be very useful in enlightening 
the substance of this EFP tool. 
By focusing on making distinctions between the EU’s strategic partners, Susan 
Gratius315 has given a new perspective to the analysis of the subject. According 
to her assessment there are two groups of partners: the ‘status quo’ partners 
which are the ‘established powers’316 in the world system and the new group of 
the emerging powers which seek to get into the centre of the international 
political stage. The first group consists of actors which want international 
economic stability, they are members of the western alliance and they promote 
western values and norms in the international system. The second group, of 
emerging powers, is composed of players who seek changes in the way the 
global system is functioning in order for them to achieve a greater role in the 
international political and economic system. They challenge the western values 
of the system as they nourish national sovereignty and non-interfering policies, 
and they treat multilateralism as an instrument to limit the actions of the 
established super powers. In the first group, Gratius identifies the allies and the 
like-minded countries. The allies (Canada and Japan) share the same views on 
effective multilateralism in an idealistic and defensive way and in which values 
and interests are accommodated. The like-minded countries (USA, Mexico, 
                                                          
315 Gratius, Susanne, ‘Can EU Strategic Partnerships deepen multilateralism?’, FRIDE Working Paper No 109, 
September 2011, Retrieved 22 September 2011 from http://www.fride.org/publication/943/can-eu-strategic-
partnerships-deepen-multilateralism 
316 Gratius, Susanne,  'The EU and the ‘special ten’: deepening or widening Strategic Partnerships?', Policy Brief No 
76, June 2011, Retrieved 22 September 2011 from http://www.fride.org/publication/875/making-eu-strategic-
partnerships-effective, p.5 
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South Korea) share the same support for multilateralism and they share the 
same western values as the EU and its allies. However, they are active in 
multilateralism mostly in an instrumentalist approach in order to promote 
national interests through regional and international cooperation. In the second 
group of “emerging powers”, Gratius points to the coexistence of distant 
partners and difficult partners. The distant partners, while they have a 
multilateral foreign policy agenda, tend to vote against the EU’s view or to 
abstain on serious global issues (South Africa, Brazil, India) but the differences 
in various issues are not difficult to overcome, since these players do not have 
global ambitions. The difficult partners approach multilateralism in a limited way 
and according to their own perceptions and concerns against interference on 
internal issues (Russia, China). They are revisionist powers in the global 
system, just like the distant partners, but the difference is that Russia and China 
are considered to be ‘dominant’ powers compared to the ‘minor powers’317.  
She argues that these variations of partnerships should reflect on EU policies as 
well, with different approaches and tools applied in each case. Therefore the EU 
needs to define the differences and the similarities that its partners have 
expressed on various issues, create ad hoc alliances in some areas and engage 
with difficult partners on more suitable issues at a bilateral level so that there are 
always concrete results. In a way, similar to Grevi, and Biscop and Renard, she 
argues that a relationship which is more issue-specific can be pursued at first 
and then develop into a broader, ‘all inclusive’ partnership with all the outer 
characteristics such as the joint action plans, the regular summits and finally the 
strategic partnerships318. The EU can also explore partners’ stances and then 
create ad hoc coalitions of countries with similar views, in what she describes as 
a ‘minilateralist approach’. Afterwards, the EU can pursue, in the long term, a 
coordination of all its partners at a multilateral level. However, progress in the 
                                                          
317 The USA, alongside Russia and China, are considered to be a ‘dominant power’ while the rest of the partners are 
considered to be ‘minor powers’. 
318 Gratius, Susanne,  'The EU and the ‘special ten’: deepening or widening Strategic Partnerships?', Policy Brief No 
76, June 2011, Retrieved 22 September 2011 from http://www.fride.org/publication/875/making-eu-strategic-
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bilateral partnerships is still associated with the political desire of the most 
‘difficult partners’ to make concessions. In any case, it is only in the long-term 
that the EU can bring all partners under a single, comprehensive multilateral 
umbrella. 
 
Table 4.1 
 ‘Status quo’ ‘Revisionists’ 
1) Allies:  
ideological 
converges  
Canada, Japan 
3) Distant:  
Without global 
ambitions, 
possible 
converges 
South Africa,  
Brazil, India 
2)Like-minded: 
converges 
because of 
Instrumental 
approach 
USA, Mexico, 
South Korea 
4) Difficult:  
Own perceptions 
and global 
ambitions do not 
leave space for 
great compromise 
Russia, China 
 
Thomas Renard, as already seen, has made the distinction between the formal 
and true ‘strategic partnership’, before providing his analysis of what is a true 
‘strategic partnership’. Beyond this distinction, he has also proposed two more 
sets of distinctions. First, he makes the distinction between the “comprehensive 
partners” and the “limited-range partners”. In the first group (where the USA, 
Russia, China and India are placed) the EU can seek a more comprehensive 
partnership, including all possible areas of cooperation and coordination. In the 
second group (including the rest of the partners) the EU can establish a 
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partnership on a more limited and focused area of cooperation, that is in fewer 
fields and issues in which the ‘strategic partnership’ can provide added value to 
the partners. However, it is interesting to note that in this differentiation, even 
though it is not being suggested by Renard, the differentiating actor between 
these two groups is the power status of the players. Whilst for the EU and the 
USA it can be suggested that they (broadly) share interests and values, in the 
case of Russia, China and India it is obvious that the EU and its partners do not 
share the same norms and values (e.g. in multilateralism or national 
sovereignty). Thus, the ‘dominating actor’ element that Gratius had suggested 
fits into this categorisation. Renard then, is suggesting that the EU seeks 
comprehensive partnerships with the ‘dominant powers’ and more specific, 
issue or region related partnerships with the “minor powers”. 
The second set of categorisations of the partnerships includes the essential 
partners, the pivotal partners, the natural allies and the regional partners319. In 
the first category, that of essential partners, only the USA fits. That is because 
the USA stands above all other partnerships and this partnership is essential for 
any substantive action of the EU on the global stage. Renard argues that for the 
EU “little can be done without the support of the American superpower”320. In 
the second group, that of pivotal partners where Russia and China and to some 
level Brazil and India can also be included, the partnerships are pivotal for 
tackling global affairs because the stance of these players can change the 
adoption of decisions and thus affect the direction of developments, towards EU 
views or not. The third group is the one of natural allies of like-minded countries, 
including Canada, Japan and South Korea. It is interesting that in this case the 
category proposed by Renard and Gratius are identical. They are considered to 
share same perceptions of the world system with the EU and to be also very 
active at a global level. However they are less strategically important than the 
pivotal partners. The last group is that of regional powers, namely Mexico and 
                                                          
319 Renard Thomas, 'The Treachery of Strategies: A Call for Ture EU Strategic Partnerships', Egmont Paper 45, April 
2011, Retrieved on 29 April 2011 from http://aei.pitt.edu/32321/1/ep45.pdf, p.23 
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South Africa and their strategic role is firmly associated with their influence at a 
regional level.   
 
Table 4.2 
‘Comprehensive partners’ ‘Limited-range partners’ 
1) Essential for 
any substantive 
action 
USA 
3) Like-minded but 
less strategically 
important than 
‘pivotal’  
Canada, Japan, 
South Korea 
2) Pivotal since 
their stance can 
change the global 
balances 
Russia, China, 
(Brazil, India) 
4) Regional 
influence  
Mexico, South 
Africa 
 
The approach of Renard emphasises the role and the identity of the EU’s 
‘strategic partners’ and the expectations that the EU may have from them, 
based on their power status and influence at the world stage. In this respect, it is 
different from the approach of Gratius which is more value-driven, based on the 
case study of multilateralism. This difference of approaches can also explain the 
differences of the hierarchical ranking of major EU’s partners, those of Russia 
and China. While the USA fits the most advanced level of ‘strategic partnership’ 
for both scholars, in the case of Russia and China, these partners are according 
to Renard “pivotal” and according to Gratius “distant”. In the approach of 
Renard, the term pivotal can be associated more with the possible outcomes of 
the partnership in biregional and global issues, while in the case of Gratius the 
term distant describes more the character of the partnership itself. 
This differentiation of the categorisation of the ‘strategic partnerships’ brings into 
the discussion an added element that needs to be taken into consideration 
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when analysing this notion. The definition of ‘strategic partnerships’ already calls 
for the exploration of values and perceptions which are invested in the 
relationship, alongside interests. However, this differentiation also highlights the 
expectations the parties, and more importantly the EU, generate because of 
these relationships. Thus, the way the EFP balances between these two 
approaches needs to be addressed in this thesis, through the assessment of the 
roles of interests, values and self-images. 
To the extent that the EU prioritises one of these elements, compared to the 
other two, will reveal the character of the relationships aimed at by the EU (if the 
EU wants to engage in interest-based cooperation or seeks value-driven 
relationship), the leverage the EU can have over symmetrical partners, the 
scope of its desired reach (global or bi-regional), and its expectations regarding 
the final outcome. 
 
Conclusions 
As shown in this chapter, the European Commission proposed the notion of 
“strategic partnership” almost fifteen years ago but since then the concept has 
remained vague, as it was developed alongside the further integration of the 
foreign policy mechanisms of the EU. The way EU was maturing as an 
international actor also reflected gradually on this EFP tool. The EU turned its 
focus on this term only after the creation of the EEAS, but even then it did not 
provide any clear definition for it.  
Based mostly on  EC communications and the realities of the EU relationships 
with third parties, scholars have analysed the way the EU has acted and 
organised its relationship with “strategic partners” in order to tackle the 
vagueness surrounding the term. One of the contributions of this thesis is the 
introduction of the documents and presentations prepared by the EEAS in an 
attempt to add to the academic debate. Thus, this chapter has built upon the 
academic debate as well as the understanding of EU policymakers of this notion 
in order to bridge these two processes. A definition of strategic partnership was 
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proposed that introduced a multidimensional strand and provided a platform to 
accommodate the role of non-state actors from various fields within the societies 
of the two parties. It also highlighted the symmetry of power balance between 
the partners and the growing level of which call for flexibility from the EU side, 
compared to the more traditional approaches of EFP. In addition, it has 
highlighted the role of perceptions beyond that of interests and values. A more 
detailed methodological framework, which will be used for exploring the EU-
GCC relationship, is still needed but this will be presented in the next chapter.  
Nevertheless, what has become clearer is that ‘strategic partnership’ is a tool for 
the EFP to manage, both internally providing the long-term objectives and 
policies and externally due to the changing global environment, its relationships 
with emerging powers, since the more traditional approaches seem inadequate, 
due to the elements that differentiate these partners from the less confident and 
less developed (and to certain levels powerless) countries of traditional 
cooperation schemes.  
Moreover, a brief review of the EU documents, as well as the academic work on 
‘strategic partnerships’, reveals the rationale and the common components of 
this new foreign policy tool. ‘Strategic partnership’ has been a ‘single and 
coherent framework’ through which the EU aspired to “clearly and jointly define 
objectives” as well as formulate policies in a “coordinated” manner. Through the 
application of this tool, the EU aimed  at enhancing the cooperation of the EU 
and its partners at all three levels, bilateral, bi-regional and multilateral, in order 
to promote EU interests, values and its (self-)image. Furthermore, a process of 
institutionalisation was introduced in these partnerships since various bodies 
were established in order to promote cooperation. 
Beyond the attempts to define the notion of ‘strategic partnership’, for which the 
chapter has provided a lengthy review and a proposed definition, a central point 
recognised by  most scholars is that EU partnerships are not all the same or 
equal in value, priority and development. This thesis has categorised the 
development of this tool based on the interests, values and self-images of the 
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EU, taking into consideration the changing internal and external environments of 
the EU. However, it was Renard and Gratius that provided scales for assessing 
existing “strategic partnerships”, giving two different sets of hierarchical 
categorisation; Renard’s approach being more interest-driven and the approach 
of Gratius’ more value-driven.  
Based on the proposed definition of the EU’s ‘strategic partnerships’ provided, 
the next chapter will provide the main hypothesis and the research questions in 
order to explore the EU-GCC relationship. It will examine whether the EU and 
the GCC states are heading towards a “strategic partnership” and how this 
development of the EU-GCC relationship reveals aspects of the changing EFP 
as well as how this relationship reflects back, by affecting EFP.  
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METHODOLOGY OF THE THESIS 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters, it was shown that the unique character of the 
European Union (EU) affected the shaping and the implementation of its foreign 
policy, which is composed of the policies and actions of both the EU bodies as 
well as its member states towards third parties. Since the conception of the EU, 
the EFP was to a large extent divided between the external (economic) relations 
of the first pillar and that of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of 
the second pillar. Due to the economic power of the EU and its lack of 
significant independent military capabilities, academics’ attention was attached 
to the framework of the EU as a civilian and/or a normative power. These 
arguments do not only tackle the capacities and the instruments of the EU in 
promoting its interests but they also highlight its values and its perceptions 
about itself, its partners and the world system, economically and politically. 
Thus, it is of utmost importance that this thesis addresses its hypothesis based 
on this distinctive character of the EU, namely the superiority of its economic 
arm compared to the thin military capabilities, its post-modern character with the 
co-existence of supranational and intergovernmental internal processes and the 
balance between interests, values and perceptions in the shaping of the EFP. 
Scholars have agreed that there is a certain level of normative aspects in the 
EFP and consequently the main focus has been on the cohabitation of these 
elements, the way they are interrelated and the priority and significance given to 
each one of these elements in the (foreign) policy making process. The 
arguments of the instrumental use of values and identities in the shaping of the 
EFP as well as those on the priority placed on the grand goals of the EU and its 
member states over their values, have paved the way for a discourse based on 
which this thesis will attempt to set its main hypothesis and the subsequent 
research questions. 
These arguments become even more vital for the analysis of the EFP, 
especially in the case of “strategic partnerships”. Whilst in the context of more 
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traditional relationships the EU was characterised as the powerful pole and 
could set the conditions and the structures of the relationship, in the case of 
“strategic partnerships” EFP leverage is significantly challenged.  Partners’ 
values, perceptions and specific interests seem to diverge, in a context where 
the parties simultaneously cooperate and compete for economic interests and 
for political influence in the global system. Therefore, the way interests, values 
and perceptions interact in the EFP within the framework of “strategic 
partnerships” can be revealing about the EFP goals, tools, approaches and 
outcomes. 
In this context, the aim of the thesis is to explore how the EU has applied 
‘strategic partnership’ in its dealings with the GCC states which have developed 
a self-image of increasingly significant players in their region and beyond. 
Having in mind the internal characteristics of the EFP and the image the EU 
projects about itself in global affairs, the main focus will be on the tools and 
actions deployed by the EU in order to cooperate but also compete with third 
parties, which have the power to refute the normative aspects of the EFP and 
can challenge EU interests. While in the case of the traditional EU policies in the 
MENA region the EU has been the dominant pole directing policies and actions, 
based on its own norms and interests (reinforcing at the same time its own self-
images) in the case of the GCC states the EU needs a different approach. Thus, 
the main question is how the civilian and normative self-image of the EFP 
affects the development of the EU-GCC relationship and how the EFP is 
affected in return because of this relationship. This question arises from the fact 
that the GCC states have different value systems as well as the political and 
economic power to bargain with the EU or even to reject EU norms and policies 
in the region.  
Yet, it has been established that there is a great level of interdependency 
between the two regions and the option of ignoring each other, because of the 
differences in values, is not actually viable. Hence, it is vital to examine how 
values, interests (in security and economy) and self-images interact, in order to 
understand EFP in the Gulf region and the broader Middle East. ‘Strategic 
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partnership’ will be the tool which will provide the necessary benchmarks for 
assessing the manner in which the EU coordinates the actions of its bodies and 
member states, towards  EFP objectives, in order to address external changes, 
to promote its interests without jeopardizing its own value system, and to 
reinforce its self-images in the Arabian Peninsula. Consequently, it will examine 
how the EU advances these elements, through a framework of engagement with 
the GCC states, in a broad based manner, at bilateral, inter-regional and 
multilateral levels. In doing so, the thesis explores for the first time a bloc-to-bloc 
relationship through this framework of ‘strategic partnership’, and the outcome 
of this research shall also provide insights on the development of the EU as a 
foreign policy actor, especially since the creation of EEAS has raised  
expectations in this area. 
This chapter will present the hypothesis which will be examined in this research, 
and the research questions that will be addressed for testing the hypothesis.  It 
will then present the case studies and explain the reasons for choosing them as 
the most suitable in exploring EU-GCC relations as well as the timeframe of the 
research, the material that has been used and the limitations faced during the 
research. In brief, this chapter will provide a methodological approach by which 
the thesis aims to provide an original insight into the EU-GCC relationship. It 
aims to do this by using a framework that has not been used before, that of 
strategic partnership, investigating more than one case study, incorporating 
activities from the societal, non-state level as well as by looking into this 
relationship for the past ten years, which will  accommodate the dynamics of 
change in the EU’s expectations, interests, normative aspects and self-images. 
 
Hypothesis: Interests, values and (self-)images 
In the specific case of EU-GCC relations, this thesis has shown (in the 
Introduction) that there is a great level of convergence of economic and 
political–security interests of the two parties. Briefly, there has been a constant 
deepening of interdependency in terms of the economy, energy and security of 
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the two regions which has provided a new context in which the two parties seem 
to share goals and interests. More specifically, the EU has promoted the 
integration of the Gulf economies into the world economic system, promoted 
regional stability through regional integration and, domestically, favoured 
economic liberalisation and diversification projects. The GCC states have taken 
advantage of the technical support offered by the EU, for their own regional 
project as well as for their national economic diversification plans. Furthermore, 
during the oil boom of the 2000s the need for greater technological 
advancement and transfer of expertise from Europe to the Gulf, the surpluses of 
transnational flows of capital which have been invested in Europe, the rise in the 
bi-regional trade, as well as common security threats due to new sources of 
instability in the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, transnational radical Islamist groups) 
have created the dynamics for a closer EU-GCC relationship. However, the two 
parties have not reached the level of an officially declared (by the EU), strategic 
partnership. 
Having in mind the fact that the EU has developed ‘strategic partnerships’ with 
other parties with value systems that are divergent (e.g. China and Russia), the 
value factor of the relationship cannot be pointed to as the sole source of this 
lack of an official declaration of an EU-GCC ‘strategic partnership’. Moreover, 
scholars have argued about the instrumental use of values as well as the 
prioritisation of interests over values. Therefore, the hypothesis needs to 
consider and address these approaches. It is worth remembering that according 
to these approaches, values are seen as being instrumentally used in the EFP, 
since they are pursued in a way that they advance specific interests and they 
also help to legitimise internally and externally the application of certain policies. 
However, the values themselves are not the source of the policy making 
procedure321. Furthermore, it has been suggested that values are “second order 
concerns” which are allowed to become a central part of the policy making 
process only to the extent that they do not clash with the grand goals of the EFP 
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and the interests of the EU member states322. At this point, the role of 
perceptions, which have not been heavily touched upon by scholars in their 
definitions of ‘strategic partnership’ but have been identified as a possible 
source of development and application of this political tool by the EU, needs to 
be explored. 
Taking the above points into consideration,  in the case of the EU-GCC 
relationship, the main hypothesis of this thesis is the following: If the EU and the 
GCC states share interests and grand goals to the extent that these are 
prioritised by the EU and its member states, then value-driven differences are 
subordinated to interests and as a result (i) the EU and the GCC states enhance 
their relationship towards a “strategic partnership” and (ii) the EU’s (self-) image 
as a foreign policy actor is weakened in terms of its normative (self-)image and 
enhanced in terms of its effectiveness as a ‘strategic partner’ in a multipolar and 
interdependent world.  
Based on the above hypothesis, it can also be suggested that if the EU indeed 
applies norms in an instrumental manner, then to the extent that the GCC states 
respond to interests that are related to the values that have been instrumentally 
promoted, then the value factor of EFP is weakened in the official interactions of 
the two parties. Thus, if this is the case, the fact that the two parties have not 
officially declared an existing ‘strategic partnership’ is due to reasons that are 
either relate to their interests or their perceptions and not the values of the two 
parties. Therefore, the image of the EU as an effective foreign policy actor and a 
useful partner in the multipolar global setting, is not hindered by its value-driven 
language but by its ability to adapt to the new realities of the international 
system. 
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Research Questions 
Given the abovementioned hypothesis and propositions as well as the definition 
of ‘strategic partnership’ constructed for the thesis, the following questions will 
be asked in order to explore the central elements of the hypothesis. 
 
1. The two parties are engaged in a symmetrical – balanced relationship 
which is characterised by a parallel process of cooperation and 
competition. Therefore, what will be explored isthe convergence as well 
as the divergent characteristics of this relationship in terms of interests, 
values and images. How is the negotiating power of the EU affected in 
promoting its interests in the region? Having in mind the value driven 
arguments of the EFP, how can the EU and the GCC states cooperate? 
How can EFP promote its values over an equally powerful partner who is 
predominately different in terms of values? How can this factor influence 
the images the two parties have for themselves and for their external 
environments? 
 
2. In terms of interdependency, the main question is whether this is indeed 
existent in the EU-GCC relationship, nowadays. If this is the case, as the 
introduction also suggests, to which level it is shaped by interests, values 
and images? What are the added values the parties bring in to the 
relationship? Are the parties in reality pivotal for each others’ goals? Can 
the EU project itself as a strategic partner to the GCC states and vice 
versa? Moreover, how has the normative aspect of the EFP been 
advanced or compromised due to the interdependency factor? What are 
the implications of the latter to the EU and the GCC (self-) images? 
 
3. The common interests and shared challenges are identified at national, 
regional and international levels. Have the parties managed to transform 
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share concerns and expectations into common approaches and joint 
actions, having in mind the possibility that interests and values are 
incompatible? How have perceptions influenced the shaping of common 
interests? How are all these dealt with by the two parties in the three 
environments and what is the outcome? How has the outcome affect the 
two parties and their perceptions as well as the relationship itself? At this 
point, it should be noted that both parties are considered to be powerful 
in terms of economy but with less powerful military capabilities. Yet, their 
relationship has been addressing, directly and indirectly, security issues. 
 
4. Since a “strategic partnership” is a multilayered, multidimensional and 
multileveled relationship, the question is whether in the case of the EU-
GCC relationship,  bi-regional interactions have intersected different 
ranks of the societies, from different fields and at different levels 
(bilateral, bi-regional and international) in a way which has enhanced this 
relationship. 
 
5. In addition, it is suggested that a relationship which focuses merely on 
specific commercial and security interests cannot be qualified as a 
'strategic partnership'. A 'strategic partnership' is a much broader, if 
possible all inclusive, long-term relationship, which is has been 
institutionalised into formal channels of communications. Yet, a strategic 
partnership needs to remain dynamic and flexible to adjust to the 
changing environments of the parties. . Therefore the question is whether 
this relationship has evolved over time and if the parties have been 
flexible in accommodating changing interests, values, expectations and 
perceptions. Moreover, to what extent has institutionalisation of the 
relationship been a factor to enhance or hinder the strategic character of 
the EU-GCC relations? 
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6. Furthermore, since this is the first attempt to explore a bi-regional 
relationship within the framework of “strategic partnerships”, it is vital to 
address the questions regarding the role of the unique characters 
regional organisations have compared to nation-states. Has the 
institutional mismatch of the two organisations affected the development 
of the relationship? Were there any member states or other actors who 
have hindered the evolution of the biregional relationship or on the 
contrary have pushed forward the partnership? To what extent have 
internal divisions or on the contrary, has cohesiveness shaped the 
partnership?  
 
7. In addition, if the EFP is characterised by a triangular relationship 
between interests, values and images, then the question regarding the 
balance of normative approaches and interest-based approaches of the 
EFP is raised. Are the values and the perceptions of the EU (and the 
GCC states) an obstacle or an asset for this relationship?  
 
The last research question introduces the need to explore the level of mutual 
understanding that the two parties need to reach in order to advance their 
relationship. The level to which the parties do make compromises regarding 
their values and perceptions in order to advance their common interests also 
characterises the kind of partnership that may arise. It has already been shown 
that there are different scales for assessing the EU’s “strategic partnerships”, 
either based on interest-driven or value-driven approaches. Since the 
hypothesis of this thesis suggests that the EU and the GCC states are moving 
towards a strategic partnership, then the research should also address the 
question of what kind of “strategic partnership” is being shaped. 
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Case Studies 
The ambition of this research is to be multidimensional, multilayered and 
multileveled. That means that the case studies should address issues that go 
beyond the role of the ruling elites and explore the role of different actors from 
the bureaucracies, the business communities and academics, from different 
dimensions of the interactions (and most importantly in the fields of economy 
and security) which affect policies at bilateral, bi-regional and international 
levels. Thus, there must be at least one case study which goes beyond bilateral 
relations, and which has a direct effect on the regional or global setting. 
Moreover, it should be remembered that the current literature has been focused 
on the role of the EU in political reforms in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf 
and the poor results of EU foreign policy in the Gulf region in terms of 
democratisation. Since the aim of this thesis is to analyse how interests, values 
and images are accommodated in the relationship and how they have become 
factors in advancing or hindering this relationship towards a ‘strategic 
partnership’, in different thematic fields, within the same context by the same 
actors, it will apply a ‘most different systems design’323. Thus, this thesis will 
explore one case of economic cooperation (which nevertheless includes 
aspects of political, economic and social norms but it tests the EFP in a field 
where the EU is proudly vocal about its strength) and one case which is in the 
field of core politics and security. The latter becomes even more important 
because of the nature and the capacities of the EFP, which has been identified 
as significantly weaker in military terms, compared to its economic capabilities, 
giving space to criticism about the broader capacities of the EFP. 
In the economic sphere, the negotiations for the signing of a Free Trade 
Agreement are an obvious focal point, since the EU-GCC Cooperation 
Agreement, which is the legal basis of this bi-regional relationship since late 
1980s, has called for these FTA talks. Alongside (and due to) the discussions 
for a FTA, the two parties have initiated a dialogue and various channels of 
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cooperation regarding the region-building process (especially in the economic 
realm) in the Gulf region. Therefore, central EFP instruments, namely technical 
assistance and the political support for region-building processes, are 
associated with this case. Beyond the cooperation of the technocrats and the 
ruling elites, this broader issue of economic cooperation is a case in which the 
role of the private sector, and more specifically that of the business 
communities, is vital in providing an example by which the multidimensional and 
multilayered character of the relationship can be explored. At a time when the 
GCC states aim to diversify their economic models and tackle the demographic 
pressure arising from the high number of youth unemployment, the EU sees an 
opportunity to promote its policies for economic and political reforms based on 
its own values and perceptions. However, the level of resistance that the GCC 
states can pose to these values and perceptions creates an interesting debate 
between the European model of democracy, free markets and global 
governance policy against the rentier state approach of the GCC states and 
their limited engagement with globalisation when the latter (beyond economics) 
touches upon the fields of cultural and political organisation. Adding to all these, 
the political conditionalities that the EU has attached to the negotiations have 
affirmed that this is clearly a case of ‘politics meets economics’, an essential 
characteristic of the EU ‘strategic partnerships’ as understood by EU 
policymakers themselves.  
In the predominantly political-security field, democratisation has been the key 
issue for the EU, and that is why it was covered by earlier research work. 
However, during the last decade, security has become a central issue for both 
of the regions. The EU has clearly identified terrorism, proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime as the 
most challenging threats for European security since 2003324. In order to tackle 
these threats, a combination of intelligence, police, judicial, military means and 
                                                          
324 European Council, A secure Europe in a better world - European security strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003, 
p. 5 
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economic instruments is needed325. The case of the situation in Yemen seems 
to have been related to four out of five of these threats. At the same time, 
Yemen poses a security threat for the GCC states as well, both in terms of acts 
of terrorism, as well as ideologically, since the transnational Islamic movement 
in Yemen challenges the legitimacy of the rulers and the organisation of 
societies in the GCC states. Thus, the unstable situation in Yemen has posed 
challenges to the GCC states within all their environments; internal, regional and 
international. Having in mind the thin military capabilities of the EU, the fact that 
the role of terrorist groups in Yemen affects regional and global security, the fact 
that GCC states have immediate interest in tackling the situation in Yemen, but 
also the fact that the EU and the GCC have different departure points for their 
policies in Yemen (the EU aims at tackling the roots of the problem, namely 
poverty and the need for democratisation, while the GCC place the issue of 
Yemen in the context of pan-Arabism that needs to take into consideration the 
concerns and the expectations of the GCC states),  will make it  extremely 
interesting and useful to examine how common interests are transformed into 
concrete action, affected by the values and the perceptions of the two partners.  
Indeed, if for the EU the focus is on the political and economic reforms that 
Yemen needs in order to address the threats emanating from the country itself, 
the GCC states and more specifically Saudi Arabia had developed a network of 
political influence through the tribal leaders, which is closer to the culture and 
the societal organisation of the Arabian Peninsula, but challenges the 
individualism and transparency of the democratic norms of the EU.  
It will be significant also to explore if the common interests of the EU and the 
GCC have indeed been the main factor to shape their relationship, forcing the 
abovementioned values and perceptions to subordinate to the security interests, 
as the hypothesis of this thesis suggests. Moreover, it will test the regional 
approach, based on the step-by-step approach of the EU and its strategic 
partners, as well as the added value that the partners can bring into this 
relationship. In this context, the central role of Yemen as a base for the ‘Al 
                                                          
325 Ibid, p. 7 
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Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula’, and the reactions of the two parties can 
provide interesting information for understanding the broader framework of this 
bi-regional relationship in the field of security and high politics. The role of the 
EU and the GCC states in the ‘Consultative Group for Yemen’ and the 
‘Friends of Yemen’ fora as well as the extent to which the two regional 
organisations have coordinated their actions in the Yemeni crisis of 2011, will 
be the three main points of focus in this case study, since terrorism has been 
associated with the trajectory of Yemen in becoming a failed state.  Even 
though, in the introduction of this thesis, I had referred to the common interests 
of the EU and the GCC states to cooperate against the money laundering 
actions that were linked to the financing of terrorist organisations as well as in 
constraining the Iranian nuclear project, these cases seem to be less useful for 
assessing the EU-GCC relationship. In the case of money laundering, and 
despite the fact that there has been a certain level of cooperation through 
exchange of expertise during workshops and in introducing new institutions and 
laws, this is a very specific and technical issue, for which a high level of secrecy 
in terms of distribution of information has been imposed. Moreover, this issue is 
one which can be described as a soft security issue. However, one of the aims 
of this thesis is to explore the foreign policies of the two partners in a hard 
security issue, having in mind the thin military capacities of the two partners. In 
the case of the Iranian nuclear programme, for which the EU and the GCC 
states share the same concerns (in the field of hard security), there would be a 
great level of antagonism between the EU and GCC states on one hand and 
Iran on the other, which will complicate the balance, blurring the possible 
outcomes and conclusions of the research. Moreover, Iran (in contrast to 
Yemen) does not belong to the Arab world, and thus will limit the research in 
terms of the role of Arabism as an integral part of the value system based on 
which GCC foreign policies are shaped. For these reasons, the case of Yemen 
is the most suitable for exploring the EU-GCC cooperation in political–security 
issues, in a long timeframe which can also assess the evolution of the bi-
regional relationship. 
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Overall, I will test one case in which the EU and the GCC states can cooperate 
and at the same time be competitive actors aiming to promote their own 
distinctive interests (FTA talks) and one case in which the two parties share 
common interests (security), but may have different approaches and 
understanding because of their own values and perceptions. This will not only 
provide depth, but also a greater understanding of the dynamism of the 
symmetric character of the relationship of the EU and the GCC states towards a 
strategic partnership. 
The timeframe of the case studies shall be the ten years beginning from 2001 
until 2011, because during this time:  
- The global and regional context has changed creating new dynamics for 
cooperation – enhancing the relationship between the EU and the GCC 
states 
- Europe rose as a potential alternative to US dominance in the area 
because of the need for  more effective cooperation between the two 
regions in various fields after the events of 9/11 
- The Lisbon Treaty was implemented, which created the EEAS and led to 
more centralised, Brussels-based policy making system in the EU. 
- The number of EU member states doubled and a great amount of 
resources (human and economic) was moved from the integration project 
into other policy areas, including the EFP.  
- The GCC states made some important steps towards their own 
integration which the EU supported. Due to this integration process and 
their economic development, the GCC states claimed a more important 
role in regional and global politics.  
- The EU prioritised energy security, and the Gulf states have been an 
important source of energy for Europe. 
- GCC sovereign wealth funds have become more active in Europe. 
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- During 2011, the EU and the GCC faced common challenges because of 
the ‘Arab Spring’. 
All these reasons created new dynamics for an enhanced relationship between 
the EU and the GCC states and the two blocs have established a very 
interesting framework with the co-existence of different factors which can either 
galvanise a more strategic approach towards their relationship or shed light on 
the weaknesses of this cooperation. 
 
Material used 
This thesis has collected material from official documents, reports and articles 
published either on paper or online. Even though it has been less easy to gather 
information from the Arab states because of the personalised and deeply 
centralised system of the decision making process, I have had access to the 
rich empirical data of the Gulf Research Centre (which has already be 
mentioned) and other institutions online. Additionally, I have visited the area for 
collecting information relevant to the subject of this thesis. I have also collected 
material from interviews with policymakers and researchers from the EU and the 
Arab states of the Gulf, in an attempt to understand the insights of this 
relationship beyond the official language that is included in official documents326. 
Moreover, in August 2011 Wikileaks released a great number of cables from the 
US embassies in Sanaa, Yemen and in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. A lot of these 
cables revealed necessary insights on the role of the KSA and the Yemeni 
reactions to EU and GCC policies.    
The major difficulty for this thesis is the fact that even though I did have access 
to classified documents of the EU (after 2010), which enabled me to get very 
important information about the shaping of EU policies and approaches, I was 
not allowed to disclose any information that is directly linked to these classified 
documents. I have only been able to refer to such information indirectly; in 
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certain cases such information was disclosed during my interviews with 
policymakers who have had input into the decision making process, either in 
Brussels or in EU member states capitals. It is also noted that in most cases, 
these policymakers requested that they remain anonymous and therefore I will 
provide a list of my interviews disclosing only the nationality of the interviewees.  
 
Limitations 
This thesis has explored the partnership of the EU and the GCC in two specific 
case studies. Even though I have tried to incorporate as many different aspects 
of this relationship as possible, namely the economic, political and security 
aspects, I do understand that the areas of cooperation between the two regional 
blocs are not limited in these fields. For example, energy security and hard 
security agreements between member states of the two regions could have 
been areas of research as well. Nevertheless, I have attempted to address -in 
the limited scope of a PhD thesis-, two major elements: the “economics meets 
politics” aspect of the EFP and the outcome of this partnership in a broader 
regional level, thus beyond strict bi-regional matters.  
Furthermore, this is a specific case of EU partnership with a third party, the 
GCC and its member states, which have their own distinctive characteristics in 
terms of society and the ruling system. Additionally, this is research for a region-
to-region partnership, which may differentiate this thesis from previous 
academic work, since most of the academic research thus far on the issue has 
been on partnerships with single nation states. Nevertheless, it also means that 
the findings of this study cannot be generalised by projecting the conclusions of 
this specific research on the wide spectrum of EU partnerships.  
Moreover, I have tried to incorporate as many different dimensions of the 
partnership as possible, in terms of the actors which are involved, in terms of 
the coexistence of values, interests and (self-) images and in terms of the level 
of engagement at a bi-regional, and broader regional and an international levels, 
as  has already  been mentioned. Again, I do not claim that I have explored this 
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relationship in a way that all relevant questions have been addressed. For 
example, the direct and indirect role of the EU member states and the GCC 
states in the shaping of the decisions of the United Nations Security Council 
regarding the situation in Yemen, has not been addressed. This was decided 
due to practical reasons which are associated with the level of access to 
information about the decisions taken at the UN headquarters as well as 
because I focused at levels where the two parties had immediate influence. 
In any case, I feel that this thesis has addressed the major questions for the 
development of the EU-GCC relationship towards a strategic partnership, in a 
comprehensive way at a bi-regional level, where both parties had leading roles.  
 
Conclusions  
This thesis has discussed the literature on the EU-GCC relations, demonstrating 
the value of recent works by Youngs and Nonneman, which have been 
important in contributing to the understanding of bi-regional relations. However, 
despite the insights they offer, they only explore the case of political reform in 
the Arabian Peninsula; they are thus static, as they fail to capture the dynamics 
of development, and they ignore all the activities taking place at levels other 
than  high governmental positions. There is an important gap in the existing 
literature, therefore, which this thesis aims to address, by addressing this 
relationship as one of a multilayered, multidimensional and multileveled 
character and by exploring the role of various actors across the political and 
social ranks of the two regions, from different fields at national, regional and 
international levels.  
A brief reference to the broader literature on the EFP enabled us to place the 
EU-GCC relationship within the debate of the EU as a global actor with special 
reference to the use of economic tools and normative goals, due to the EU’s 
own structure, development and (self-) images. Stating that the EU – GCC 
relationship could not fit the pattern of traditional EFP cooperation schemes (in 
the Middle East), where the EU is the dominant pole in unbalanced 
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relationships, a gap in the current literature for the EU-GCC relations was 
identified. Based on that, the thesis suggested that the EU-GCC relationship 
should be explored from the perspective of a ‘strategic partnership’, in order to 
incorporates interests, values and (self-) images in a triangular relationship, 
exploring their balance within the relationship and how these elements have 
developed through a decade, aiming to capture the dynamic character of the 
relations.  
Since there is no clear definition on the concept of ‘strategic partnership’ I have 
also worked on the current literature on this notion and I have introduced 
insights and information into the academic debates from within the EU regarding 
the shaping and the development of the EU’s ‘strategic partnerships’. Exploring 
the academic debate and the understanding of EU policymakers on the issue, I 
have concluded on a number of elements which form a ‘strategic partnership’ 
and I have provided a definition for its concept, which aims to combine the 
theoretical approaches of academics but also the understanding of the term by 
practitioners. 
In the next three chapters, I will give a brief description of the state of play of the 
EU-GCC relationship on a broader level and then draw attention to the goals of 
the two parties. A more detailed presentation and analysis of the EU-GCC 
interaction focusing on the very specific case studies of the thesis will follow, 
giving answers to the research questions raised in this chapter and testing the 
hypothesis that if the EU indeed applies norms in an instrumental manner, then 
to the extent that the GCC states have responded to  interests, which are 
related to the values that have been instrumentally promoted, then the value 
factor of EFP is weakened in the official interactions of the two parties. If this is 
the case, the fact that the two parties have not officially declared an existing 
‘strategic partnership’ is due to reasons that are either related to their interests 
or their perceptions and not the values of the two parties. Therefore, the image 
of the EU as an effective foreign policy actor, and a useful partner in the 
multipolar global setting, is not hindered by its value-driven language but by its 
ability to adapt to the new realities of the international system. 
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The thesis will end with a conclusion on the EFP in the Gulf region, assessing 
the extent to which the EU and GCC have reached a strategic partnership, and 
suggesting at the same time the reasons behind any success or failure, and the 
broader implications for EFP. 
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EU-GCC RELATIONS: TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
 
Introduction 
 European Union (EU) and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) relations have 
always been mainly focused on economy. The EU is the GCC's biggest trading 
partner and importer of goods in the region and GCC markets have been 
important for the EU especially since bi-regional trade has been asymmetrical in 
its nature, in favour of Europe. More recently, flows of investments from the Gulf 
to Europe verified the interdependency of the two regions327. Biregional trade 
between the EU and the GCC was treated under the Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) regulations and under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) the 
EU granted to all developing countries328. Since 1990 bi-regional trade has been 
constantly growing. In 1989, when the Euro-Arab Dialogue was collapsing, the 
EU and the GCC states signed a Cooperation Agreement, according to which 
the two parties agreed to negotiate a trade agreement overcoming MFN and 
GSP status, eventually leading to a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). During the 
first decade of the talks the progress of the official negotiations was minimal, but 
there were some encouraging signs for the overall relationship because of the 
work of the business communities. In the 21st century, because of the new 
political environment and the economic development of the Gulf region, both at 
a local as well as at regional level (with the integration process of the GCC 
states), a new momentum for the economic relations of the two regions 
emerged. New opportunities were raised for the EU to become a significant 
player in the area and a strategic partner in the GCC’s efforts for economic 
diversification and further economic development.  
This chapter will analyse the case study of economic relations between the EU 
and the GCC states within the framework of a strategic partnership. It will use 
                                                          
327 Hollis, Rosemary, Europe and the Middle East: Power by Stealth?, Rosemary Hollis, International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 73, No. 1, Jan., 1997, pp. 15-29.  
328 Escribano-Francés, Gonzalo, “An International Political Economy View of EU-GCC Partnership”, Paper presented 
at the “International Conference on Challenges of Economic Development for the GCC Countries”, Kuwait City, 29-31 
January 2005, p. 7 
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the methodological framework presented in the previous chapter in order to 
explore the history and the development of the FTA negotiations and the 
relationship of the business communities of the two regions. It aims at 
identifying the common interests and challenges of the two regional blocs and at 
examining whether interests and the subsequent cooperation go beyond purely 
economic gains, tackling the effect of values and the role of perceptions in this 
cooperation. It will also address the elements of competition and the level to 
which these have hindered closer cooperation between the parties.  
The power balance and the interdependency component will be central in 
exploring the shaping and the development of this relationship. This thesis will 
address how this interdependency factor has evolved during the last two 
decades and examine the added value the parties bring to the partnership. In a 
related matter, the chapter will then address the question of the long-term 
approach of this relationship and the flexibility that the two partners have shown 
in order to tackle the new developments in the fields of economy and politics, at 
national, regional and international levels, in order to overcome problems or to 
add impetus to their partnership. 
Furthermore, the chapter will investigate the role of the different actors, coming 
from different levels of the hierarchy of various fields of political institutions and 
socio-economic groups in order to examine if this relationship has been  
multidimensional, multilayered and multileveled, as a ‘strategic partnership’ 
should be, according to the suggested definition of this notion. It will also assess 
the broader range of the EU-GCC partnership, beyond the bi-regional level, 
having in mind on one hand the EU eagerness to promote multilateralism and 
on the other hand the GCC perceptions of autonomy in their internal but more 
importantly in their external environments. The extent to which the EU and the 
GCC have agreed on joint actions and have provided concrete results will also 
be examined, alongside internal cohesiveness as well as how the latter 
obstructs or promotes the shaping of an EU-GCC strategic partnership.  
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A special focus will be dedicated to the way the EU has promoted its values and 
norms in the Gulf region, as this is a central aspect of  EFP and ‘strategic 
partnerships’, according to the EU’s self-image. This is becoming even more 
important in light of the different structures and values of the societies and of the 
political systems in the GCC states as well as the fact that the Gulf leaders have 
their own perceptions about sovereignty accompanied by their ability to resist 
EFP. The extent to which the EU and the GCC states negotiate and reach 
understanding regarding values, norms and perceptions affects accordingly the 
shaping of a ‘strategic partnership’, either positively or negatively. It is expected 
that it will also influence the way that EFP is conducted, leading to re-
assessment, both by EU policymakers as well as other observers, about the 
character of EFP.  
The chapter will end with a presentation of the effects of the institutionalisation 
of the partnership as well as of the new opportunities arising from the regional 
and global environment may have on the development of the EU-GCC 
relationship. The aim of the current chapter is to project all the elements that 
form a strategic partnership on the specific case study in order to arrive at a 
conclusion as to what extent the EU-GCC relationship corresponds to this 
model of cooperation. The chapter will begin with a brief introduction to the 
‘rentier state’ structure of the Gulf states which is vital for the understanding of 
the way the Gulf leaders conduct internal and external policies and for the 
opportunities as well as the challenges posed for the EU-GCC relationship. 
Then, a brief history of the FTA negotiations will be presented. Sections 
referring to the different elements of a strategic partnership will follow. 
 
The ‘rentier state’ in the Gulf region 
The Gulf economies have mainly been based on the ‘rentier state’329 model of 
economic and societal organisation. This model is characterised (i) by the 
dependence of the national economy on substantial external rents that can 
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support the state expenditures even if there is no or a limited domestic sector for 
economic development (ii) these revenues are controlled by a very small group 
of people, usually the royal families and a small state class (elite) around them 
(iii) by whom state wealth is distributed to society and (iv) by the fact that the 
latter has no involvement in any production process330. Therefore, the lack of 
reforming forces within the Gulf societies, due to the structural characteristics of 
the ‘rentier state’, the subsequent dependence of the private sector to the state 
and the non-existence of an indigenous workforce and middle class means that  
the state is the only driving force of the economy. The dominant role of the state 
economy influences the relevant development plans and productivity rates. The 
public sector does not pursue purely economic gains, which is the case with the 
private sector, but it has to accommodate also social and political objectives331. 
Since the 1970s oil money has granted the capability to the royal families of the 
Gulf states to buy loyalty through the expanded public sector. They channelled 
money to local societies through goods allocation (housing schemes, stipends) 
or services (infrastructures), instead of investing in the development of domestic 
economic activities, namely industries and services. This was the main pattern 
of public policies in the Persian Gulf, as the results of this approach were 
immediate and the political gains more obvious332. Even when the Gulf states 
put forward development plans and initiatives for reforms or for restructuring the 
local economies, the ruling families had to weight the political cost of their 
decisions. They had to overcome the obstacles of balancing between the 
various economic actors and bureaucracies in order to keep everyone satisfied 
and loyal333. Moreover, the interaction between the state and the few private 
companies through a system of royal favours and subsidisations blurred the line 
between the rulers and the businessmen. Therefore, the distinction between 
                                                          
330 Beblawi, Hazem, ‘The rentier state in the Arab world’, in Beblawi, Hazem  and Luciani, Giacomo, eds., The Rentier 
State, London, Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1987, pp. 51-52 
331 Ayubi, Nazih, ‘Etatisme versus privatization: The changing Economic Role of the State in Nine Arab countries’ in 
Handoussa, Heba ed., Economic Transition in the Middle East, Global Changes and Adjustment Strategies, Egypt: 
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332 Abdel-Fadil, Mahmoud, The Macro-behaviour of Oil-rentier states in the Arab region, in Beblawi, Hazem  and 
Luciani, Giacomo, eds., The Rentier State, London, Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1987, p. 84 
333 Youngs, Richard, Europe and the Middle East: in the shadow of September 11, Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2006, p. 227, p. 15 
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private and public sectors were highly blurred and it should not surprise anyone 
that until very recently privatisation goals were merely a slogan by the Gulf 
leaders, rather than clearly defined goals pursued through concrete national 
policies and reforms334. On the contrary, the ruling families have used national 
wealth coming from oil revenues to boost the economic activities of the private 
economy, like the construction sector, through infrastructure projects and the 
welfare system with the housing schemes. This is, however, a mechanism of 
‘internal recycling’ of the oil rent, without building on the capacities for a real 
development of the private economy to the extent that it could become 
independent from the oil rents335.  The dependence of the national economy on 
the allocation system of rents developed a ‘rentier mentality’ within the Gulf 
societies, which still characterises a great majority of the local population. 
Because there is no linkage between production and gains the ‘work-reward 
causation’ is broken336. Income has been isolated from any notion of work and 
business risk and it is rather perceived as a fact that is much more linked to the 
political context and the political behaviour of the citizens. As a result of this 
system of effortless income for the GCC nationals, the workforce in these 
countries consists of expatriates. What is more interesting is that a large number 
of companies in trade and development are run by foreigners. Keeping in mind 
though that foreign ownership has not been easy in the Gulf countries, GCC 
citizens become ‘sponsors’, (‘al kafil’). They register companies or apply for 
permissions for trade or closed professions under their names and in exchange 
they get a share from the profits of their sponsored partners. This is another 
layer of the recycled rentier system, which has also led to the ‘kafil mentality’, 
according to which income does not derive from work or risk but solely from 
GCC citizenship and sponsorship337. In this institutional and political context, it is 
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no wonder the Gulf states could not attract direct foreign investments. Actually, 
during the 1990s, the average growth of FDI inflows had been -9%, whereas at 
the same time the global average growth was 19% and 30% for developing 
countries. Additionally, it should be noted that the FDI in the pre-2002 era was 
directed almost exclusively to the energy-related sector. It should also be 
pointed out that it was not simply a matter of no inflows of capital. By investing 
in other fields, foreign companies would have transferred technology and 
expertise that was greatly needed by the economies of the Gulf region338. 
In this brief description of the way the Gulf region is organised politically, 
economically and socially, it could be easily identified that the Gulf leaders have 
been the predominant actor in the all fields of activities and their actions were 
motivated by their aim to secure internal autonomy, through buying  loyalty. As a 
result, none of the major values pursued by the EU as described in the previous 
chapter were met in this context. The role of the state and national sovereignty 
were still fundamental (as opposed to the supranational rule of law), social 
freedoms and rights had been linked to obedience to the existing ruling system 
(as opposed to social freedoms, consensual democracy and human rights). 
Sustainability of peace could also be questioned to the extent that the 
sustainability of the economic and political structure was also challenged. Minor 
values promoted by the EFP (social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable 
development, good governance) were also very weak, if at all existent. 
 
Brief history of the FTA negotiations 
The FTA negotiations between the EU and the GCC are the cornerstone of their 
biregional relations, despite the slowdowns, the problems and even the 
suspension of the talks (2008) during the last twenty years. The EU-GCC FTA 
talks entered a phase of serious negotiations only after 2003, as the timing was 
just right then. The new political environment which was shaped by the 
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aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in  GCC–US relations, the increased interest of the 
European Union in the region339 and the establishment of an EU Delegation 
Office in Riyadh provided new impetus to the EU-GCC relations. In the field of 
economy, the GCC introduced a Common Custom Union facilitating bloc-to-bloc 
negotiations, and economic relations between the two regions grew even further 
both because of the oil prices and the new Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) 
inflows to Europe from the Gulf states340. When the negotiations resumed in 
2002, five rounds of talks took place within the first year, two more in 2003 and 
another three in 2004, proving the desire of the EU and the GCC states to build 
upon the new momentum. The negotiation rounds were followed by technical 
meetings341. In 2004, under the initiative of Chris Patten, Commissioner for 
External Relations at the time, the two parties agreed to concentrate their efforts 
on the economic sphere, namely on the negotiations for concluding the FTA, 
business relations, and energy cooperation. Human rights also became part of 
the talks342.  However, in December 2008 the GCC states suspended the official 
negotiations, sending the message that they are running out of patience. By 
May 2009, the EU and the GCC had agreed on 99% of the issues.  
Two obstacles remain: the inclusion of the human rights clauses; and the export 
duties in relation to Saudi rules and laws. The human rights clauses have 
became part of the negotiations mainly for two reasons; firstly because the EU 
always includes political clauses in the trade agreements and secondly due to 
the fact that the European Parliament has been active in raising  human rights 
issue for the Gulf States. The GCC states agreed on the addition of this matter 
in what is nevertheless seen as a purely economic agreement, since they do 
understand that this is the way the EU conducts negotiations for external 
relations. However, even though they made the concession of including a 
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discussion on human rights in this economic agreement, they are uncomfortable 
on how these clauses may be used in the future. On the export duties issue, 
even though the GCC and the EU had agreed on the terms about the prohibition 
of any export duties, at some point the GCC states (mainly, if not exclusively, 
because of the KSA) reverted to their previous position, so that they would be 
able to impose export duties on local products. Thus, the discussions reopened. 
The EU suggested time limitations, quantitative limitations or proportionate 
measures343 but the GCC states insisted that the matter should be left out of the 
FTA talks, or that prohibition of any export duties becomes an issue subjected 
only to bi-regional consultations. It should be noted that currently the KSA, and 
the rest of the GCC states, do not have export duties on petrochemical 
products, but the Gulf leaders do not want to relinquish their right to do so in the 
future in order to discourage export of raw materials and to encourage the 
development of their internal industrial production. The EU refuses to agree on 
further concessions on the matter because this would create a negative 
precedent for the rest of its negotiations for FTAs and it would also undermine 
the essence of the FTA agreement. Moreover, European diplomats have 
consistently argued that since the GCC states do not currently have export 
duties, they fail to see the rationale behind the stance of the GCC states. What 
is more, for European diplomats, this agreement is not expected to produce 
massive economic gains either to the EU or the GCC states, even though they 
could not be more specific on what the EU’s expectations and calculations are 
regarding the economic outcomes of the FTA agreement344. On their part, the 
GCC states have argued that their right to place export duties relates to their 
own internal development and stability and as such these priorities should be 
respected by the EU. In this sense the language used in the GCC arguments is 
one dressed with normative language in order to present an economic issue as 
                                                          
343 Letter sent to Dr. Hamad AL-Bazai, Deputy Finance Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by Joao Aguiar 
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a lack of understanding in terms of needs and values between the two 
parties345. 
These two thorny issues are discussed between the EU and the GCC 
negotiators during meetings that take place both in Brussels and in the Gulf 
area, informally. Representatives of the European Union and the Gulf states 
have been in contact since the first months of 2009, despite the official 
suspension of the talks. It is said that they want to reach an agreement through 
these informal channels, before going public about the progress of the 
negotiations346. On the rest of the issues covered by the FTA talks, the creation 
of the GCC Custom Union and the adoption of a general 5% tariff compared to 
the varied tariffs from 3.4% (Kuwait) to 16.3% (Bahrain) facilitated the dialogue. 
Public procurement, intellectual property and investment policies were also 
added to the talks, and there has been no reference to any difficulties arising 
from their inclusion347. No agreement has, yet, been reached between the EU 
and the GCC for the FTA. 
 
Common interests and shared challenges 
According to the Cooperation Agreement, which came into force in 1990 the two 
parties agreed to work together for three main objectives, as they were 
described in Article 1 of the agreement:  
(a) to strengthen relations between the European Economic Community, 
on the one hand, and the GCC countries, on the other, by placing them in 
an institutional and contractual framework; 
(b) to broaden and consolidate their economic and technical cooperation 
relations and also cooperation in energy, industry, trade and services, 
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agriculture, fisheries, investment, science, technology and environment, on 
mutually advantageous terms, taking into account the differences in levels 
of development of the Parties; 
(c) to help strengthen the process of economic development and 
diversification of the GCC countries and so reinforce the role of the GCC in 
contributing to peace and stability in the region348 
The two parties agreed, thus, on various common interests, namely (i) to create 
an institutional and contractual framework of cooperation (ii) to enhance 
cooperation in a wide range of issues (iii) to work together for the diversification 
and development of the GCC economies and (iv) to reinforce the role of the 
GCC as an agent of peace and stability. The contractual and institutional 
cooperation of these two regional blocs served the interest of both players to 
reinforce their role at regional and international levels. Moreover, it was 
promoting cooperation with economic and commercial benefits for both regions 
and it was providing technical assistance to the GCC states which was needed 
for their economic diversification as well as for their regional integration. These 
were serving again the identity building process of the EU and the GCC at the 
same time they were tackling the security concerns of the leaderships of the two 
regions. Based on EFP approaches, economic development leads to the rise of 
an independent middle class which can pursue reforms and thus lead the Gulf 
region to a more sustainable and peaceful environment, based on EU 
experiences and aspirations. On the other hand, the GCC states were aiming at 
economic development which was going to provide the rulers with the 
necessary tools to reinforce the societal organisation of their states and 
consolidate their power, enhancing their internal autonomy. In addition, the GCC 
leaders have been eager to engage with the EU since it had the image of a less 
dominant foreign policy actor and that was an important element for the GCC 
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which felt that their regional and international environments were dominated by 
aggressive players (Iraq and Iran) or by a superpower (the USA) which needed 
to be counter-balanced.  
   The more recent document of ‘Strengthening the EU’s partnership with the 
Arab World’ repeats the need for cooperation on economic development with 
the GCC states, the diversification of their economies, the further integration of 
their regional project and enhancing their role for regional security, while 
reaffirming the linkage between security, stability and economic development. It 
adds a call for promoting WTO membership, which is associated with 
modernisation and liberalisation of their regulatory frameworks349. These areas 
of cooperation fully coincide with EU values and interests in the Gulf region. 
Beyond the commercial interests that the EU has in the development and the 
liberalisation of the GCC economies, EU policymakers have the ambition to 
promote regionalism and further advance the role of regional actors in the global 
economic setting but also to promote multilateralism and thus support the idea 
of supranational rule of law. It should be highlighted that this is the first bloc-to-
bloc negotiation the EU initiated for an FTA and the first that has been so 
advanced. A successful end to the negotiations will create new dynamics for the 
EU’s role as a normative actor in inter-regional cooperation as well as in 
broader, global, terms since inter-regional agreements simultaneously lead to a 
gradual reshaping of the global framework reflective of EU norms and interests.   
 
Interdependency and symmetry of the relationship 
Despite common interests, the EU and the GCC relationship has faced 
difficulties in concluding the FTA and in some cases in working together to 
reach a common understanding about specific objectives. This is because of the 
negotiating attitude and power of the two parties, which have different departure 
points in the relationship. Moreover, despite their growing interdependency, the 
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power balance has shifted dramatically during the last decade creating a new 
context in which the relationship has been shaped. Indeed, when the EU and 
the GCC states initiated their relationship there was a clear power balance in 
favour of the Europeans, which has been adjusted to a more symmetrical 
relationship during the decade of the 2000s due to the political and economic 
realities of the regional and global context.  
In the 1990s, as it was entering into a new phase of economic development with 
the Single Market, the reunification of Germany and the opening of the markets 
in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU was also building on its economic power 
to promote its foreign policy. On the other hand, the GCC states experienced 
very vividly their security weaknesses, during the first (Iraq-Iran) and second 
(Iraq-Kuwait) Gulf wars while they were still reliant on growing their economies 
strictly through oil revenues. Moreover, the GCC were about to enter a decade 
of oil price decrease which was going to affect their economies350 and create 
awareness of the fact that their internal societal and economic structure was 
unsustainable, due to  dramatic population growth and the lack of equal growth 
in terms of economy. Clearly, the balance of power, despite the economic 
wealth of the GCC states was in favour of the EU. However a level of 
interdependency was always present. The EU had just started broadening its 
economic cooperation with third countries and exploring its foreign policy tools 
in the field of external relations. The Gulf region provided a lucrative market for 
European products, but it also provided a promising interlocutor for promoting 
inter-regional cooperation and thus enhancing its presence as a global actor. 
The Gulf states, due to economic and security concerns, had begun already to 
forge their own regional integration project, aiming to achieve autonomy 
internally and externally. The cooperation of the GCC states was going to 
advance their economic relations with the prospect of assisting their economic 
development and more significantly to create a third pole against the two larger 
countries in the Gulf, Iran and Iraq. The EU was the only role model of regional 
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integration available for following at the time, adding to the desire of both parties 
to cooperate and reinforce their roles as regional blocs.   
After 2001 this interdependency grew bigger. The EU identified a rich 
developing market in the Arabian Peninsula that was expanding at astonishing 
rates351. Year by year the GCC states were attracting more products from 
Europe due to the thriving economy based on high oil prices. The needs of the 
Gulf countries for modernisation flooded them with expatriate workers and the 
GCC states were transforming into a market like no other in the wider region. At 
the same time, the GCC states were progressing with their own integration 
process and they were seeking the help of the EU. In this context, the EU was 
aiming at becoming a significant partner for the GCC states and at assisting in 
the stability building process, by exporting its knowledge and practices into GCC 
societies and economies. However, due to their economic surpluses and the 
fact that they were making impressive progress in their diversification projects, 
the GCC rulers became more confident and more assertive when dealing with 
the EU. This became obvious in the way they negotiated with the EU on 
economic and technical cooperation, including the FTA talks.  
This new power balance has shaped the development of the relationship and 
has fed divergences in the understanding of this cooperation by the two 
partners. The EU and the GCC states had developed approaches and plans 
which seem to have been significantly diverse. Through the diversification 
process and during the negotiations for the conclusion of the FTA, the EU aimed 
at exporting its own model of economic development and integration. The EU 
requested that its partners agree to a noteworthy opening of their economies 
both in order to attract investments and also to meet the requirements for 
reaching an agreement for introducing an EU-GCC FTA. This approach was 
based on the EU’s own development following the Second World War and its 
own integration path which reinforced the EU’s self-image as a successful case 
of promoting economic cooperation, development and democracy because of its 
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supranational structure. The EU wanted to tackle the inefficiencies of the ‘rentier 
state’ model in order to create a dynamic private economy which would address 
their concerns regarding high unemployment, especially within the young local 
population. The EU aimed at regional stability through combating radicalisation 
and preventing instability through the development of the private sector of the 
economy and the subsequent impact this would have on the engagement of 
society in moderate politics. What is more, the EU has been disappointed by the 
slow implementation process of reforms and has communicated these concerns 
to its partners352.   
On the other hand, the GCC states were looking for a partner to assist them 
with their diversification project on the basis of an equal partner, if not on the 
basis of a producer – customer relationship. The GCC wanted to ‘buy’ expertise 
according to their own interests and without any preconditions353, feeling 
comfortable by the revenues of the high oil prices, of the post-9/11 years. The 
fact that the EU was asking for reforms based on its own experience was not 
welcomed by its partners in the Gulf. On the contrary, there were cases in which 
the GCC policymakers felt that the way the EU addressed some issues revealed 
a lack of understanding of the GCC needs and expectations. Even in the mid-
1990s the European Commission had prepared a study, reflecting its own 
experiences and values, for the economic reforms needed in improving the 
environment for investments and the legal framework for commercial activities in 
the Gulf region. However, the findings were seen as overly critical by the GCC 
states which agreed, however, to present their own study. More recently, the 
GCCs have also felt that "they are never fast enough for the EU"354, which 
sometimes asks too much, making requests that are either beyond the 
capabilities of the GCC Secretariat General and the Gulf states in general or 
that cannot be implemented immediately. Furthermore, for reasons which are 
associated with the status that the GCC projected  for themselves regarding 
their role in the regional and global context as well as in relation to the EU, and 
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for reasons they claim  are pragmatic and derive from the realities of their 
societal structure, GCC diplomats rejected EU approaches on economic 
reforms. They expressed their disappointment because the EU has not been 
very attentive when dealing with the GCC states, namely not taking into 
consideration their distinctive character355. In this case, it can be suggested that 
the EU, despite the changes in the regional and global environment, was (at 
certain level) still engaging with the GCC states according to its more traditional 
approaches of EFP in which the EU has been the dominant pole. The criticism 
of EFP that has been received from Gulf diplomats can also be reflected in the 
criticism by academics about the cultural imperialism factor which is invested in 
the shaping and the conduct of the EFP.  
In providing assistance to the GCC states for their integration process, the EU 
has been very confident in initiating policies and projects. Nevertheless, in this 
field, it seems that there were no major obstacles. Due to the lack of already 
established mechanisms in the Gulf region, the GCC states have been willing to 
listen to EU experts and to adopt proposals and experiences transferred from 
EU bodies and agencies in their own region. The GCC recognised the 
supremacy of their European interlocutors and they have been, in general, very 
receptive to EU guidance.  This is related both to the way the EU has presented 
itself as a master of regional integration and the effectiveness in promoting this 
image to the extent that the third parties do not challenge it. This is an 
undisputable added value that the EU can bring into the relationship and as 
such it is well received by the GCC states, reinforcing on the one hand the role 
of the EU in the region and on the other hand the dependency of the GCC 
states in further advancing their own integration project.  
Concluding, at the beginning of the relationship, the EU was the most advanced 
partner with a monopoly of the desirable knowledge for the GCC, but as time 
passed the GCC states reserved for themselves the status of rising power and 
as such they wanted their expectations to become part of their relationship with 
                                                          
355 Interview with an Omani diplomat, 26 March 2010, Muscat 
EU-GCC relations: Trade and Economic Relations 
 
Angelos Lenos  p. 179 
the EU. Therefore they set certain limitations on the way the EU could introduce 
plans for reforms in this relationship, or to the extent that they would make 
concessions during the negotiations. Therefore, it is important to note the role of 
status that each foreign policy actor has perceived for itself in the shaping of a 
strategic partnership, in order to better understand the balance within this 
symmetrical partnership.  
 
Is the FTA still relevant in the current context? 
As this thesis argues, a strategic partnership consists of policies for cooperation 
which have a long term perspective, but at the same time are flexible enough to 
adapt to the realities that are created by new developments over time. However, 
the previous section indicated that the EU was not particularly adaptive to new 
regional and global realities and thus unable to accommodate GCC interests 
and perceptions about their own status and role, creating difficulties in the 
advancement of the EU-GCC relationship. 
The EU-GCC have been holding FTA negotiations for the past twenty years, 
based on the Cooperation Agreement of 1989 (as shown) which still remains the 
only legal basis for the relationship of the EU and the GCC signed by the two 
sides. However, the economic and political balance has considerably changed 
over these twenty years. Thus, it is immediately understood that the EU-GCC 
relationship might have a long-term perspective but it lacks the ability to 
transform and stay relevant to time and the new state of affairs.   
More specifically, the idea of an FTA area and the subsequent interaction in the 
economic field has a very long term perspective. The time that the idea of the 
FTA was conceived in particular, reveals a very ambitious and strategic option. 
The European Single Market was not yet in place, the global economic setting 
was still very conservative, the statist economic model of ex-communist/ 
socialist states had just collapsed and the GCC organisation was still at the very 
early stage of its life. In this ambiguous and uncertain framework, the two blocs 
forged a Cooperation Agreement with a very clear and aspiring goal. The 
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immediate gains of any FTA have been vague and the practical problems have 
been significant. Nevertheless, even though the leaders of the regions 
acknowledged these challenges, they still agreed to pursue economic 
cooperation and initiated negotiations for the FTA which would have long-term 
effects on the economies of both regions. They did so by committing themselves 
in this Cooperation Agreement. 
At the early stages of the negotiations for the FTA, the two parties recognised 
the practical problems for continuing with the negotiations and in order to create 
the necessary preconditions for a successful negotiation, the EU and the GCC 
agreed to postpone substantial negotiations, until the GCC had agreed on a 
common market with regulations on import taxes. In the meantime, 
policymakers of the two regions were still in communication and worked towards 
the common goal of finalising the agreement. Low level meetings were held in 
order to assess the practical matters to be raised during the more substantial 
phase of the negotiations.  
Nevertheless, during the last decade, the two partners have failed to re-evaluate 
their partnership. Despite the change of power balance, there were no 
adjustments in the relationship and the way the two sides negotiate, in order to 
accommodate the new role of the GCC states in the global economy and their 
new enhanced confidence. The mandate and the preconditions remain the 
same as before. In this respect, it should not be surprising that the GCC states 
had the initiative of officially suspending the negotiations. Beyond the frustration 
revealed by this action, it also sent a clear message about the self-image the 
GCC developed regarding their economic relations with their first trade partner. 
What is more remarkable is the fact that the economic benefits of this 
agreement in a long term perspective and within the new economic global 
context are still uncertain. The last assessment study was prepared for the EU 
in 2002, at a time when the economic development of the GCC states had not 
yet met the high levels of the current era. In 2010, the EU was not in a position 
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to provide a clear answer about the economic gains of an FTA agreement356. 
Equally, an impact assessment on behalf of the GCC states was due to provide 
results only in March 2011357. The study was finally delivered in 2012 but it did 
not reveal major economic gains from this agreement for the GCC states. 
 
Institutionalisation 
The long-term approach of the EU-GCC relationship has been a key factor in 
the institutionalisation of the relationship, keeping the two parties together even 
during difficult periods of very minimal progress during FTA talks. However, an 
important question is whether this institutionalisation has been productive or if it 
has led to the inflexibility that has characterised EU policy makers in dealing 
with the GCC states, in the new context of regional and global economics and 
politics.  
High level representatives as well as technocrats and social groups have met 
and worked towards the direction of concluding the EU – GCC FTA agreement 
and promoting economic relations. At the highest end level there are the annual 
meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from all the member states, which 
also give political direction for economic relations. However, it should be noted 
that these meetings have been characterised as ‘uninteresting and ineffective 
monologues’358 and ‘a few minutes of ‘show-time’ for the Ministers without any 
real essence as there is no space for a constructive dialogue, agreement and 
subsequently follow up, even when imaginative suggestions are presented on 
the table’359. The lack of an institutionalised dialogue between the Ministers of 
Trade/Economy of the EU-GCC states, even under the leadership (or at least 
the coordination) of the European Commission, is striking and equally revealing 
if we keep in mind the importance of the core issue of the FTA. In the case of 
technocrats, the meetings are, in comparison, more fruitful and their results are 
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more concrete. The European Custom Union, the EU Common Market, the 
European Monetary Union, the introduction of the Euro and the European 
Central Bank have all been models for the GCC plans for their own economic 
integration. From this perspective, the EU has not just provided the outline for a 
(relatively) successful project but it has also been active in transferring expertise 
and other technical information about the creation and implementation of such 
projects and institutions360. The European Central Bank and the Eurostats 
service provide the most visible examples of EU bodies and agencies 
contributing to knowledge transfer for the regional integration of the GCC states 
( as explained in more detail below). 
 However, the institutionalisation process is not without problems. First of all, 
difficulties arise from the fact that this is the first bloc-to-bloc trade agreement. 
Thus, neither the EU, nor the GCC have any previous experience on the model 
they should use. What is more, the GCC Secretariat is not a supranational body 
(contrary to the European Commission), but all the decisions are taken on an 
inter-governmental level. Thus, it could be suggested that through the problems 
of this process, the two partners gain knowledge and expertise on how to 
handle issues of bi-regional cooperation in the future. It can be also suggested 
that the institutionalisation of the EU-GCC relationship has been a factor for 
encouraging institutionalisation of the GCC intra-regional relations.  
Even when there is a wide level of institutionalisation and 
communication/interaction, there is little follow-up for implementing these ideas 
and projects. The Joint Action Plan (JAP) is the most ambitious plan for 
institutionalising the EU-GCC relationship, covering a wide range of areas. In 
total, fourteen areas are included in the JAP which highlight the priority areas of 
the relationship and which introduces mechanisms and concrete programmes 
for enhancing bi-regional relations361. The participation of experts and officials in 
the JAP reflects the ‘strategic importance the GCC and the EU attach to their 
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relationship’362. The JAP can be seen as a great initiative to set the framework 
for joint projects of mutual interest and for creating the umbrella for all 
interactions, highlighting the existing development of bi-regional relations, 
setting all the ad-hoc actions under a single plan. In this respect, 
institutionalisation through JAP gives an added urge for further development 
and it makes the levels of cooperation more visible. The concrete outcomes, 
however, of this plan are still questioned.  
In any case, it should be noted that the institutionalisation of the meetings has 
created a productive spirit between technocrats of the two regions even on the 
thorny issue of the FTA talks. Negotiations have been taking place in an 
informal way even though the negotiations were suspended by the GCC states 
in 2008. Moreover, technical assistance is always available for the Arab 
bureaucrats even if the communication of the request is done on an informal 
level and most of the times on an ad hoc basis. Whenever the GCC Secretariat 
General needs assistance and guidance the EU can provide this.  The GCC 
Delegation Office in Brussels will contact DG RELEX and from there the Gulf 
organisation will get directions for communication with the competent 
department of the Commission every time363. 
Summing up, since the signing of the Cooperation Agreement, the EU and the 
GCC states have experienced  a history of constant widening and deepening of 
the institutionalisation of their relationship, to the extent that there are already 
positive spill-over effects in the interactions of actors from the other  layers of 
the political and societal structure of the two regions. The institutional mismatch 
of the two organisations has been both an opportunity for further cooperation 
between the EU and the GCC in transferring expertise to the Gulf region as well 
as a great challenge for overcoming differences in understanding the capacities 
and the expectations of the two regions. More specifically, in relation to the 
problems of the institutional mismatch, the EU has been inflexible in 
                                                          
 
363 Interviews with GCC diplomats, Brussels, 08 April 2009  Note: This was prior to the implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS. 
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understanding and incorporating the differences between the two organisations, 
to the extent that a certain level of frustration has been visible among the GCC 
states. The EU is seen as treating the GCC states as a reflection of its own 
structure, lacking the ability to understand the limitations of the GCC states. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the GCC capacities are more limited than those 
of the EU, the EU is more than willing to provide technical assistance for the 
reshaping of the GCC, so that it meets the EU’s criteria. Therefore it can be 
suggested that while the EU was eager to replicate its own operational model in 
the Gulf region and for this end it has provided technical assistance, it was 
promoting its own (supranational) model of integration. In this respect it was 
ignoring the fundamental differences in the culture and values of the two 
regions. The GCC states have prioritised autonomy and sovereignty with the 
Gulf leaders also demonstrating a preference for inter-governmental 
cooperation. Consequently, the EU approach clearly conflicted with the GCC 
value system, despite the positive attitude of the Europeans in its provision of 
technical assistance. 
 
Internal cohesiveness 
Since trade is in the competence of the EU, the EU approach vis-a-vis the GCC 
states in the FTA negotiations is notably cohesive. The European Commission 
is the competent body for negotiating the agreement with the states of the 
Arabian Peninsula and which is in regular contact with the GCC Secretariat and 
most of the institutions in the Gulf region. On the one hand, this has proven to 
be an effective way of negotiating, especially if it is compared to the way the 
GCC states act. The EU has a small group of advisors and a chief negotiator 
who is able to make decisions according to the mandate he has received. On 
the contrary, the GCC states have a chief negotiator who has to refer to the 
negotiators of the single GCC states before he submits his final decision, 
although he is the leading negotiator on behalf of all of them. On the other hand 
though, the role of the Commission is not always fruitful. Some EU member 
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states are in anticipation of the finalisation of the FTA agreement and they 
would like to see the agreement signed as soon as possible364. Beyond the 
economic benefits of the conclusion of such an agreement, member states from 
both regions have described an FTA agreement as the most significant sign of 
political will of the two parties to enhance their relationship365. Despite the 
eagerness shown by some EU member states to reiterate their political interests 
in the Gulf region, the Commission is inflexible when dealing with the issue. This 
inflexibility of the European Commission arises firstly because of the mandate it 
was given and which is based on the same template as other FTA agreements 
without taking into consideration the distinctive characteristics of the GCC states 
and secondly because its approach is more  technocratic and bureaucratic  
rather than political. Indeed the mandate has reflected the standard procedure 
followed by the EU when engaging in negotiations for FTAs, including the 
clauses for human rights, and do not take into consideration the very specific 
characteristics each interlocutor may have. Even though this may have 
consequences for the effectiveness of the negotiations (especially when dealing 
with symmetrical partners) and it may also raise criticism about the monolithic 
approach of the EU in the matter, it should be added that in this case the 
Commission has been an agent of promoting the EU (self-)image to third 
parties. Since the Commission cannot be flexible and change the rules of the 
game, but it has to follow the mandate given by the Council, it upholds the EU 
standards without any compromise in all cases. 
What is more, EU individual member states can hardly push forward the talks, 
since they have no competence on the issue. They can only have a 
supplementary role by suggesting possible constructive ways for the 
Commission to overcome the difficulties emerging due to GCC member states 
approaches. In the case of the GCC the role of the member states has worked 
in the opposite direction, complicating the conclusion of the bi-regional 
                                                          
364 EU member states have urged for a conclusion of the FTA agreement either with written communication with the 
Commission or by public statements. 
365 Letter of a Minister of Foreign Affairs of a member state of the EU to his colleagues. It has also been a common 
observation from all the diplomats from both regions, which were interviewed for the needs of this thesis. 
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agreement. More specifically, the role of the KSA seems to be the one that 
obstructs real progress. Bureaucrats in governments from the two regions and 
from departments of the two regional organisations have suggested that the 
KSA is the one country which is inflexible with its views regarding the export 
duties making the conclusion of the agreement difficult366. Generally, the KSA 
has been unenthusiastic in accelerating its integration in the global economic 
system and it was the last of the GCC states to have joined the WTO. Moreover, 
the KSA has practically challenged regional integration by its reluctance or 
inability to implement regional agreements. While the common market came into 
force on 1 January, 2008 it was not until April 2009 that the Saudi government 
lifted all restrictions for GCC citizens to live, work and buy properties in the 
Kingdom367. More relevant to the FTA talks, the issue of export duties is 
reportedly associated with the unwillingness of the KSA to agree on the terms of 
the agreement regarding the abolition of the rights to place export duties. Even 
though, as appears in letters exchanged between the EU and the GCC states, it 
was agreed that the export duties were going to be included in the agreement, 
under the pressure of the KSA the GCC states reverted to their initial position, 
declining all compromising suggestions by the European negotiator368. The KSA 
regards the issue of export duties as a major one, because they advocate that 
export duties drive the sales of petrochemical products into the local market and 
thus raw materials are kept cheap for local industries. If raw materials were sold 
abroad their price would rise internally, due to high demand, and supplies would 
become less available for the local economy. EU bureaucrats consider this as a 
problematic approach. European diplomats understand this as the lack of 
willingness of the KSA to give concessions in a field in which they are actually 
going to sacrifice some privileges allowing the rules of market competition to be 
                                                          
366 Interviews with bureaucrats and experts in the EU and the GCC region, between 2009-2011 
367 Hartley, Joanna, "Saudi drops work restrictions for all GCC citizens", Arabian Business, 22/04/2009. Retrieved on 
16 June 2009 from http://www.arabianbusiness.com/553384-saudi-drops-work-and-living-restrictions-for-all-gcc-
citizens 
368 Letter sent to Dr. Hamad AL-Bazai, Deputy Finance Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by Joao Aguiar 
Marchado, Deputy Director General, DG Trade, European Commission, Brussels, 07 April 2010. 
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implemented369. On the contrary, Arab diplomats consider this issue as a highly 
political one associated with societal benefits. They insist on the need to deal 
with the matter keeping in mind the needs of local societies to protect their 
major industrial unit with all the consequences this will have on the local 
people370. Whilst there is validity in the argument of the KSA, the fact that the 
GCC had initially agreed on the removal of the export taxes as well as the fact 
that the EU had proposed gradual limitations in terms of time and quantity in 
order for the KSA to deal with the social consequences, seems to support the 
EU argument that this is about the economic concessions the KSA is not willing 
to make. What is also interesting in this case is that the KSA feels strong 
enough to practically block the final agreement on the FTA, revealing the self-
image the Saudi leadership has in relation to the EU but also in relation to its 
partners within the GCC.  
In spite of the central role of the European Commission in EU-GCC relations, 
the role of the individual member states and that of the Presidency of the 
Council have been important too. Prior to the implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty, and in the cases of the rotating presidency of France and Germany, the 
Gulf states became one of the priorities of European foreign policy. Both of the 
leading figures (President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel) visited the region as 
presidents of the European Council emphasizing their political will for enhancing 
EU-GCC relations. Without a doubt, France and Germany worked in favour of 
the EU-GCC FTA during their own rotating presidency. However the interest 
they have shown can also be associated with their own image, both as an 
efficient EU presidency and as a genuinely interested actor in the region, with 
benefits (in the end) for their bilateral commercial or strategic interests. 
However, the rotation system of the Council’s presidency produced 
inconsistencies in the policies of the EU with a lack of follow-up in the work that 
was already done371. Thus, the EU sent contradictory messages to the GCC. 
Therefore, to the extent that the individual national interests are compatible with 
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370 Interviews with diplomats from Oman and Kuwait 
371 Interview with a European diplomat, working for the European Council, Brussels, 03 April 2009 
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the EU goals, in particular when it comes to economics, bilateral economic 
activities in the Arabian Peninsula strengthen the image of the European 
presence and downgrade the risks and the disadvantages of the non-conclusion 
of the FTA agreement. Politically, however, it is debateable whether these 
national activities should be seen as undermining or promoting the EU role. It 
was suggested that because of the high economic stakes, single member states 
are very careful when dealing with political issues372, leaving a greater space to 
the European Union for these matters. In this respect, the image of the EU as a 
normative actor with high standards in promoting its values is reinforced. 
However, due to this double game the member states play (by cooperating 
directly with the GCC states whilst at the same time t raising political issues 
within the EU framework) the perception of the effectiveness of the EU is 
weakened compared to the role of the member states. As a result, in the context 
of interdependency the EU seems weaker and bilateral cooperation with the 
member states of the EU become more attractive for the GCC states. In 
addition, it has been argued that when EU states promote their interests 
individually they do not feel the need to demonstrate their enthusiasm for further 
developing the relations of the EU and GCC member states within the context of 
the EU-GCC Cooperation Agreement. Indeed, the absence of a persistent 
promoter of the EU-GCC relationship has been identified as one of the problems 
in this partnership373. Moreover, enhancing bilateral relations can be interpreted 
as a lack of confidence in the ability of the European Commission to conclude 
the FTA and generally in the capability of the EU to become a significant actor in 
the region, as a bloc374. After the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, there was a 
two-faced challenge for the EU -GCC relationship. On one hand, there has been 
an ambition for a more cohesive foreign policy with competences transferred to 
the EEAS and the HR, Lady Ashton. On the other hand, the role of closer-tie-
seekers has been minimised, even during the member states’ Presidency of the 
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Council of the European Union375. The first two years since the Lisbon Treaty 
came into force have shown that the HR, the EEAS and even the President of 
the EU have not been visible in the scope of promoting the EU-GCC relations 
and especially in facilitating the conclusion of the FTA agreement.  
 
Joint actions of a multidimensional and multilayered partnership 
Since a “strategic partnership” should be, by definition, a multilayered, 
multidimensional and multileveled relationship, this section should examine 
whether in the case of the EU-GCC relationship, the bi-regional interactions 
have intersected different ranks within societies, from different fields and at 
different levels (bilateral, bi-regional and international) in a way which has 
enhanced this relationship. 
Indeed, the multidimensional character of the relationship has been a key factor 
for the EU-GCC relationship. Actors coming from different layers of political and 
societal hierarchy of the two regions and from different thematic areas of this 
manifold relationship have kept bi-regional relations going, even in times when 
the FTA talks were suspended. Actually, ideas for enhancing bi-regional 
relations were promoted even more eagerly during the years of the disruption of 
the FTA talks, in an effort to tackle this lack of progress in the negotiations. 
During the 1990s progress on the negotiations was minimal, if at all existent. 
Therefore, the two parties agreed to put forward ideas which were 
supplementary to the FTA negotiations, including projects in education, media 
and ‘decentralised cooperation in the field of business relations’376. Therefore, in 
the field of economics, the EU-GCC relationship was not pursued solely within 
the narrow frameworks of the FTA negotiations. The broader interactions of 
various actors created their own dynamics and therefore this multidimensional, 
multilayered and multileveled partnership can be identified also with joint actions 
                                                          
375 The trio of the member states which run the presidency may suggest some priorities to Ashton’s cabinet, but the 
final word lies in her office 
376 EU/ GCC, ‘Joint Communiqué’, 6th EU GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting, 22 April 1996 
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from actors, beyond the official annual ministerial meetings and the role of the 
leaders of the EU and the GCC member states. In contrast to the lack of 
progress at formal Ministerial level, business people from the two regions have 
been very active and have built up their own momentum in EU-GCC relations. 
Whilst their interests are purely economic, they add to the impetus towards a 
deeper and more cohesive relationship through their joint projects thus adding 
to  economic interdependency,  lobbying towards their governments in order to 
facilitate the legal framework in which they cooperate, as well as contributing 
through  the communication of ideas, perceptions and expectations  – all of 
which  creates a greater level of mutual understanding. 
 
National governments and supranational actors 
Economic reforms and studies for macroeconomic challenges and opportunities 
have become an important part of bi-regional interactions in the EU-GCC 
relationship. In the communiqué that was issued just after the GCC-EU 12th 
Joint Council and Ministerial meeting, there was a reference to a study that “was 
presented by the GCC in the 13th Joint Cooperation Committee on the 
investment climate in the GCC countries for attracting Foreign Direct 
Investment”377. Indeed, the study was given to the European Commission for 
providing feedback and suggestions for improving the regulations on 
investments in the Gulf. An investments expert group, which worked on the 
conclusions of the two parties took place and discussed the prevailing –at the 
time- conditions in investment, providing suggestions for reforms. In addition, in 
2003, there was a forum in Dubai where the Gulf states presented their own 
reform plans to the European Union and called for active participation of 
European companies in the local investment projects. Furthermore, an 
ambitious project for broadening the EU-GCC talks on economy was the 
establishment of the EU—GCC Economic Dialogue. The first Economic 
Dialogue, which was a forum for the two regional economies to exchange ideas 
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on issues of international economy, took place in 2004. The second one which 
was going to take place in 2009 was postponed for a year, even though this was 
a forum for consultation at high level for common problems, and the EU and the 
GCC were facing similar challenges in the era of the international financial 
crisis. The second Economic Dialogue materialised a year later, in 2010. The 
third one took place as scheduled in June 2011 and the fourth EU-GCC 
Economic Dialogue was organised in Brussels in March 2013. The agenda of 
the Economic Dialogue consisted of the global financial crisis and policy 
responses, the dynamics of the EU single market and the GCC common 
market, and the institutional development of the EU and the GCC. Furthermore, 
the European Central Bank378 has been one of the most significant actors in 
exchanging information and transferring expertise to the Gulf region. Eurostats 
have provided a model for the establishment of the GCC Statistics Department 
and pending the establishment of the GCC Custom Union during the early years 
of the 2000s, officers from the customs departments of the GCC states were 
trained by European experts379.  
In addition, in a positive step forward, the EU and the GCC states agreed on a 
JAP which introduces a series of subjects ‘for Implementation of the GCC-EU 
Cooperation Agreement of 1998’. These include among others holding (i) 
regular dialogue on economic and financial issues to exchange views on 
macroeconomic issues at senior level (ii) annual joint forums for the exchange 
of expertise and information in all aspects of the GCC and EU experience in 
economic integration (iii) technical meetings to examine certain issues such as 
the taxation system and the Islamic banking products (iv) regular meetings in 
order to continue  cooperation with the EU Central Bank in the area of the GCC 
Monetary Union. The JAP introduces cooperation on investment (addressing a 
need which arises after the Sovereign Wealth Funds became a focal point of 
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interest for both sides; the GCC own some of the most important SWFs and the 
EU has expressed its concern about the role of this institutions in the past) and 
encourages the enhancement of trade relations between the two sides in order 
to increase bilateral EU-GCC trade. The idea of this JAP is to bring people 
together from different areas and from different ranks of the political and social 
strata, as well as technocrats from the two regions. However two important 
shortcomings must be noted; first there are no Head of States meetings in the 
planning or any thematic Ministerial meetings (especially for economic matters 
and more specifically the FTA negotiations, as already pointed out). This can be 
interpreted as a lack of acknowledgement by the EU of the importance of a 
strategic relationship with the GCC states, thus failing to recognise the current 
status of the GCC states as rising powers. Having in mind the summits that the 
EU holds with various other global players and regions, this can indeed be read 
as the inability or unwillingness of the EU to attach to the GCC states a greater 
role in the EFP, which the GCC states would have welcomed, especially since 
they have been looking for an enhanced role in the Middle East. Second, there 
are no funds allocated for the implementation of concrete projects in the 
framework of the JAP. It is of no surprise then that over a year after the first 
meeting for the implementation of the JAP (in February 2010), the JAP has not 
taken off yet, even though it was agreed that it was going to be fully 
implemented by 2013.  
 
Business communities  
Business communities have been equally successful in establishing channels of 
communication and cooperation. Regional and bilateral forums exist and are 
very vibrant, since each national business community aims to promote its own 
distinctive interests in the other party’s region. 
During the first year the Cooperation Agreement came into force, 400 
businessmen and people involved in the industries of the two regions held their 
first EC – GCC Conference on industrial cooperation and Investment in 
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Granada in 1990380. An Industrial Development Committee was established and 
until 1995 two more EU-GCC Industry Conferences were held (Qatar, 1992 and 
Oman, 1995) 381. In 1995 the promotion of decentralised cooperation became a 
central political project for developing the EU-GCC relationship. This project was 
designed to bring together groups and people of civil society in an attempt to 
bridge the gap and to overcome the difficulties that high political contacts were 
facing382. These were only the first steps towards enhancing bi-regional 
dialogue between business communities and the concrete results were not 
impressive.  
In the 21st century, the cooperation of the business communities of the two 
regions was built upon the dynamics of the overall EU-GCC relations that 
emerged in the new global context. However, concrete results can only be 
identified during the last few years, because of the introduction of the financing 
instrument for cooperation with industrialised and other high-income countries 
and territories. This instrument has been the legal basis for “enhanced 
cooperation between the European Union (EU) and industrialised and other 
high-income countries”383 for the years 2007-2013. This is the first instrument 
which makes clear reference to the GCC states and offers the platform for 
driving EU money to the region. Within the framework of this instrument, the 
Union called for proposals for the “EU-GCC Public Diplomacy and Outreach 
2007” programme. The goal of this scheme is to bring together, inter alia, 
business communities from Europe and the Gulf, to facilitate economic 
diversification projects and reforms on labour market policies. 
The most successful story of the ‘EU-GCC Public Diplomacy and Outreach 
2007’ was the “EU-GCC Chamber Forum”384, run by Eurochambres and the 
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382 EU/ GCC, ‘Joint Communiqué’, 6th EU GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting, 22 April 1996  
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Federation of GCC Chambers of Commerce. Eurochambres and the FGCCC 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding in October 2007 after the initiative of 
the FGCCC to ask for closer cooperation between the two bodies. 
Although the EU had set no political conditions on providing the grants to 
Eurochambres, there is a continuous communication of the organisation with the 
RELEX and the Trade DG for updating on the developments and exchanging 
information. The Eurochambres was also asked to present its work on this 
project to working groups of the European Council.   
During the Eurochambres and FGCCC discussions, the two parties have shared 
ideas and proposals for enhancing their cooperation and generally there has 
been a great interest in the work done within this joint programme. The FGCCC 
even proposed to provide space for the creation of offices and delegation of the 
Eurochambres in the Gulf region. The proposal is under consideration from the 
Eurochambres, especially since it is recognised that the Gulf states have shown 
a political will for diversifying their economies, and there is ‘definitely a serious 
trend and a change of mind’385 for the local economies and the creation of Small 
and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) compared to the economic 
diversification and development plans of the 1990s. Even though the joint 
project places an emphasis on the role of the SMEs, there is no involvement of 
the Enterprise Europe Network for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises386. 
The Eurochambres has no bilateral relations with Chambers of single states/ 
city of the Gulf region because of its structure and because of the nature of the 
programme that was agreed according the MOU signed. However, it does 
encourage the bilateral agreements and cooperation between single European 
Chambers and single Gulf Chambers. Indeed there have been some 
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386 There is no agreement between the EU and the GCC states which could make the GCC states eligible for 
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agreements of this kind387. All these agreements which involve exchange of 
information and the use of European expertise are complimentary to the work of 
the Eurochambres, which has been supportive and provides any needed 
assistance, even though a lot of German/ British/ French Chambers already 
have business delegations in the Gulf. From this point of view, the 
Eurochambres work is in the benefit of new member states which have no 
national business units in the region. 
Although one of the four key topics of discussion has been innovation transfer, 
the Eurochambres have no contact with the Research and Development DG of 
the Commission, or the INCO-NET network. Nevertheless, they still support 
initiatives for projects in new sectors for new business ideas and for promoting 
educational programmes. However, these initiatives are more on policy level 
than in providing technical assistance. 
Generally, the GCC businessmen and the European Union share the same 
interest in the opening of the local economies and the constraint of the role of 
the state in the economy. However, there was “no direct alliance” for co-
ordinating policies and actions in pursuing their goals. The EU has been using 
lobbying methods as well as the official channels of communication in the 
framework of the FTA negotiations to promote its interest in opening the GCC 
markets and the FGCCC is pursuing its own interests with direct contacts with 
the GCC rulers.   
Consequently, even though the multidimensional and multilayered character of 
this relationship was initiated as an antidote to the stalemate of the FTA 
negotiations various actors in different areas of cooperation have developed 
their own dynamics. The spill-over effects of  EU-GCC high level planning are 
already visible, even if these high level programmes are minimal  and usually 
without consistency. The opportunities of an emerging area (and the 
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subsequent needs that arise from this, which go beyond the Cooperation 
Agreement) have led people from the two regions to interact on different 
themes, making the framework of EU-GCC economic relations much broader 
than the stalled talks on the FTA agreement. This is especially true of the role of 
the dialogue between the business communities of the two regions, with the 
establishment of the business forum seemingly of great significance. It is argued 
that the business communities have been urging the political leaderships of their 
states to facilitate economic interaction and the conclusion of the FTA388. In this 
respect, it can be suggested that the difficulties at the high level of 
communication have led to lower level interaction, which in turn fed back 
positively to higher level dialogue. However, it is again debatable whether 
national actors work in favour of the EU presence in the Gulf region, as a bloc. 
Even though it is clear that national actors enhance European activity in an 
extremely competitive environment, it can be argued that national member 
states overshadow any collective efforts. On the other hand, if European 
national actors were not in place, EU action in the region would be minimal with 
the vacuum being filled by third parties. In this respect it is also noted that to the 
extent that cooperation plans are not fulfilled, GCC states are already looking for 
other options. Interdependence will weaken at the same time as the non-
conclusion of the FTA is seen as an indication of the lack of political will for a 
more fruitful partnership, urging the GCC states to turn their search and 
interests eastwards. Therefore, the adoption of the JAP in 2010 can be read as 
an answer to these concerns. Indeed, it sends a clear message of the desire of 
both sides to move towards a more strategic approach with regards to this 
relationship. This is a project which can be described as a master plan, building 
upon the ideas of interdependence and mutual understanding. Forming joint 
projects and exchanging views on common challenges leads to long-lasting 
cooperation for mutual benefits. Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that this 
multidimensional master plan lacks a political and security dialogue, of which 
the two regions are in need, in order to deal with matters of regional stability and 
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security. However, the most challenging part of this project is its actual 
implementation and the need for follow-up from the various actors involved.      
 
Has the EU engaged the GCC on the value aspects of the partnership? 
In the previous chapters, it has been argued both with reference to EU 
documents as well as to academic work that the EFP aims, beyond its 
commercial interests, to promote its values and norms, through political and 
economic reforms as well as engagement with multilateral organisations.  
In this specific case of bi-regional relations, the EU has indeed encouraged the 
GCC states to adopt reforms regarding the political system and the respect of 
human rights both indirectly and directly. Indirectly, the openness of the 
economic system in the GCC states and the weakening of the ‘rentier state’ 
model can lead to a new window of opportunity for political reforms through a 
bottom-up approach. Directly, the EU has insisted that human right clauses are 
attached to the FTA agreement. Indeed, the goal of diversifying the GCC 
economies is not a purely economic one; quite the opposite. To the extent that 
the GCC states abandon or minimise the dependence of their economies and 
societies to the ‘rentier state’ model, it is argued that the political system of 
these countries will change. It is not argued that it will be transformed into a 
system which resembles Western type democracy but that it will change in 
terms of engaging its citizens in the economic and consequently the political 
activities of the state. The EU rationale prescribes that the diversification of the 
economy creates a new space for the development of the private economy and 
new opportunities for the business communities of these countries to pursue 
their interests, beyond the long-established system of royal favours. Moreover, 
since diversification is coupled with internationalisation of the economy and 
because the thriving sectors of the private economy are found in tourism, 
financial services and trade, the diversification of the local economies urge the 
leaders to seriously engage with multilateral economic institutions and thus 
share responsibility for the development of world economy. Furthermore, it is 
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equally important to raise the question of security. Security and internal stability 
are achieved when the needs of the local population are efficiently addressed. 
Nevertheless the GCC people were historically used to getting what they need 
effortlessly, through the state. Therefore, there is an urgent need to tackle these 
challenges and especially the high rates of youth unemployment. The State 
economy cannot continue accommodating the new, expansive and young 
workforce, especially as its productivity and efficiency can be questioned. 
Unemployment is over 15% in three out of the six GCC states. The problem of 
unemployment is getting sharper day by day as the Gulf societies are 
characterised by the fast growing youth population389. Therefore, the GCC 
states need to create 90 million jobs over the next two decades and reserve 
these new work places for GCC nationals. From this perspective, the EU policy 
to encourage and assist the GCC plans for their economic diversification and 
development as well as for their own regional integration, fits the purposes of an 
‘economy meets politics’ approach. The results however have not been 
encouraging thus far. 
 
Good governance, reforms and multilateralism 
Reforms in the economic field could lead to the development of an independent 
middle class and engagement with global institutions, according to the EU 
approach. However, in the specific case of the GCC states, even though an 
independent middle class of businessmen in the Gulf and especially in Saudi 
Arabia has been forming and the division between this class and the royal 
families is becoming clearer compared to the past, businessmen have shown no 
interest in pursuing political ends. They have been successful in demanding and 
getting concessions for their businesses but there have been, yet, no political 
demands. This is a system, manipulated by the rulers, of “giving tips” to the 
higher middle class, to keep them satisfied financially and to avoid any other 
                                                          
389 In Oman, local population under the age of 24 accounts for 56.2% and in Saudi Arabia 54.9%. In Bahrain 44.5%, 
UAE - 40.6%, Kuwait - 39.3%, Qatar - 36.2%. Source: GCC Secretariat, "TOTAL NO. OF POPULATION BY AGE 
DISTRIBUTION", GCC Stats 2005, Retrieved on 19 June 2006 from http://library.gcc-sg.org/gccstat/genstat/G2.htm. 
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demands in the political field390. Moreover, there is not a planned bottom-up 
procedure from the EU. It is rather the other way round. Businessmen in Europe 
have been lobbying and pressing for more intensive cooperation with the Gulf 
region. Because of the political profile of the talks, however, achieving the 
European goals has been difficult. That was until very recently when there was 
a change of mind in the Commission and it turned to the use of business as a 
means for promoting political ends391.   
Furthermore, comparing the levels of transparency and good governance since 
the end of the 1990s and late 2000s, indicators on rule of law, control of 
corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, accountability and 
political stability have not shown any substantive change392 during the last 
decade when the GCC states have been indeed diversifying their economies 
intensifying their interactions with the EU and the global economic system. The 
only exception with better performance on all indicators has been the state of 
Qatar, which is however the least adaptive to (western-type) democratic 
processes. In this respect, this thesis tends to agree with the findings of 
Matthew Gray393, that the GCC states have not been promoting reforms in an 
attempt to move beyond the ‘rentier state’ model but on the contrary to 
modernise and reinforce this model, which offers the rulers autonomy from their 
citizens. Gray suggests that the Gulf region has been experiencing a ‘late 
rentier’ state model, which is characterised by a responsive state towards the 
basic needs of its people and to promote awareness of this responsiveness but 
without any serious attempt to make concessions at a political level, to engage 
with global institutions and globalisation, in terms of economics, at the same 
time that it keeps its red lines and the limitations regarding this economic 
openness. Even in terms of reforms, these have aimed  at providing a more 
friendly economic environment and processes in order to attract foreign 
                                                          
390 Interview with Dr. Samir Ranjan Pradhan, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, 12 May 2009 
391 Interview with Eurochambres’ International Officer, Brussels, 09 July 2009 
392 Annex 6, Table A3 
393 Gray, Matthew, 'A Theory of 'Late Rentierism' in the Arab States of the Gulf', Centre for International and Regional 
Studies Occasional Paper (CRIS), vol. No 7, 2011, pp. 1-44 
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investments, rather than reshaping the macroeconomic character of their 
economy and society. The GCC governments become entrepreneurs and they 
are the leading forces of the diversification project. Taking advantage of their 
energy sector, they invest in fields which are indirectly related (airlines, ports, 
energy related industries, business services) in order to create new 
opportunities for employing local youth, keeping at the same time the central 
role in economic planning. Even the free trade zones which have been created 
in the Gulf region are based on the expectations and the strategic planning of 
the rulers, since most of these zones have specific, thematic, character and they 
are limited in scope. Thus, the leaders create these free, business friendly areas 
without actually pursuing substantial reforms in the core of their economic and 
societal structure. Furthermore, the Gulf leaders reinvest the profits of their 
economic activities through their sovereign wealth funds, which provide a 
platform for gains in the long-term and also a tool for a more innovative foreign 
policy, when their investments become tools of political leverage394. This 
approach towards economic liberalisation and globalisation reflects the GCC 
values, which aim at a very instrumental approach in economic reforms in order 
to advance their autonomy and independence within their three different 
environments, instead of engaging in a more value-norms driven understanding 
of globalisation, which calls for concessions of sovereignty in favour of a 
supranational rule of law. The latter has been promoted by the EU.  
 
The human rights clauses 
On a more specific issue related to the EU-GCC negotiations for the FTA, the 
EU has introduced ‘human rights clauses’ based on the political clauses used in 
previous FTA negotiations and agreements already signed with third countries. 
Even though this approach derives from the EU self-image as a normative 
foreign policy actor, it should be noted that previous FTA agreements were 
concluded with countries which have formally adopted democratic values and 
                                                          
394 Ibid,  pp 23-34 
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the relevant political system395. Obviously the GCC states do not fit this model of 
political structure and ‘using a universal blueprint for cooperation has been 
characteristically problematic’ to the EU-GCC FTA case396. Even though it 
should be taken into consideration that using human rights clauses on most of 
the agreements the EU signs with third parties has become part of the way the 
EU conducts foreign policy (and this approach characterised the EU as a unique 
global actor), it is interesting to note that there was never a debate among the 
EU member states about the language and the form these clauses should take 
in the case of the GCC states, in order to respond to some sensitivities of the 
other side. To some extent this is because of the internally undisputed EU self-
image as a value-driven actor. Indeed, GCC diplomats consider this persistence 
for the human right clauses as a sign of lack of understanding of the values and 
the norms of the GCC societies and political structure397. What is more, the fact 
that human right clauses are associated with the clauses of unilateral 
suspension of the agreement, has created frustration among the Arabs. Even 
when they understand that the EU wants ‘for its own reasons’398 to incorporate 
political clauses in what is supposed to be a purely economic agreement, they 
do not seem to understand how economic agreements can be suspended for 
non-economic reasons. This divergence in the approaches between the EU and 
the GCC reveals once again the different rationales behind the economic 
cooperation. For the EU FTA is also a tool for promoting its values and norms, 
through economic cooperation, while the GCC states make a very distinctive 
separation between economics and politics (in terms of their national 
sovereignty) when dealing with third parties.  
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the human rights clause is still not 
something that concerns the negotiating teams of the two partners, as they feel 
that they have reached a compromise on this matter. They have agreed on the 
                                                          
395 EU has concluded FTA agreements with Mexico (2000), Chile (2004), South Africa (2005) and South Korea 
(2010).  
396 Interview with an EU member state diplomat, Brussels, 29 June 2010. 
397 Interviews with diplomats from Oman and Kuwait, March and June 2010. 
398 Interview with a Qatari diplomat, Cyprus, 19 April 2010 
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wording of the clauses, which is not disturbing to the GCC states and it adheres 
to the EU request for references of human rights being included in the FTA 
agreement, even in a broader context399. Yet, during interviews with EU and 
GCC diplomats in 2011400 they referred to the inclusions of the human rights 
issue as the most important obstacle for the conclusion of the agreement, 
revealing that they lacked in-depth knowledge about the difficulties on the export 
duties issue. Nevertheless, this approach could also be associated with their 
desire to be silent about their specific interests and to emphasise a value-driven 
divergence in a face-saving exercise. Moreover, these diplomats revealed 
another misunderstanding of the real problems and the terms of the 
negotiations. What the EU calls respect of international laws concerning foreign 
labour, the GCC understand as 'issues of immigration introduced on the table of 
the negotiations'. Since there is no flow of illegal immigrants from the Gulf region 
to Europe, the GCC diplomats describe the inclusion of immigration matters in 
the FTA talks as irrational. Again, there is a clash between the normative 
approach of EFP, with the EU aiming to engage the GCC states in a dialogue 
for rights of non-citizens in the Gulf region, while the GCC negotiators prioritise 
national sovereignty and interests. 
Beyond the obvious lack of common understanding of the way this FTA 
agreement is negotiated, it can also be suggested that GCC states project for 
themselves a status of ‘rising powers’, which allow them to challenge the EU 
foreign policy tools of political conditionality. Having this point of view in mind, it 
should be remembered  that the EU-GCC FTA talks were, officially, suspended 
after a unilateral decision of the GCC Supreme Council, in Qatar, in December 
2008, in an obvious demonstration of power against their major trade partner.  
In summary, the EU has not been able to promote its norms and values in the 
Gulf region, either through high level interactions with ruling elites or through 
                                                          
399 The main concern of the GCC states has been the suspension clauses that the EU wanted to insert in the text. 
However, the International Law allows to any of the (two) parties of an agreement to denounce the agreement, even if 
there are no suspension clauses in the agreement itself. As a result, no specific reference for suspension clause 
needs to be added in the text, since the GCC have a very strong opinion against it. 
400 Interviews with EU and GCC policymakers from January 2011 to June 2011 
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joint actions of EU and GCC business communities. Regarding the FTA, even 
when it seems that the EU and the GCC negotiators have generally overcome 
the challenge of the human rights clauses in a balanced way, some individual 
actors (most importantly the KSA) has used the divergences on the value factor 
in order to disguise the real obstacle for the conclusion of the FTA, which has 
been the KSA refusal to make concessions on the export duties it places on 
petrochemical products produced within the country. Consequently, despite the 
failure of the EU to promote its values, this has not been the deal breaker.  
 
Windows of opportunity in the regional and global contexts? 
The post 9/11 years were characterised by polarisation of the relationship 
between the USA and the Arab world and a deeper interdependence of the EU-
GCC relations, since GCC states initiated investments in European and other 
western industrial projects which could at some point transfer expertise in the 
Gulf region. Politically, the GCC leaders aimed at capitalising on economic 
development and making their presence in the western world stronger. In this 
respect, partnership with the EU could provide them with the necessary status in 
order to become the regional power they believe they deserve to be.  
 
Regional and international integration as opportunities for partnership 
The regional integration project of the GCC states has been the most obvious 
opportunity that has arisen for the two partners to advance their partnership. 
The GCC states have welcomed the active involvement of the EU agencies in 
the transfer of expertise to the Gulf region, as demonstrated already. Beyond 
and adding to their internal economic diversification projects and their regional 
integration process, the GCC states worked for their integration into the world 
economy by joining the WTO. Once again, the EU was a partner for the Gulf 
states in this direction. The EU provided technical assistance and political 
support to the GCC states, without any political preconditions, to the extent that 
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its actions raised criticism401. The EU prioritised the integration of the GCC 
states in the world economy, over other issues, looking both for commercial 
benefits for European business and for easing a long-term, global ranged 
cooperation with the Gulf region. What is more, multilateralism has been one of 
the major components of the EFP, in order to engage partners with the world 
system and thus share responsibility in global challenges. Therefore, both 
directly and indirectly, by assisting  GCC integration at a regional and 
international level, the EU was making progress in its relationship with the GCC 
states while promoting its interests (by opening the GCC markets) and values 
(multilateralism), at the same time it was reinforcing its (self-)image as a 
normative policy actor. 
Despite the EU’s advantage as one of the most developed knowledge-based 
economies in the world, to export knowledge, technology and machinery, 
responding to the new needs of the GCC economies it had to face the 
competition of products and experts from Asia402. It is no coincidence that FTA 
negotiations were intensified at the same time as Asian emerging powers were 
becoming more visible in the Gulf region after 2000. Two rounds of negotiations 
per year took place from 2004 to 2007 and most of the issues were resolved. 
During the first decade of the new century, the EU-GCC Forum was revitalised 
as well and the cooperation of the business communities of the two regions 
gained new dynamism403. Due to competition from third parties, the EU had to 
work harder in order to prove the added value it could offer to the GCC states, 
but this has been difficult to achieve without the conclusion of the FTA 
agreement. Keeping in mind that both parties have been dealing with the FTA 
negotiations as an exercise by which they assess the willingness of the other 
party to advance the partnership404, the role of the European Commission was 
not productive, since it has been unable to build upon the new momentum and 
tackle the rising competition.  
                                                          
401 Interview with a German Member of the European Parliament, Brussels, 13 January 2009. 
402 Interview with Dr. Samir Ranjan Pradhan, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, 12 May 2009 
403 See Annex 06 
404 This is the conclusion of a number of interviews 
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The business communities of the EU and the Gulf were also taking advantage 
of the new opportunities of the wider EU-GCC relationship, as shown, but it 
should be noted that the EU and the Eurochambres are not the only partners of 
the FGCCC. On the contrary, FGCCC have pursued closer links with China405, 
and already signed Memoranda of Understanding with the Asian Pacific 
Chamber of Commerce406, the US Chambers407 and the African and French 
Language Countries Chambers Confederation408. This is part of the geostrategic 
and economic diversification the GCC states have been aiming for, whilst 
attempting to broaden their autonomy in their three environments. Nevertheless, 
the interdependency factor of the EU-GCC relations is still very strong, as the 
support of the EU has been crucial for the engagement of the GCC countries 
with global institutions and for providing the needed technical assistance and 
expertise. Indeed, EU business laws are the model for business practice for 
GCC companies409. That is why the FGCCC has also shown great interest in 
the idea of adopting a Charter for Enterprises, on the basis of the European 
Charter for Enterprises. A model of cooperation in this field exists in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, which could be replicated.   
Nevertheless, the EU and the GCC seem to be missing opportunities rising from 
common regional and international challenges for a closer relationship, based 
on common interests. The case of the Gulf’s Sovereign Wealth Funds and the 
challenge of Iran’s role in the region associated with the funding of the Iranian 
nuclear programme are two examples of this argument. While Wealth Sovereign 
Funds have been heavily investing in the EU countries, with the result that this 
could have been an area of cooperation between the two partners, Europeans 
                                                          
405AMEInfo, "FGCC Chambers inaugurates agency in China", Retrieved on 13 June 2009 from 
http://www.ameinfo.com/184108.html 
406AMEInfo, "FGCCC to sign MoU with the Asian Pacific Chamber of Commerce", Retrieved on 13 June 2009 from 
http://www.ameinfo.com/172881.html 
407AMEInfo, "FGCCC to sign MoU with US Chambers", Retrieved on 13 June 2009 from 
http://www.ameinfo.com/174648.html 
408AMEInfo, "Federation of GCC Chambers to sign MoU with African and French Language Countries Chambers 
Confederation", Retrieved on 13 June 2009 from http://www.ameinfo.com/173293.html 
409 Interview with Dr. Samir Ranjan Pradhan, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, 12 May 2009 
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reacted quite negatively to the inflows of Gulf funds in Europe410. It was only in 
the JAP (2010) that the EU and the GCC initiated a dialogue on investments 
and sovereign wealth funds, even though the concrete outcome of this action 
plan is still thin and it should not be overestimated. In the case of Iran, both the 
EU and the GCC states have been acutely worried by the nuclear ambitions of 
Iran. The EU has introduced a series of unilateral sanctions regarding the 
economic transactions of the state companies of Iran and more specifically of 
companies which are linked to the Iranian nuclear programme. The GCC states 
share the same concerns to the extent that they feel threatened by this Iranian 
programme. However, and in spite of the fact that most of the economic 
transactions of the Iranian companies are processed through GCC financial 
institutions and firms (most of which are based in Dubai) none of the two 
partners has initiated a dialogue on the issue. The EU did not even invite the 
GCC states to consider adopting the same restrictive measures or at least a 
system of early notification for the transfer of funds which may be related to the 
Iranian nuclear programme. From this point of view, a common threat as it is 
perceived by both partners has not been enough in order to trigger more 
coordinated cooperation between the EU and the GCC.   
To sum up, the practical needs or the offers on the transfer of expertise 
provided a new framework in which the global range of the cooperation was 
communicated taking into consideration the desired status that each player has 
adopted for itself. The EU has been a facilitating factor for the ambitions of the 
GCC states for regional and international integration. However, the EU and the 
GCC have not been ready to take advantage of the recent new opportunities 
that emerged, which reveals a lack of mutual trust between the two sides and a 
lack of willingness of the EU to engage with the GCC under their new status, 
that of rising powers as perceived by the Gulf leaders themselves. As a result, 
the EU and the GCC are falling behind the expectations for further developing 
                                                          
410 Asutay, Mehmet , GCC Sovereign Wealth Funds and Their Role in the European and American Markets (2008). 
Equilibri, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2008, pp. 335-354. Retrieved on 17 July 2009 from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735653 
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their partnership for achieving the strategic goals of development, stability and 
security.  
 
Conclusions 
Without any doubt, when the EU and GCC states initiated their Cooperation 
Agreement and then the FTA talks, their decision was very ambitious and it had 
a very clear strategic character, as it was paving the way for a new approach of 
the European external relations approach for multilateralism, while at the same 
time it was believed that the EU was engaging the Gulf region in a process of 
internal and regional transformation on one hand and engagement with the new 
globalised world on the other. It was a decision that was clearly aiming at long-
term benefits for both partners, compatible with their interests (commercial and 
political), self-image (especially regarding inter-regional relations) and values 
(the EU had the ambition to export is norms and the GCC found a partner which 
was less dominant and aggressive and capable of assisting them in securing 
autonomy, internally, regionally and internationally). However, since 1989 
political and economic realities have changed. The EU is not enjoying a status 
of a much more developed bloc compared to a rich, yet much less 
sophisticated, region. A power balance in favour of the EU is not existent 
anymore, since the GCC have achieved internal development and they have 
made progress on diversifying their economies. Nowadays there is a more 
balanced power balance characterised by interdependency and a much more 
confident stance by the GCC states on their foreign and regional policies. 
Nonetheless, the EU does not seem ready to adjust to the new status of the 
GCC states. The EU has been insisting on exporting its own model of 
development, based on its own needs, values and experiences,  provoking in 
some cases the reaction of the GCC states. Nevertheless, at the broader level, 
the GCC have acknowledged in practice the primacy of the EU in regional 
integration projects and has welcomed technical assistance in this field. 
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Reflecting this lack of ability of the EU to adjust to the new power balance, the 
institutionalisation of the EU-GCC relationship has been expanding at 
technocratic levels and in the field of business but it has not yet met the 
expectations at high political levels, usually raised by any strategic partnership. 
The absence of Head-of-States meetings and of thematic ministerial meetings 
(especially in dealing with the thorny issue of the FTA) leads to the conclusion 
that there is still a great gap between the desire of the two regions for a more 
strategic relationship and the actual decisions that are being made. On the other 
hand, the adoption of the JAP should be highlighted as a very strategic option, 
which was adopted by both parties without any serious difficulty, adding to the 
dynamics of interdependency.  
In terms of internal cohesiveness, the EU has been significantly cohesive 
compared to the GCC states. This is not irrelevant to the institutional mismatch 
of the two blocs and the different departure points for the two regional blocs. 
The EU has been following an integration path based on a more supranational 
approach, while the GCC states prioritise their own independence and 
autonomy, pursuing a more inter-governmental approach. Real internal 
differentiations within the GCC, in terms of economic interests as well as intra-
GCC power competition only give provide reason for specific member states to 
act in a non-constructive way for further enhancing biregional relations. 
Despite the differences on the rationale behind the regional and foreign policies 
of the two parties, it should be highlighted that the value factor has not been the 
thorniest issue in this relationship. In terms of the value aspect of the 
partnership, the EU aimed (i) at engaging the GCC states in the world system, 
promoting in this way its inclination to multilateralism, (ii) at assisting regional 
integration of the Gulf region as a reflection of the EU’s self-imagined successful 
model of cooperation, development and stability (iii) at the same time it was 
promoting the openness of the local economic and subsequently of the political 
system based on its own values and interests and (iv) at attaching human right 
clauses on the FTA agreement, using its economic tools for achieving political 
ends. However the GCC states have severely challenged the political 
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conditionality approach of the EU. Nevertheless, the economic diversification of 
the GCC economies and the regional integration of the Gulf region have actually 
led to important commitments of the GCC states within the world system, 
including the WTO. However, EU effectiveness beyond this aspect is doubted, 
since the GCC leaders have used globalisation and regionalism in an 
instrumental manner in order to renovate and reinforce the ‘rentier state’ 
structures of the Gulf states. Yet the fact that there has been an inclusion of 
human rights clauses, with the EU and the GCC appearing to have made 
concessions, should be stressed. The EU appeared to uphold the normative 
aspect of EFP, creating frustration among GCC states which feel that their 
autonomy and sovereignty has been challenged by EU norms and the EU 
approach. In any case, and despite the agreement on human rights clauses, 
there has not been a final agreement on a FTA text. It is interesting to note that 
the GCC actors have been using the human rights clause in order to divert the 
discussion from the crucial issue of the negotiations, namely the refusal of GCC 
states to make concessions on the export duties it places on petrochemical 
products produced within the region. 
Beyond the disagreement on the export duties, what is striking in this 
relationship is the fact that none of the two partners can name the clear 
economic gains of a possible conclusion of the FTA agreement. Without a 
clearly defined picture of the benefits of this agreement, there are no incentives 
for the two parties to seriously engage and negotiate with determination to 
conclude this agreement. It is for this reason that EU and GCC diplomats refer 
to the manifold political gains of concluding the FTA than the actual economic 
benefits and both sides consider the conclusion of the agreement as a 
benchmark for testing the political willingness of the other side to further develop 
this bi-regional partnership. Nevertheless, while both parties agree on the 
political importance of the agreement, they lack knowledge of the actual 
obstacles for concluding the agreement and they seem unwilling to push for 
more intensive talks for a final agreement.  
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In parallel (to the official negotiations) processes, the multidimensional, 
multileveled and multilayered character of this partnership has been confirmed. 
Even though the high level interactions have not been very fruitful in providing a 
FTA, these interactions have created spill over effects in the society of the EU 
and the GCC states. This dynamism has contributed to the development of the 
relationship even when the results of the FTA negotiations were poor, if at all 
visible. It has kept the two parties in a dialogue and it managed to get on board 
actors which invested in this partnership and have delivered positive outcomes 
with concrete actions. At the same time they have been making demands for 
more cooperation. Indeed, the most interesting finding of this research regarding 
the actors of bi-regional cooperation is related to the role of the business 
communities. Business people from the two regions have been very active and 
they are building up their own momentum in EU-GCC relations. While their 
interests are purely economic, they add to the impetus towards deeper and 
broader relations, reaffirming that their relationships cross- cut the various 
layers of society and it is not just an elite-driven project without any substantial 
support at the grassroots level. 
Overall, this thesis argues that since the signing of the Cooperation Agreement 
of 1989 the EU and the GCC states have been developing a relationship 
towards a strategic partnership, based on their common interests for economic 
development and enhancing inter-regional cooperation, their expanding 
interdependency as well as the multidimensional, multileveled and multilayered 
cooperation. Moreover, the changes in the regional and international 
environment have provided new opportunities for them and indeed in the case 
of the regional integration process of the Gulf region, the EU responded very 
positively and constructively. The transfer of expertise from EU to the Gulf 
region has been pivotal for the GCC integration process. Nevertheless, the two 
partners failed to show the trust and readiness needed to effectively address the 
role of the Sovereign Wealth Funds in investments in Europe and the role of 
financial institutions of the Gulf region in facilitating the funding of Iranian 
companies which might be associated with the Iranian nuclear programme. 
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Furthermore, there are divergences in the value systems that shape the foreign 
and policies of the two parties, as well as the self-images and role that the two 
partners hold from themselves in the international arena. 
On the case study of the FTA and the economic relations between the EU and 
the GCC states, attention must be drawn to the fact that the EU has had 
different approaches when it comes to forging a strategic partnership with third 
countries or regions. The EU works towards either a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement or FTAs. In the case of the Gulf region, the EU signed a 
Cooperation Agreement with the GCC states in 1989 and since then, it has 
initiated the FTA negotiations. Even though the EU-GCC relationship started 
even before the foreign policy pillar was introduced into the EU framework 
through the TEU, indicating a strategic interest by the two partners and a top 
priority for the EU external relations policy, the two parties have failed to take 
advantage of momentum built at different points in time by delaying the 
conclusion of a FTA. It can be suggested that the conclusion of the FTA 
negotiations will be a milestone for launching a strategic partnership between 
the two regions, as was the case in South Korea. In the case of the latter Asian 
country, the EU and the government of South Korea sealed the FTA agreement 
and at the same time decided to ‘upgrade their relationship into a strategic 
partnership’411.  
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EU-GCC PARTNERSHIP ON THE YEMENI CRISES 
 
Introduction 
The situation in Yemen has posed a threat to the security and the stability of 
the Middle East region over a number of years, and more so since the youth 
uprisings in 2011. This has impacted on the GCC states but also the EU and 
the rest of the world, in terms of the existence of Al Qaeda of the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) within the Yemeni borders, the proliferation of weapons, 
the trajectory of Yemen towards the status of a failed state and also the 
ideological challenge towards the ruling systems in the GCC countries. The 
complexity and the magnitude of the threats have called for a coordinated 
reaction from the players affected. From this perspective and keeping in 
mind the interests of both actors for stability and security in the wider Gulf 
region, the way the EU and the GCC have approached the political and 
economic situation in Yemen as well as the security threats arising because 
of this situation, can yield vital insights for the purposes of this thesis. 
The main question this chapter addresses is whether the EU and GCC 
policies and actions in Yemen have converged in an attempt to form a 
common strategy to jointly respond to new prospects or challenges. This 
chapter will begin with a brief description of the situation in Yemen, the EU’s 
policies in the country and GCC–Yemen relations. It will then provide an 
overview of the three main points of focus for assessing the EU-GCC 
relationship in Yemen, namely the Consultative Group on Yemen (CG), the 
Friends of Yemen forum (FoY) and the GCC proposal for a power transfer in 
Yemen after the youth uprising in 2011. The chapter will then analyse 
whether the various elements that shape a strategic partnership are 
identified in this case study, in terms of interests, values and (self-)images. 
First, it will identify the common interests of the two parties based on the 
common challenges they face, in view of the deteriorating situation of the 
economy, society and state apparatus of Yemen. It is important to examine 
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how the same priority on security has been taken into consideration by 
actors who have different value systems and (self-) images about their own 
role as promoters of stability. It will then examine if this relationship has been 
institutionalised and whether values have been an important factor in the 
shaping of common responses to the Yemeni challenges, while keeping in 
mind that the declared outcome is a combination of the democratic values 
reflecting EU norms and the values of the Arabic political culture which 
engage with tribal politics.  
Beyond the role of values, this research will further test the role of 
interdependency and the symmetrical character of the relationship, namely 
whether these characteristics hinder the shaping of a strategic partnership or 
advance bi-regional communication. The way this relationship has been 
influenced by long-term approaches and its ability to adjust to new 
developments at a regional or global level will also be examined, taking into 
consideration the new rising role that the GCC states have perceived for 
themselves. The engagement of regional and global actors as well as the 
global interest of this issue will also be addressed. Moreover, it will explore 
the joints actions by all the actors involved, including national governments 
in the EU and the GCC and the bodies of regional and international 
organisations, as well as internal cohesiveness on the issue within the two 
regional blocs. Furthermore, it will assess the tangible outcome of the 
relationship of the EU and the GCC states in dealing with Yemen as well as 
its economic development and the security threats emanating from the 
country. By analysing these issues, the thesis will address the issue of 
whether the EU-GCC relationship has produced common policies and 
actions, to the extent that it meets the requirements for a relationship to be 
considered a strategic partnership. It will also examine how two players with 
economic might but with less developed military capabilities address and 
tackle hard security issues and how this affects their bi-regional relationship 
but also the implications on their own image as foreign policy actors. 
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The situation in Yemen 
Yemen remains one of the least developed countries worldwide and about 
half of its population (42%) lives under the national poverty line. Yemen has 
one of the highest birth rates in the world and as a result, approximately 44% 
of the Yemenis are under the age of 15412. The country is dependent on 
foreign donations and due to the enormous amount of funds needed for 
structural changes in Yemen, development in the country is an extremely 
challenging task. Despite some positive steps taken by the government of 
Yemen with the financial and technical support of the international 
community, “it is expected that Yemen will remain an off track country and 
will not achieve most of the MDGs by 2015”413. The Yemeni government has 
initiated various strategic plans for the country, namely the second Five Year 
Development Plan (2001-05), Poverty Reduction Strategy, the third National 
Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (2006-2010) and the National 
Reforms Agenda414, but the level to which these plans have actually been 
implemented is still questionable, due to lack of absorption capacities by 
Yemeni authorities. Corruption and lack of good governance also remains a 
major obstacle to Yemen’s development. Due to the political structure of 
tribal networks and the economic concessions made to tribal leaders in 
exchange for their support of the government, the centralised power of the 
government and the fact that major economic gains of the state are achieved 
through the state-controlled oil and gas exports, the state seems to have a 
monopoly over the economy of Yemen. From this point of view, abuses of 
the system by central government officials are considered to be widespread 
in the country, while foreign investments are seriously discouraged in this 
                                                          
412 United Nations Population Fund, “Country Profile: Yemen”, 2009, Retrieved on 19 July 2011 from 
http://www.unfpa.org/sowmy/resources/docs/country_info/profile/en_Yemen_SoWMy_Profile.pdf 
413 United Nations Development Programme, “Yemen 2010 Report: The Second National Millennium 
Development Report”, 2009, Retrieved on 20 July 2011 from 
http://undp.org.ye/reports/24d06139cb9b57MDG%20Yemen%20English.pdf. 
414 Ibid 
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environment415. This situation is only made worse by continuous security 
threats. The security situation ‘continued to deteriorate’ during the last few 
years and in 2009 the AQAP was formed by the merger of  Al Qaeda in 
Yemen with various groups associated with Al Qaeda in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia (KSA). According to USA intelligence, the aim of the new 
formation of the Al Qaeda branch was to recruit jihadists from the region and 
use Yemen as its basis for launching attacks, not only within the country but 
in other countries too416. The abovementioned economic and political 
situation, as well as the high unemployment rates for young people (officially 
25%; unofficially 35-40%417), create a fertile ground for the development of 
radicalism and extremism.  
 
EU-Yemen relations 
The EU has developed its relations with Yemen based on the traditional 
approaches of the EFP, according to which humanitarian and development 
aid is provided, attached to political conditionalities which aim at engaging 
the recipient party into a dialogue about EU interests, norms and values in a 
specific region. In this case, the EU initiated policies for Yemen based on the 
Cooperation Agreement which came into force in 1998418 and the Strategic 
Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle East419. In 2004, the EU 
opened a delegation office in Sanaa and established a Political Dialogue 
                                                          
415 United Nations Development Programme, “Assessment of Development Results: Yemen”, 2005, Retrieved 
on 20 July 2011 from http://www.undp.org/evaluation/documents/ADR/ADR_Reports/ADR_Yemen.pdf 
416 United States Department of State, “2009 Country Reports on Terrorism – Yemen” Retrieved on 5 August 
2010 from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c63b615c.html; United States Department of State, Country 
Reports on Terrorism 2008 - Yemen, Retrieved on 10 July 2011 from  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49fac6a628.html 
417 Carnegie Middle East Center, 'Arab Youth Unemployment: Roots, Risks and Responses’, February 2011, 
Brussels. Retrieved on 31 July 2011 from http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Justin_Sykes.pdf  
418European Union, Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Yemen (L 
72/18), 11 March 1998 
419 European Council, ‘Final Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East’, 
June 2004, Retrieved on 19 August 2011 from 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Partnership%20Mediterranean%20and%20Middle%20East.pdf 
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with the Yemeni government420. EU policies were applied through different 
frameworks: the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI), the European 
Instrument for the promotion of Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and 
the Instrument for Stability. Within the framework of the Development Co-
operation Instrument (DCI), which was introduced in 2007, the EU 
sponsored programmes for economic development and maritime security, 
whilst it also provided assistance for refugees, the health services and for 
improvement and promotion of human rights421. Under the activities of the 
EIDHR, the EU supported NGOs for promoting Human Rights in Yemen and 
it provided assistance for reforms in the judicial system and security 
apparatus422. It also deployed an EU Election Observation Mission in the 
country for the Presidential and local council elections in 2006 which 
identified some democratic deficits and proposed some concrete changes423. 
For the years 1990-2006 the EU allocated €200 million for assistance to 
Yemen while the 2007-2010 Multiannual Indicative Programme allocated 
another €60 million424; the 2011-2013 Multiannual Indicative Programme 
increased the aid to €70 million425. Yemen can also pursue further economic 
aid through thematic programmes, such as Food Security, Migration and 
Asylum programme, Investing in People programme, Non-State Actors and 
                                                          
420 European Union, ‘Political & economic relations’, EU Delegation Office to the Republic of Yemen, Sanaa, 
Retrieved on 19 August 2011 from 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/yemen/eu_yemen/political_and_economic_relation/index_en.htm 
421 The EU has funded projects for responding to migrants' needs and ensuring maritime security, supporting the 
country's accession to the World Trade Organisation, improving access to quality reproductive health services, 
implementing small projects focusing on women and children's rights and supporting vulnerable migrants and 
asylum seekers in Yemen (See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/case-studies/gulf-region/gulf-
region_en.htm)  
422 The EIDHR-Yemen programme was introduced in 2008. Six projects were awarded in 2009 and ten more in 
2010. All of them were initiated by NGOs for promoting human rights and social development. EuropeAid 
‘Compendium of Activities Funded under EIDHR’. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/documents/updated_report_by_location_en.pdf 
423 European Union, ‘Final Report, Presidential and Local Council Elections’, Election Observation Mission, 20 
September 2006. Retrieved on 02 September 2011 from 
http://www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/EUEOMYemenfinalreport.pdf 
424 European Commission (RELEX), ‘Multiannual Indicative Programme (2007-2013)’, 2006, Retrieved on 18 
July 2011 from http://eeas.europa.eu/yemen/csp/mip_07_13_en.pdf 
425 European Commission (RELEX), ‘Mid-Term Review of the EC-Yemen Development Strategy 2007-2003’, 
Preparation of the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011-2013, 2010, Retrieved on 18 July 2011 from 
http://eeas.europa.eu/yemen/docs/yemen_mtr_concept_en.pdf 
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Local Authorities in Development, and Environment Programme426. The 
central goal of all these policies has been identified as providing support to 
Yemeni authorities “to promote good governance and to fight against 
poverty”427. Security and counter-terrorism were also in the list of priorities of 
the EU. These issues were on the agenda of the three EU-Yemen political 
dialogue meetings, in 2004, 2005 and 2006. Moreover, under the umbrella of 
the Instrument for Stability, the EU initiated a Counter-terrorism workshop 
with the participation of Yemeni local actors. Thus it is evident from these 
activities that   the EU has been keen to promote its normative EFP model in 
Yemen. Through its aid packages the EU has promoted reforms that would 
lead to structures based on EU values of political participation, stability 
through engagement, good governance, and the openness of economic 
sectors. However, security has always been a priority and responding even 
further to the need for stability and counter-terrorism policies, the EU military 
mission EUNAVFOR ATALANTA was introduced in 2008. EUNAVFOR 
ATALANTA is a military mission of the EU, including naval and air forces, for 
tackling the security threats in the Gulf of Aden, opposite the Yemeni 
coast428.  
 
GCC-Yemen relations 
The GCC has been active in dealing with issues raised by Yemen, for 
political, economic and cultural reasons. Yemen shares borders with two 
countries of the GCC: KSA and Oman. It is the second largest country of the 
Arabian Peninsula with the second largest population of this region as well. 
The historical, cultural and tribal ties of the GCC states and Yemen are 
interwoven by the great numbers of Yemeni citizens working in the GCC and 
                                                          
426 European Parliament, ‘Fact Sheets on the European Union: Arab Peninsula, Iraq and Iran’, October 2009, 
Retrieved on 19 August 2011 from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en//FTU_6.4.6.pdf 
427 European Union, ‘EU-Yemen relations’, EEAS website. See http://eeas.europa.eu/yemen/index_en.htm 
428 European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions’, 2009 Annual Report from the European 
Commission on the Instrument for Stability  COM(2010) 512 final, 20  September 2010, p. 5 
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the linkage between GCC royal families and Yemeni tribes. The Emirati royal 
family has acknowledged this kinship. Furthermore, the GCC states are the 
largest aid sponsors for Yemen429. On this basis, Yemen applied for GCC 
membership in 1996 and it became an official candidate in 1999. Kuwait was 
not supportive of this candidacy and the KSA vetoed it. Because of these 
objections, but most importantly because of the enormous differences in the 
economic and political structure of Yemen compared to the rest of the 
countries of the Arabian Peninsula as well as the security threat it poses in 
the wider region, Yemen has not yet reached a level of a foreseen future 
membership. In terms of security, values and (self-)images the GCC states 
considered Yemen as a source of risks and acute challenges. Despite its 
problematic application, the fact that Yemen had a facade of a democratic 
system posed threats to the legitimacy of the ruling families which have been 
at large undemocratic. Inclusion of Yemen in the GCC could plausibly open 
a discussion on the democratic processes in the whole region. The existence 
of AQAP, however, posed more concrete ideological and security threats to 
Yemen’s neighbours. AQAP was active in challenging the lucrative lifestyle 
of the Gulf rulers while it was also active in bombing attacks against GCC 
targets. Furthermore, the socio-economic situation of the Yemenis could 
potentially confront the pan-Arabic language of the GCC rulers, because the 
latter allowed this enormous discrepancy between the living conditions of 
Yemenis and the rest of the Gulf nationals.  Allowing these dissimilarities 
among members of the same regional organisation would have been 
obscure. Nevertheless, in a positive step for Yemen's integration in the 
region, Yemen and the GCC signed a protocol which defines the relationship 
between the two parties. Simultaneously, Yemen joined GCC affiliated 
agencies with a non-political character, namely the Arab Education Bureau, 
                                                          
429 The National, 'Yemen must grow into GCC', 31/05/2009, Abu Dhabi, Retrieved on 20 July 2011 
fromhttp://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/yemen-must-grow-into-gcc?pageCount=0 
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the Health Ministers’ Council, the Labour and Social Affairs Ministers’ 
Council, and the Gulf Cup tournament 430. 
 
The focal points of the EU-GCC relationship in relation to Yemen 
In order to examine the hypothesis of this research, the chapter will focus on 
three focal points which have attracted the interest of the international 
community in general and more specifically of the EU and the GCC. These 
are the CG for Yemen, the FoY forum and the youth uprising in Yemen in 
2011 and the subsequent GCC initiative for a peaceful political transition in 
the country. These three parallel procedures are the most significant and 
most highlighted processes at a global level for tackling the challenges 
related to the situation in Yemen. 
 
Consultative Group (CG) for Yemen 
In November 2006 the Consultative Group (CG) for Yemen was established. 
The CG was characterised by a series of meetings which were initiated by 
the UK and which were co-sponsored by the GCC and its member states. 
The meetings were attended by over forty donors and agencies, including 
the presidency of the EU, the GCC Secretariat, Yemeni President Saleh, 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of some EU and GCC states and other high 
profile political figures from the EU, the GCC states and other donors.  
During the meeting, the Yemeni government presented a series of plans for 
reforms: (i) the National Reform Agenda, for moving the country from Lower 
to Middle Human Development Group by 2025, for creating sustainable 
economic growth beyond 7% and for reducing poverty by half in ten years431 
                                                          
430 European Institute for Research on Euro-Arab Cooperation, 'GCC (Gulf Cooperation Countil)', Brussels. 
Retrieved on 20 July 2011 from http://www.medea.be/en/countries/arab-world-general/gcc-gulf-cooperation-
council/ 
431 Al-Abbasi, Mytahar A., 'The 3rd Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction, 2006-2010', 
Presentation at the Yemen Consultative Group Meeting, 15-16 November 2006, London. Retrieved on 20 July 
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(ii) the 3rd Development Plan for Poverty Reduction for the year 2006-
2010432 for initiating economic reforms, making progress on good 
governance, advancing decentralisation of development and making 
progress on achieving the Millennium Development Goals and (iii) the Public 
Investment Programme which “succeeded to a great extent in matching the 
priorities of the investment program with the general economic framework 
and macroeconomic policies of Yemen”433 
CG follow-up meetings took place in Yemen (2007, 2008, 2009) and in 
Riyadh (2010). The follow-up meetings reviewed the progress made by the 
Yemeni government regarding its commitments to political and economic 
reforms, based on the Yemeni government’s multi-year programmes434. 
 
Friends of Yemen (FoY) 
In January 2010, the ‘Friends of Yemen’ (FoY) platform was introduced in 
London. It is a forum which convened with a high profile level participation. 
The fundamental role of the EU and the GCC states was highlighted by the 
fact that the Ministerial meetings were co-chaired by Yemen, the UK and the 
KSA. The FoY forum prioritised the regional perspective of any attempt to 
address the Yemeni problems and provided “a framework to coordinate and 
streamline international engagement and support for Yemen, and to set a 
series of milestones which would lead to real progress on the ground and 
then new donations”435, reflecting to a large extent the desire of the EU to 
                                                                                                                                                                   
2011 from http://www.yemencg.org/library/after/working%20session/5yplan-
CG%20Meeting%20session%201.pdf 
432 Ibid 
433 Al-Attiyah, Abdulrahman, ‘Statement of Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council at the Conclusion 
of the Yemen Consultative Group Meeting’, 16 November 2006, Retrieved on 20 July 2011 from 
http://www.yemencg.org/library/after/Opening%20statements/Remarks%20by%20the%20Secretary%20General
%20of%20the%20GCC_En.pdf 
434 Wikileaks, 'Donors call for RoYG participation in EITI, other Improvements in Business Environment', US 
Embassy in Sanaa cable, 20 January 2006, Retrieved on 10 September 2011 from 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06SANAA146.html 
435 Interview of an EU diplomat, who is based in Yemen, Brussels, 02 August 2011 
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force the Yemeni leadership to adhere to its commitments, based on the 
normative EFP approach of political conditionality.  
A distinction between the CG and FoY is the attention paid to the security 
factor and the extra effort attached to the containment of the role of AQAP in 
Yemen. Indeed the FoY has developed a more comprehensive approach, 
compared to the CG meetings, as it aims at providing a balance between the 
security concerns on the one hand and the need for democratic reforms and 
economic development on the other hand. The goal of the FoY is to provide 
assistance to the Yemeni authorities on counter-terrorism and de-
radicalisation policies addressing the economic, social and political roots of 
terrorism, on anti-corruption practices and on a new ten-year development 
plan for poverty reduction and economic growth.  
In March 2010, the UAE hosted the second meeting of the FoY, while the 
third one convened in New York in September 2010 on the sidelines of the 
United Nations General Assembly. The fourth meeting was scheduled for 
March 2011, but due to the youth uprising in Yemen, it was postponed. It 
took place in September 2012 while the fifth meeting was organised in 
March 2013. 
 
GCC initiative 
In January 2011, after the collapse of Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia and the 
youth uprising in Egypt which demanded the resignation of the President 
Mubarak, thousands of young students demonstrated in major cities of 
Yemen and called for President Saleh to leave the country. Young 
demonstrators camped in the city centre of Sanaa while protests erupted in 
other large cities too. The EU and the GCC leaders (alongside the USA 
government) urged Saleh to initiate changes in the country and welcomed 
his proposal for a national dialogue for constitutional reforms and 
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elections436. However, after protesters were killed by army snipers on 18th of 
March 2011, the EU, the GCC and the USA changed their stance, adopted a 
stricter approach against President Saleh437 and called for a smooth 
transition to a democratic and inclusive system of rule in Yemen. While 
Saleh was losing support from different tribes, on 9th April 2011, the Foreign 
Ministers of member states of the GCC, proposed an "exit plan" to Saleh. 
The proposal of the GCC states suggested that Saleh would have to transfer 
many of his powers to the Vice President, and to create a national unity 
government led by the opposition, which would lead the country to elections 
and to a new Constituent Assembly. The plan also offered protection from 
prosecution of Saleh and his family for crimes that were committed during 
the 32 years of his leadership, for which he was accused by the opposition. 
A serious weakness of the proposal was its failure to specify the date of 
Saleh’s departure from power. The opposition movement said that the 
proposal protected the interests of the president and "falls short of meeting 
the basic demands of the Yemeni people"438. The proposal was supported, 
nevertheless, by the EU and the USA439. The EU “welcomed the initiative of 
the GCC and fully recognise[d] the role the GCC can play as a mediator”440, 
signalling, for the first time in public, the willingness of the EU to recognise 
an enhanced role for the GCC regarding, at least, regional developments. As 
events were unfolding and violence shook the country, the GCC leaders 
(specifically the KSA441), following consultations with tribal leaders in Yemen 
                                                          
436 Ashton Catherine, “Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Yemen”, 10 
March 2011, Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Yemen website, Retrieved on 10 July 2011 
from http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/yemen/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/20110310_01_en.htm  
437 Ashton, Catherine, “Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the ongoing violence in 
Yemen” 10 March 2011, Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Yemen website, Retrieved on 10 
July 2011 from 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/yemen/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/20110318_01_en.htm; US 
Secretary of State, 'Violence in Yemen', Press Statement, 18 March 2011, Retrieved on 10 July 2011 from 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/158597.htm 
438 Kuwait News Agency, “Yemeni opposition rejects GCC initiative”, 4/11/2011, Retrieved on 10 July 2011 from  
http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesPublicSite/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2159225&Language=en 
439 US Secretary of State, 'GCC Initiative in Yemen', Press Statement, 8 April 2011, Retrieved on 10 July 2011 
from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/04/160361.htm  
440 European Council,’ Council conclusions on Yemen’, 3082nd Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 12 April 2011 
441 Interview of an EU diplomat, who is based in Yemen, Brussels, 02 August 2011 
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during meetings that took place in Riyadh, agreed to amend their proposal. 
The new GCC initiative was revealed on the 21st of April 2011. According to 
the new GCC plan, Saleh would resign within 30 days of signing the 
agreement, and two months later presidential elections would take place. In 
the meanwhile a new government of national unity would  be formed, with 
the participation of Saleh's ruling party, the opposition and other political 
parties442. The EU backed the new plan in a statement by HRVP Lady 
Ashton, in which the GCC initiative was described as the ‘best chance’ for 
Yemen to address its crisis443. In three cases President Saleh refused to 
sign the agreement. On 3rd of June 2011, the presidential compound in 
Sanaa was bombed and Saleh was injured. He was transferred to Riyadh for 
treatment. He returned to the country on 23rd of September 2011444. Two 
months later, under the pressure of the international community, Saleh 
signed an agreement, on the 23rd of November 2011, at the royal palace in 
Riyadh. Saleh retained his title and some of his privileges until presidential 
elections were held on 21st of February 2012. Saleh was also granted 
immunity from prosecution. After the elections, Abdu Mansour Hadi, 
assumed office as the new President and a national dialogue between the 
political parties and groups began. What was more important, a civil war, 
based on the tribal and personal cleavages (Saleh clan against General’s al-
Ahmar clan) was avoided while a process of inclusive democratic process 
was initiated. The rules of the game changed, in favour of a more democratic 
system, and the state institutions have been rebuilt. This is not argue that the 
major economic, security and political problems of Yemen have been solved. 
On the contrary, they remain pressing as ever. However, a further 
deterioration of the situation has been avoided and a new political framework 
                                                          
442 Reuters, “New Gulf plan seeks 3-month power transfer in Yemen”, 21 April 2011, Retrieved on 10 July 2011 
from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/21/us-in-yemen-idUSTRE73K2ER20110421 
443 European Union, ‘Statement by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on the Political Agreement on 
the GCC initiative for peaceful transition in Yemen’ (A 163/11), 27 April 2011 
444 A timeline of the incidents in Yemen can be found at: Reuters, “Timeline: Protests against Saleh rule in 
Yemen”, Retrieved on 30 September 2011 from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/09/us-yemen-events-
idUSTRE7981BN20111009 
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was put in place, in order to address the aspirations of the Yemeni people, 
the interests (ideological and in terms of security) of the GCC state, as well 
as the expectations and the interests of the EU. The GCC states and the EU 
have been (since then) providing economic and technical assistance to the 
new Yemeni government for the further implementation of the GCC plan.   
 
Sharing common interests and goals? 
Due to the mixture of (i) internal challenges that the central government was 
facing from the 'Houthi' rebels in the northern borders as well as the 
separatist movement in the south of the country, which led to the subsequent 
lack of legitimacy of the central government, (ii) the complex tribal 
configuration and the antagonism between various tribes445, (iii) the well-
established Al Qaeda branch (AQAP) and its transnational activities and (iv) 
the dire economic and social situation of the country, Yemen was a source of 
instability for the wider region of the Arabian Peninsula. Both parties, the EU 
and the GCC were affected, directly and indirectly, by this situation. In an 
attempt to attract further attention from the EU and the GCC, as well as 
economic assistance, the Yemeni authorities claimed that Yemen was a 
‘frontline state’ for the Gulf region and for the wider Middle East in relation to 
refugees from Somalia, piracy, and jihadists. It was claimed that Yemen was 
the first line of resistance to all of these challenges; and it was an argument 
that met with understanding within the two regional blocs446. The vast 
amount of money allocated for Yemen by these regional organisations and 
their member states447 only confirmed their interest and their shared goals 
for economic development and stability in Yemen.  
                                                          
445 Interview with a diplomat working for EU institutions, Brussels, 28 July 2011 
446 From various interviews; EU and GCC diplomats recognise the crucial role of Yemen in the security and 
stability of the area. 
447 In 2009, EU institutions and member states contributed $203.9m which equals to 50% of the donations for 
that year. In 2006, during the CG meeting, GCC states pledged for the 50% of the total amounts raised in that 
meeting, namely US$2.4b for a multi-year programme. Smith, Kerry and Poole, Lydia, Yemen aid factsheet 
1995-2009, Trends in overseas development assistance, Global Humanitarian Assistance, 
Development Initiatives, 2010, Somerset, United Kingdom 
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In response to these challenges the EU resorted to its civilian tools 
reproducing its normative EFP. It initiated a strategy according to which it 
applied its available financial and technical tools to prevent the collapse of 
this Arab state, which would have had tremendous consequences for the 
security of the region (terrorism, piracy, narcotics) and would have generated 
a new wave of refugees. According to the Yemen - European Community 
Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2013, EU actions aimed at:  
...contributing to the stabilisation of the country and 
to poverty reduction, in line with the objectives 
established in the EU Strategic Partnership for the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East and with the 
Yemeni government’s own policy reform agenda. 
This should be done by increasing support for 
democracy, human rights, the rule of law, 
economic development and human development, 
in close liaison with the rest of the donor 
community448.  
The EU also recognised that these goals could only be achieved with 
international cooperation, which was “crucial for successfully combating 
terrorism and addressing conditions conductive to terrorism”449. Therefore, it 
can be suggested that the EU (self-) image prompted the reproduction of the 
standard EFP normative approach according to which transition to 
democracy and human rights leads to economic development and security. 
At the same time, it promoted a multilateral approach to the Yemeni crisis, 
distributing responsibilities to various players in the region.  
The situation in Yemen also worried the royal families of the GCC states. For 
the abovementioned reasons, Gulf leaders acknowledged that “there is no 
                                                          
448 European Commission (RELEX), ‘Multiannual Indicative Programme (2007-2013)’, 2006, Retrieved on 18 
July 2011 from http://eeas.europa.eu/yemen/csp/mip_07_13_en.pdf 
449 European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on Counter-Terrorism’, 3109th General Affairs Council Meeting, 12 
September 2011 
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doubt the Yemeni issue will be of interest and concern of the GCC countries 
for years to come”450. The possibility of a total failure of Yemen has 
frightened the GCC states which prioritised Yemen as a security threat and  
developed  initiatives regarding the political problems in the country, beyond 
their generous contribution to aid and development donations. Indeed, real 
threats but also perceived ones, especially since Saleh had been 
manipulative with the insecurities of the GCC leaders regarding the role of 
Iran451; prompted the GCC states to become more active in dealing with the 
risks in Yemen in view of the danger this situation posed by jeopardising 
their autonomy in their national, regional and international environments. The 
KSA had its own agenda which was pursued both by sponsoring internal 
actors in Yemen and by the use of force, especially since Saudi leaders 
were more adaptive to the idea that the internal situation in Yemen had given 
the opportunity to Iran to gain a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula and 
undermine security in the Arab countries of the Gulf. UAE became the most 
important donor for Yemen452, Qatar offered its mediation services for the 
ceasefire in the war between the government forces and the Huthis453, and 
Oman moved forces to its borders with Yemen to control the illegal cross-
border trespassers.   
                                                          
450 At a press conference at the end of the 2010 GCC Summit, UAE Foreign Minister said: "There is no doubt 
that the Yemeni issue will be of interest and concern of the GCC countries for years to come and for other 
international donors as well". Salama, Samir, 'Yemen gets a pledge of financial aid to help maintain stability', 
GulfNews, 08/12/2010, Retrieved on 14 July 2011 from http://gulfnews.com/in-focus/gccsummit2010/yemen-
gets-a-pledge-of-financial-aid-to-help-maintain-stability-1.725307 
451 Even though there are no concrete proofs that Iran have been supporting the Huthis rebels, President Saleh 
insists that this is the case and it seems that it is widely believed in the region, as revealed in US cables that 
were made public recently (Wikileaks, 'Saudi strikes in Yemen: An invitation to Iran', US Embassy in Sanaa 
cable, Created: 16 November 2009, Retrieved on 10 September 2011 from 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09SANAA2070.html; Wikileaks, ' Saleh sees foreign hand behind Yemen's 
internal woes ', US Embassy in Sanaa cable, Created: 31 May 2009, Retrieved on 10 September 2011 from 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09SANAA1015.html).  
452 In 2009 the EU offered to Yemen $134m, 32% of the total donations of the year in Yemen; Smith, Kerry and 
Poole, Lydia, Yemen aid factsheet 1995-2009, Trends in overseas development assistance, Global 
Humanitarian Assistance, Development Initiatives, 2010, Somerset, United Kingdom. 
453 Al-Dar, Abdulsalam, Policy Focus 'The Problem of Sada and Ceasefire Initiatives', Sheba Center for Strategic 
Studies, Retrieved on 17 July 2011 from Available online at: 
http://www.shebacss.com/docs/PolicyFoucs/scssepf012-10.pdf 
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Under these circumstances, the common interests of the EU and the GCC 
can be summed up in the designated goal of the FoY, namely to prevent a 
fragile state like Yemen becoming a failed state. This joint goal could only be 
pursued within an all-inclusive framework in a way which was compatible 
with EU norms and, according to EU terminology, in an approach of 
“economics meets politics”. Indeed, the EU and the GCC states recognised 
that a positive outcome in the security field was impossible without 
developments in the economic (and consequently) social situation of the 
country and its people. It is for this reason that initiatives by the EU and the 
GCC regarding Yemen were comprehensive, including elements of 
economic, social and political developments alongside the efforts for 
achieving a greater level of security, both internally and from a 
regional/international perspective. 
The common anxiety of the EU and the GCC states in relation to Yemen was 
expressed on a bi-regional level many times in the Joint Communiqués that 
followed EU-GCC Ministerial Meetings. Even though these Ministerial 
Meetings were, criticised as being unproductive, the Joint Communiqué was 
a statement of issues of common concern. In the EU-GCC Joint 
Communiqué that followed the EU-GCC Ministerial meeting in Luxembourg 
in June 2010454, the last one before the youth uprising in Yemen in January 
2011, the two parties stated the following: 
The [EU and the GCC states] also expressed their 
shared commitment to support Yemen’s 
development as a unified, stable, democratic and 
prosperous state and encouraged the Government 
of Yemen to continue efforts in this regard. Both 
sides agreed that a comprehensive approach was 
needed in Yemen, with strong support from the 
international community, and in particular Yemen's 
                                                          
454 EU/GCC, ‘Joint Communiqué’, 20th EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting, 14 June 2010 
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neighbours including in the context of the Friends 
of Yemen’ process. They agreed to enhance 
dialogue and cooperation on the issue.  
This statement implied that EU values and approaches are accommodated 
in tackling the crisis (development aid in exchange for democratisation and 
multilateralism with the engagement of Yemen’s neighbours). However it 
remains to be explored whether  adopted official language was  applied in 
practice. Indeed this convergence of interests did not necessarily lead to 
common approaches against well defined security threats, especially 
keeping in mind that the EU and the GCC states had different value systems 
and different priorities and approaches in their foreign policies. 
 
Compromising western-type democracy and Arabic tribalism 
Despite the common interests in the development and stability of Yemen, the 
differences in values and norms of the two regions have tested the EU–GCC 
relationship. Yemen was itself a very challenging case anyway, since it has 
been, theoretically at least, the only western type democracy with regular 
elections for the parliament and the President of state in the wider Arabian 
Peninsula region. Nevertheless, Arabic tribalism and the country’s Muslim 
character have been fundamental ingredients of the political process in 
Yemen.  
Since the GCC states do not share EU values or the EU’s tendency to attach 
political conditionality to democratisation and respect for human rights, they 
showed no interest in expressing dissatisfaction when the Yemeni authorities 
were not making tangible progress with political reforms. On the contrary, 
this had been an issue on which the EU was very vocal. More specifically, 
the EU had sent an Election Observation Mission in 2006 and handed a set 
of recommendations for the reform of the election regulations in order to 
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further express its desire for the democratisation of Yemen455. In addition the 
FoY platform was ‘a political process and not a pledging exercise’456 and as 
such the EU called for the Yemeni authorities to show concrete reforms and 
to re-convince the donors about their commitment to progress in economic 
development and reforms in the political sphere. The EU also noted that 
“commitment alone is not enough, results are needed”457. In this respect the 
EU attached political conditionality to the funds it was allocating to Yemen. 
Applying its normative agenda, the EU requested solid results on good 
governance, transparency and democratic developments in order to further 
discuss funding for Yemeni projects.  EU policymakers agreed on the 
necessity of the Yemeni government to implement democratic reforms and 
promote decentralisation of powers, as a way of achieving stability in the 
long run, within the framework of a more inclusive political system. Therefore 
the EU applied its values of democracy as a way of dealing with the systemic 
problem of the political structure of the country. On the contrary, the GCC 
states were always more practical on issues focusing on the results for 
achieving stability and development, reinforcing the security of their 
countries and of the Gulf region, rather than pursuing political changes 
through their funds. Keeping in mind the internal political structure of the 
GCC states it would have been unimaginable that these states would ask for 
‘more democracy’ in Yemen when their own royal families ruled without 
being accountable to their people. Nevertheless, they did request concrete 
progress on economic reforms, which would enable Yemen to absorb GCC 
funds more efficiently. Because of concerns regarding the lack of efficient 
implementation of projects along with their reservations about corruption in 
Yemen, the GCC states froze, in some cases, the donations that had been 
                                                          
455 The EU deployed a Core Team, Long Term Observers and Short Term Observers in all 21 governorates of 
Yemen and after the elections they publicly presented their conclusions, as well as recommendations for reforms 
and changes to the Yemeni authorities. European Union, ‘Final Report, Presidential and Local Council 
Elections’, Election Observation Mission, 20 September 2006. Retrieved on 02 September 2011 from 
http://www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/EUEOMYemenfinalreport.pdf  
456 Interview with a diplomat working for EU institutions, Brussels, 28 July 2011 
457 “Yemen at a crossroads”, Joint EU Statement for the 3rd Yemen-Donors Post-CG Follow-up Meeting on 5 Aril 
2009 in Sanaa. 
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agreed for transfer to the country458. To the extent that transparency and 
good governance were central aims in the EU’s normative approach for the 
country, the above actions of the GCC states contributed in some way to 
adding pressure for Yemen to reform and comply with EU requests 
(indicating potential convergence towards EU policy). However, it should be 
noted that the GCC states did not always prioritise political solutions; in 
some cases the KSA had used force to repel fighters from areas near its 
southern borders459. 
After the youth uprising, the EU and GCC approaches further converged, 
even though the EU and the GCC states had different views on the values 
implied by the GCC initiative. The GCC plan accommodated immunity to 
Saleh and his family for crimes which might have been committed during his 
Presidency and most importantly during the 2011 uprising in Yemen. This 
was not compatible with the values of the EU and its member states which 
called for accountability, especially in relation to crimes committed by the 
leaderships against the people of their countries. Yet, it was the most viable 
solution to move forward at a time when the whole Middle East was shaken 
by revolts and demonstrations. The EU significantly and clearly expressed its 
support for the GCC plan, in every way, but it refused to become a co-
signator of the agreement or guarantor for its implementation because of the 
elements in the proposal that contradicted its values. While the EU accepted 
the fact that by endorsing the agreement it was adding to the pressure on  
the Yemeni government and the opposition for its full implementation, 
European diplomats made it clear in internal discussions that they wanted to 
‘avoid the legal and procedural complexities of formal countersignature’460. It 
was decided that the EU would be a witness to the signing of the agreement 
                                                          
458 Dorsey, James M., U.S., 'Europe Press GCC States on Yemen Membership', World Politics Review, 12 
October 2010, Retrieved on 22 July 2011 from http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6672/u-s-europe-
press-gcc-states-on-yemen-membership 
459 Reuters, “Saudi air force hits Yemen rebels after border raid by Souhail Karam”, Riyadh, 5/11/2009, 
Retrieved on 15 July 2011 from http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/05/us-saudi-yemen-attack-
idUSTRE5A41TF20091105  
460 Views expressed by EU member states at a discussion in Brussels, as conveyed by various interviewees, 
some of which with participation in relevant meetings in Brussels, April 2011. 
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and that the EEAS would publish a statement in support of the agreement 
which was the ‘best way forward’461. Practically, the EU promoted an 
agreement which did not reflect its values, but which neither legally or 
formally bound it to the agreement or its implementation.  
However, although the agreement itself did not correspond to EU values, it 
could be suggested that the expected outcome was within the framework of 
the values projected by the EU. The aim of the proposal was the political 
transition of Yemen under regional leadership and the acceleration of the 
democratisation process, by setting up democratic institutions and 
empowering the new and emerging social and political forces. Therefore the 
GCC plan could be read as being obviously related to the political 
conditionalities that the EU imposed on Yemen. From this perspective it 
provided a way to restore stability through peaceful means. It was an 
inclusive plan with the participation of all parties, it provided multilateral 
engagement of international actors and it promoted respect of fundamental 
rights and democratic values462 for the new era in the country. From this 
point of view, the GCC also adopted the values and policies of the EU in 
exchange for its primary role in persuading the Yemeni actors to sign and 
implement the agreement, which would benefit both the EU and the GCC. 
Therefore, there was a compromise in which both parties had to meet the 
other party’s sensitivities. The EU recognised the leading role of the GCC, 
while the GCC had to react positively on the democratic aspirations of the 
local people of Yemen and the engagement of EU in favour of these 
aspirations. In this framework, even though Yemeni authorities were using 
violence against the Yemeni people, the EU did not initiate any discussions 
for applying sanctions against the Yemeni leadership in order to protect 
basic human rights, as it had done in other cases in the region, specifically 
Libya and Syria. The GCC were strongly in favour of the ‘carrot approach’ 
                                                          
461 Ashton, Catherine, ‘Letter to the Vice President of the Republic of Yemen, Abd al-Rab Mansur Hadi’, 
A(11)681617-D(11), 07 June, 2011 
462 As it was assessed by the Ambassadors of the EU and its member states in Sanaa in June 2011. The 
information was gathered and verified by various interviewees.  
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and the EU did not want to act in a way that was counter-productive to the 
GCC initiative, or in contrast to GCC approaches. GCC leaders had 
conveyed their views that imposing sanctions on Yemen would lead Saleh to 
react aggressively and probably cut ties with the EU or the international 
community, advancing its repression tactics internally. Therefore, the GCC 
states negotiated values in exchange for efficiency with their European 
partners, and the final outcome of the crisis confirmed the efficacy of the 
GCC approach. This mutual understanding on the handling of Saleh during 
the youth uprising highlighted the importance of the leading role of the GCC 
even though this leading role had not always been accepted or promoted by 
the EU, during the last two decades. 
 
Who has the lead? 
The discussion regarding the leading role in the EU-GCC relationship in 
tackling the threats emanating from Yemen is primarily linked to the (self-
)image and the priority placed on the norms and the values of the two 
parties. It is also tightly associated with the interdependency of the two 
actors in this matter. Until 2011 the level of cooperation and coordination did 
not reflect this interdependency, in spite of the fact that since 2009 there 
were some minor positive steps towards this direction. On the contrary, due 
to the symmetrical character of the relationship, there was a power struggle 
between the two sides.  
Since the early years of the decade of 2000, when the EU was showing 
greater interest for a structured relationship between the EU and the GCC on 
various issues including the challenges emanating from Yemen, the EU had 
its own views on institutionalised cooperation between Yemen and the GCC. 
The EU, at this time, imagined the role of the GCC according to its own 
norms and experiences, when it used integration policies as a way of 
engaging with neighbours facing tremendous challenges after the collapse of 
their socialist state structures. Since the ‘EU was blaming the GCC states for 
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not doing enough’463, the Europeans felt that the future membership of 
Yemen in the GCC would provide a new context within which the 
international community would  be able to deal with Yemen,  as responsibility 
would be shared with GCC states. Because of this, the EU was happy to 
publicly encourage plans for Yemen’s integration to the GCC. In 
correspondence with the EU, if not under European guidance, the Yemeni 
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation prepared and presented 
the study ‘Preparing Yemen for Better Economic Integration into GCC’464 at 
the first CG for Yemen, in London in November 2006. The study went as far 
as to provide a proposal for practical measures that could have been taken 
in order to achieve the economic integration of Yemen in the GCC, based on 
the outlined criteria. What is more, at the same conference, the EU reiterated 
its readiness to ‘share its experience of enlargement processes with the 
GCC and Yemen, as they seek closer cooperation and integration’465. 
However, the GCC did not welcome this kind of European intervention with 
proposals which were presented without any prior consultation with the GCC 
states. They felt that they were pressurised to accept directions on dealing 
with an issue they considered to be solely GCC’s internal business, to the 
extent that a diplomat working for the GCC described this attitude as a policy 
of neo-colonialism on behalf of the EU466, at a time when the GCC states 
were claiming for themselves a more independent and confident regional 
role. Under these circumstances and due to: a) the pre-decided solutions the 
EU was promoting based on its own model b) EU  failure  to adopt to the 
                                                          
463 Interviews with GCC diplomats, Brussels, 08 April 2009 
464 Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, “Preparing Yemen for Better Economic Integration into GCC”, Ministry of Planning 
and International Cooperation, Republic of Yemen, 2006. Retrieved on 18 July 2011 from 
http://www.shebacss.com/docs/steuss001-10.pdf 
465 European Union, ‘Statement by the Presidency of the European Union (Finland’s EU Presidecny)’, Yemen 
Consultative Group Meeting, 16 November 2006, Retrieved on 18 July 2011 from 
http://www.yemencg.org/library/after/pledging%20statements/Statement%20of%20European%20Union%27%20
Presidency%20%28Finland%29.pdf  The same view was reiterated by the EU, following the third EU-Yemen 
Political Dialogue. European Union, ‘Third EU-Yemen political dialogue meeting (Sana’a 20 November 2006)’, 
15582/06 (Presse 334), Brussels, 21 November 2006 
466 Interviews with GCC diplomats, Brussels, 08 April 2009  
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new realities regarding GCC states, the EU and the GCC faced difficulties in 
reaching a common approach regarding Yemen, at least until 2009. It was 
then that EU diplomats based in Yemen reported to Brussels that the EU 
needed a more constructive approach with the GCC states. They recognised 
that any fruitful cooperation on this matter should entail serious participation 
from the GCC states on strategy formation, since their role would be pivotal 
to any sustainable solution. This EU attempt for GCC engagement had to 
take into consideration that the GCC states were only willing to get involved 
in initiatives that they felt comfortable with, and in formations in which they 
had a strong say. 
Since then, signs emerged indicating that the EU had abandoned the tactic 
of applying pressure for Yemen’s membership to the GCC. Instead the EU 
began calling for some kind of regional commitment by the GCC states in 
tackling the challenges arising from the instability in Yemen467 and after 
2009, the two partners began to find common ground on their activities and 
policies for this volatile country. This convergence of approaches was further 
highlighted in the early months of 2011. In the case of the youth uprising 
against Saleh, both sides realised the need for coordination and cooperation, 
based on mutual respect of the distinctive character of each side and its own 
values, priorities and reservations. European diplomats acknowledged the 
crucial role of the GCC states in solving the crisis and in this respect they 
reached out to their Gulf partners for consultation before taking any action, 
especially since the GCC states had developed an extensive network of 
communication with tribal leaders. Indeed the GCC proposal was tabled after 
the KSA and other GCC actors consulted with tribal leaders in Yemen. The 
EEAS was developing an active and visible policy regarding the new 
developments in the Middle East in 2011 and from this perspective the GCC 
states wanted EU support for their proposal. That was a major step in the 
EU’s new tactic. It abandoned its attempt to impose on the GCC its own 
normative-driven solutions and reached out to the GCC with sincere 
                                                          
467 Interview of an EU diplomat, who is based in Yemen, Brussels, 02 August 2011 
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eagerness to listen to their views, based on their own understanding of the 
situation and with respect to their new regional role. 
The GCC states also pursued EU backing of their initiative, since they 
underlined the fact that the EEAS was heavily engaged in the broader crisis 
which erupted in the wider Middle East in 2011. In the specific case of the 
youth uprising in Yemen, the EU and the GCC were both respected by the 
Yemeni government and the opposition, as the local actors recognised key 
roles for the EU and the GCC for a sustainable solution. It must be noted 
that despite the internal debates on the EU stance in Yemen as strong 
stakeholders were not fully convinced that the ‘carrot approach’ was 
productive in dealing with Saleh, the EU fully supported the mediation efforts 
led by the GCC countries468, sealing the new approach the EU had taken 
since 2009 which favoured a more GCC-led engagement in Yemen.  
 
Institutionalising common actions  
The power struggle which was identified in the previous section also 
influenced the institutionalisation of the dialogue between the EU and the 
GCC states, which remained poor in the bi-regional context (EU-GCC 
ministerial and political directors meetings). This was because the GCC 
states were very reluctant to engage in a direct dialogue with the EU on this 
issue, as already demonstrated. They felt that these meetings were 
platforms for receiving directions from the EU on how to deal with Yemen. 
They were clear that they did not favour the idea of Yemen joining the GCC 
and they resisted any attempt to get into an institutionalised dialogue 
between the EU and GCC which heavily involved Yemen, since the EU had 
repeated its proposal for a solution which was a reflection of its own 
integration path. A more institutionalised form of EU-GCC dialogue on 
                                                          
468 European Council, ‘Council conclusions on Yemen’, 3076th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 21 March 2011; 
Reuters, “Top Yemeni generals back democracy protesters”, 21 March 2011. Retrieved on 31 July 2011 from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/21/us-yemen-idUSTRE72K1RJ20110321  
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Yemen can be noticed only within the broader high profile fora of CG and 
FoY.  
It was well known to EU and GCC diplomats that the main objective of the 
Yemeni authorities was to get their hands on new donations through these 
fora rather than initiating real developments in the political and economic 
environment of the country. It is for this reason that the EU, the GCC states 
and other regional players encouraged the institutionalisation of attached 
political conditionalities to the development assistance granted to Yemen, in 
a way in which the GCC states would not appear as setting preconditions on 
their aid. It was also a way for the GCC states to assess the commitment of 
Saleh to adhere to its commitments and to act accordingly, multilaterally, 
regionally or bilaterally. The institutionalisation of the multilateral approach 
towards the Yemeni crises was also compatible with the normative aspects 
of the EFP. 
 
The aim of the CG was to bring together major players in Yemen under a 
single framework and to garner the interest of the international community. 
The driving forces in these meetings were European and GCC states, even 
though it should be noted that the role of the EU as a supranational actor 
was limited and was definitely in the shadow of EU member states, and 
more specifically of the UK. For EU diplomats, the FoY platform469 was the 
only available mechanism which provided a holistic approach to the situation 
in Yemen both in terms of the actors which were involved thus ensuring  
international alignment on this case, as well as in terms of the ‘economics 
meets politics’ approach. It was interweaving human rights, the clause of 
political inclusion (identified in the National Dialogue) and a real reform 
agenda in terms of the economy. Furthermore, within the FoY platform, 
regional actors agreed to establish two committees for channelling their 
efforts through formal procedures which were to become important tools for 
                                                          
469 Interview of an EU diplomat, who is based in Yemen, Brussels, 02 August 2011 
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providing specific recommendations to the government of Yemen. The two 
committees were also granted the role of monitoring the implementation of 
these recommendations, as part of an institutionalised benchmarking 
system, created by technocrats, according to which the EU – GCC (and 
other interested) governments were going to assess new financial 
contributions470. The working committee on Economy and Governance was 
co-chaired by Germany and the UAE471 and the working committee on 
Justice and Rule of Law, was co-chaired by the Netherlands and Jordan472. 
This allocation of chairs is compatible with the GCC approach to heavily 
engage on an equal basis with the EU in promoting common goals in 
Yemen, but in a broader context rather than at bi-regional EU-GCC level. 
The GCC states preferred to engage through a multilateral manner in order 
to evade the pressure put on them during inter-regional meetings, by the EU. 
The broader context of interaction on the Yemeni situation allowed the Gulf 
rulers to balance the role of the EU and its member states with the 
participation of other players which were not as eager as the EU to see 
Yemen becoming a member state of the GCC To the extent that the EU was 
becoming a dominant player attempting to impose a non-acceptable 
solution, the GCC states agreed to lighten their stance on multilateral 
approaches and engage in fora in which they committed themselves 
regarding their foreign policies. However, this concession of sovereignty 
could also be read as instrumental, rather than a genuine interest in a 
multilateral response to Yemen (as the case of the EU appears to be), as will 
be explained later in this chapter. Moreover, it should be highlighted that 
there was a clear division of labour between the GCC and the EU. The GCC 
states refrained from getting involved with delicate political issues, which 
                                                          
470 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of Yemen”,  
24 September 2010, Retrieved on 31 August 2011 from http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/central-
content-pdfs/middle-east/friends-of-yemen-statement  
471 Friends of Yemen, “Final Report by Co-Chairs United Arab Emirates and Federal Republic of Germany”, 
September 2010, Retrieved on 31 August 2011 from http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/central-
content-pdfs/middle-east/foy-working-group-final-report 
472 Friends of Yemen Working Group on Justice and Rule of Law, “Final Report”, September 2010. Retrieved on 
31 August 2011 from http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/central-content-pdfs/middle-east/foy-jrol-
working-group-final-report 
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included corruption, rule of law, de-radicalisation and border security, which 
were included in the second working group. These were norms and values 
which were much more compatible with the EU and its self-image. 
After the crisis in 2011 erupted, because of the popular demand for 
President Saleh’s resignation the EU-GCC did not form any new committee 
or forum that would have the role of coordinating policies of all interested 
parties. Even though the urgent and extraordinary situation in Yemen may 
have not led to the set up of a new body, as was the case with the Contact 
Group on Libya473, it can be suggested that this was because the GCC 
states did not want to negotiate their leading role, especially since this role 
had already been recognised by the EU. Consequently, even though the EU 
and the GCC did not initiate the formation of a new committee for Yemen 
this was not counterproductive to the enhancement of the EU-GCC 
relationship. On the contrary, there seemed to be an agreed division of 
labour, according to which the leading role of the GCC was reaffirmed. 
During the non-institutionalised, yet constant, communication between the 
two sides, the joint interests of the EU and the GCC to end the crisis in 
Yemen in a way that addressed their security concerns were promoted 
through a plan that accommodated the transition to a democratic and 
inclusive political system as envisaged by the EU but also in a way that it 
respected the autonomy of the GCC states in their region. The fact that the 
EU recognised this primacy of the GCC states was the most significant 
element though. Due to this, the GCC re-engaged with the EU at an inter-
regional level, since this approach was reinforcing the self-image of the GCC 
states as a leading force in the region.              
 
 
 
                                                          
473 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The London Conference on Libya, 28/03/2011, Retrieved on 31 August 
2011 from http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/mena/libya/london-conference-on-libya/  
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Long-term approach and flexibility 
It is important to remember that both the EU and the GCC, due to the 
character of the long-lasting situation in Yemen, had allocated resources and 
shaped approaches on a long-term perspective to deal with the challenges 
arising in this country of the Arabian Peninsula. The EU had included Yemen 
in institutionalised multi-year programmes both for promoting political 
reforms and for granting economic aid for the development of the country, as 
shown in an earlier section of this chapter. For the GCC states, Yemen was 
one of the top priorities as shown in their donations in external development 
aid474 and, since 2002, Yemen had participated in some of the GCC bodies 
and agencies. From the perspective of development policies, Yemen's 
participation in these bodies is important475. What is more significant, is that 
both regional organisations and their member states have been flexible in 
organising and participating in various regional and international fora for 
Yemen, despite the fact that the rationale behind the participation in these 
fora has been different as already discussed.  
In the peak of the uprising in Yemen, and in the rest of the Arab world, the 
GCC states searched for a new, more visible and dynamic role in regional 
politics, as seen in the case of Yemen, as well as in the cases of Libya, Syria 
and Bahrain. The EU responded very positively to the new expectations of 
the GCC states, especially in relation to the case of Yemen. Very quickly the 
EU and GCC began coordinating their actions by establishing direct 
channels of communication between Ashton and her assistants on the one 
hand and the GCC Foreign Ministers and the GCC Secretary General on the 
other hand476. Coordination at the level of ambassadors in Sanaa was also 
established with regular meetings and the participation of the EU, the GCC, 
                                                          
474 Development Assistance donated by the GCC member states represents almost half of the overall assistance 
pledged for Yemen for the years 2007-2011; Department of International Development of OECD, Country 
'Evaluation of DFIP Country Programmes: Yemen', Evaluation Report EV706, February 2010, p.8 
475 European Institute for Research on Euro-Arab Cooperation, “The Gulf Cooperation Council”, Retrieved on 29 
August 2011 from http://www.medea.be/en/countries/arab-world-general/gcc-gulf-cooperation-council/  
476 That was the conclusion of interviews with EU and GCC officials who had immediate access to information 
regarding the EU-GCC cooperation on dealing with the latest Yemeni crisis. 
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the member states of the two regional organisations, as well as the USA 
ambassador477. Moreover, high positioned diplomats of the EEAS were in 
constant communication (and in an absolute coordination) with the GCC 
Secretariat General, and the EU  made  sure that its policy of granting the 
GCC states a primary role in the Yemeni crisis was clearly conveyed to 
them478. That was an unambiguous change in EU policy which had tried 
initially to engage the GCC states in EU-constructed approaches and plans. 
During the crisis, even when there were some minor reservations by EU 
member states, the EU followed the GCC recommendations as EU member 
states felt that the GCC was ‘the most appropriate body for putting pressure 
on Saleh at this point’479. In addition, during their meetings with Yemeni 
representatives, European diplomats urged them to work closely with the 
GCC as the EU saw no other way of ending the crisis in their country480. 
 
The central role of governments in a multilateral context 
The multidimensional character of the EU-GCC relationship in dealing with 
the security and economic situation in Yemen was limited, especially in 
reference to the involvement of actors from different levels of the political 
and social layers of the two parties. Not many actors from different layers 
could get involved because of the critical situation in Yemen. There has been 
limited, if at all existent, presence of business communities with substantive 
work, unlike the EU-GCC business communities joint projects as shown in 
the previous chapter. It was extremely difficult, therefore, to identify any 
synergies of this kind in the case of Yemen. In the case of NGOs and other 
                                                          
477 The fact that these coordination meetings were taking place were also confirmed on 22 May 2011, when the 
UAE Embassy was sieged in Sanaa by Saleh's supporters. It was revealed that the GCC Secretary General, 
GCC member states and EU, USA and UK Ambassadors in Yemen were holding a meeting for coordinating 
their actions. The incident was confirmed by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs; UAE MoFA, 'Abdullah Bin 
Zayed urges Yemeni government to take immediate measures to ensure security of the UAE embassy in 
Sana'a', Retrieved on 29 August 2011 from http://www.mofa.gov.ae/MOFA_English/portal/5abfdde7-930b-4c81-
901f-299322dfcc29.aspx 
478 Interview with EU diplomat working for a member state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, 30 March 2011 
479 From information received by all EU member states during a meeting in Brussels, 26 May 2011, by the EEAS 
regarding the Yemeni crisis. Information was gathered and confirmed by various interviewees. 
480 Interview with a diplomat working for EU institutions, Brussels, 28 July 2011 
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development actors, joint work was also limited, but this seemed to work in 
favour of the common EU-GCC interests. NGOs and other organisations 
based in the EU were promoting, among others, reforms and developments 
in the fields of good governance whereas the GCC actors were investing in 
infrastructures and were hesitant in raising issues which involved  regional 
sensitivities due to the broader political context481. Thus, there was a clear 
division of labour towards common goals between EU and GCC players in 
this sense. This is the reason why even though technocrats from the two 
regions were not in constant communication or cooperation with visible joint 
outcomes, it has been suggested that there has been a common 
understanding and approach regarding the definition of the responsibilities of 
each actor. This division of labour resembles the division of labour identified 
in the GC and FoY fora. The EU promotes its values that will shape the 
internal environment of Yemen with long lasting effects while the GCC states 
focused on concrete results. Even though this approach did not directly 
engage the GCC states in a normative process as the EU would wish to do, 
it nevertheless reinforced the (self-) image of the EU as a normative player, 
at the multilayered level. Not only did EU bureaucrats promote EU values but 
non-state actors, such as NGOs did as well. 
The central role for shaping policies rested with the governments of the EU 
and the GCC countries, even within the framework of regional and 
international organisations and processes, which were preferred by the 
GCC, in contrast to bi-regional approaches, for the reasons that have 
already been explained. As a result, the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Arab Development Fund (ADF), 
and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) were asked to get greatly involved 
in the development programmes of Yemen. The EU and GCC governments 
assumed the leading role in engaging these organisations through the 
                                                          
481 Yemen was the only democratic, theoretically at least, political system and thus the GCC states were not 
legitimised in articulating demands for democratic reforms in Yemen, without provoking reaction both in Yemen’s 
internal political structure (against foreign intervention from Arab neighbours in the complex political context of 
the region)  and in the GCC states themselves.  
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organisation of regional and international fora. The UAE even submitted to 
the OECD a full report in 2011 for the development aid that it offered to 
Yemen482. The cooperation of the abovementioned organisations has 
produced a specific programme for water projects in Yemen, with the 
participation of GCC states, in a field were Germany and the Netherlands 
had already invested heavily483. Moreover, the CG and the FoY platforms 
were established which engaged EU and GCC member states as well as 
other international actors in channelling economic and technical assistance 
to Yemen, towards specific economic and political goals. Consequently, 
there was a spillover effect of this relationship, but not in relation to non-state 
actors as in the first case study of this thesis, but rather in relation to regional 
(development) organisations. This engagement of multilateral organisations 
has been central in the normative agenda of the EFP, as a way of diffusing 
responsibility and in engaging actors in a way that they adhere to rules of the 
game, composed of reforms and political conditionality, which coincide with 
the EU norms. 
The multidimensional character of the relationship from a thematic 
perspective has not been easy to spot either. Of course, there was a 
coexistence of issues of development and security, as has been explained. 
Therefore, from this point of view there was a broader multidimensional 
comprehensive approach. Nevertheless, beyond this ‘economics meets 
politics’ approach the relationship did not meet more complicated or more 
diversified levels of cooperation. For example, while EU member states and 
GCC member states (in coordination with NATO forces) launched a joint 
military action in Libya484, in the case of the EU operation in the Gulf of 
                                                          
482 Smith, Kimberly, United Arab Emirates Statistical Reporting to the OECD development assistance committee, 
OECD Development Co-operation Directorate, March 2011, Paris. Retrieved on 17 July 2011 from 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/0/47283752.pdf 
483 UAE offered a significant percentage of its US$130m to Yemen in 2009 on water projects. Germany offered 
US$26.9m and the Netherlands US$13.5m; OECD/DAC Secretariat and the World Water Council, “Donor 
Profiles on aid to water supply and sanitation”, November 2008, Retrieved on 17 July 2011 from 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/12/41752319.pdf 
484 After the uprising in Libya against Qaddafi in 2011, EU and GCC forces jointly launched military air 
operations, which proved beyond any doubt that the EU and the GCC have had the technical/ military capacity to 
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Aden, called ATALANTA485, the GCC did not offer any technical or any other 
support to the EU, within the scope of  formal cooperation. The EU and the 
GCC states did not sign any framework agreements for the participation of 
GCC forces in CSDP crisis management operations, despite the common 
economic and security interests of the two parties in the specific region486. 
The only positive exception was the cooperation with Oman, which provided 
its infrastructure and units of its royal navy participated in some operations. 
However even though the operation started in 2008, it was only in 2012 that 
Oman signed the official agreement for cooperation. 
 
Searching for the role of national approaches in regional policies 
As the case of Oman, in the ATALANTA operation, but more importantly the 
central roles of the UK and the KSA, have shown, the actions of national 
actors affect bi-regional cooperation. What remains to be evaluated is the 
direction in which the role of national policies pushes the relationship, 
undermining or advancing inter-regional understanding and cooperation. 
Their role in promoting interests, values and self-images is equally important. 
From an EU perspective, the member states had developed extensive 
national programmes in relation to the long-lasting threats emerging from the 
situation in Yemen, even though development aid is an area of competence 
of the European Commission, with Germany and the UK being the top two 
EU donors for Yemen. Between the years 2000-2008 Germany offered the 
21% of total donations to Yemen, with a total amount of US$553.7 million. A 
new commitment for €265m was made during the visit of the German 
                                                                                                                                                                   
work together. Therefore it was just a matter of a political decision for the two parties to cooperate on military 
grounds as well.  
485 In support of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1846 (2008) and 
1897 (2009), and in reaction to the high numbers of acts of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden, in the 
high seas opposite the Yemeni coast, the EU decided in the European Council of 8th December 2008 to deploy 
military forces in the area, with the use of EU naval forces. Details can be found on the website of the Operation 
(http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/, last accessed: 10/09/2011). 
486 Interview with EU diplomat, working for EU member state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 26 June 
2011 
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Foreign Minister to Yemen in March 2012487. The UK has been contributing 
approximately £46.7m per year but committed to almost double this amount 
by 2015, thus becoming the top EU donor in the country488. France, the 
Netherlands, Italy and Germany have been promoting projects in 
accordance to EU priorities in the country. France funded a Democratic 
Governance and Security Project in association with the EU Delegation 
office in Sanaa489. The Netherlands, apart from heavy investments in water 
projects, also supported projects on human rights, gender, elections, justice, 
public financial management and the Integrated Framework for the 
promotion of trade and export490. Finland and the Czech Republic worked on 
governance and gender, Denmark on elections and Italy on sustainable 
development491. 
However, the political role of the UK should be highlighted. Within the 
framework of FoY, the European Commission allocated €15 million under 
the Instrument for Stability Counter Terrorism package for Yemen for 
security and law enforcement reforms, for development of the legal 
framework and criminal justice system and for the prevention of 
radicalisation as well as conflict prevention. Nevertheless, Yemen’s national 
counter-radicalisation strategy which was going to be presented to the FoY 
meeting in KSA in February 2011 was prepared by the UK. Moreover, the 
UK also acted as a liaison player between the EU on the one hand and the 
GCC and/or the Yemeni government on the other hand492. It became 
obvious that the role of the UK was fundamental for all the initiatives for 
                                                          
487 Saudi Gazette, 'Germany pledges €265m in aid to Yemen', 12 March 2012, Sana'a, Retrieved on January 
2013 from http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20120312119508 
488 Smith, Kerry and Poole, Lydia, “Yemen aid factsheet 1995-2009”, Trends in overseas development 
assistance, Global Humanitarian Assistance, Development Initiatives, 2010, Somerset, United Kingdom 
489 UNDP, “Local Governance Support Project (LGSP) - Project Fact Sheet”, Last Modified on 15/03/2011, 
Retrieved on 16 August 2011 from http://www.undp.org.ye/governance_59817.php  
490 Yemeni Embassy in The Netherlands, 'Yemen - The Netherlands 30 years of partnership and cooperation", 
Retrieved on 17 July 2011 from http://yemen-embassy.nl/Article.aspx?id=cdddfb23-f665-40a8-a6a5-
df997c969bef 
491 UNDP, “UNDP Partnerships”, Retrieved on 17 July 2011 from http://www.undp.org.ye/partnerships_1.php 
492 Information gathered in interviews with diplomats working of the EU institutions and member states, based in 
Brussels and Yemen, 2010 and 2011. 
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Yemen and it was in most ways independent from the EU humanitarian and 
development aid to the country. In this respect, it is worth noting that during 
the First CG which took place in London in November 2006, the British 
pledging statement praised the constructive role of the GCC and the OECD, 
but it failed to mention even once the contribution or the role of the EU or 
that of the European Commission493.   
However, the role of EU member states was not contradictory to the norms, 
values, policies and actions of the EU as a whole. On the contrary, this 
division of labour between the EU institutions and the British diplomatic 
service has helped the cooperation of the EU with the GCC. During the 
Yemeni crisis in 2011 the EEAS and the EU member states’ actions were 
also well coordinated and targeting at the same goals. Both the EU and its 
member states were sending identical messages to the Yemeni actors of this 
crisis494. The only public differentiation was the call of the French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppe, for Saleh to step down at a time (March 2011) 
when the EU was still encouraging dialogue between the government, the 
movement of the students and the opposition495. This French position was a 
single case of deviation which did not influence the overall outcome of the 
intra-EU discussions for Yemen; the GCC were still in charge of the situation 
and the EU kept sending clear messages that it was willing to follow their 
lead in terms of the way and the speed the GCC had chosen to deal with the 
new situation in Yemen.  
From a GCC perspective, internal cohesiveness was not as clear as in the 
case of the EU. Even though in the case of development aid all GCC states 
                                                          
493 Thomas, Gareth, “Donor Pledging Statement”, 16 November 2006, Retrieved on 18 July 2011 from 
http://www.yemencg.org/library/after/pledging%20statements/Statement%20of%20UK.pdf 
494 Interview with an EU diplomat, Brussels, July 2011. The diplomat revealed that in July 2011 a high-ranking 
German diplomat visited Riyadh and Sanaa where he conveyed the message for a peaceful transition of power 
in line with the GCC initiative. In May 2011, the Yemeni Ambassador was summoned in the Belgian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, where the Belgian diplomats reiterated the common EU stance in favour of the GCC plan.  
495 European Council, ‘Council conclusions on Yemen’, 3076th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 21 March 2011; 
Reuters, “Top Yemeni generals back democracy protesters”, 21 March 2011. Retrieved on 31 July 2011 from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/21/us-yemen-idUSTRE72K1RJ20110321 
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had been generous with Yemen, (including Kuwait which had its reservations 
at first because of the Yemeni stance during the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait in 
1991, in support of Saddam Hussein), in the more political issues the GCC 
states did  not always follow a single policy. On the contrary, the KSA 
leadership developed a bilateral approach in dealing with the situation in 
Yemen which in most cases was either non-aligned or contradictory to EU 
and GCC approaches. The main interest of the KSA was to secure that its 
porous borders with Yemen would not be trespassed by armed Yemenis, 
and especially the Huthis rebels, so that the Yemeni and KSA forces could 
focus on dealing with AQAP496. These goal was pursued by direct 
communication of the KSA government with the Yemeni government in the 
framework of a military/security KSA-Yemen joint committee which reviewed 
possible military targets. As admitted by the Saudis, Saleh took advantage of 
this committee and tried to manipulate it in order to weaken his political 
opponents497. Furthermore, the Saudi government granted funds to the 
Yemeni government directly and outside the scope of the platforms of the 
international community which attach political conditionality to aid. Even 
though KSA and Yemen officials were meeting twice a year in order to 
review the developments of these projects498, the funds donated to Yemen 
were seen by the Saudi government as a commitment to the war against 
AQAP and thus hardly negotiable. Moreover, the KSA establishment of a 
wide network of KSA-loyal tribal leaders which were systematically paid by 
the Saudi government499  aimed at giving the KSA the upper hand in security 
matters, even within the Yemeni territory. 
  
                                                          
496 Wikileaks, ' Saudi Arabia: Renewed Assurances on Satellite Imagery ', US Embassy in Riyadh cable, 
Created: 07 February 2010, Retrieved on 10 September 2011 from 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10RIYADH159.html; 
497 Ibid 
498 Wikileaks, ' Saudi Arabia: General Jones ', US Embassy in Riyadh cable, Created: 12 January 2010, 
Retrieved on 10 September 2011 from http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10RIYADH90.htm 
499 Interview of an EU diplomat, who is based in Yemen, Brussels, 02 August 2011 
 EU-GCC cooperation on the Yemeni crises  
Angelos Lenos  p.247 
 
Due to this approach, the informal tribal system of the country was reinforced 
outside the formal state structures, the Yemeni government created an 
alternative, autonomous channel of receiving external funds, and funds were 
associated with KSA bilateral aims (in security) and not with the policies of 
reform as articulated at the multilateral fora. Therefore, the political reforms 
promoted by the international community under the leadership of the EU and 
its member states were seriously undermined. Saleh felt less obliged to 
follow the international community’s directions for reforms, as he could play 
the security card to extract money from the royal palace in Riyadh, while at 
the same time tribal leaders were empowered, without any control or 
preconditions. Consequently, different power poles were created in the 
country and there was even less effective control by the state authorities. 
This approach was indeed compatible with Saudi interests as well as values, 
since tribalism has been part of the political process in the Arabian 
Peninsula. The KSA was also intervening in the internal affairs of another 
state in the name of pan-Arabic solidarity against terrorism, but in reality it 
was empowering a favourable leadership in dealing with regional threats and 
in safeguarding KSA’s security, both in terms of ideology (against doctrines 
of radical Islam) and in terms of actual attacks by militias. Overall, the 
autonomy via the stability and security of the GCC states were prioritised 
over a more long-term and comprehensive approach to the Yemeni crisis. 
Consequently, by applying the identified model of Arab foreign policies 
(seeking autonomy in their three environments), GCC states undermined the 
work of multilateral processes, despite the fact that they all agreed on the 
same goals of bringing stability and development to Yemen.  
In the case of donation allocations, as well as in the case of the GCC plan 
for a transitional government of national unity, Qatar appeared impatient with 
President Saleh and withdrew its support of relevant projects500. The same 
frustration was expressed by Oman as well, blaming the Yemeni government 
of being too slow to act on donation absorption and suggesting corruption 
                                                          
500 Interview with a GCC diplomat, Abu Dhabi, 14 April 2011 
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regarding these funds501. During the youth upheaval, the KSA was directly 
influenced by the situation in Yemen and consequently pursued the lead in 
dealing with the challenges that emerged. It is for this reason that some EU 
member states expressed the view that the role of the KSA was 
‘indispensable’ for a joint EU-GCC action in solving the Yemeni crisis502. On 
the other hand, Qatar differentiated its approach from the GCC initiative for 
solving the crisis in Yemen. According to EU diplomats this is because Qatar 
had its own ambitions in the wider region and it was trying to make its 
presence felt after the events that had shaken the Middle East in 2011503. 
That is why even though the KSA has encouraged EEAS diplomats to be 
patient with the Yemeni president504, on 12 May 2011 the Qatari Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs circulated an announcement according to which Qatar 
withdrew from the GCC initiative to resolve the crisis in Yemen and that it 
was ‘forced to take [this decision] due to the procrastination and delay of 
signing the proposed agreement’505. Nevertheless, individual approaches 
from GCC states did not hamper the EU-GCC relationship, in the case of the 
youth uprising. 
 
The global and regional range of the partnership  
 Yemen’s situation is undoubtedly a case of regional and international 
interest. Yemen’s internal situation, both in terms of development as well as 
in terms of security, was seen in relation on the one hand, to the instability it 
could cause both to its neighbourhood with the influx of illegal immigrants 
and jihad warriors in the GCC states and beyond, and on the other hand in 
relation to the wider issue of combating terrorism, because of the existence 
                                                          
501 Wikileaks, ' GCC Membership Remains Beyond Yemen’s Grasp ', US Embassy in Sanaa cable, Created: 30 
December 2008, Retrieved on 10 September 2011 from http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08SANAA2061.html  
502 Interview with an EU diplomats, Brussels in June and July 2011 
503 Interview with EU diplomat, working for EU member state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 26 June 
2011  
504 Interviews with EU diplomats, from June to August 2011 
505 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, ‘Qatar Withdraws from GCC Initiative on Yemen’ Doha. 
12/05/2011. Retrieved on 25/05/2013 from http://english.mofa.gov.qa/Official_Statements.cfm?id=87 
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of power branches of Al Qaeda in Yemen. It was widely accepted among the 
political elites of the two regions (and beyond, namely the USA), that in 
Yemen the AQAP was well established and that it had set up training camps. 
Moreover, AQAP was coordinating with other branches of the Al Qaeda 
network, namely those in Maghreb and in Afghanistan/Pakistan. The 
concerns over the influence of the Yemeni case in the wider region’s security 
were systematically expressed by both European and Arab diplomats506, but 
it is noted that these concerns were also explicitly stated in a statement by 
Catherine Aston on 27July 2011. In the statement, the following was quoted: 
In my conversation [with Abu-Bakr Al Qibri, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Yemen] I have also made clear that the Yemeni 
people can no longer be subjected to the current 
political, economic and humanitarian crisis 
affecting Yemen, which also has serious regional 
and international implications507.   
It is for this reason that the EU and the GCC have tried to engage other 
players in tackling Yemeni’s challenges. Indeed the USA participated in 
regional and international fora concerning Yemen and supported the work 
done within these frameworks. They were also committed to long term 
approaches, even though US policymakers have admitted in discussions 
with the EU that their role was always focused on the military response 
against the AQAP threat in Yemen which they considered to be the most 
immediate threat to the country508.  Japan was also one of the donors for 
projects in Yemen, but on the political front it seemed to give priority and 
support to the role of the GCC, whose cooperation with the government of 
                                                          
506 This is the conclusion of a number of interviews with EU and GCC diplomats, during the research for this 
thesis. 
507 European Union, ‘Statement by the Representative Catherine Ashton after her meeting with Abu-Bakr AL 
Qibri, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Yemen’, A 298/11, 27 July 2011  
508 Interview with a European diplomat, working for EU institutions, 8 December 2010 
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Yemen seemed to be the most suitable approach509. Russia expressed its 
reservations with some political decisions taken by the EU (and the GCC 
states) regarding Yemen. Russian diplomats underlined the need to avoid 
any measures which gave the impression that the political steps taken by the 
government were dictated by the international community510.  
Consequently, despite the international interest in this issue and the opinions 
expressed by various parties during the international meetings for Yemen, it 
was widely accepted that the EU and the GCC member states were the ones 
leading the political process, by calling and hosting regional and international 
meetings, such as the CG and the FoY Ministerial Meetings. More 
importantly, there seemed to be a common understanding regarding the 
division of labour between the EU, the GCC states and the USA. The EU 
would initiate political reforms programmes, in a way compatible with the 
normative agenda of the EFP both in terms of EU values and perceptions 
regarding the promotion of democracy as well as in the diffusion of 
responsibility through multilateral engagement. The GCC would heavily 
invest in infrastructure avoiding projects on the ground with political 
implications with the Yemeni authorities511 in the name of the assistance 
provided because of their pan-Arabic stance, while their interests in 
development and security in Yemen (which would affect their own stability) 
were promoted simultaneously. The USA would concentrate on dealing 
directly with the security threats being posed by the actions of AQAP, 
allowing at the same time to the EU to keep its ‘civilian power’ posture 
unchallenged and to the GCC states to remain clear of any (Iranian) criticism 
of fighting groups of (radical) Islamists in cooperation with the ideological 
enemies of Islam. Therefore, there were regional and international 
                                                          
509 Ito, Hideki (Deputy Director General, Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan), Statement at the Pledge Session of the Yemen Consultative Group Meeting, November 16, 2006.  
510 Interview with a European diplomat, working for EU institutions, 8 December 2010 
511 Department of International Development of OECD, Country 'Evaluation of DFIP Country Programmes: 
Yemen', Evaluation Report EV706, February 2010, pp.8, 15 
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engagements, which were responding to the expectations and priorities of 
the EU and the GCC actors. 
 
 
 
The outcome of the joint EU-GCC actions 
Keeping in mind that a strategic partnership is not assessed only by the 
desires and the expectations of the partners but by the tangible outcomes of 
this partnership as well, it is important to sum up the result of EU-GCC 
cooperation in Yemen. 
First of all, there are two political fora that were established in order to 
coordinate policies and donations in Yemen; the Consultative Group (CG) 
and the Friends of Yemen (FoY). Within these frameworks, committees were 
established and technocrats and diplomats from different countries (but 
mainly the EU and the GCC) attempted to coordinate their actions and use 
the leverage of donations in order to convince Saleh to implement long-
awaited reforms in the country512. After the first CG meeting in 2006, GCC 
states and the Yemeni government introduced a technical committee in 
order to allocate GCC donations on specific projects, as identified in the 
Public Investment Plan (PIP). Moreover, it should be noted that the PIP was 
prepared by Yemeni authorities in view of the CG meeting in London and in 
a move on behalf of the government to: convince the aid donors that Yemen 
was setting clear priorities for the investments that it was receiving; show 
that it was working systematically for the better use of donations; and 
demonstrate that it was improving its aid absorption capabilities. Following 
the CG meeting in London, the Yemeni government issued a decree (March 
2007) calling for the establishment of Project Implementation Units (PIUs) in 
                                                          
512 Wikileaks, 'Donors call for RoYG participation in EITI, other Improvements in Business Environment', US 
Embassy in Sanaa cable, 20 January 2006, Retrieved on 10 September 2011 from 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06SANAA146.html 
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the Ministries of Electricity, Public Works, and Highways to follow the 
successful path achieved by other PIUs513. In the 3rd CG meeting, in April 
2009, donors commonly expressed their concerns regarding the slow pace 
of reforms of the Yemeni authorities. It is also interesting to note that during 
this meeting the GCC states pursued international coordination, even though 
they assumed a significant role regarding Yemen, on a bilateral basis514. 
Consequently, it can be suggested that the EU and the GCC were shaping 
the directions that the Yemeni government had to take in order to meet the 
criteria and the expectations of its aid donors. However, as discussed in 
these meetings, closer coordination between the GCC and non-GCC donor 
communities’ was still needed515. Indeed, coordination for advancing the 
effectiveness of the aid was a necessity especially in relation to the linkage 
of GCC aid flows with specific requests for the Yemeni government to 
introduce measures and reforms516 . 
Beyond the joint programme for water supply in Sanaa that was agreed and 
was put forward with the constructive engagement of the EU and GCC 
member states, more visible results of  EU-GCC cooperation, especially in 
the political field, are  not as easy to find, due to two factors: the GCC 
preferred a multilateral framework of cooperation rather than  bi-regional ;  
and Saleh  manipulated  the critical situation of the country in terms of 
security in order to evade his commitments regarding reforms. It has been 
suggested that the GCC did not want to add pressure on Saleh and there 
were meetings in which the GCC states wanted to undermine the work of 
committees or other bodies and therefore they were represented by junior 
                                                          
513 The World Bank Group Sana’a Office, “Yemen Economic Update”, Spring 2007, Sanaa. Retrieved on 8 July 
2011 from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTYEMEN/News%20and%20Events/22262620/YEU_1Q07.pdf 
514 Wikileaks, 'ROYG claims it is committed to reform, removing fuel subsidies ', US Embassy in Sanaa cable, 
Created: 21 April 2009, Retrieved on 10 September 2011 from 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09SANAA716.html 
515 Wikileaks, 'Second Post-Consultative Group Follow-Up Meeting Held in Yemen ', US Embassy in Sanaa 
cable, Created: 11 February 2008, Retrieved on 10 September 2011 from 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08SANAA256.html  
516 Wikileaks, ' Riyadh meeting to challenge both GCC and Yemen ', US Embassy in Sanaa cable, Created: 23 
February 2010, Retrieved on 10 September 2011 from http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10SANAA380.html 
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diplomats or diplomats with no serious engagement with the specific 
issues517. Moreover, diplomats in the EU and the GCC states have 
questioned the genuine desire of the KSA to work in coordination with other 
players in the region in order to put pressure on President Saleh. Feeling 
that they were directly threatened by the situation in their neighbouring 
country, the Saudi leaders had developed their own distinctive channels of 
communication and their own mechanisms of exerting pressure on Saleh in 
order to drive the situation in the country in a direction which responded to 
Saudi needs and interests. The image of the EU in Yemen, due to its civilian 
means and its normative agenda, was not that of an actor who could provide 
immediate answers to the security concerns of the KSA. Thus, the Saudi 
leadership favoured more tangible results through bilateral channels, 
especially since the KSA felt comfortable dealing directly with the situation in 
Yemen, reinforcing a culture of autonomy when it came to national security 
interests. 
During the 2011 uprising in Yemen, however, the EU and the GCC 
presented a firmly co-sponsored proposal, initiated by the GCC, for peaceful 
power transfer from Saleh to a government of national unity. Despite the 
delay by Saleh to sign the agreement (original date was November 2011), 
this proposal did eventually lead to the desired power transfer in Yemen in 
February 2012. What is important for this thesis is that not only had the EU 
and the GCC states supported a concrete proposal which had been the only 
one that the opposing sides in Yemen were seriously considering, but that 
this produced tangible results. The GCC states (despite different approaches 
from Qatar in some cases) coordinated their actions regarding the popular 
uprisings in the Middle East, during the winter of 2011 because their sense 
of stability was threatened. They felt the need to act in a more regional 
manner in order to safeguard their self-interests in terms of security and 
stability, by ensuring the continuation of their internal political system, which 
                                                          
517 This is a conclusion based on interviews with EU diplomats and political analysts in Europe and the Gulf 
region. 
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has been based on their values and identities (state sovereignty, pursuit of 
autonomy in their three environments: national, regional and international, 
their versions of pan-arabism and Islamic identity), as well as to enhance 
their regional self-image as an important player in the Middle East. The 
concrete results in the Yemeni crises could be seen as a case which 
reflected the ability of the GCC states to provide collectively tangible 
outcomes, whilst taking into consideration the expectations, interests and 
values of other important regional and international actors 
 
A new window of opportunity 
The years that followed the events of 9/11were characterised by a trend of 
prioritising security and anti-terrorism policies. However, in the case of 
Yemen, joint EU-GCC actions towards Yemen, at a bi-regional level, did not 
change dramatically. Of course the EU and the GCC states funded projects 
and policies which were linked to tackling terrorism, but the refusal of the 
GCC states to accept Yemen’s participation in the EU-GCC Anti-Money 
Laundering workshops highlights the overall reluctance of the GCC to 
subscribe to EU approaches on Yemen. In 2008, the Middle East and North 
Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), which is a body for 
providing recommendations and assistance on tackling funding for terrorism, 
reported that Yemen was failing to meet the requirements for effecting 
implementation of the regionally accepted standards on the issue. Yemen 
had agreed to push forward reforms and in this respect it actually made 
some concrete steps. However, due to capacity constraints, it requested 
assistance and training from donor countries for their implementation518. The 
                                                          
518 Wikileaks, ' Yemen: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism ', US Embassy in Sanaa cable, Created: 
10 February 2019, Retrieved on 10 September 2011 from http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09SANAA259.html; 
Wikileaks, ' Update on Yemen’s Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Efforts ', US Embassy 
in Sanaa cable, Created: 22 February 2008, Retrieved on 10 September 2011 from 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08SANAA1568.html; Wikileaks, ' Yemen: ROYG Prepares for MENAFATF 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Finance Evaluation', US Embassy in Sanaa cable, Created: 15 
August 2009, Retrieved on 10 September 2011 from http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09SANAA1517.html 
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EU suggested that Yemen participate at the EU-GCC Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) workshops already in place, but the GCC did not welcome 
this suggestion. Moreover, the GCC states discouraged the EU from dealing 
with security threats in a regional context or from raising the issue during the 
EU-GCC AML workshop519. Therefore, it can be concluded that GCC actions 
towards a more comprehensive, bi-regional approach on the issue were not 
affected by the new, even more threatening, common concerns on the 
expansion of terrorism networks in Yemen in the 2000s, at least not to the 
extent that the EU was hoping for. While the internal stability of the GCC 
states was threatened by the movements of radical Islam, Gulf leaders felt 
that sacrificing their autonomy in foreign policy and their regional project, as 
well as their self-image as independent and growing in significance regional 
players, was more costly than the benefits a comprehensive regional 
approach could bring. In addition, the way anti-terrorism policies were 
phrased, targeting Islamic movements as the major source of threat for 
western values, added to the hesitation of the Gulf leaders, as they had to 
calculate the Muslim character of their societies. It was believed that any 
concessions in this area would provide an opportunity for the Iranians to 
accuse the GCC leadership of cooperation with the ideological enemies of 
Islam. 
In a dramatic change of course, the cataclysmic events of 2011 in the wider 
Middle East, with the collapse of the long established regimes under popular 
pressure, have driven the EU-GCC relationship into levels never met before 
in relation to common responses to the youth uprisings in various countries 
of the Middle East. The case of Yemen was a great example. As extensively 
described in previous paragraphs of this chapter, the uncertainty that 
emerged in this political environment fundamentally challenged the political 
                                                          
519 In a meeting in June 2009, diplomats of the the member states were informed about the EU attempts to 
convince the GCC to let Yemen attend the EU-GCC workshop on countering the financing of terrorism. In the 
end, the GCC had refused, to the great disappointment of the EU since this area was an obvious interest for the 
GC, the EU and Yemen, as conveyed by various interviewees. 
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and economic structures of the Arab states, including some of the GCC 
states (Bahrain, Oman and to lesser extent the KSA and Kuwait). Neither of 
the two parties, the EU and the GCC states, felt confident for unilaterally 
managing the new regional situation effectively, and both parties radically 
shifted approaches having realised the need for common approaches and 
coordinated actions. The autonomy of GCC states was indeed at stake and 
the legitimacy of the systems and the security of the states had been 
shaken. Thus, the two parties established regular communication 
exchanging information, assessments and ideas for dealing with the new 
developments520.  The EU granted a leading role to the GCC states in the 
case of the Yemeni crisis, but in exchange for this it managed to get GCC 
states seriously engaged, achieving a long standing objective of the EFP in 
the Gulf region. Due to these new developments, the interdependence of the 
two blocs became even more obvious and common interests were 
expressed effectively through joint initiatives and actions. 
 
Conclusions 
The situation in Yemen during the last decade and the way the EU has been 
tackling the threats emanating from this country and has attempted to 
engage the GCC states, reveals certain levels of co-existence between the 
more traditional approach of the EFP and elements of “strategic partnership”. 
Without question, the bilateral relations between Yemen and the EU fit the 
traditional approach of a very normative agenda, which calls for Yemeni 
authorities to adopt reforms in politics and economics in exchange for 
development assistance and financial aid. Political conditionality has been a 
central aspect of EU-Yemeni relations, which are characterised by a very 
asymmetrical power balance. Thus, the EU could promote interests and 
values in a way that it was reproducing its (self-)image as a normative 
                                                          
520 All EU diplomats who were contacted for the purposes of this thesis since March 2011, have confirmed that 
the EEAS was in constant communication with the GCC General Secretary and the FMs of GCC member states, 
coordinating their actions. 
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power, applying civilian tools even when dealing with serious security 
threats. 
The EU attempted, unsuccessfully, to include the GCC states in this model 
of addressing security concerns. The GCC states, and more specifically the 
KSA, faced even more serious and immediate threats arising from the 
situation in Yemen. The ideological and the hard security threats of the 
transnational movements of political Islam as well as the spillover effects of 
the deteriorating situation of a fragile state forced the GCC rulers to focus on 
concrete actions with immediate and short-term results. Having in mind the 
risks for their external borders and their internal stability the GCC states did 
not favour the normative approach of the EFP, either in terms of the reforms 
or the integration policy which the EU promoted based on its own 
(successful) experiences. 
What is more, the way the EU attempted to promote its own ideas in the 
Yemeni crisis, created frustration for the GCC states, since it was felt that 
the EU did not recognise their regional power status or their sensitivities 
(sovereignty and independence on regional and foreign policy making 
processes) on the matter. The GCC states had been engaging with 
developments in Yemen in the name of Pan-Arabism, but they clearly 
prioritised their autonomy when it came to internal stability, external security 
and regional integration. 
Nevertheless, the interdependence of the two parties was not seriously 
questioned. On the contrary, the EU knew that the participation of the GCC 
states in the solutions of the Yemeni problems was fundamental, while the 
GCC states welcomed EU interest and engagement since the EU could 
become a balancing actor; both in relation to the role of the USA but also in 
promoting reforms and adding certain levels of pressure to the Yemeni 
leadership. Yet, for reasons that had to do with the EU approach but also 
with GCC values and self-images, direct bi-regional cooperation proved to 
be problematic, at least until 2009. 
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Therefore, the EU and the GCC states felt more comfortable engaging at a 
broader, multilateral level. That approach corresponded with EU and GCC 
values and self-images. The EU promoted  multilateralism as a matter of 
principle in its in its foreign policy, believing this was the most effective way 
of achieving  shared responsibility and common norms that the parties 
engaged needed to follow. Needless to say these norms had to be compliant 
with EU values. The GCC states participated in the CG and FoY processes 
in order to evade EU pressure to cooperate bi-regionally and generally to 
create more balanced procedures, which would correspond to their own 
needs for autonomy. However, this divergence in the rationale behind the 
multilateral engagement also led to different understandings of the role of 
multilateral fora. The EU was eager to promote political conditionality and 
reshape the rules for political and economic games in Yemen, while the 
GCC states (and more specifically the KSA) treated them in a more 
instrumentalist manner, in order to assist their bilateral engagement, or to 
avoid adding political pressure on President Saleh directly.   
In these multilateral fora, the role of member states was crucial. The UK, 
especially, was very active and beyond the actual assistance it provided to 
the organisation of all these meetings, it facilitated the engagement of the 
GCC states, as the supranational institutions of the EU did not have a very 
central role and bilateral as well as multilateral levels were preferred over the 
bi-regional. The KSA, however, was less productive since it was seen as 
undermining this multilateral engagement, by promoting a direct Saudi-
Yemeni approach, either at a governmental or a tribal level. In any case, 
these fora produced multileveled and multidimensional cooperation, to the 
extent that a division of labour was been identified; the EU promoting the 
more normative agenda of reforms, while the GCC states focused on 
development projects through aid. 
The hesitation of the GCC states to engage with the EU at a bi-regional level 
weakened from the beginning of the youth uprisings in the Arab world after 
January 2011. The developments which changed the political map of 
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countries like Egypt, Tunisia and Libya meant the two parties became much 
more flexible in rearranging their priorities. Due to the magnitude of the 
challenge of regional security as well as the management of the new 
geopolitical situation, the GCC states prioritised their own stability and the 
EU showed sincere readiness to engage with its Gulf partners in order to 
pursue common objectives in a new partnership, characterised by a balance 
of power.  
By responding to the need of the GCC states through recognising their 
regional role the EU managed to push for some aspects of its normative 
agenda. The GCC states had the lead and provided a plan for ending the 
crisis in Yemen, taking into consideration the calls of the EU for a peaceful 
transition of power and the introduction of a democratisation process. The 
EU recognised GCC leadership on the issue and supported their plan. 
Based on a mutual understanding of the values and the self-images of the 
two parties, the EU and the GCC made use of the added value each party 
brought in the relationship and deepened their interdependency even further. 
As a result, it could be argued that to the extent that the independence of the 
two parties was becoming more visible and concrete, especially in terms of 
security (external for the EU and as a matter of regime stability in the GCC 
states) the two parties were becoming more flexible and willing to 
accommodate the interests, values and perception of the other side. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Introduction 
For the last twenty years, the EU and the GCC have been developing a 
relationship based on the Cooperation Agreement of 1989 which aimed at 
providing a contractual and institutional framework for the two partners. 
Since then the relationship of the two regions has deepened and widened. 
The spectrum of the fields of cooperation as well as the actors which were 
involved in bi-regional relations has expanded significantly. Moreover, the 
regional and international environment has added new impetus and it has set 
new challenges for the economic, technical and political cooperation of the 
EU and the GCC. The aim of the thesis was to explore the development of 
this relationship and to test whether this was transforming into a ‘strategic 
partnership’ between the EU and the GCC states, based on interests, values 
and (self-)images. By doing so, the thesis aimed at exploring the way EFP 
deals with emerging powers, taken into consideration the symmetry of power 
and the competition element of interests, values and perceptions beyond the 
level of cooperation between the parties. 
The thesis has reviewed the existing literature on the EU-GCC relationship, 
which has not been very extensive and it attempted to place it within the 
current academic work of the EFP. The study of the EFP demonstrated the 
sui generis character of the EU as an actor in international relations and it 
showed that its unique characteristics should be taken into consideration 
when analysing its foreign policy approaches. Following that, this thesis 
discussed the academic debate on the EU’s foreign policy tool of ‘strategic 
partnerships’. Once it had presented and evaluated the way the EU has 
conceptualised this term, working on the reports that were prepared by EU 
policymakers, either from the European Commission or from the EEAS, this 
thesis reviewed the studies on strategic partnerships from an academic 
perspective. It compared the various elements that were presented in the 
academic debate and the EU documents in order to bridge the two 
approaches and provide a single framework for addressing this concept. It 
has examined the rationales behind the establishment and the application of 
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this tool and it has presented the categorisation of ‘strategic partnerships’ 
based on values and interests. It has also highlighted the role of perceptions. 
For the needs of this research, a ‘strategic partnership’ has been identified 
as the symmetrical relationship of interdependency, where the role of the 
partner is pivotal for joint action and for producing concrete results in tackling 
common challenges and in promoting common interests, at bilateral, regional 
and global level. The partnership is a multilayered (and not a relationship of 
the ruling elites without popular support but rather with the engagement of 
different actors from the bureaucracies, the business communities, 
academics), multidimensional (from different dimensions of the interactions 
and most importantly in economics and security) and multileveled (aiming at 
bilateral, bi-regional and international levels) relationship. The character of 
the partnership is that of long-term institutionalised relationship, which is 
dynamic and flexible enough to adjust to changes in order to address the 
simultaneous cooperation and competition of the partners. Accommodation 
of the mutual understanding of the perceptions, the expectations and the 
values the partners invest in this relationship is a fundamental aspect of this 
partnership, as it creates the context in which interests are shaped and 
pursued. 
In order to test the suggested methodological framework and the way EFP 
has been engaging emerging powers, the application of the tool of ‘strategic 
partnership’ has been explored in two multileveled, multidimensional and 
multilayered cases: first, the economic relations of the EU and the GCC 
states, having as a focal point the negotiations for the establishment of a 
Free Trade Area as well as the assistance to the regional (economic) 
integration of the GCC states; and second, the cooperation of the EU and the 
GCC in dealing with the Yemeni crises, focusing on the meetings of the 
Consultative Group for Yemen, the Friends of Yemen forum and the joint 
reactions to the youth uprising in Yemen in 2011. The ambition of this thesis 
was to test the role of different actors, in different cases from different 
aspects of this relationship, putting emphasis on the cooperation of the two 
partners in the fields of economy and politics, including security, taking into 
consideration the unique character of EFP, which was placed in the context 
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of economic and political symmetry and interdependence. These cases were 
selected as they addressed issues from a broader range of bi-regional 
interactions and they helped to assess the actions of the two partners not 
only within their own boundaries but also their impact on the wider regional 
and international environment. They also facilitate the evaluation of interests, 
values and (self-) images in cases where the symmetrical power balance 
between the EU and the GCC sets new limits to the leverage and the 
expectations of the two sides. 
In this concluding chapter, the empirical findings of this research in relation to 
the two case studies will be presented systematically and comparatively, in 
relation to the central research questions. The chapter will then provide the 
major conclusions of this research and will address the main hypothesis, 
namely that, if the EU and the GCC states share interests and grand goals to 
the extent that these are prioritised by the EU and its member states, then 
value-driven differences are subordinated to interests and as a result (i) the 
EU and the GCC states enhance their relationship towards a “strategic 
partnership” and (ii) the EU’s (self-) image as a foreign policy actor is 
weakened in terms of its normative (self-)image and enhanced in terms of its 
effectiveness as a ‘strategic partner’ in a multipolar and interdependent 
world. If this is the case, the fact that the two parties have not officially 
declared an existing ‘strategic partnership’ is due to reasons that are either 
related to their interests or their perceptions and not the values of the two 
parties. Therefore, the image of the EU as an effective foreign policy actor, 
and a useful partner in the multipolar global setting, is not hindered by its 
value-driven language but by its ability to adapt to the new realities of the 
international system. 
Following this there will be some reflection on what the main findings mean 
for the theoretical framework employed in the thesis and the implications and 
limitations of this research in relation to the wider academic discussion on 
the EFP with reference to the rationales behind the ‘EU’s strategic 
partnerships’, the elements and the categories of this notion and they way it 
has affected the shaping of EFP in the Middle East. This chapter, and the 
thesis, will end with suggestions on possible future approaches of the study 
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of the EU-GCC relationship which could provide the academic community 
with a deeper sense of understanding of how the EU has applied ‘strategic 
partnerships’ in its relations with emerging powers.  
 
The Research Questions: Main Empirical Findings 
This section will address the research questions which were constructed 
from a review of the EFP literature and the literature on ‘strategic 
partnerships’. The definition of ‘strategic partnership’ that was proposed 
introduced a multidimensional strand and provided a platform to 
accommodate the role of non-state actors from various fields within the 
societies of the two parties. It also highlighted the symmetry of power 
balance between the partners and the growing level of interdependency, 
which call for flexibility from the EU side, compared to the more traditional 
approaches of the EFP. In addition, it highlighted the role of perceptions 
beyond that of interests and values.  
 
From supremacy to symmetry 
The EU-GCC relationship started in the context of supremacy for the EU 
because of its economic development established on a knowledge-based 
model, the progress of its regional integration and the relative security that 
the collapse of the socialist regimes brought to Europe. On the contrary, the 
GCC states experienced security weaknesses because of the role of Iraq 
and Iran in the region while their economy was solely dependent on oil 
revenues, which decreased in the 1990s. In this context, the EU and the 
GCC were forming common interests in exporting products from the EU to 
the GCC states, in the transfer of technical assistance for regional integration 
from Europe to the Gulf region and for further advancing their cooperation in 
economics and politics, since the GCC states treated the EU as a less 
aggressive actor in the region, compared to Iran, Iraq and the USA. Against 
this background, the EU applied a more traditional EFP approach and as a 
dominant player aimed at exporting its on model of economic development 
and regional integration, while the GCC states had found a new player who 
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could balance their regional and international environments in a way that 
their autonomy was increased, either by counter-balancing the other actors 
or more importantly by assisting their own regional project. It is important to 
remember that this project was initiated indeed for creating a third pole in the 
region, against the dominance of Iraq and Iran. Thus, references to the 
values and norms of the EU in the Cooperation Agreement of 1989 were 
accommodated, especially since the GCC states recognised the primacy of 
the EU in regional integration projects. 
At the beginning of the twenty first century, the GCC states entered a phase 
in which they were thriving in terms of economy and due to this, they were 
becoming more confident and assertive in their foreign policies, either in 
relation to the EU or in dealing with the crises in Yemen. The negotiating 
power of the EU was weakened, also because of the developing relations of 
the GCC states with emerging powers and markets in Asia. Nevertheless, for 
the longest part of the decade between 2001 and 2011, the EU shaped its 
foreign policy in the Gulf region, based on its normative (self-)image and 
agenda. Thus the EU aimed at exporting its neoliberal economic agenda, 
including through political and societal reforms, as part of the FTA talks while 
it was encouraging the GCC states to adopt its own model of regional 
integration in order to deal with the challenging situation in Yemen. This 
stance of the EU was firmly rejected by the GCC states, since they prioritised 
national sovereignty and non-intervention when it came to their internal 
political and economic structures as well as regional autonomy, in relation to 
Yemen. 
 
A relationship of interdependency 
From the very beginning of the relationship the two parties shared a sense of 
interdependency. Beyond commercial interests, the EU needed to enhance 
its role as a regional organisation, both by exporting its model (reinforcing its 
normative self-image) and by assisting the shaping of other regional 
organisations (enhancing the legitimacy of regional projects, like itself, in the 
global system). The GCC states looked for assistance in their own regional 
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project and for balancing their external environments by engaging a civilian 
foreign policy actor, which was of no threat. Therefore, the self-images and 
perceptions of each party were responding to the needs of the other, 
reinforcing the level of interdependency and creating further interest for inter-
regional cooperation. In the post-2001 years, the GCC states promoted more 
eagerly their diversification projects in order to create sustainable 
development and tackle challenges to long-term stability and internal 
autonomy, as well as their further regional integration. The EU role, thus, 
became even more central providing added value to this relationship. 
However, while the EU was aiming at exporting its norms in order to tackle 
the ‘rentier state’ inefficiencies through reforms, the GCC states were 
interested in updating and reinforcing this model. They were seeking to 
import know-how and technology without political conditionality attached. In 
the case of Yemen, the engagement of GCC states was an obvious objective 
of EFP. The EU saw the role of the GCC states as pivotal in addressing the 
security and development risks, at the same time the Gulf rulers identified 
the situation in Yemen as a direct threat to themselves, both in terms of 
security (by the actual attacks of AQAP in the region) and in terms of 
ideology (the societal structure and economic models of the GCC states 
were discredited; their devotion to religion and their application of Islam was 
challenged by the doctrines of radical Islam; and the ideology of pan-Arabism 
was suffering due to the great divergences between the standard of livings of 
the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula). The way, however, that EU 
policymakers attempted to impose on the GCC states their own 
understanding of the best solutions to the risk of Yemen becoming a failed 
state, provoked the reluctance of the GCC states to engage with the EU, 
since GCC leaders were rejecting the idea of the integration of Yemen in the 
GCC. It was only in 2011 that the GCC and the EU built upon their 
interdependency, and that was when the EU acknowledged a level of 
primacy for the role of the GCC states, and made compromises when it 
came to the normative aspect of the GCC initiative of 2011. As a result, it can 
be suggested that both sides have seen each other as a ‘strategic partner’. 
The EU has become a strategic partner in economic diversification and the 
regional integration process of the GCC states, as well as in terms of having 
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their role as a leading regional actor recognised by major global actors. On 
the other hand, the role of the GCC states for stability in the region has been 
fundamental for the EU. 
 
From shared interests to joint actions 
For most of the history of the EU-GCC relationship and despite the fact that 
common interests were broadly defined and the two sides had agreed on the 
wider areas in which they wished to expand their cooperation, the actual 
goals and approaches were not precisely identified leaving constructive 
ambiguity to prevail. When common interests had a solid shape, 
accommodating the needs and expectations of the two sides, it was more 
probable that the partners were committed in a constructive approach. In 
addition, when they did not engage in a power struggle they could actually 
provide concrete results. These are the cases of transferring knowledge on 
regional integration processes in the Gulf area and of having a commonly 
accepted plan for a peaceful power transfer in Yemen. Due to the superiority 
of the EU in regional building processes, its suggestions on the matter were 
not challenged, despite the fact that the EU was following a supranational 
model while the GCC states preferred an intergovernmental approach. In the 
case of Yemen, the GCC provided a plan, whose very specific terms did not 
fully comply with EU norms and values. However, the EU supported the plan, 
providing at the same time a primary role to GCC states in this crisis. The 
fact that the EU acknowledged a primary role for the GCC, which was 
seeking recognition for its growing (regional) significance provided the 
necessary incentives for the GCC states to engage in a constructive 
cooperation with the EU in the Yemeni crises. This meant that the long-term 
objective of EFP in relation to the GCC states assuming responsibility (in a 
broader context compatible with the EU norms) was achieved. In the case of 
the FTA, which has been the central point of reference since the inception of 
the relationship, the tangible economic benefits of the agreement have not 
been widely known. It is striking that despite the political weight attached to 
the FTA talks, the benefits of this agreement are yet unidentified, or at least 
not known to most of the players involved. Therefore the parties are less 
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incentivised to negotiate values and norms. Therefore, to the extent that the 
EU and the GCC have had clear objectives, they have worked their way 
towards a strategic partnership, despite divergences in values and 
perceptions. As a result, in order to advance their partnership, the EU and 
the GCC need to go beyond the identification of broader areas in which they 
would like to see more comprehensive cooperation, and clearly point out 
specific targets with tangible benefits for the two regions. In this respect the 
JAP is a move in the right direction, since it was the first document to identify 
fourteen different areas of bi-regional cooperation and to place them under 
the same institutional umbrella. However, even with the JAP it is not clear 
what the desired outcome will be in terms of concrete actions. 
 
A multilayered, multidimensional and multileveled relationship 
What became very obvious in this research was the fundamental role of non-
state actors. The business communities of the two regions developed their 
own rich dynamics of cooperation, despite the problems in the relationship, 
especially in the earlier years of bi-regional cooperation when the GCC 
states were not institutionally ready to engage seriously in inter-regional 
negotiations. The joint actions of the businessmen from Europe and the Gulf 
highlighted the significant role that the different actors from different layers 
can have as driving forces towards a deeper relationship, by enhancing 
economic interdependency (through joint projects) and by requests for 
measures to be taken by the governments which  facilitate  bi-regional 
cooperation. At the same time, direct communications and exchange of ideas 
created a greater level of mutual understanding about the values, the needs 
and the perceptions of each side. In the case of Yemen, due to the nature of 
the challenges, the role of non-state actors was minimal. On the contrary, it 
was multilateral organisations and bodies that were more active. As a spill-
over effect of the lack of mutual understanding between the EU and the GCC 
states in most of the time during the years between 2001 and 2011, a 
broader approach was preferred. This broader engagement of actors was 
compatible with the normative agenda of the EFP, which aimed at diffusing 
responsibilities to various actors through their commitments within the 
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framework of multilateral cooperation. In the specific case of Yemen, the 
level of strategic cooperation within the multilateral frameworks can be 
identified in the division of labour between the EU and the GCC states, which 
reflects the priorities, self-images and values of the two sides. The EU has 
focused on the promotion of reforms, attaching political conditionality clauses 
to aid, whilst the GCC states engaged the Yemeni leadership through 
various benchmarks without applying direct conditionality. However, it should 
be added that to some extent the KSA has used this multilateral framework 
in a very instrumental way in order to advance the objectives of its bilateral 
engagement with Yemen. In any case, this relationship has been advancing 
at the bilateral, bi-regional and international levels, confirming that this is a 
dialogue of interests, values and perceptions that go beyond the ruling elites 
of the two regions. As this thesis has demonstrated, the role of non state 
actors (especially that of the business communities) has been significant in 
promoting the inter-regional cooperation verifying that a ‘strategic 
partnership’ is not merely made up of interactions between the ruling 
(political) elites.  
 
Long-term and institutionalised relationship, yet flexible and adaptive? 
The fact that the EU and the GCC states agreed to sign a Cooperation 
Agreement in 1989 at a time when both organisations lacked the deep level 
of integration they do enjoy today reveals the long-term and strategic 
approach of their decision. Due to common interests regarding GCC regional 
integration procedures (as explained), EU and GCC technocrats established 
a successful network for knowledge transfer to the Gulf region. More 
recently, in 2010 the two parties adopted the JAP, which is an important step 
for further institutionalising this partnership, by providing the institutional 
umbrella for the major activities of EU-GCC cooperation and confirming the 
long-term approach the two partners have invested in. Yet the fact that the 
EU was not flexible regarding the FTA talks which took place over the period 
2001-2011 insisting on political conditionality, human rights clauses and 
reforms based on its own values and norms, reveals a lack of willingness 
and ability to accommodate the perceptions, the values and the interests of 
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its partners. However, it should also be noted that the GCC states, with the 
prominent role of the KSA, taking advantage of their new confidence in 
regional and international affairs, has been less willing to make concessions 
in interests (especially since the broader benefits of possible concessions 
were elusive), despite the fact that in the long-term these concessions could 
be vital for the development of the relationship. 
In the case of Yemen, the institutionalisation of the cooperation was almost 
impossible at a bi-regional level, due to the lack of understanding about the 
perceptions each side had developed about addressing the risks emanating 
from Yemen. On one hand the EU was applying its traditional approach of 
exporting its values through political conditionality added to the assistance 
provided to Yemen, as well as by promoting the integration of Yemen in the 
GCC. However, the GCC states did not favour any of these approaches, and 
as a result, in order to avoid EU pressure on the matter, were more 
interested in multilateral engagements. In any case, the multilateral 
institutionalisation of the cooperation corresponded with both the values and 
the perceptions of the two parties. The EU promoted its values for joint 
responsibilities and political conditionality, reinforcing its self-image as a 
normative foreign policy actor. The GCC managed to gain relative autonomy, 
against EU pressure, within the broader context of multidependency and they 
did not get directly involved with political conditions on the aid offer. At the 
same time, they addressed their interests and responsibilities emanating 
from the ideologies of Pan-Arabism and reaffirmed their emerging political 
role at a broader level, beyond the bi-regional.  
In any case, it should be kept in mind that institutionalisation has not been a 
decisive factor for the development of the partnership. The institutionalised 
ministerial meetings were unproductive and in some cases institutional 
mismatch between the two regions raised concerns that there was a lack of 
mutual understanding as well. On the contrary, the case of the youth uprising 
in Yemen demonstrated that on an ad hoc basis (outside any formal 
institutional dialogue) the EU and the GCC could communicate their 
interests, their concerns and their values effectively, by demonstrating 
flexibility, within the changing regional context of early 2011.  
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Internal cohesiveness of regional actors 
 The two case studies under scrutiny in this thesis have shown that the role 
of individual member states can either hinder or enhance the development of 
strategic partnership. From the EU perspective the competences of the 
European Commission, have in this case  allowed it to add cohesiveness to 
the EU’s approach  through excluding  member states from trying to pursue a 
different (and possibly more useful approach) regarding the conclusion of the 
FTA negotiations. However, this level of cohesiveness and very firm stance 
during the negotiations has also led to the criticism that the technocratic 
approach (according to very specific mandate which replicates the mandates 
used for all FTA talks) was unable to capture the political significance of 
concluding this agreement. This criticism referred more to the human rights 
clauses. It was suggested that to the extent that the EU was unwilling to 
make concessions on its normative agenda, it might have reproduced its own 
(self-) image as a normative actor but at the same time it was less effective. 
This weakened the position of the EU, in particular as it was operating in a 
framework of interdependency. However, the EU provided alternatives both 
for this issue as well for the issue of petrochemicals, affirming that under 
certain circumstances the EU could negotiate its values (and interests). It 
should be also noted that this research has pointed to cases in which single 
member states have promoted their national interests bilaterally, leaving the 
normative aspect of foreign policy to be dealt with by EU bodies. In this 
respect, the EU normative self-image was once more reaffirmed, but the 
credibility of the EU to deliver was put at risk. That leads to subsequent 
effects on the perceptions regarding the EU’s capabilities as a foreign policy 
actor. From the GCC side, the role of KSA was counter-productive. Due to 
the intergovernmental level of cooperation (which derives from their 
normative stance not to make concessions on sovereignty, as EU member 
states have done for their own regional integration), the KSA has been able 
to bring the talks to a dead end, due to its withdrawal of an agreement 
achieved at an earlier stage regarding the petrochemical industry in the 
Kingdom. The KSA both in relation to the EU but as well as to the rest of the 
member states in the GCC felt confident enough to backtrack from a 
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compromise and to hinder the effective conclusion of the FTA negotiations. 
In the case of Yemen, the KSA prioritised a bilateral approach giving the 
impression that the multilateral approach was preferred only to the extent it 
could be used, instrumentally, in order to put pressure on the Yemeni 
leadership so that the latter would become more receptive during their 
bilateral communications. On the contrary, the role of the UK in the case of 
Yemen, even though it was overshadowing the role of the EU as an actor, 
proved to be beneficial to the bi-regional partnership. The UK addressed the 
concerns and the expectations of the GCC states more effectively. By 
initiating multilateral fora, it provided the necessary platforms for the GCC 
state to evade bi-regional cooperation, but it brought the GCC states into the 
center of the process for tackling the Yemeni crises, as desired by the EU. 
Therefore, questions regarding the institutionalisation and the cohesiveness 
of each partner are important to the extent that they reveal the complexity of 
the interests and the various possible combinations of interactions of values, 
interests and perceptions that can coexist in the framework of a partnership. 
However, it should not be taken for granted that having a cohesive or tightly 
shaped approach based on the institutional framework are always beneficial 
for the development of a strategic partnership. Consequently, cohesive and 
clearly defined policies are needed but once again it should be stressed that 
flexibility, in order to accommodate changing values, interests and 
perceptions is vital for further developing a partnership, since it will provide 
incentives to the parties to negotiate interests and values,.  
 
A triangular relationship between interests, values and images  
The EU aimed, through this relationship, to export its norms in internal 
economic and political processes, to reinforce its self-image as a civilian and 
normative actor, to influence the regional context and to promote 
multilateralism among the GCC states, in a manner that these emerging 
powers would engage and abide by EU norms. Regarding internal 
processes, the outcome of the EU actions remains uncertain. Even though 
human rights clauses were attached to the FTA negotiations, the real end 
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product of this inclusion is debated. Human right clauses are dealt with more 
as a language tool which dresses the text of the agreement, without any 
reference to preconditions that the GCC states are expected to meet before 
the signing of the agreement. EU and GCC policymakers have reached a 
minimum common ground which enables them to include these clauses in 
the agreement text as soon as the export duties issue is resolved. 
Nevertheless, it can hardly be suggested that the GCC states are making 
any effort for political reform because of these clauses. The openness of the 
system in the GCC states has been an important element in EU policies but 
the results of these reforms, in political terms, are still minimal. Therefore, it 
can be argued that the lack of a conclusion of the FTA negotiations may 
produce negative impressions about the political will of the two parties to 
enhance their relationship, but at the same time it saves face when it comes 
to the value aspects of these talks. The normative (self-) image of the EU is 
not challenged by an agreement with the undemocratic GCC states at the 
same time that the GCC states have managed to safeguard their national 
sovereignty on decisions related to internal reforms. In the case of 
transferring knowledge on regional integration and assisting the integration of 
the Gulf region into the global system, the EU has been successful beyond 
any doubt. In this respect it has promoted its model of stability through 
cooperation and sharing responsibilities at regional and international levels. 
In the case of Yemen, it is indeed interesting that the GCC states agreed to 
provide a text which calls for democratic changes, especially if we consider 
the central role of the KSA in the shaping of this proposal.  
What is more, the case of Yemen also illustrated that to the extent that the 
two partners prioritised their own views regarding their power and their place 
in this partnership, the final outcome was disappointing. On the contrary, 
when the two sides became more flexible in accommodating the concerns, 
the interests and the expectations of each other, they reached common 
grounds for joint actions impressively fast. It took some time for the EU to 
recognise that it was no longer the strong pole of the relationship, as it used 
to be twenty years ago (based also on the more traditional interactions of the 
EFP) and that it had to become more practical and pragmatic. Even if locally 
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(the EU Ambassadors in Yemen) the EU had recognised this reality since 
2009, the EFP was not accommodating this element when dealing with the 
GCC states, until 2011. The EU kept promoting its own model of crisis-
solving approach giving the opportunity to GCC states to accuse the EU of 
lack of understanding of their distinct characteristics (values and 
sensitivities). When the EU changed its stance dramatically in 2011, the 
outcome was notable. Therefore, the status that each party perceives for 
itself should be taken into consideration for a fruitful partnership, as the 
development of the EU-GCC relationship proved during the last 20 years.  
 
Summary of main empirical findings 
The development and the evolution of the EU - GCC relationship has shown 
that grand goals (related directly or indirectly to the security challenges) have 
encouraged the two parties to become more cooperative and to subordinate 
their differences in terms of values to their grand goals and interests. In the 
case of the GCC plan for Yemen, the EU accepted and promoted a plan 
which did not fully accommodate its values. In the case of the Gulf regional 
integration process, despite the fact that the two parties have fundamental 
differences on their needs and their value stance for regional integration, 
they managed to cooperate closely because the interests and the 
perceptions of the two parties were advanced in a parallel way. 
Consequently, addressing the hypothesis of this thesis, it can be suggested 
that the EU has indeed applied norms in an instrumental manner, in order to 
advance its interests (commercial and security related), values (internal 
reforms, regionalism, and multilateralism) and (self-) images (as a regional – 
supranational institution and a global actor). To the extent that the EU was 
also addressing the interests and the perceptions of the GCC (regarding their 
role in regional affairs as well as their security) the GCC states responded 
positively, accommodating EU values in their policies. In this respect, the 
relationship of the two parties was moving towards a 'strategic partnership'. 
On the contrary, it can be argued that when EU values clashed either with 
the interests or perceptions of the GCC states, the EU goals and the EU role 
in the region were both challenged. Therefore, the EU had to balance and 
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prioritise these three elements in order to promote its own interests as well 
as to remain a relevant actor in the region. Moreover, beyond interests and 
values, it is of utmost importance that the EFP addresses the self-images of 
EU's partners and accommodates their perceptions. Based on these 
findings, the role of interests, values and perceptions needs to be 
reconsidered, regarding their input in to EFP  decision making, and in 
particular  in the context of the ‘normative power’ argument, which coincides 
with the EU (self-)image. The balance of these factors needs to be explored 
as well as in the case of ‘strategic partnerships’ which have been significant 
foreign policy tools for the EU in order to deal with  emerging powers who 
have the ability to challenge the EU’s interests, values and perceptions more 
effectively compared to the more traditional (and asymmetric) EU 
cooperation schemes. 
 
Strategic Partnerships: Conceptual and theoretical implications 
This thesis has confirmed the central role of symmetry of power balance 
between the partners, which has lead the EU to become more 
accommodating to the needs and expectations of its partners in interests, 
values and perceptions in order to be able to build their relationship upon the 
notion of ‘strategic partnership’. Despite the normative agenda which has 
been shaping EU goals invested in ‘strategic partnerships’ because the 
partners were able to negotiate effectively, the balance between interests, 
values and perceptions has changed over time, in different cases. Therefore, 
compared to the more traditional relationships, EU ‘strategic partnerships’ 
are more dynamic, since they are becoming a platform based on which the 
partners are in constant negotiations about their interests, values and 
perceptions and in this respect the EU is becoming more flexible in order to 
be a more effective foreign policy actor.  
Furthermore, this study has discovered that through ‘strategic partnerships’ 
the EU has not only been able to manage internally its relations with 
emerging powers by providing long-term objectives and policies which shape 
EFP but it has also been able to work with partners on a division of labour 
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which serves the interests of the two parties, whilst at the same time 
respecting their perceptions and accommodating to a (certain extent) their 
values. 
Due to this need for flexibility and rebalancing between the three core 
elements of ‘strategic partnerships’, it has also became obvious that rigid 
cohesiveness of regional organisations (including the EU) is not a 
prerequisite of successful bloc-to-bloc ‘strategic partnerships’. Indeed, EU 
institutions were characterised by lack of ability for maneuver when this could 
have been useful, while the role of single EU member states proved to be 
constructive. This productive flexibility was also reaffirmed when partners, 
going beyond the official, institutionalised, channels of cooperation managed 
to convey and negotiate interests, values and perceptions at crucial times. 
 
The rationales of ‘strategic partnerships’ 
Having in mind the four sets of ‘strategic partnerships’ suggested by this 
thesis (see Table 8.1 below)  based on the rationale of the use of this foreign 
policy tool, the case of the EU-CC relationship has verified the patterns that 
have been proposed for the third and fourth sets. 
Table 8.1 
Traditional 
partners 
Pre-TEU 
years 
USA, Japan, 
Canada  
The EU and its 
partners 
shared 
interests and 
values. 
The EU was not 
the most 
powerful party 
and the 
partnership was 
almost 
predefined 
The 
immediate 
neighbours 
Late 
1990s 
Russia and 
Ukraine 
The aim was to 
‘Europeanise’, 
with the export 
of norms and 
engagement in 
The EU was 
more powerful 
than its 
interlocutor but 
the EU was only 
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interests, in the 
immediate 
neighbourhood 
regionally 
ambitious 
Inter-regional 
partners  
1990s-
2000s 
Primarily 
South Africa 
and Mexico. 
China and 
India were 
also seen as 
actors who 
could 
promote 
regional 
cooperation / 
integration 
 
GCC 
The aim was to 
influence the 
reshaping of 
their internal 
political 
structure and 
to engage 
them in 
multilateralism, 
through 
regionalism. 
The EU was 
reinforcing its 
own structure 
in world politics 
The EU had the 
expertise for  
regional 
integration. The 
focus is more 
regional and the 
EU aims at 
taking 
advantage of 
the partners’ 
regional 
influence 
Rising 
powers in a 
multipolar 
world 
2000s Priority was 
given to the 
USA, Russia 
and China. 
The rest of 
the ‘pivotal’ 
partners 
followed  
 
GCC 
The aim was 
for the EU to 
remain 
relevant in the 
global political 
and economic 
system. The 
EU has to 
negotiate 
interests and 
norms with 
pivotal 
partners 
There is a clear 
level of power 
balance 
symmetry and 
interdependency 
in terms of 
interests, values 
and self-images 
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In these two sets, the EU due to its more mature and cohesive internal 
configuration was capable of promoting its interests, values and self-images, 
by the application of civilian tools. Indeed through long-term engagement 
with the GCC states, the EU aimed at advancing its commercial interest, 
exporting its norms and reinforcing its self-images. What is more interesting 
is the fact that indeed the EU-GCC relationship could fit progressively into 
the third and fourth sets. 
While at the beginning of the relationship the EU was more powerful than the 
GCC states, politically as well as in terms of sustainable diversified economy, 
the GCC states had only just embarked on their reform and development 
plans with the aim of engaging with global institutions. In this context, the EU 
provided guidance and assistance for their internal restructuring, their 
regional integration and their international engagement. By exporting its 
norms (good governance, openness of the political and economic system), it 
was advancing its interests and it was acting as an agent of socialisation for 
the GCC states in global affairs. The way the EU facilitated the GCC states 
accession to the WTO, as well as the way broader engagement was 
promoted in the case of Yemen prior to the 2011 uprising, verified this EU 
behaviour. This approach was not only exporting EU norms and values but it 
was also promoting legitimacy for the EU as a supranational organisation.  
In the years that followed 2011, the relationship came closer to the pattern of 
the fourth set. Following the establishment of the EEAS, expectations grew 
while changes in the external environment also created new dynamics. The 
growing significance of the GCC states, the security challenges in the wider 
Middle East, and the competition by rising Asian players in the Gulf region 
posed new challenges to the EFP. In the context of a symmetrical 
relationship the EU could not aim at promoting its norms and interests as 
before. The EU had to negotiate interests and values, both internally and 
externally with third parties. Indeed, the EU made concessions for the FTA 
talks, since no preconditions for changes or political reforms were included 
for the GCC states, despite the fact that there was internal criticism about the 
lack of flexibility on the issue of human rights clauses against the European 
Commission. Moreover, in the case of Yemen, it was clearly illustrated that 
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the EU agreed with a plan which did not fully comply with its values. In 
addition to the negotiation of values and interests, to the extent that values 
(even economic related ones) are prioritised, then the EU may reinforce its 
self-images, but this preference will come with a cost regarding its 
effectiveness and its relevance, in terms of interdependency, in the new 
multipolar system. If the EU prioritises interests, the ‘normative argument’ 
needs reconsideration. The way the EU balances between values and 
interests, leads to different kinds of partnership and a different categorisation 
of its partners. 
 
The role of interests, values and perceptions: interest-based or value-driven 
partnerships? 
This categorisation of the ‘strategic partnerships’ according to Gratius and 
Renard, was based either on values or on interests and the added value that 
the parties could bring into the partnership. Therefore, based on these 
frameworks, and from the value perspective of Gratius, the GCC states 
appear to fit into the ‘distant partners’ category. The Gulf states are indeed 
revisionist players in the global system but divergences in values are not 
difficult to overcome because the GCC states do not have global ambitions. 
Following Renard’s categorisation, the GCC states fit into the regional 
powers with important influence in regional affairs, next to Mexico and South 
Africa. However, it is still important to assess the role of interests, values and 
perceptions / self-images in the EU-GCC relationship. The following table 
illustrates how each element was placed in specific cases: 
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Table 8.2 
Issues Interests Values 
Perceptions / Self-
images 
FTA  negotiations Elusive Different Compatible 
Regional 
integration 
Common 
Different 
rationales 
Compatible 
Yemen: FoY, CG Common Different Incompatible 
Yemen: uprising Common Compromise Agreement 
 
It is clear that whilst interests have been common, albeit broadly defined, the 
relationship was fruitful only in two out of the four cases; in the assistance 
provided for regional integration of the GCC states and in dealing with the 
2011 uprising in Yemen. Values and subsequent rationales of interactions 
have been different and there was only one case when the two sides 
reached a compromise. In terms of perceptions and self-images in two 
cases, these were compatible and more importantly, in the case of the 2011 
uprising in Yemen, there was an informal agreement. The two sides were 
willing to negotiate values when the benefits of their interactions were 
obvious, and they were deemed to be more important and prioritised to the 
extent that their concerns about security and their regional and international 
role were accommodated. They reached a mutual understanding on values, 
but it cannot be claimed that this is moving towards a value-based ‘strategic 
partnership’, since they have had fundamental differences in this field. Even 
in the most fruitful case of cooperation (namely the regional integration 
process in the Gulf, the Yemeni crisis of 2011 and to some extent the 
diversification process of the GCC economies in which the role of non state 
actors was significant) the rationales and the departure points were different. 
The neoliberal norms of the EU and its promotion of supranational 
approaches were not compatible with the ‘neo-rentier’ political and economic 
goals of the GCC states or the insistence on national sovereignty when it 
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came to regional affairs. In any case, the values factor has not been a ‘deal 
breaker’ for the two partners. 
To the extent that interests were precise, whether they tackle commercial 
benefits or stability and security issues, there is a level of interest-based 
partnership. This became more evident during the early years of the 
relationship when economic relations prevailed, despite the limited level of 
political integration of the two regional organisations, as well as in the case of 
the Yemeni uprising in 2011. However, this element of common interests is 
not enough. The lack of bi-regional cooperation in the Yemeni crisis before 
2011, despite the very concrete, security related interests cannot be 
explained, if the factors of self-images and perceptions are not incorporated 
in to ‘strategic partnerships’.  
Indeed, what is more interesting in these findings is that the role of 
perceptions and self-images has been fundamental. To the extent that this 
relationship addressed perceptions and (self-) images, it  became  useful for 
both sides. The rationale behind this cooperation was to enhance inter-
regional cooperation between the EU and the GCC states, in order to serve 
the EU’s legitimacy in global affairs but also its self-images as a normative 
and civilian actor, as well as to accommodate the GCC need to bolster the 
regional image of the Gulf states against the dominant regional roles of Iraq 
and Iran. When the GCC states became more confident, in the 2000s, and 
they were looking for acknowledgement of their new status by established 
global players, EU-GCC cooperation (on Yemen) responded to that need. 
Simultaneously, in a context of multipolar competition, the EU sought the 
cooperation of the GCC states in order to remain central to the developments 
in the Middle East, and more specifically in a region which was getting global 
attention, economically and politically. At the same time, the engagement 
with the GCC states (in the cases examined by this thesis) reinforced the 
self-image of EFP. The way the EU promoted multilateralism as well as the 
democratic transition in the countries of popular uprising in 2011 (and more 
specifically in Yemen) reinforced the EU’s self-images and perceptions.  
Therefore, the vital point is whether the parties are willing to accommodate 
each others’ perceptions about their own identities and role in regional and 
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global affairs. Of course, values and power balance are significant in shaping 
and negotiating these perceptions, as suggested by Gratius and Renard, but 
the way they have kept these elements isolated in their categorisations point 
to the limitations of their models. What is needed is a new ranking system 
which would accommodate all three elements (interests, values, perceptions 
and self-images) within various cases of ‘strategic partnership’.  
Moreover, while the EU could be more comprehensive in its engagement 
with the GCC states (with the pursuit of a joint approach and coordinated 
action on other security issues as well, namely the nuclear power 
programme of Iran) it still perceives the GCC as playing a more limited role 
than itself. Even though this validates the ‘minor power’ categorisation of 
Renard regarding the way the EU approaches the GCC states, it also means 
that the relationship falls short of its potential. However, having in mind the 
growing interdependency of the two regions, the way the EU and the GCC 
states cooperate on global affairs either in tackling global economic 
governance or in the case of the Iranian nuclear programme, could be 
explored in more detail in the near future in order to reconsider this 
conclusion. 
 
EFP: Theoretical implications  
The post-modern character of the EFP, as the sum of the actions of national, 
supranational and intergovernmental processes, (accompanied by the 
transnational role of non-state actors) has enhanced the role of the EU in the 
Gulf region, since the actions have been directed (broadly speaking) in the 
same direction, aiming at similar goals. Despite the criticism the European 
Commission received regarding the FTA talks, as well as the evident lack of 
strong military capabilities, conceptually the role of the EU in the Arabian 
Peninsula cannot be challenged. Moreover, the fact that there has been a 
different level of integration in the two cases that the thesis explored 
(supranational process in economic affairs and intergovernmental in the 
security realm) did not seem to create fundamental conceptual problems for 
the relationship, or any other practical dilemmas or confusion. In terms of 
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process, especially since the main volume of official interactions was made 
with the European Commission, there was no confusion or overlapping 
approaches. Even to the extent that the different levels of importance placed 
by the rotating presidencies on this relationship may have sent mixed 
signals, this did not create any dilemmas. In relation to outcomes, the two 
success cases (regional integration and the Yemeni uprising of 2011) they 
fall in different institutional competences (or different pillars, according to pre-
Lisbon Treaty terminology) suggesting that EU’s internal structure did not 
create conceptual challenges for this relationship.  
What was also reinforced was the 'civilian identity' of the EFP, to the extent 
that this argument is related to the means applied by the EU. Despite the fact 
that security concerns were addressed, either directly as in the case of 
Yemen or indirectly in the case of the regional integration of the Gulf states, 
the EU approaches were in the main, non- military. In addition, considering 
the  arguments made by Hyde-Price, Pace and Sjursen, who suggested 
civilian power does not only mean the use of non military tools but also the 
non application of coercive approaches, we can still suggest that the EU has 
not been an actor applying coercive tools. Whilst at the beginning of the 
relationship, the EU was politically and economically more powerful, it still did 
not use this supremacy in order to impose policies. There were no negative 
measures taken against the GCC states, even to the extent that the GCC 
states could not respond to the demands of the EU regarding regional 
integration before substantial negotiations started. The EU did not react 
negatively, but on the contrary it became more engaged in providing 
technical assistance. In the 2000s, the EU had even less leverage to impose 
its policies and it rather became more accommodating of GCC interests, 
values and perceptions. 
In the 2000s the weakening of the 'normative argument' in relation to the EU-
GCC relationship also became clearer. First of all, in terms of the outcomes, 
the effects of the EU’s normative approach have been minimal since there 
have not been any major political changes in the internal systems of 
governance in the GCC states. Whilst there has been an inclusion of human 
rights in the FTA talks, these do not require any specific measures to be 
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taken by the Gulf rulers prior to the signing of the agreement. On the 
contrary, it has been suggested that a redrafting of the language in this field 
was undertaken in order to keep the GCC engaged in the process, even 
though that undermined the normative approach of the EFP. The only 
pending issue in the FTA negotiations refers to the economic reforms that 
the EU demands from the Gulf states. In this respect, it seems that the 
criticism against EFP regarding the window dressing of neo-liberal 
(economic) policies with a value-driven language gain validity. Moreover, in 
the case of the Yemeni crisis, following the youth uprising in 2011, the EU 
made concessions in order to accept the GCC proposal. It should be noted 
though, that the GCC states had already made an effort to address EU 
values and sensitivities and they have managed to do so to a large extent. 
Therefore (without ignoring the role of perceptions) it can be argued that the 
GCC proposal demonstrates a successful negotiation of values between the 
two parties. 
Moreover, during the last two decades the EU has been active and effective 
in promoting regional integration in the Gulf region and engagement of the 
GCC states with multilateralism. In this respect, there is a well defined 
normative aspect of EFP. However, reiterating the fact that no immediate 
changes have taken place in the Gulf political systems, it seems appropriate 
to ask whether the EU is becoming a transformative power, by gradually 
influencing the development of the Gulf states' external environments rather 
than directly exporting norms and values to the GCC states. In addition, the 
fact that the EU has been pursuing a bloc-to-bloc FTA can also be 
understood as an attempt by the EU to transform the international 
(economic) legal framework through a gradual, inter-regional approach. In 
this respect, the decision to advance this relationship has been strategic 
entailing the normative aspirations of EFP to influence the global decision 
making system, despite the fact that this partnership did not provide any 
concrete results in this specific field.   
Furthermore, even though the EU has indeed used values and norms in an 
instrumentalist manner in order to promote its interests and self-images it 
would be too simple to suggest that there is no genuine importance in the 
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values themselves. The way the EU has been shaped and its approach 
towards a more supranational structure and processes verify the sincere 
desire for overcoming the nation state phase and  promoting the set of 
values that shape its own identity. In this respect, there is a normative 
agenda in EFP, but the way the EU communicates these norms may be 
counter-productive. Instead of the EU being  eager to promote only its own 
values and norms, by describing them as universal, it can remain a 
normative power by engaging with regional powers and by negotiating and 
accommodating their values in inter-regional, minilateral or bilateral 
approaches. By being a more inclusive normative power, the EU may 
approach a model of a value-driven relationship with its partners and more 
importantly in this context of multipolarity to remain relevant and an attractive 
'strategic partner' that can be open to a normative dialogue. Indeed, in the 
case of the Yemeni uprising of 2011, there has been a negotiation of values 
which can be considered successful. Subsequently, it can be claimed that 
the EU is distancing itself from the argument of a ‘normative power’, which is 
a (self-)image deriving from its own values and norms. Even though the EU 
still applies values and norms in its EFP, these are not all the predefined EU 
norms and values, but the result of a compromise with a ‘strategic partner’. 
Therefore, a question could be raised regarding the prioritisation of some 
values over others regarding third parties. Based on the findings of this 
research, it could be suggested that multilateral engagement and diffusion of 
responsibility for common challenges with certain levels of mutual 
understanding on values and sensitivities of the two parties are prioritised 
over the attempt of the EU to promote its neo-liberal agenda (in economics 
and politics) for the internal reforms of its partners. This argument needs to 
be validated in future research. Moreover, engagement with the global 
community affects the contexts in which third parties take their decisions. In 
this respect it is also valid to ask, again, whether the EU is becoming a 
transformative power. 
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Reflections on the research 
The suggested framework, of applying ‘strategic partnership’ for the 
exploration and analysis of the EU-GCC relationship, has  proven fruitful in 
allowing me to unpack the role of various actors and to assess the balance of 
interests, values and self-images, which have been fundamental for this 
thesis. It has allowed this research to overcome, to a large extent, the 
shortcomings of the work of Youngs and Nonneman and to contribute to the 
understanding of the EFP in the Gulf region, at bilateral and bi-regional 
levels. Even though the issue of Yemen also tackled international security 
concerns, it cannot be claimed that a thorough exploration of the 
international impact of this relationship has been achieved, in order to 
address this partnerships at all three levels; national, regional and 
international. 
Moreover, the ability to differentiate between interests, values and 
perceptions has, in some cases, been weakened due to the complex and 
overlapping character of these notions. Indeed, security concerns can fit both 
into the interests of the two parties but they also heavily influence 
perceptions (especially of the GCC states whose self-images are more 
security oriented within their three environments). In addition to this, 
interviewees were more eager to talk about values and perceptions rather 
than interests, further blurring the distinction between the three elements. 
Without a doubt, however, the neo-liberal normative agenda of the EU was 
not only associated with more integrated regional and global communities or 
the implementation of rules of global governance which are compatible with 
EU norms but also with the economic benefits of more liberal and open 
economies in the GCC states. 
More specifically, in the case of the FTA negotiations, there were conflicting 
stories and understandings of the last thorny issue of the talks, that of 
petrochemicals in terms of interests, norms and perceptions. Both sides 
presented different arguments regarding the role of the petrochemical 
industry in the GCC states and they referred to the agreement of KSA joining 
the WTO using different interpretation, regarding its significance and the 
effects this agreement generates in relation to FTA talks. This confusion was 
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repeated in independent presentations of the EU-GCC negotiations by 
various analysts. In order to deal with this I focused on the exchange of 
written communication between the EU and the GCC in order to identify the 
main problems of the negotiations. I also had to further study analyses 
regarding the accession of GCC states in the WTO which did not attempt to 
associate this accession with the FTA talks and to further study the role of 
petrochemicals in the diversification process of the GCC (mostly Saudi) 
economies. Since this development of the petrochemical industry is an 
ongoing process, the analyses were mostly on forecasts about the near 
future rather than actually presenting solid conclusions. Against this 
background, I had to take into consideration all the relevant information and 
to conclude on the role of actual interests, values and perceptions in this 
case, based on personal understanding.  
Furthermore, although I am currently a diplomat for the Republic of Cyprus 
and have come across documents which provided useful information for 
understanding the development of the EU-GCC relationship, I was not 
allowed to disclose information from these documents. I was able to refer to 
this information only indirectly and only to the extent that it was brought up 
during my interviews. In addition, even though I had access to people holding 
crucial posts in the EEAS, as well as from member states Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, interviewees were in some cases reluctant to reveal 
information that was not already in the public domain, or indeed, revealing to 
any degree. In addition I had to assess the extent to which interviewees, 
especially in the GCC states, were positive for symbolic and diplomatic 
reasons i.e. when responses could clearly not be verified with the realities on 
the ground or with responses of other interviewees. This also added an 
element of caution in what could be utilised from such interview material, and 
what indeed could be deemed as valid evidence for evaluating progress 
towards a strategic partnership.  
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Future studies on the EU ‘strategic partnerships’  
It has been clearly identified in this thesis that there is a division of labour in 
the case of knowledge transfer to the Gulf states as well as in the case of 
Yemen. How can this be addressed in future research for strategic 
partnerships, especially bearing in mind that both Gratius and Grevi suggest 
a thematic, gradual, approach before the EU and its partners move towards 
a more comprehensive partnership? Yemen and regional integration have 
indeed been cases which demonstrate the effective cooperation of the two 
partners and which has provided common ground in order to move forward 
with a deeper partnership. Therefore, this element which has been 
suggested by the thesis could be explored in relation to other strategic 
partnerships of the EU, in order to test its validity.  
Additionally, it has been argued in this thesis that the institutionalisation of 
relations, and cohesiveness do not necessarily add to the effectiveness of a 
partnership. Nevertheless, some scholars consider both of these elements 
as essential for ‘strategic partnerships’. In this respect, future studies on the 
role of institutionalisation and cohesiveness of actions can shed more light 
on the impact of these factors, having in mind the need for flexibility and 
adaptability to the needs, interests, values and perceptions of the third 
parties. 
Furthermore, the thesis has highlighted the multidimensional and 
multilayered character of the EU’s ‘strategic partnerships’. The role of actors 
in various strata from a wide spectrum of fields of the two partners was 
fundamental in the creation of dynamics for a deeper relationship. This 
feature could also be projected to the rest of the EU’s ‘strategic partnership’ 
cases, in order to assess the role of non-governmental actors alongside the 
bureaucracies of the two partners in promoting the development of such a 
partnership. 
Moreover, in this thesis it has been argued that the EU has expressed its 
desire to assist the GCC states for their own regional integration, for the 
integration of the Gulf region in the global economic and political system and 
for the economic diversification of the GCC states. The aim of this policy was 
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to promote the openness of the internal system of the GCC states, both 
politically and economically as well as to encourage the GCC states to 
assume their own share of responsibility for wider regional and international 
challenges. In the case of Yemen, it seems that the EU has managed to 
constructively engage the GCC states but there are still no significant 
changes in their internal political structures. Nevertheless, some minor steps 
have been taken by the UAE which has held elections for a consultative body 
for the first time in its history, while Qatar announced that it will hold its first 
elections in this field in 2013. The KSA has also made some modest steps, 
notably in granting social and political rights to women. Therefore, it can be 
suggested that the EU is becoming a transformative power in the Gulf region. 
The findings of this thesis cannot yet support this argument. Any future 
research may be in a position to identify further evidence for this matter.  
Related to the above assumption that the EU is becoming a transformative 
power, it is important to assess the role of the EU as a socialising actor for 
third parties in engaging them with the international community. What are the 
influences of this socialisation on the decision making systems of third 
parties as a result of EU policies? Moreover, it would be important to explore 
how the EU follows up on this socialisation and how EFP goals are promoted 
at a multilateral level through the new globally engaged partners. This 
becomes even more important in the case of the GCC states, due to their 
role in the world economy. The way the EU and the GCC states have been 
tackling common challenges at global level, at the time of the current global 
financial crisis, could provide useful insights about the outcomes, the 
potential and the limitations of this relationship. 
In addition, the case of the youth uprising in Yemen, as well as the case of 
the revolution in Libya which was not nevertheless addressed in this thesis, 
has given the opportunity to the two partners to readjust their role in the 
Middle East. During the recent uprisings in the Middle East, the EU and the 
GCC states have advanced their presence in the political framework of the 
region and they have also deployed military forces in close coordination. 
Therefore, future research on the EU-GCC partnership could examine how 
this ad hoc military cooperation can influence the formation of more 
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permanent cooperation between the two regions. In this respect it should be 
noted that in October 2011 the EU initiated an internal discussion for signing 
an agreement with Oman regarding the use of Omani infrastructure for the 
transit and stationing of EU military forces that are deployed in the framework 
of the EUNAVFOR ATALANTA mission. The agreement was signed in 2012. 
Lastly, the ‘normative power’ argument of EFP needs to be reconsidered in  
light of the successful negotiation of values between the EU and the GCC 
states, regarding the GCC initiative for addressing the Yemeni uprising of 
2011. How the EU prioritises its values in internal debates regarding third 
parties, affects the articulation of its EFP goals and objectives and it also 
affects its (self-)image. Are indeed multilateral engagement and diffusion of 
responsibility for common challenges with certain levels of mutual 
understanding on values and sensitivities of the two parties prioritised over 
the attempt of the EU to promote its neo-liberal agenda (in economics and 
politics) for the internal reforms of its partners? Does this make EFP more 
effective in providing actual results, or does it weaken established ideas about 
EFP ‘normative power’ creating confusion internally and externally? 
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EU and “Strategic Partners“ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An approach to identifying  
Strategic Partners 
EU and Strategic Partnerships 
• Russia – 1999 
• US 
• Japan    European Security Strategy 2003 
• Canada 
• China – 2003 
• India – 2004 
• South Africa – 2006 
• Brazil – 2007 
• Mexico – 2008 
 
More to come?  
Ukraine, Egypt, Indonesia, South Korea, Pakistan, Israel... 
Size of economies  
A comparison of GDP (millions of USD) 
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Industrial World Production   
Outlook for the future 
Source: OCDE, March 2010 
Lisbon 
 
• Long-term and comprehensive approach. 
 
• Economics meets politics. 
 
• Move from positions to strategy. 
 
 
First example: China 
 
 
• Second largest 
economy 
• Around 9% growth 
rate per year 
• Large currency 
reserves 
 
• Heavily dependant on 
trade 
• Depends on growth 
for stability 
• Developing country 
 
BUT 
What China wants 
• Internal stability / external security. 
 
• Respect as a global player. 
 
• Access to markets and resources. 
 
• Multipolar world. 
 
 
What does China want  
from EU 
• Market access. 
 
• Lifting arms embargo, granting of market 
economy status. 
 
• Coherent EU as a global partner; eg on 
climate, piracy, Africa. 
What we want from China 
• Market access, transparent and non-
discriminatory rules; eg IPR, government 
procurement.  
• Partner in security challenges, global 
governance; eg G20. 
• Show leadership on climate. Partnership on 
energy. 
• Real progress on rule of law and human rights. 
 
 
 
How we get there 
• Bring economics and politics together. One 
message, 27 voices. 
• Make best use of tools (eg 56 sectoral 
dialogues with China). 
• Persistent and creative approach. Think 
differently. 
• Look at overall leverage and trade-offs. 
• Be result-oriented. 
India 
• Need an integrated strategy.  
 
• Need to strengthen economic links (FTA). 
 
• Need to become partner on security 
challenges – to start with in the region. 
 
• « We think the EU is a pole but we don’t know 
whether you want to be one ». 
 
 
 
 Annex I: What do citizens think 
about China 
Overall, China is not seen as the major security threat for EU citizens … 
Q2. I will also list a number of potential security threats facing Europe and the West. Please tell me how big a 
threat they are to Europe and the West’s security with 1 being not a threat 2 a small threat and 3 a serious threat? 
Base: all respondents, % EU27, Gallup Poll 
Annex I 
…but there are wide variations between Member States 
Q2. I will also list a number of potential security threats facing Europe and the West. Please tell me how big a threat they are 
to Europe and the West’s security with 1 being not a threat 2 a small threat and 3 a serious threat? 
Gallop Poll; Base: all respondents, % by country 
Annex II 
… and some citizens in some Member-States still see an emerging role for China as 
an important economic partner  
Q3. Thinking about the future of Europe in the world, who should be Europe's closest ECONOMIC PARTNER in the world? 
Gallop Poll; Base: all respondents, % by country 
Annex III 
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EU BILATERAL TRADE AND TRADE WITH THE WORLD DG TRADE
TOTAL MERCHANDISE TRADE, 2004-2008
1. Evolution of the EU's Trade Balance with Gcc
2. Evolution of the GCC's Trade Balance
GEOGRAPHIC BREAKDOWN OF TRADE, 2008
3. EU Trade with Main Partners
4. GCC's Trade with Main Partners
SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF TRADE
Sitc Rev3, Sections and Product Grouping
5. European Union, Trade with the World and Gcc, by Sitc Section
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EU'S TRADE BALANCE WITH GCC
European Union, Trade with GCC millions of euro, %
Period Imports
Variation
(%, y-o-y)
Share of total 
EU Imports 
(%)
Exports
Variation
(%, y-o-y)
Share of total 
EU Exports 
(%)
Balance Trade
2004 25.580 26,0 2,5 41.321 9,2 4,3 15.741 66.901
2005 38.021 48,6 3,2 50.875 23,1 4,8 12.855 88.896
2006 35.943 -5,5 2,7 54.788 7,7 4,7 18.845 90.730
2007 31.761 -11,6 2,2 61.468 12,2 5,0 29.707 93.228
2008 36.502 14,9 2,4 68.969 12,2 5,3 32.467 105.470
2008Q1 8.141 - 2,1 16.151 - 5,1 8.010 24.292
2008Q2 9.518 - 2,4 16.611 - 4,9 7.093 26.129
2008Q3 11.069 - 2,7 16.926 - 5,0 5.857 27.996
2008Q4 7.773 - 2,1 19.281 - 6,0 11.508 27.054
2009Q1 5.164 -36,6 1,7 14.205 -12,0 5,6 9.042 19.369
2009Q2 5.190 -45,5 1,8 14.093 -15,2 5,3 8.903 19.282
2009Q3 - - - - - - - -
2009Q4 - - - - - - - -
Average annual growth (2004-2008) 9,3 13,7 12,1 
European Union, Trade with the World millions of euro, %
Period Imports
Variation
(%, y-o-y)
Exports
Variation
(%, y-o-y)
Balance Trade
2004 1.026.709 10,0 952.723 9,7 -73.986 1.979.432
2005 1.179.569 14,9 1.052.720 10,5 -126.849 2.232.289
2006 1.351.813 14,6 1.159.324 10,1 -192.489 2.511.138
2007 1.433.399 6,0 1.240.908 7,0 -192.491 2.674.307
2008 1.552.373 8,3 1.309.435 5,5 -242.937 2.861.808
2008Q1 379.259 - 316.069 - -63.190 695.327
2008Q2 392.038 - 337.253 - -54.785 729.291
2008Q3 409.154 - 336.786 - -72.368 745.940
2008Q4 371.922 - 319.328 - -52.594 691.249
2009Q1 302.035 -20,4 254.421 -19,5 -47.614 556.456
2009Q2 284.374 -27,5 264.612 -21,5 -19.762 548.986
2009Q3 - - - - - -
2009Q4 - - - - - -
Average annual growth (2004-2008) 10,9 8,3 9,7 
Source: EUROSTAT (Comext, Statistical regime 4) TRADE A2 - CG/MP
World excluding Intra-EU27 trade; European Union: 27 members. 22-Sep-09
GCC: United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
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GCC, Trade with the European Union millions of euro, %
Period Imports
Variation
(%, y-o-y)
EU Share of 
total Imports 
(%)
Exports
Variation
(%, y-o-y)
EU Share of 
total Exports 
(%)
Balance Trade
2004 40.500 38,9 33,5 22.464 26,1 11,6 -18.036 62.965
2005 52.802 30,4 33,0 33.151 47,6 12,7 -19.651 85.953
2006 57.138 8,2 30,8 32.269 -2,7 10,2 -24.870 89.407
2007 68.977 20,7 31,0 29.325 -9,1 9,2 -39.652 98.302
2008 75.858 10,0 29,0 33.187 13,2 8,1 -42.671 109.046
2008Q1 17.766 - 31,1 7.401 - 7,9 -10.365 25.167
2008Q2 18.272 - 30,3 8.653 - 8,8 -9.619 26.925
2008Q3 18.619 - 26,9 10.061 - 8,8 -8.559 28.680
2008Q4 21.201 - 28,2 7.073 - 6,8 -14.129 28.274
2009Q1 - - - - - - - -
2009Q2 - - - - - - - -
2009Q3 - - - - - - - -
2009Q4 - - - - - - - -
Average annual growth (2004-2008) 17,0 10,2 24,0 
GCC, Trade with the World millions of euro, %
Period Imports
Variation
(%, y-o-y)
Exports
Variation
(%, y-o-y)
Balance Trade
2004 120.737 33,0 193.110 19,4 72.373 313.847
2005 159.773 32,3 260.718 35,0 100.946 420.491
2006 185.579 16,2 316.245 21,3 130.665 501.824
2007 222.233 19,8 318.087 0,6 95.854 540.320
2008 261.717 17,8 410.433 29,0 148.716 672.150
2008Q1 57.162 - 93.495 - 36.333 150.656
2008Q2 60.351 - 98.209 - 37.858 158.560
2008Q3 69.136 - 114.303 - 45.167 183.439
2008Q4 75.068 - 104.427 - 29.359 179.495
2009Q1 - - - - - -
2009Q2 - - - - - -
2009Q3 - - - - - -
2009Q4 - - - - - -
Average annual growth (2004-2008) 21,3 20,7 19,7 
Source: IMF (DoTS) TRADE A2 - CG/MP
22-Sep-09
GCC: United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
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EU TRADE WITH MAIN PARTNERS (2008)
The Major Imports Partners The Major Exports Partners The Major Trade Partners
Rk Partners Mio euro % Rk Partners Mio euro % Rk Partners Mio euro %
Extra EU27 1.552.372,5 100,0% Extra EU27 1.309.435,1 100,0% Extra EU27 2.861.807,6 100,0%
1 China 247.857,6 16,0% 1 United States 249.595,3 19,1% 1 United States 435.995,5 15,2%
2 United States 186.400,3 12,0% 2 Russia 105.153,1 8,0% 2 China 326.325,0 11,4%
3 Russia 173.617,2 11,2% 3 Switzerland 97.742,1 7,5% 3 Russia 278.770,2 9,7%
4 Norway 92.035,6 5,9% 4 China 78.467,4 6,0% 4 Switzerland 177.848,3 6,2%
5 Switzerland 80.106,1 5,2% 5 Turkey 54.260,9 4,1% 5 Norway 135.736,0 4,7%
6 Japan 74.948,8 4,8% 6 Norway 43.700,4 3,3% 6 Japan 117.342,0 4,1%
7 Turkey 45.886,6 3,0% 7 Japan 42.393,3 3,2% 7 Turkey 100.147,5 3,5%
8 South Korea 39.406,6 2,5% 8 United Arab Emirate 31.679,6 2,4% 8 South Korea 65.063,6 2,3%
9 Brazil 35.554,4 2,3% 9 India 31.540,2 2,4% 9 Brazil 61.908,2 2,2%
10 Libya 34.233,1 2,2% 10 Brazil 26.353,7 2,0% 10 India 60.980,2 2,1%
11 India 29.440,0 1,9% 11 Canada 26.106,7 2,0% 11 Canada 49.900,8 1,7%
12 Algeria 28.349,8 1,8% 12 South Korea 25.657,0 2,0% 12 Algeria 43.660,9 1,5%
13 Taiwan 24.063,0 1,6% 13 Australia 25.186,7 1,9% 13 South Africa 42.472,6 1,5%
14 Canada 23.794,1 1,5% 14 Ukraine 25.156,8 1,9% 14 Saudi Arabia 42.377,7 1,5%
15 South Africa 22.245,0 1,4% 15 Mexico 22.082,2 1,7% 15 Libya 39.969,8 1,4%
16 Saudi Arabia 21.117,4 1,4% 16 Singapore 22.018,3 1,7% 16 Ukraine 39.523,8 1,4%
17 Malaysia 17.514,4 1,1% 17 Saudi Arabia 21.260,3 1,6% 17 Singapore 38.196,3 1,3%
18 Kasakhstan 17.410,0 1,1% 18 Hong Kong 21.093,1 1,6% 18 United Arab Emirate 37.498,3 1,3%
19 Thailand 17.172,3 1,1% 19 South Africa 20.227,6 1,5% 19 Australia 36.399,5 1,3%
20 Singapore 16.178,0 1,0% 20 Algeria 15.311,1 1,2% 20 Mexico 35.896,3 1,3%
21 Nigeria 15.380,4 1,0% 21 Morocco 14.414,3 1,1% 21 Taiwan 35.682,3 1,2%
22 Ukraine 14.367,0 0,9% 22 Croatia 14.321,8 1,1% 22 Hong Kong 32.599,7 1,1%
23 Iran 14.362,2 0,9% 23 Israel 14.077,8 1,1% 23 Malaysia 29.084,1 1,0%
24 Mexico 13.814,1 0,9% 24 Egypt 12.732,1 1,0% 24 Nigeria 26.589,8 0,9%
25 Indonesia 13.506,8 0,9% 25 Taiwan 11.619,3 0,9% 25 Iran 25.729,7 0,9%
26 Hong Kong 11.506,6 0,7% 26 Malaysia 11.569,7 0,9% 26 Thailand 25.660,0 0,9%
27 Chile 11.280,7 0,7% 27 Iran 11.367,5 0,9% 27 Israel 25.278,4 0,9%
28 Australia 11.212,8 0,7% 28 Nigeria 11.209,4 0,9% 28 Kasakhstan 23.084,1 0,8%
29 Israel 11.200,6 0,7% 29 Tunisia 9.943,2 0,8% 29 Morocco 22.798,5 0,8%
30 Azerbaijan 10.549,2 0,7% 30 Serbia 9.018,0 0,7% 30 Egypt 20.819,2 0,7%
31 Argentina 10.534,1 0,7% 31 Thailand 8.487,8 0,6% 31 Croatia 19.490,1 0,7%
32 Tunisia 9.491,2 0,6% 32 Qatar 6.610,0 0,5% 32 Indonesia 19.483,1 0,7%
33 Iraq 9.123,0 0,6% 33 Belarus 6.363,7 0,5% 33 Tunisia 19.434,5 0,7%
34 Vietnam 8.559,8 0,6% 34 Argentina 6.086,0 0,5% 34 Argentina 16.620,1 0,6%
35 Morocco 8.384,3 0,5% 35 Indonesia 5.976,3 0,5% 35 Chile 16.407,3 0,6%
36 Egypt 8.087,1 0,5% 36 Libya 5.736,7 0,4% 36 Serbia 13.037,9 0,5%
37 Angola 7.717,5 0,5% 37 Kasakhstan 5.674,1 0,4% 37 Angola 12.994,8 0,5%
38 Venezuela 6.338,5 0,4% 38 Angola 5.277,3 0,4% 38 Azerbaijan 12.610,4 0,4%
39 Belarus 6.064,6 0,4% 39 Chile 5.126,6 0,4% 39 Belarus 12.428,3 0,4%
40 United Arab Emirate 5.818,7 0,4% 40 Kuwait 4.590,7 0,4% 40 Vietnam 11.912,7 0,4%
41 Bangladesh 5.452,3 0,4% 41 Venezuela 4.308,3 0,3% 41 Iraq 10.821,1 0,4%
42 Philippines 5.301,4 0,3% 42 Pakistan 3.912,9 0,3% 42 Venezuela 10.646,9 0,4%
43 Kuwait 5.216,0 0,3% 43 Lebanon 3.907,0 0,3% 43 Kuwait 9.806,7 0,3%
44 Croatia 5.168,3 0,3% 44 Philippines 3.780,7 0,3% 44 Qatar 9.511,3 0,3%
45 Colombia 4.684,2 0,3% 45 Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.740,4 0,3% 45 Philippines 9.082,0 0,3%
46 Serbia 4.019,9 0,3% 46 Colombia 3.492,4 0,3% 46 Colombia 8.176,7 0,3%
47 Equatorial Guinea 3.986,3 0,3% 47 Syria 3.466,3 0,3% 47 Pakistan 7.541,7 0,3%
48 Peru 3.933,6 0,3% 48 Vietnam 3.352,9 0,3% 48 Syria 7.075,5 0,2%
49 Pakistan 3.628,8 0,2% 49 Oman 3.319,2 0,3% 49 Bangladesh 6.517,6 0,2%
50 Syria 3.609,2 0,2% 50 Gibraltar 3.139,6 0,2% 50 Peru 6.114,2 0,2%
- GCC 36.501,5 2,4% - GCC 68.968,9 5,3% - GCC 105.470,4 3,7%
EU Imports from … EU Exports to … Imports + Exports
 Partner regions Mio euro %  Partner regions Mio euro %  Partner regions Mio euro %
ACP 75.982,6 4,9% ACP 67.943,5 5,2% ACP 143.926,1 5,0%
Andean Community 10.997,5 0,7% Andean Community 6.924,7 0,5% Andean Community 17.922,2 0,6%
ASEAN 79.292,5 5,1% ASEAN 55.676,2 4,3% ASEAN 134.968,7 4,7%
BRIC 486.469,2 31,3% BRIC 241.514,4 18,4% BRIC 727.983,6 25,4%
CACM 4.461,8 0,3% CACM 2.413,1 0,2% CACM 6.875,0 0,2%
Candidates 52.822,1 3,4% Candidates 71.124,1 5,4% Candidates 123.946,2 4,3%
CIS 226.506,6 14,6% CIS 149.840,9 11,4% CIS 376.347,4 13,2%
EFTA 176.008,6 11,3% EFTA 144.924,9 11,1% EFTA 320.933,4 11,2%
Latin American C. 96.740,4 6,2% Latin American C. 79.835,7 6,1% Latin American C. 176.576,1 6,2%
MEDA (excl EU and T 69.788,7 4,5% MEDA (excl EU and T 76.858,9 5,9% MEDA (excl EU and T 146.647,5 5,1%
Mercosur 47.724,4 3,1% Mercosur 33.484,2 2,6% Mercosur 81.208,6 2,8%
NAFTA 224.008,5 14,4% NAFTA 297.784,1 22,7% NAFTA 521.792,6 18,2%
EFTA: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland; Candidates: Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Turkey; Andean Community: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru;
CIS: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Moldova Republic of, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan;
CACM: Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala; Mercosur: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay; NAFTA: Canada, Mexico, United States;
Latin America C.: CACM, Mercosur, ANCOM, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela; BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India, China;
ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam;
ACP: 79 countries; MEDA (excl EU & Turkey): Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia.
Source: EUROSTAT (Comext, Statistical regime 4) DG TRADE
European Union: 27 members. 22-Sep-09
GCC'S TRADE WITH MAIN PARTNERS (2008)
The Major Imports Partners The Major Export Partners The Major Trade Partners
Rk Partners Mio euro % Rk Partners Mio euro % Rk Partners Mio euro %
World 260.202,9 100,0% World 410.042,2 100,0% World 670.245,0 100,0%
1 EU27 75.599,3 29,1% 1 Japan 89.777,3 21,9% 1 Japan 110.580,9 16,5%
2 China 28.181,7 10,8% 2 South Korea 42.601,0 10,4% 2 EU27 108.945,4 16,3%
3 United States 27.124,8 10,4% 3 United States 41.869,4 10,2% 3 United States 68.994,2 10,3%
4 Japan 20.803,6 8,0% 4 EU27 33.346,1 8,1% 4 China 61.032,9 9,1%
5 India 17.068,8 6,6% 5 China 32.851,2 8,0% 5 South Korea 52.277,9 7,8%
6 South Korea 9.676,9 3,7% 6 Singapore 22.230,9 5,4% 6 India 27.102,9 4,0%
7 Turkey 9.171,2 3,5% 7 Thailand 14.982,7 3,7% 7 Singapore 26.647,3 4,0%
8 Saudi Arabia 7.239,1 2,8% 8 India 10.034,1 2,4% 8 Thailand 19.425,3 2,9%
9 United Arab Emirate 6.579,8 2,5% 9 Pakistan 8.755,3 2,1% 9 United Arab Emirate 12.629,1 1,9%
10 Australia 4.989,8 1,9% 10 United Arab Emirate 6.049,3 1,5% 10 Turkey 11.865,9 1,8%
11 Thailand 4.442,6 1,7% 11 Iran 5.794,3 1,4% 11 Pakistan 11.233,9 1,7%
12 Singapore 4.416,3 1,7% 12 South Africa 4.872,2 1,2% 12 Saudi Arabia 10.441,5 1,6%
13 Malaysia 4.092,1 1,6% 13 Indonesia 4.769,7 1,2% 13 Malaysia 7.771,2 1,2%
14 Switzerland 3.477,7 1,3% 14 Philippines 4.197,5 1,0% 14 Australia 7.546,6 1,1%
15 Brazil 3.125,4 1,2% 15 Malaysia 3.679,1 0,9% 15 Iran 7.544,1 1,1%
16 Hong Kong 2.640,0 1,0% 16 Syria 3.414,6 0,8% 16 Indonesia 7.223,2 1,1%
17 Pakistan 2.478,6 1,0% 17 Bahrain 3.285,2 0,8% 17 Brazil 6.214,8 0,9%
18 Indonesia 2.453,5 0,9% 18 Saudi Arabia 3.202,4 0,8% 18 South Africa 5.988,7 0,9%
19 Canada 2.050,8 0,8% 19 Oman 3.175,0 0,8% 19 Bahrain 4.988,5 0,7%
20 Qatar 1.870,7 0,7% 20 Brazil 3.089,5 0,8% 20 Syria 4.947,7 0,7%
21 Iran 1.749,8 0,7% 21 Jordan 2.730,7 0,7% 21 Philippines 4.527,1 0,7%
22 Bahrain 1.703,3 0,7% 22 Turkey 2.694,7 0,7% 22 Egypt 4.159,5 0,6%
23 Egypt 1.681,4 0,6% 23 Australia 2.556,8 0,6% 23 Switzerland 4.095,8 0,6%
24 Syria 1.533,1 0,6% 24 Egypt 2.478,1 0,6% 24 Hong Kong 4.058,9 0,6%
25 Ukraine 1.310,0 0,5% 25 Qatar 2.061,2 0,5% 25 Qatar 3.931,9 0,6%
26 Russia 1.148,2 0,4% 26 Yemen 1.975,4 0,5% 26 Canada 3.802,0 0,6%
27 South Africa 1.116,5 0,4% 27 Kenya 1.917,1 0,5% 27 Oman 3.794,2 0,6%
28 Jordan 980,9 0,4% 28 Morocco 1.914,2 0,5% 28 Jordan 3.711,6 0,6%
29 Kuwait 810,2 0,3% 29 Bangladesh 1.901,5 0,5% 29 Kuwait 2.674,2 0,4%
30 Lebanon 741,9 0,3% 30 Kuwait 1.864,0 0,5% 30 Yemen 2.651,1 0,4%
31 New Zealand 697,7 0,3% 31 Canada 1.751,2 0,4% 31 Morocco 2.124,9 0,3%
32 Yemen 675,7 0,3% 32 Hong Kong 1.418,9 0,3% 32 Kenya 1.994,0 0,3%
33 Oman 619,2 0,2% 33 New Zealand 1.222,3 0,3% 33 Bangladesh 1.979,6 0,3%
34 Argentina 611,8 0,2% 34 Sudan 1.017,5 0,2% 34 New Zealand 1.920,0 0,3%
35 Norway 504,9 0,2% 35 Lebanon 842,2 0,2% 35 Lebanon 1.584,1 0,2%
36 Mexico 428,9 0,2% 36 Ethiopia 754,4 0,2% 36 Sudan 1.334,9 0,2%
37 Philippines 329,6 0,1% 37 Nigeria 721,0 0,2% 37 Ukraine 1.327,8 0,2%
38 Sudan 317,4 0,1% 38 Switzerland 618,1 0,2% 38 Russia 1.210,0 0,2%
39 Vietnam 270,4 0,1% 39 Tanzania 600,9 0,1% 39 Mexico 1.026,7 0,2%
40 Sri Lanka 269,9 0,1% 40 Mexico 597,8 0,1% 40 Ethiopia 845,5 0,1%
41 Zambia 251,2 0,1% 41 Sri Lanka 496,6 0,1% 41 Sri Lanka 766,5 0,1%
42 Croatia 244,2 0,1% 42 Djibouti 385,8 0,1% 42 Nigeria 748,5 0,1%
43 Somalia 233,0 0,1% 43 Turkmenistan 379,5 0,1% 43 Tanzania 691,3 0,1%
44 Chile 224,4 0,1% 44 Vietnam 268,4 0,1% 44 Argentina 682,6 0,1%
45 Morocco 210,6 0,1% 45 Tunisia 221,7 0,1% 45 Norway 656,3 0,1%
46 Libya 206,6 0,1% 46 Uganda 213,8 0,1% 46 Turkmenistan 580,8 0,1%
47 Turkmenistan 201,3 0,1% 47 Algeria 212,4 0,1% 47 Vietnam 538,7 0,1%
48 Kasakhstan 153,3 0,1% 48 Zambia 207,3 0,1% 48 Zambia 458,4 0,1%
49 Surinam 104,8 0,0% 49 Maldives 164,8 0,0% 49 Djibouti 398,2 0,1%
50 Tunisia 98,3 0,0% 50 Seychelles 158,8 0,0% 50 Libya 349,2 0,1%
GCC's Imports from … GCC's Exports to … GCC's Trade with…
 Partner regions Mio euro %  Partner regions Mio euro %  Partner regions Mio euro %
ACP 2.592,4 1,0% ACP 11.775,5 2,9% ACP 14.367,8 2,1%
Andean Community 80,3 0,0% Andean Community 74,5 0,0% Andean Community 154,8 0,0%
ASEAN 16.047,6 6,2% ASEAN 50.147,3 12,2% ASEAN 66.194,9 9,9%
BRIC 49.524,1 19,0% BRIC 46.036,5 11,2% BRIC 95.560,7 14,3%
CACM 104,9 0,0% CACM 11,8 0,0% CACM 116,7 0,0%
Candidates 9.424,1 3,6% Candidates 2.718,2 0,7% Candidates 12.142,3 1,8%
CIS 2.899,1 1,1% CIS 764,0 0,2% CIS 3.663,1 0,5%
EFTA 3.985,1 1,5% EFTA 770,8 0,2% EFTA 4.755,9 0,7%
Latin American C. 4.660,7 1,8% Latin American C. 3.948,0 1,0% Latin American C. 8.608,6 1,3%
MEDA (excl EU and T 5.289,6 2,0% MEDA (excl EU and T 11.813,9 2,9% MEDA (excl EU and T 17.103,5 2,6%
Mercosur 3.776,9 1,5% Mercosur 3.161,3 0,8% Mercosur 6.938,3 1,0%
NAFTA 29.604,5 11,4% NAFTA 44.218,4 10,8% NAFTA 73.822,9 11,0%
EFTA: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland; Candidates: Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Turkey; Andean Community: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru;
CIS: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Moldova Republic of, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan;
CACM: Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala; Mercosur: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay; NAFTA: Canada, Mexico, United States;
Latin America C.: CACM, Mercosur, ANCOM, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela; BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India, China;
ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam;
ACP: 79 countries; MEDA (excl EU & Turkey): Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia.
Source: IMF (DoTS) DG TRADE
European Union: 27 members. 22-Sep-09
EUROPEAN UNION, TRADE WITH THE WORLD AND GCC, BY SITC SECTION (2008)
European Union, Imports from the World European Union, Imports from... Gcc  
SITC 
Codes
SITC Sections
Value
(millions of 
euro)
Share of 
Total (%)
SITC 
Codes
SITC Sections
Value
(Millions of 
euro)
Share of 
Total (%)
Share of 
total EU 
Imports
SITC T TOTAL 1.552.373 100,0% SITC T TOTAL 36.502 100,0% 2,4%
SITC 3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 444.750 28,6% SITC 3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 27.745 76,0% 6,2%
SITC 7 Machinery and transport equipment 414.187 26,7% SITC 5 Chemicals and related prod, n.e.s. 2.956 8,1% 2,4%
SITC 8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 195.003 12,6% SITC 6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 2.574 7,1% 1,5%
SITC 6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 177.279 11,4% SITC 7 Machinery and transport equipment 1.266 3,5% 0,3%
SITC 5 Chemicals and related prod, n.e.s. 123.299 7,9% SITC 8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 508 1,4% 0,3%
SITC 0 Food and live animals 72.597 4,7% SITC 9 Commodities and transactions n.c.e. 328 0,9% 0,9%
SITC 2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 67.625 4,4% SITC 2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 241 0,7% 0,4%
SITC 9 Commodities and transactions n.c.e. 36.205 2,3% SITC 4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 173 0,5% 2,2%
SITC 4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 7.938 0,5% SITC 0 Food and live animals 131 0,4% 0,2%
SITC 1 Beverages and tobacco 6.299 0,4% SITC 1 Beverages and tobacco 4 0,0% 0,1%
Other 7.191 Other 576
European Union, Imports from the World European Union, Imports from... Gcc
European Union, Exports to the World European Union, Exports to... Gcc
SITC 
Codes
SITC Sections
Value
(millions of 
euro)
Share of 
Total (%)
SITC 
Codes
SITC Sections
Value
(millions of 
euro)
Share of 
Total (%)
Share of 
total EU 
Exports
SITC T TOTAL 1.309.435 100,0% SITC T TOTAL 68.969 100,0% 5,3%
SITC 7 Machinery and transport equipment 569.203 43,5% SITC 7 Machinery and transport equipment 35.692 51,8% 6,3%
SITC 5 Chemicals and related prod, n.e.s. 201.811 15,4% SITC 6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 10.816 15,7% 6,1%
SITC 6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 178.668 13,6% SITC 8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 7.896 11,4% 5,8%
SITC 8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 136.087 10,4% SITC 5 Chemicals and related prod, n.e.s. 6.003 8,7% 3,0%
SITC 3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 81.056 6,2% SITC 0 Food and live animals 2.995 4,3% 6,4%
SITC 0 Food and live animals 46.659 3,6% SITC 3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 1.633 2,4% 2,0%
SITC 9 Commodities and transactions n.c.e. 36.593 2,8% SITC 9 Commodities and transactions n.c.e. 1.169 1,7% 3,2%
SITC 2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 29.217 2,2% SITC 2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 875 1,3% 3,0%
SITC 1 Beverages and tobacco 19.453 1,5% SITC 1 Beverages and tobacco 673 1,0% 3,5%
SITC 4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 3.055 0,2% SITC 4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 55 0,1% 1,8%
Other 7.634 Other 1.162
European Union, Exports to the World European Union, Exports to... Gcc
Source: EUROSTAT (Comext, Statistical regime 4) DG TRADE
World excluding Intra-EU trade and European Union: 27 members. 22-Sep-09
GCC: United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
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EUROPEAN UNION IMPORTS, BY PRODUCT GROUPING
European Union, Imports from... Gcc  
Millions euro % Millions euro % Millions euro %
0000 - Total 25.580,1 100,0% 35.942,7 100,0% 36.501,5 100,0% 2,4%
1000 - Primary products 18.197,5 71,1% 27.584,9 76,7% 29.074,0 79,7% 4,6%
1100 - Agricultural products 235,8 0,9% 279,0 0,8% 322,6 0,9% 0,3%
1200 - Fuels and mining products 17.961,7 70,2% 27.305,9 76,0% 28.751,4 78,8% 5,5%
2000 - Manufactures 7.233,9 28,3% 7.888,9 21,9% 6.523,0 17,9% 0,7%
2100 - Iron and steel 43,6 0,2% 34,2 0,1% 53,1 0,1% 0,1%
2200 - Chemicals 1.796,5 7,0% 3.001,4 8,4% 2.955,6 8,1% 2,4%
2300 - Other semi-manufactures 1.197,3 4,7% 1.507,2 4,2% 1.628,9 4,5% 2,1%
2400 - Machinery and transport equipment 3.194,6 12,5% 2.434,3 6,8% 1.266,1 3,5% 0,3%
2410 - Office and telecommunication equipment 1.439,8 5,6% 1.353,9 3,8% 360,8 1,0% 0,2%
2420 - Transport equipment 813,2 3,2% 248,6 0,7% 220,9 0,6% 0,2%
2430 - Other machinery 941,6 3,7% 831,8 2,3% 684,4 1,9% 0,5%
2500 - Textiles 114,7 0,4% 110,7 0,3% 112,2 0,3% 0,6%
2600 - Clothing 243,5 1,0% 146,3 0,4% 87,8 0,2% 0,1%
2700 - Other manufactures 643,7 2,5% 654,7 1,8% 419,3 1,1% 0,3%
3000 - Other products 148,2 0,6% 388,6 1,1% 328,3 0,9% 0,9%
European Union, Imports from... Gcc
European Union, Imports from the World  
Millions euro % Millions euro % Millions euro %
0000 - Total 1.026.708,8 100,0% 1.351.813,3 100,0% 1.552.372,5 100,0%
1000 - Primary products 313.348,9 30,5% 512.688,0 37,9% 637.107,8 41,0%
1100 - Agricultural products 86.856,6 8,5% 99.199,5 7,3% 116.516,0 7,5%
1200 - Fuels and mining products 226.492,2 22,1% 413.488,5 30,6% 520.591,8 33,5%
2000 - Manufactures 682.720,3 66,5% 810.273,4 59,9% 871.336,5 56,1%
2100 - Iron and steel 19.323,3 1,9% 30.142,1 2,2% 42.748,8 2,8%
2200 - Chemicals 88.619,6 8,6% 109.028,2 8,1% 123.298,7 7,9%
2300 - Other semi-manufactures 56.884,6 5,5% 69.540,3 5,1% 77.875,2 5,0%
2400 - Machinery and transport equipment 354.603,6 34,5% 402.638,2 29,8% 414.186,9 26,7%
2410 - Office and telecommunication equipment 148.394,1 14,5% 178.652,5 13,2% 170.105,1 11,0%
2420 - Transport equipment 96.751,1 9,4% 95.957,0 7,1% 99.890,4 6,4%
2430 - Other machinery 109.458,4 10,7% 128.028,7 9,5% 144.191,3 9,3%
2500 - Textiles 16.957,6 1,7% 19.075,2 1,4% 18.756,0 1,2%
2600 - Clothing 48.282,7 4,7% 59.263,6 4,4% 61.974,1 4,0%
2700 - Other manufactures 98.048,9 9,5% 120.585,9 8,9% 132.496,9 8,5%
3000 - Other products 32.106,1 3,1% 28.902,2 2,1% 36.736,7 2,4%
European Union, Imports from the World
Source: EUROSTAT (Comext, Statistical regime 4) DG TRADE
World excluding Intra-EU trade and European Union: 27 members. 22-Sep-09
2008
GCC: United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
SITC Rev. 3: 1000 - Primary products: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 68; 1100 - Agricultural products: 0, 1, 2, 4, excl. 27, excl. 28; 1200 - Fuels and mining products: 3, 27, 28, 68; 2000 – Manufactures: 5, 6, 7, 8, excl. 68, excl. 891; 2100 - Iron and steel: 67; 2200 – Chemicals: 5; 2300 - Other semi-
manufactures: 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 69; 2400 - Machinery and transport equipment: 7; 2410 - Office and telecommunication equipment: 75, 76, 776; 2420 - Transport equipment: 78, 79, 713, 7783; 2430 - Other machinery: 71, 72, 73, 74, 77, excl. 713, excl. 776, excl. 7783; 2500 –
Textiles: 65; 2600 – Clothing: 84; 2700 - Other manufactures: 81, 82, 83, 85, 87, 88, 89, excl. 891; 3000 - Other products: 9, 891. 
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EUROPEAN UNION EXPORTS, BY PRODUCT GROUPING
European Union, Exports to... Gcc  
Millions euro % Millions euro % Millions euro %
0000 - Total 41.321,2 100,0% 54.787,8 100,0% 68.968,9 100,0% 5,3%
1000 - Primary products 3.544,3 8,6% 5.268,1 9,6% 6.940,3 10,1% 3,5%
1100 - Agricultural products 2.764,0 6,7% 3.520,4 6,4% 4.180,6 6,1% 4,9%
1200 - Fuels and mining products 780,3 1,9% 1.747,7 3,2% 2.759,6 4,0% 2,4%
2000 - Manufactures 37.145,9 89,9% 48.191,3 88,0% 59.607,9 86,4% 5,6%
2100 - Iron and steel 1.374,3 3,3% 2.780,9 5,1% 3.874,6 5,6% 9,3%
2200 - Chemicals 4.095,4 9,9% 4.934,8 9,0% 6.003,3 8,7% 3,0%
2300 - Other semi-manufactures 3.591,1 8,7% 4.607,0 8,4% 5.749,0 8,3% 5,7%
2400 - Machinery and transport equipment 23.117,1 55,9% 29.719,2 54,2% 35.691,7 51,8% 6,3%
2410 - Office and telecommunication equipment 6.194,9 15,0% 8.294,5 15,1% 5.606,7 8,1% 6,9%
2420 - Transport equipment 7.220,9 17,5% 7.370,1 13,5% 10.221,2 14,8% 5,2%
2430 - Other machinery 9.451,2 22,9% 13.670,7 25,0% 19.281,1 28,0% 6,7%
2500 - Textiles 455,2 1,1% 421,5 0,8% 438,7 0,6% 2,7%
2600 - Clothing 814,4 2,0% 949,4 1,7% 1.209,2 1,8% 6,5%
2700 - Other manufactures 3.666,5 8,9% 4.739,2 8,7% 6.583,2 9,5% 5,7%
3000 - Other products 311,8 0,8% 925,0 1,7% 1.258,9 1,8% 3,3%
European Union, Exports to... Gcc
European Union, Exports to the World  
Millions euro % Millions euro % Millions euro %
0000 - Total 952.722,8 100,0% 1.159.324,3 100,0% 1.309.435,1 100,0%
1000 - Primary products 113.838,3 11,9% 162.999,9 14,1% 199.909,4 15,3%
1100 - Agricultural products 62.794,2 6,6% 75.480,2 6,5% 85.148,0 6,5%
1200 - Fuels and mining products 51.044,1 5,4% 87.519,7 7,5% 114.761,3 8,8%
2000 - Manufactures 816.277,0 85,7% 962.978,1 83,1% 1.063.856,1 81,2%
2100 - Iron and steel 24.244,3 2,5% 34.402,3 3,0% 41.441,7 3,2%
2200 - Chemicals 152.621,2 16,0% 184.569,3 15,9% 201.811,0 15,4%
2300 - Other semi-manufactures 81.341,0 8,5% 94.916,9 8,2% 100.280,4 7,7%
2400 - Machinery and transport equipment 430.095,5 45,1% 504.080,9 43,5% 569.203,0 43,5%
2410 - Office and telecommunication equipment 80.252,5 8,4% 90.604,3 7,8% 81.576,9 6,2%
2420 - Transport equipment 154.107,7 16,2% 170.745,0 14,7% 194.760,1 14,9%
2430 - Other machinery 193.494,2 20,3% 239.719,8 20,7% 289.473,7 22,1%
2500 - Textiles 16.878,6 1,8% 17.174,2 1,5% 16.116,6 1,2%
2600 - Clothing 14.600,1 1,5% 16.733,0 1,4% 18.510,7 1,4%
2700 - Other manufactures 96.055,1 10,1% 110.722,2 9,6% 116.052,0 8,9%
3000 - Other products 23.677,7 2,5% 33.585,4 2,9% 38.035,6 2,9%
European Union, Exports to the World
Source: EUROSTAT (Comext, Statistical regime 4) DG TRADE
World excluding Intra-EU trade and European Union: 27 members.
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GCC: United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
SITC Rev. 3: 1000 - Primary products: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 68; 1100 - Agricultural products: 0, 1, 2, 4, excl. 27, excl. 28; 1200 - Fuels and mining products: 3, 27, 28, 68; 2000 – Manufactures: 5, 6, 7, 8, excl. 68, excl. 891; 2100 - Iron and steel: 67; 2200 – Chemicals: 5; 2300 - Other semi-
manufactures: 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 69; 2400 - Machinery and transport equipment: 7; 2410 - Office and telecommunication equipment: 75, 76, 776; 2420 - Transport equipment: 78, 79, 713, 7783; 2430 - Other machinery: 71, 72, 73, 74, 77, excl. 713, excl. 776, excl. 7783; 2500 –
Textiles: 65; 2600 – Clothing: 84; 2700 - Other manufactures: 81, 82, 83, 85, 87, 88, 89, excl. 891; 3000 - Other products: 9, 891.
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RANK OF GCC IN EUROPEAN UNION TRADE (2008)
EU Imports EU Exports EU Balance
SITC Rev.3 
Product Groups
Rank
Millions
of euro
Share in 
Total
Share of 
total EU 
Imports
Rank
Millions
of euro
Share in 
Total
Share of 
total EU 
Exports
Millions
of euro
TOTAL - 36.501,5 100,0% 2,4% - 68.968,9 100,0% 5,3% 32.467,3
1000 - Primary products - 29.074,0 79,7% 4,6% - 6.940,3 10,1% 3,5% -22.133,7 
1100 - Agricultural products - 322,6 0,9% 0,3% - 4.180,6 6,1% 4,9% 3.858,1
1110 - Food - 308,2 0,8% 0,3% - 3.742,8 5,4% 5,4% 3.434,6
1111 - Fish - 29,0 0,1% 0,2% - 27,9 0,0% 1,0% -1,1 
1112 - Other food products and live animals - 279,3 0,8% 0,4% - 3.715,0 5,4% 5,6% 3.435,7
1120 - Raw materials - 14,4 0,0% 0,1% - 437,8 0,6% 2,8% 423,4
1200 - Fuels and mining products - 28.751,4 78,8% 5,5% - 2.759,6 4,0% 2,4% -25.991,8 
1210 - Ores and other minerals - 226,8 0,6% 0,6% - 417,2 0,6% 3,2% 190,5
1220 - Fuels - 27.745,0 76,0% 6,2% - 1.632,8 2,4% 2,0% -26.112,2 
1221 - Petroleum and petroleum products - 25.183,6 69,0% 7,6% - 1.623,0 2,4% 2,2% -23.560,6 
1222 - Other fuels - 2.561,4 7,0% 2,3% - 9,8 0,0% 0,2% -2.551,6 
1230 - Non ferrous metals - 779,7 2,1% 2,1% - 709,6 1,0% 3,5% -70,1 
2000 - Manufactures - 6.523,0 17,9% 0,7% - 59.607,9 86,4% 5,6% 53.085,0
2100 - Iron and steel - 53,1 0,1% 0,1% - 3.874,6 5,6% 9,3% 3.821,5
2200 - Chemicals - 2.955,6 8,1% 2,4% - 6.003,3 8,7% 3,0% 3.047,7
2210 - Pharmaceuticals - 32,5 0,1% 0,1% - 1.962,1 2,8% 2,6% 1.929,6
2220 - Plastics - 1.588,0 4,4% 9,7% - 965,1 1,4% 3,3% -622,9 
2230 - Other chemicals - 1.335,1 3,7% 2,0% - 3.076,1 4,5% 3,2% 1.741,0
2300 - Other semi-manufactures - 1.628,9 4,5% 2,1% - 5.749,0 8,3% 5,7% 4.120,1
2400 - Machinery and transport equipment - 1.266,1 3,5% 0,3% - 35.691,7 51,8% 6,3% 34.425,6
2410 - Office and telecommunication equipment - 360,8 1,0% 0,2% - 5.606,7 8,1% 6,9% 5.245,9
2411 - Electronic data processing and office equipment - 113,4 0,3% 0,2% - 2.031,9 2,9% 8,0% 1.918,5
2412 - Telecommunications equipment - 232,8 0,6% 0,3% - 3.516,4 5,1% 9,3% 3.283,7
2413 - Integrated circuits and electronic components - 14,6 0,0% 0,1% - 58,4 0,1% 0,3% 43,7
2420 - Transport equipment - 220,9 0,6% 0,2% - 10.221,2 14,8% 5,2% 10.000,2
2421 - Automotive products - 44,2 0,1% 0,1% - 6.347,5 9,2% 5,0% 6.303,3
2422 - Other transport equipment - 176,7 0,5% 0,4% - 3.873,7 5,6% 5,8% 3.697,0
2430 - Other machinery - 684,4 1,9% 0,5% - 19.281,1 28,0% 6,7% 18.596,7
2431 - Power generating machinery - 271,6 0,7% 1,1% - 2.808,7 4,1% 7,0% 2.537,1
2432 - Non electrical machinery - 214,0 0,6% 0,3% - 12.176,7 17,7% 6,6% 11.962,6
2433 - Electrical machinery - 198,7 0,5% 0,4% - 4.295,7 6,2% 6,8% 4.097,0
2500 - Textiles - 112,2 0,3% 0,6% - 438,7 0,6% 2,7% 326,5
2600 - Clothing - 87,8 0,2% 0,1% - 1.209,2 1,8% 6,5% 1.121,4
2700 - Other manufactures - 419,3 1,1% 0,3% - 6.583,2 9,5% 5,7% 6.163,9
2710 - Personal and household goods - 25,1 0,1% 0,1% - 1.219,6 1,8% 5,4% 1.194,6
2720 - Scientific and controlling instruments - 162,9 0,4% 0,6% - 1.698,3 2,5% 4,7% 1.535,4
2730 - Miscellaneous manufactures - 231,4 0,6% 0,3% - 3.665,3 5,3% 6,3% 3.434,0
3000 - Other products - 328,3 0,9% 0,9% - 1.258,9 1,8% 3,3% 930,5
EU Trade with... GCC
Source: EUROSTAT (Comext, Statistical regime 4) DG TRADE
Share by products in EU 27 Total Trade excluding Intra-EU trade. 22-Sep-09
2000 - Manufactures: 5, 6, 7, 8, excl. 68, excl. 891; 2100 - Iron and steel: 67; 2200 - Chemicals: 5; 2210 - Pharmaceuticals: 54; 2220 - Plastics: 57, 58; 2230 - Other chemicals: 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 59; 2300 - Other semi-manufactures: 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 69; 2400 - Machinery and transport equipment: 7; 2410 - Office and
telecommunication equipment: 75, 76, 776; 2411 - Electronic data processing and office equipment: 75; 2412 - Telecommunications equipment: 76; 2413 - Integrated circuits and electronic components: 776; 2420 - Transport equipment: 78, 79, 713, 7783; 2421 - Automotive products: 781, 782, 783, 784, 7132, 7783;
2422 - Other transport equipment: 79, 713, 785, 786, excl. 7132; 2430 - Other machinery: 71, 72, 73, 74, 77, excl. 713, excl. 776, excl. 7783; 2431 - Power generating machinery: 71, excl. 713; 2432 - Non electrical machinery: 72, 73, 74; 2433 - Electrical machinery: 77, excl. 776, excl. 7783; 2500 - Textiles: 65; 2600 - Clothing:
84; 2700 - Other manufactures: 81, 82, 83, 85, 87, 88, 89, excl. 891; 2710 - Personal and household goods : 82, 83, 85; 2720 - Scientific and controlling instruments: 87; 2730 - Miscellaneous manufactures: 81, 88, 89, excl. 891
3000 - Other products: 9, 891.
GCC: United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
1000 - Primary products: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 68; 1100 - Agricultural products: 0, 1, 2, 4, excl. 27, excl. 28; 1110 - Food: 0, 1, 4, 22; 1111 - Fish: 03; 1112 - Other food products and live animals: 0, 1, 4, 22, excl. 03; 1120 - Raw materials: 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29; 1200 - Fuels and mining products: 3, 27, 28, 68; 1210 - Ores and other
minerals: 27, 28; 1220 - Fuels: 3; 1221 - Petroleum and petroleum products: 33; 1222 - Other fuels: 3 excl. 33; 1230 - Non ferrous metals: 68.
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EU TRADE WITH THE WORLD AND EU TRADE WITH GCC (2008)
(Ranking by Trade Flows in 2008)
EU Imports from… EU Exports to… EU Balance with …
GCC GCC
Millions
of euro
Share of 
Total
Share of 
total EU 
Imports
Millions
of euro
Share of 
Total
Share of 
total EU 
Exports
TOTAL 1.552.373 36.502 100,0% 2,4% TOTAL 1.309.435 68.969 100,0% 5,3% TOTAL -242.937 32.467
TDC 05 473.911 27.785 76,1% 5,9% TDC 16 390.812 25.992 37,7% 6,7% TDC 16 64.198 24.888
TDC 06 113.238 1.914 5,2% 1,7% TDC 17 185.454 10.466 15,2% 5,6% TDC 17 85.903 10.141
TDC 07 39.500 1.681 4,6% 4,3% TDC 15 100.307 6.871 10,0% 6,9% TDC 15 -10.707 5.766
TDC 14 34.536 1.420 3,9% 4,1% TDC 06 181.062 5.317 7,7% 2,9% TDC 06 67.824 3.403
TDC 15 111.013 1.105 3,0% 1,0% TDC 14 31.270 2.397 3,5% 7,7% TDC 18 7.955 2.118
TDC 16 326.614 1.104 3,0% 0,3% TDC 18 55.921 2.298 3,3% 4,1% TDC 04 9.084 1.959
TDC 17 99.552 325 0,9% 0,3% TDC 05 85.609 2.023 2,9% 2,4% TDC 20 -15.884 1.541
TDC 11 80.472 197 0,5% 0,2% TDC 04 42.843 1.980 2,9% 4,6% TDC 11 -44.200 1.392
TDC 18 47.966 179 0,5% 0,4% TDC 07 48.923 1.733 2,5% 3,5% TDC 13 5.882 1.215
TDC 21 20.492 178 0,5% 0,9% TDC 20 22.614 1.592 2,3% 7,0% TDC 01 -3.267 995
TDC 03 8.032 173 0,5% 2,2% TDC 11 36.272 1.589 2,3% 4,4% TDC 14 -3.265 977
TDC 13 10.989 130 0,4% 1,2% TDC 13 16.871 1.345 2,0% 8,0% TDC 10 12.009 952
TDC 01 18.908 102 0,3% 0,5% TDC 01 15.642 1.097 1,6% 7,0% TDC 02 -22.291 867
TDC 20 38.498 51 0,1% 0,1% TDC 10 27.421 989 1,4% 3,6% TDC 09 -2.674 510
TDC 08 11.653 39 0,1% 0,3% TDC 02 17.489 883 1,3% 5,0% TDC 08 -1.873 266
TDC 10 15.412 36 0,1% 0,2% TDC 09 9.439 513 0,7% 5,4% TDC 12 -8.789 264
TDC 04 33.758 20 0,1% 0,1% TDC 21 20.313 438 0,6% 2,2% TDC 21 -179 261
TDC 02 39.780 16 0,0% 0,0% TDC 08 9.780 305 0,4% 3,1% TDC 19 1.064 122
TDC 19 864 13 0,0% 1,5% TDC 12 6.283 271 0,4% 4,3% TDC 07 9.423 52
TDC 12 15.072 7 0,0% 0,0% TDC 19 1.928 135 0,2% 7,0% TDC 03 -4.848 -107 
TDC 09 12.112 3 0,0% 0,0% TDC 03 3.184 66 0,1% 2,1% TDC 05 -388.302 -25.763 
TDC sections (Harmonized System):
TDC 01 Ch.01-05 Live animals; animal products TDC 11 Ch.50-63 Textiles and textile articles
TDC 02 Ch.06-14 Vegetable products TDC 12 Ch. 64-67 Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking-sticks…
TDC 03 Ch.15 Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products… TDC 13 Ch.68-70 Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar material…
TDC 04 Ch.16-24 Prepared foodstuffs; beverages, spirits and vinegar; tobacco... TDC 14 Ch.71 Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones…
TDC 05 Ch.25-27 Mineral Products TDC 15 Ch.72-83 Base metals and articles of base metal
TDC 06 Ch.28-38 Products of the chemical or allied industries TDC 16 Ch.84-85 Machinery and mechanical appliances; electrical equipment…
TDC 07 Ch.39-40 Plastics and articles thereof; rubber and articles thereof TDC 17 Ch.86-89 Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and associated transport equipment
TDC 08 Ch.41-43 Raw hides and skins, leather, furskins and articles thereof… TDC 18 Ch.90-92 Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision…
TDC 09 Ch.44-46 Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal; cork and articles of cork… TDC 19 Ch. 93 Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof
TDC 10 Ch.47-49 Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; paper or paperboard… TDC 20 Ch.94-96 Miscellaneous manufactured articles
TDC 21 Ch.97 Works of art, collectors’ pieces and antiques
Source: EUROSTAT (Comext, Statistical regime 4) DG TRADE
World excluding Intra-EU trade and European Union: 27 members. 22-Sep-09
GCCWorld WorldTDC Sections TDC Sections TDC Sections World
ANNEX 06 
Economic/ Social Indicators related to the economies of the GCC states 
 
Table A1 
Yearly Average Brent Spot Prices provided by US Energy Information Administration 
 
Year Price (in dollars per barrel) 
1990 23.76 
1992 19.32 
1994 15.86 
1996 20.64 
1998 12.76 
2000 28.66 
2002 24.99 
2004 38.26 
2006 65.16 
2008 96.94 
2010 79.61 
2011 111.26 
Source: http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=rbrte&f=a 
 
Table A2 
Growth rates of the GCC states 
 
Year Bahrain KSA Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE 
2000 5.5% 4.9% 4.7% 4.6% 9.1% 12.2% 
2005 7.9% 5.6% 10.6% 4.0% 7.5% 4.9% 
2010 4.5% 3.8% 2.0% 4.2% 19.4% 1.4% 
Source: UN Data, http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx 
 
 
 
 
Table A3 
Good governance indicators for the GCC states1 
Voice and Accountability - Percentile Rank (0-100) 
Year Bahrain KSA Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE 
1996 25.0 8.7 44.2 33.7 27.4 36.5 
2000 17.3 8.2 43.8 28.8 31.7 32.7 
2004 28.4 10.1 39.9 27.9 37.0 26.0 
2008 23.6 4.8 32.2 18.8 21.6 22.1 
2011 14.1 3.3 30.5 18.8 21.6 20.2 
 
Government Effectiveness - Percentile Rank (0-100) 
Year Bahrain KSA Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE 
1996 72.7 46.3 60.0 69.8 68.3 72.7 
2000 71.7 46.3 52.2 65.9 69.3 78.0 
2004 72.7 45.4 61.0 69.3 71.2 76.6 
2008 66.5 52.9 56.8 67.0 72.3 78.2 
2011 71.1 40.8 53.1 65.9 75.8 77.7 
 
Rule of Law - Percentile Rank (0-100) 
Year Bahrain KSA Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE 
1996 53.1 58.9 64.6 67.0 55.0 66.5 
2000 61.7 50.7 66.0 69.4 67.5 71.3 
2004 72.7 57.4 65.6 68.9 63.2 64.6 
2008 67.8 58.2 68.8 71.2 74.0 64.9 
2011 62.4 56.8 65.7 67.6 73.7 65.3 
 
Control of Corruption - Percentile Rank (0-100) 
Year Bahrain KSA Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE 
1996 62.9 28.3 78.0 61.0 55.6 55.6 
2000 66.8 40.5 81.0 78.5 75.6 63.4 
2004 71.7 46.3 82.4 72.2 72.7 84.9 
2008 64.6 57.8 72.8 70.4 83.0 83.5 
2011 64.9 48.3 60.2 60.7 80.0 82.5 
 
                                                          
1 Source: World Bank Governance and Anti-Corruption Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp 
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ANNEX 06 
 
Business Communities in EU-GCC relationship 
 
Developments in commerce and industries during the 1989-2002 years 
During the first year the Cooperation Agreement came into force, 400 businessmen and people involved 
in the industries of the two region held their first EC – GCC Conference on industrial cooperation and 
Investment in Granada in 1990. The four objectives of the conference were:  
the exchange of information on development within the two regional organiations, 
encouragement of personal contact between the economic operators of the two 
regions, exploration of opportunities for cooperation in a number of areas such as 
energy and the petrochemical industry, and examination of ways of developing trade 
and encouraging investment
1
.  
An Industrial Development Committee was established, and until 1995 two more EU-GCC Industry 
Conferences were held (Qatar, 1992 and Oman, 1995). These conferences were not producing policies, 
but the interaction of a large number of industrialists from both regions created a forum for exchanging 
ideas for enhancing biregional cooperation and setting initiatives for widening the scope of EU-GCC 
relations2. In the 1995 Troika’s conclusions, central political project was the promotion of the 
decentralised cooperation. This project was designed to bring together groups and people of the civil 
society, hoping to overcome the difficulties that high political contacts had been facing 3. During the Sixth 
EU-GCC Joint Ministerial Meeting, the two regional partners agreed to promote cooperation of business 
communities. In February 1996, a high-level group of representatives of the GCC Chambers of Commerce 
and businessmen met EC officials and private sector representatives in Brussels4. The EU extended the 
use of BRE and BC-NET in the Gulf region. These EU’s instruments offered information in trade and 
investment opportunities. An ‘Interprise’ meeting took place in Riyadh in 1997. It was organized by the 
FGCCC and the Assembly of French Chambers of Commerce and Industry, aiming to propose initiatives 
for the interaction of Gulf and European SMEs. The European Community Investment Partners 
instrument was also extended for the GCC states for joint investment projects. However, ECIP was 
suspended in 19995 and the results of this biregional interaction were poor. 
 
Cooperation in the 21st century 
In the post-9/11 era, the cooperation of the business communities of the two regions was built on the 
dynamics of the overall EU-GCC relations that emerged. However, concrete results can be identified only 
during the last few years, because of the introduction of the financing instrument for cooperation with 
industrialised and other high-income countries and territories. This instrument has been the legal basis 
for “enhanced cooperation between the European Union (EU) and industrialised and other high-income 
countries”6 for the years 2007-2013. This is the first instrument which makes a clear reference to the 
GCC states and offers the platform for guiding EU money to the region. In the framework of this 
instrument, the Union called for proposals for the “EU-GCC Public Diplomacy and Outreach 2007” 
                                                 
1 Babood, Abdullah, EU – GCC Relations, A study in Interregional Cooperation, Dubai, Gulf Research Center, UAE, 2006, pp. 
233-4 
2 Ibid, p. 234 
3 EU/ GCC, „Joint Communiqué‟, 6th EU GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting, 22 April 1996  
4 Babood, Abdullah, EU – GCC Relations, A study in Interregional Cooperation, Dubai, Gulf Research Center, UAE, 2006, p. 249 
5 Ibid, pp. 250-51 
6 European Council, “Regulation of 21 December 2006 on establishing a financing instrument for cooperation with industrialised 
and other high-income countries and territories”. Retrieved on 22 July 2010 from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:405:0041:0059:EN:PDF 
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programme. The goal of this scheme is to bring together, inter alia, business communities from Europe 
and the Gulf, to facilitate economic diversification projects and reforms on labour market policies. 
 
Call for Proposals EU-GCC Public Diplomacy and Outreach 2007  
“The European Commission launches its first programme to enhance relations between the 
European Union and the GCC States. The European Commission will award grants (max. 950,000£) 
to project proposals leading to reflection and debate about EU-GCC relations and public knowledge 
of the European Union among GCC citizens in order to promote closer links between EU and the 
GCC. Proposals can focus on a wide variety of fields, such as business facilitation, economic 
diversification, labour market policies, energy, environment, science and technology, culture, and 
should comprise various activities (conferences, workshops, training, business facilitation, study 
visits, research, publications, etc). Projects must target and include participation of academic 
community, the media, business associations and other economic stakeholders, think tanks, policy 
and decision-makers in the EU and the GCC”7. 
 
In April 2008, the EU announced that grants will be given to the Gulf Research Centre for the “Al-Jisr 
project”. The project aims to increase awareness about the role and the structures of the European 
Union and channels of possible cooperation with the Union8. The second project sponsored by the EU 
was the “EU-GCC Chamber Forum” 9, run by Eurochambres and the Federation of GCC Chambers of 
Commerce. Eurochambres and the FGCCC signed a Momerandum of Understanding in October 2007 
after the initiative of the FGCCC to ask for a closer cooperation of the two bodies. The Eurochambres has 
a Global Platform for cooperation, in the framework of which an Annual Chamber Congress takes place. 
This is however a very loose scheme of international cooperation and usually general discussions are the 
only results. It was during this conference in 2007 that the Eurochambres and the FGCCC reached an 
agreement for signing the MOU, aiming at facilitating contacts between the regional chamber bodies, 
the exchange of knowledge and information for the best way of conducting business, through study 
visits, joint programmes, and major business events10. Just a month later, the European Commission 
called for a proposal in promoting bi-regional commercial cooperation and the Eurochambres applied. A 
grant was awarded to the Eurochambres which gave a major momentum for the implementation of the 
actions agreed by the MOU. “It was the ideal framework in which the Eurochambres proposed concrete 
initiatives”. 
 
According with the MOU an EU-GCC Chamber Forum has been created for11: 
- increasing knowledge in the Gulf region for policies on SMEs development and economic 
diversification 
                                                 
7 European Commission, “Call for Proposals EU-GCC Public Diplomacy and Outreach 2007”, 2007, Retrieved on 14 May 2010 
from http://www.eeas.europa.eu/gulf_cooperation/tender/2008/index_en.htm 
8Gulf Research Center, "EU-GCC Al-Jisr Project on Public Diplomacy and Outreach devoted to the European Union and EU-
GCC Relations", Retrieved on 10 June 2008 from 
http://www.grc.ae/?sec_code=RESPROJ&int_pkid=1&frm_module=researchprojects&frm_action=list_projects&sec_type=h&PHP
SESSID=74154105076c11ab27d7b9305f051315 
9 Eurochambres / FGCCC, "New initiative to bring European and Gulf businesses closer together", Press Release at EU GCC 
Chamber Forum, 6 October 2008 
10 Eurochambres, "Memorandum of Understanding Between Federation of GCC Chambers (FGCCC) And EUROCHAMBRES", 
Retrieved on 12 June 2008 from http://www.eurochambres.be/Content/Default.asp?Pageid=256 
11 Eurochambres, "Fostering economic diversification and cooperation", Retrieved on 09 June 2009 from 
http://www.eurochambres.be/Content/Default.asp?Pageid=256 
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- structuring a dialogue on four key topics: creation of SMEs, supply chain development, 
innovation transfer and internationalization/ impact of EU-GCC trade negotiations. 
- Developing concrete recommendation on policy reforms in the GCC states 
- Establishing a long-term chamber platform. 
 
Seven discussion groups were established in which three experts from each region participate and 
discuss issues of technical assistance on various aspects of the four key topics. 
 
In January and February of 2009, two series of discussion groups were held in Muscat, Dubai, Doha, 
Manama, Kuwait, Dammam, Jeddah and Riyadh. Representatives from the Eurochambres, from 
chambers of EU member states and a representative of the EU’s delegation office in Saudi Arabia 
presented the opportunities that GCC SMEs can have in cooperating with European companies and 
explained the way FGCCC members can seek and get assistance from the European Union and its 
member states12. In May (10-16/5-2009) a 20-strong delegation from the FGCCC visited Brussels for a 
study visit, networking and improving the framework of cooperation. The Gulf delegation will also 
attend the Eurochambres Congress which will be held in Prague on May 14th. Moreover, in September 
2009 a Chamber Forum Conference will be held in Bahrain. There a comparative study on policy 
framework for economic diversification projects of the GCC states will be presented. The conference will 
review the outcomes of the EU-GCC Chambers of Commerce Forum project and provide suggestions for 
enhancing business cooperation between the EU and the GCC states13. Even though this forum is 
exclusively for businessmen, the EU has shown interest, it participated in Eurochambres- FGCCC events 
and the “EU delegation in Riyadh has been very willing to provide help”14. Moreover, although the EU 
had not set any political conditions on providing the grants but had just approved the proposal that was 
submitted by the Eurochambres, there is a continuous communication with the RELEX and the Trade DG 
for updating on the developments and exchanging information between the EU and the Eurochambres. 
The Eurochambres was also asked to present its work on this project to the Council.   
 
During the Eurochambres and FGCCC discussions, the two parties have shared ideas and proposals for 
enhancing their cooperation and generally there has been a great interest in the work done within this 
joint programme. The FGCCC even proposed to provide space for the creation of offices and delegations 
of the Eurochambres in the Gulf region. The proposal is under consideration from the Eurochambres, 
especially since it is recognised that the Gulf states have shown a political will for diversifying their 
economies, and there is ‘definitely a serious trend and a change of mind’15 for the local economies and 
the creation of SMEs. Even though the joint project places an emphasis on the role of the SMEs, there is 
no involvement of the Enterprise Europe Network for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, as there are 
no agreement which makes the GCC states eligible for assistance, both because of the financial situation 
and geographical position of the GCC states and because of the reorganisation of the programme with 
more intra-European objectives. 
 
The Eurochambres has no bilateral relations with Chambers of single states/ city of the Gulf region 
because of its structure and the programme that was agreed on the MOU. However, it does encourage 
the bilateral agreements and cooperation between single European Chambers and single Gulf 
                                                 
12 AMEInfo, "Eurochambres pledges support to GCC SMEs", Retrieved on 13 June 2009 from 
http://www.ameinfo.com/185736.html 
13 Commerce International, "Lands of a thousand and one opportunities", Retrieved on 13 June 2009 from http://www.actu-
cci.com/article/2717/ 
14 Interview with Eurochambres’ International Officer, Brussels, 09 July 2009 
15 Ibid 
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Chambers. Indeed there have been some agreements of this kind16. All these agreements which involve 
exchange of information and the use of European expertise are complimentary to the work of the 
Eurochambres, which has been supportive and provides any needed assistance, even though a lot of 
German/ British/ French Chambers already have business delegations in the Gulf. From this point of 
view, the Eurochambres work is in the benefit of new member states which have no national business 
units in the region. 
Although one of the four key topics of discussion has been the innovation transfer, the Eurochambres 
have no contact with the Research and Development DG of the Commission, or the INCO-NET network. 
Nevertheless, they still support initiatives for projects in new sectors, for new business ideas and for 
promoting educational programmes. However these initiatives are more on policy level rather than in 
providing technical assistance. 
 
Generally, the GCC businessmen and the European Union share the same interest in the opening of the 
local economies and the constraint of the role of the state in the economy. However, there was “no 
direct alliance” for co-ordinating policies and actions in pursuing their goals. The EU has been using 
lobbying methods as well as the official channels of communication in the framework of the FTA 
negotiations to promote its interest in opening the GCC markets and the FGCCC is pursuing its own 
interests with direct contacts with the GCC rulers. Even though an independent middle class of 
businessmen in the Gulf and especially in Saudi Arabia have been shaping and the division between this 
class and the royal families is becoming clearer, businessmen have shown no interest in pursuing 
political ends. They have been successful in demanding and getting concessions for their businesses but 
there have not been, yet, any political demands. This is a system manipulated by the rulers, by “giving 
tips” to the middle class, to keep them satisfied financially and avoid any other demands on the political 
field17. Moreover,  
there is not a planned bottom up procedure from the EU. It is rather the other way round. Businessmen in 
Europe have been lobbying and pressing for more intensive cooperation with the Gulf region. Because of 
the political profile of the talks, however, achieving the European goals has been difficult. That was until 
very recently when there was a change of mind in the Commission and turned to the use of business as a 
means for promoting political ends
18
.   
It should be noted, however, that the EU and Eurochambres are not the only partners of the FGCCC. On 
the contrary, FGCCC have pursued closer links with China19, and already signed Momeranda of 
Understanding with the Asian Pacific Chamber of Commerce20, the US Chambers21 and the African and 
French Language Countries Chambers Confederation22. Nevertheless, the EU business laws are the 
model for business practice for the GCC companies23. That is why the FGCCC has also shown great 
interest in the idea of adopting a Chart for Enterprises, on the basis of the European Chart for 
                                                 
16 Dubai‟s Chamber has been very active in pursuing bilateral agreements and has signed agreements with Hamburg‟s Chamber 
(including an agreement for helping establishing a training system that replicates the German vocational training system to the 
Emirates), Milan and other European Chambers. Jeddah‟s commercial community has also developed contacts with European 
ones. 
17 Interview with Dr. Samir Ranjan Pradhan, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, 12 May 2009 
18 Interview with Eurochambres’ International Officer, Brussels, 09 July 2009 
19 AMEInfo, "FGCC Chambers inaugurates agency in China", Retrieved on 13 June 2009 from 
http://www.ameinfo.com/184108.html 
20 AMEInfo, "FGCCC to sign MoU with the Asian Pacific Chamber of Commerce", Retrieved on 13 June 2009 from 
http://www.ameinfo.com/172881.html 
21 AMEInfo, "FGCCC to sign MoU with US Chambers", Retrieved on 13 June 2009 from http://www.ameinfo.com/174648.html 
22 AMEInfo, "Federation of GCC Chambers to sign MoU with African and French Language Countries Chambers Confederation", 
Retrieved on 13 June 2009 from http://www.ameinfo.com/173293.html 
23 Interview with Dr. Samir Ranjan Pradhan, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, 12 May 2009 
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Enterprises. A model of cooperation in this field exists in the EuroMediterranean Partnership, which 
could be replicated.  
 
Networking events 
Beyond the Eurochambres – FGCCC cooperation, which is sponsored by the European Commission, 
there have been other networking events, conferences and meetings for exchanging ideas on the 
economic transformation of the Gulf region. EU-GCC Expo, as a networking event, took place in London 
in November 2008 and was organised by the Arab-British Chamber of Commerce. A major sponsor of 
the GCC Euro Expo was the Economic Development Board of Bahrain24. The state owned companies, 
Saudi Aramco25, Qatar Petroleum26 and RAK Investment Authority27, the Council for Saudi Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry28 were some of the session sponsors of the event. It has been the largest EU-
GCC bilateral trade event of its kind29. It is interesting to note that the interest of the participants was 
mainly in sectors30 which shape the backbone of the diversification projects in the Gulf region31. The 
event was supported by high profile figures32 of the EU, the GCC and the British government33. Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown delivered a personalised video message34 and Mandelson, EU Commissioner for 
Trade, stressed the importance of foreign investment in Europe and especially in the UK, placing 
emphasis on the fact that the UK has not been alerted by the role of the SWFs but welcomes this kind of 
money flows into the country35. Mr. Abdulhakeem Alkhayyat, a representative from Bahrain noted the 
importance of the event in developing and maintaining strong bilateral trade relations between the GCC 
                                                 
24 The Economic Development Board was established in order to promote and facilitate the developments towards the Economic 
Vision 2030 goals sustainability, competitiveness and, fairness in the economic development of the state. Its role is to translate 
the guidelines of the Vision into “a tangible and coordinated National Strategy across government institutions” and create the 
best possible business environment for business in Bahrain. Source: Bahrain Economic Development Board, „From Regional 
Pioneer to Global Contender: The Economic Vision 2030 for Bahrain‟, p2. Retrieved on 13 June 2009 from 
http://www.bahrainedb.com/uploadedFiles/BahrainEDB/Media_Center/Economic%20Vision%202030%20%28English%29.pdf 
25 A company owned by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which has the control of the oil sector industry in the country. Saudi 
Aramco is also involved in projects for the economic development of the country and began a program to build a $10 billion 
world-class graduate research university, the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST). 
26 Qatar Petroleum is the state owned company for the exploitation of petroleum resources. The company is aiming at  
maximising its "contribution to the national wealth of the State of Qatar, through the safe, efficient and environmentally 
acceptable exploitation of Qatar's hydrocarbon reserves and through related activities" and provide assistance for the 
implementation of the schemes for the Qatarisation of the economy and the workforce.  
27 RAK Investment Authority, the investment authority established and run by the royal family of Ras Al Khaimah, one of the 
Emirates in the UAE. Its goal is to attract investors for joint projects in Ras Al Khaimah, by simplifying the processes and 
upgrading the services in order to fulfil the goals of a sustainable and growing economy. 
28 The Council for Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry is the official federation for the 24 Saudi Chambers. 
29 More than 150 leading Gulf and European companies participated in the seminars and workshops aiming at enhancing 
biregional trade and investment relations. 
30 41% of the visitors' main interested were in the field of Banking and Financing, 16,4% in Construction and Building Material 
and 15,3% in Renewable Energy. 
31 GCC Europe Expo, "Post Event Report 2008", Retrieved on 13 June 2009 from 
http://www.gcceuroexpo.com/images/gcc%20post%20event%20report%202008.pdf  
32 Peter Mandelson, EU Commissioner for Trade, EU deputy Director-General for Trade Karl Falkenberg, Secretary General of 
the GCC Abdul Rahman Al Attiyah, Mohammad bin Ubeid Al Mazroie, GCC Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Affairs, 
Dr. Essam Fakhro, Chairman of the Federation of the GCC Chambers & Bahrain Chamber of Commerce, and all other GCC 
ambassadors to the UK attended the event. 
33 Trade Arabia, "British PM backs GCC Europe Expo", Retrieved on 13 June 2009 from 
http://www.tradearabia.com/news/newsdetails.asp?Sn=ECO&artid=149861 
34 AMEInfo, "Diyar Al Muharraq represents Bahrain at GCC-Europe Expo, London", Retrieved on 14 June 2009 from 
http://www.ameinfo.com/175833.html 
35 Wardell, Jane, "UK steps up wooing of oil-rich Gulf states", Fox News, 2008, Retrieved on 14 June 2009 from 
http://origin.foxnews.com/wires/2008Nov12/0,4670,EUBritainGulf,00.html 
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states and the European Union36. In the framework of the event, the Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Arab-British Chamber of Commerce37. 
Adding to the work done during the Europe – GCC Expo, there are bilateral (single EU member states - 
GCC) relations as well. Four GCC – City (London) conferences have already taken place and in October 
2009 the first Gulf - French Economic Forum (was?) will be hosted in Paris. In June 2009 the fourth 
annual City and Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (GCC) Conference will be held in London, which is 
sponsored by the Qatar Financial Centew Authority38. With the participation of representatives from all 
six GCC states and representatives from the financial sector of the City, the main theme of this 
conference shall be cooperating in the fields of financial services and banking, Islamic finance and 
insurance39. In the City and GCC conference in 2008, 250 key financial sector representatives from the 
City of London and the GCC countries, discussed the work that is needed to be done in the GCC to 
reform the legal and regulatory framework for Foreign Investments, the Sovereign Wealth Funds and 
the financial services sector, youth unemployment, education (with the establishment of European 
universities in the region and the vocational training programmes run by Europeans) and the role of 
women. Lead sponsors for the Conference were Bahrain Economic Development Board, Boubyan Bank 
Kuwait40, Emirates National Bank of Dubai41 and Qatar Financial Centre Authority42.  In addition, the first 
Gulf - French Economic Forum will be held in October 28, 2009 in Paris. The Forum, titled "Towards a 
Sustainable Strategic Partnership", was organised by Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Paris and 
the Arab-French Chamber of Commerce, and in coordination with the General Secretariat of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council and the French government. The integration process in the field of economy in the 
Gulf region, the GCC-French economic relations, the legislative framework in both France and the GCC 
states for foreign investments, the banking and financial systems and the ways of enhancing 
opportunities for bilateral (between France and the GCC states) cooperation will be discussed in four 
working sessions.43  
 
                                                 
36 AMEInfo, "Diyar Al Muharraq represents Bahrain at GCC-Europe Expo, London", Retrieved on 14 June 2009 from 
http://www.ameinfo.com/175833.html 
37 GCC Europe Expo, "Post Event Report 2008", Retrieved on 13 June 2009 from 
http://www.gcceuroexpo.com/images/gcc%20post%20event%20report%202008.pdf 
38 Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) was established in 2005 by the Emir of Qatar as a financial and business centre in order to 
promote foreign investments in financial services and at the same time to facilitate the development of an indigenous financial 
services market in Qatar. QFC is comprised by the QFC Authority for the commercial aspect of its activities, the QFC Regulatory 
Authority which is an independent financial regulator, an independent judiciary with a civil and commercial court and a regulatory 
tribunal. 
39 The City and GCC Financial Services Summit, "4th City & Gulf Cooperation Council Countries Conference 2009", Retrieved on 
14 June 2009 from http://www.cityandgcc.com/ 
40 An Islamic Bank established in 2004 in Kuwait 
41 A state-owned bank of the Emirate of Dubai 
42 The City and GCC Financial Services Summit, "The Third City and GCC Countries Conference, 19 June 2008", Retrieved on 
14 June 2009 from http://www.cityandgcc.com/city2008.htm 
43 Council of Saudi Chambers, "Gulf - French Economic Forum with the Participation of Gulf Businessmen", Retrieved on 14 
June 2009 from http://www.saudichambers.org.sa/2_7385_ENU_HTML.htm 
Joint Action Programme 
for 
Implementation of the GCC-EU Cooperation Agreement of 1988 
2010-2013 
 
Subject Areas of Cooperation Proposed Mechanism Target Date 
    
1. Continued exchange of views 
on macroeconomic issues 
- Hold regular EU-GCC dialogue on economic 
and financial issues to exchange views on 
macroeconomics at a senior official level 
2010 – 2013 
2. Exchange of expertise and 
information in all aspects of the 
GCC & EU experience in 
economic integration 
- Organize annual joint forums on this experience 2010 – 2013 
3. Technical cooperation in 
specific topics to be agreed 
upon in economic, financial 
and monetary areas. 
- Hold technical meetings to examine certain 
issues such as the taxation system and Islamic 
banking products 
2010 – 2013 
1. Economic, 
Financial and 
Monetary 
Cooperation 
4. Continued cooperation with the 
EU Central Bank in the area of 
the GCC Monetary Union 
- Continue holding regular meetings between 
GCC central bank governors & ECB governors 
- Exchange of expertise & technical assistance by 
the ECB on the GCC monetary union 
 
    
2. Investment 1. Encouragement of mutual 
investment 
2. Development of small and 
medium enterprises in the GCC 
States 
3. Development of GCC  human 
- Encourage business partnerships between 
businesses from both sides in all areas of 
investment 
- Establish a regular dialogue regarding issues 
that have an impact on investors access to the 
EU and GCC markets 
2010 – 2013 
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resources in various production 
activities and latest 
technologies 
- Facilitate the increase of EU-GCC investments 
flow, including the removal of the regulatory 
barriers 
- Enhance coordination between the GCC and the 
EU Chambers of Commerce Federations 
- Develop mechanisms to facilitate exchange of 
expertise 
- Exchange of expertise in the area of human 
resources development and training 
    
3. Trade 
cooperation 
1. Enhance trade relations in order 
to increase bilateral GCC-EU 
trade   
- Encourage the exchange of: 
- trade delegations in coordination with the 
business organizations 
- schedules of trade exhibitions organized in 
GCC states and EU countries 
in order to facilitate participation from both 
sides 
- Continue organizing annual “GCC Days” in  EU  
countries and promote organizing similar “EU 
Days” in GCC States 
- Organize workshops and forums on specific 
topics: E-commerce, export requirements in  
both  GCC and EU  regions, consumer 
protection 
- Exchange views on the topics to be examined 
at the WTO and the multi-lateral negotiations 
- Establish a regular dialogue on issues having  an 
impact on the access to the EU and GCC 
markets 
2010 – 2013 
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- Facilitate the increase of EU-GCC trade flows, 
including  the removal of non-tariff barriers. 
    
4. Energy 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Exchange views on oil and gas 
market developments as well as 
the energy policies on both 
sides. 
2. Exchange information and 
experiences on policies, 
frameworks, best practices and 
techniques in the field of 
energy, in upstream, 
midstream, and downstream 
(infrastructure). 
3. Cooperation in the field of 
energy equipments, machinery 
and spare parts manufacturing 
especially those used in the oil 
and gas industry. 
4. Cooperation in the field of 
clean and renewable energy 
technologies. 
5. Cooperation in the field of 
energy efficiency policy and 
measures. 
6. Cooperation in the field of 
solar energy technologies and 
policy framework. 
 
Note the ongoing work programme of the joint 
energy expert group and the setup of sub-groups, 
as well as the EU-GCC clean energy network, the 
following mechanisms are identified: 
1. Establish ad-hoc groups to address specific 
areas as needed 
2. Hold seminars, exhibits, workshops, visits, 
technical exchange and joint studies.  
3. Training and capacity building in some 
identified areas of cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 – 2013 
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Electricity & 
Water 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nuclear Safety 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Technical cooperation in all 
stages of electricity and water 
production (generation, 
transport, energy transfer 
distribution and service 
providers), including technology 
transfer 
2. Benefit from the EU in: power 
interconnection, load 
management, regulatory 
framework and in creating and 
developing regional markets for 
the trade in, and exchange of 
electricity. 
3. Exchange of best practices in 
RDT (Research, Development 
and Technology) regarding the 
integrated management and 
sustainable development of 
water, in order to achieve water 
security in the GCC states. 
Exchange best practices and 
techniques in the efficient use 
of power and water 
consumption. 
 
Cooperation in the field of 
atomic energy as well as 
nuclear safety and security. 
1. Establish ad-hoc groups to address specific 
areas as needed 
2. Hold seminars, exhibits, workshops, visits, 
technical exchange and joint studies.  
3. Training and capacity building in some 
identified areas of cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Establish ad-hoc groups to address specific 
areas as needed 
2. Hold seminars, exhibits, workshops, visits, 
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Exchange of information and 
experience in matters such as 
the legal framework for 
protection against radiation, 
nuclear security and safety, 
radioactive waste, warranties 
and appropriate systems and 
surveillance. 
technical exchange and joint studies.  
3. Training and capacity building in some 
identified areas of cooperation. 
    
5. Transport 1. Cooperation in the field of 
development, construction 
operation and maintenance of 
railway projects in GCC States. 
2. Cooperation in maritime 
affairs: passengers, vessel 
inspection, maritime 
legislation, safety regulations 
and navigation security. 
3. Benefit from the EU experience 
in the aviation management as 
well as areas of studies and 
scientific research in various 
aviation areas, particularly 
aviation and air transport safety 
and security. 
4. Exchange of expertise in 
formulating work policies and 
procedures related to the 
issuance of landing and transit 
1. Establish ad-hoc groups to address specific 
areas as needed 
2. Hold seminars, exhibits, workshops, visits, 
technical exchange and joint studies. 
3. Training and capacity building in some 
identified areas of cooperation. 
 
2010 - 2013 
Joint Action Programme of the GCC-EU Cooperation Agreement of 1988 
6/16 
permits for all types of aircraft. 
5. Benefit from the EU experience 
regarding professional road 
transport and road safety for all 
road users. In terms of 
professional road transport: the 
emphasis should be placed on 
fair competition, rights of 
drivers, passengers, students 
and workers; this would 
include rules on the access to 
the profession and social rules 
for drivers.  
    
6. Environment and 
climate change  
1. Cooperation in the field of 
waste recycling, related power 
generation technologies and 
building indigenous 
technologies in these fields, as 
well as exchange of expertise 
and research and cooperation 
between industries and research 
centers. 
2. Exchange views and studies on 
the causes and effects of 
climate change as well as 
policies dealing with climate 
change within the framework of 
relevant UN conventions. 
1. Establish ad-hoc groups to address specific 
areas as needed. 
2. Hold seminars, exhibits, workshops, visits, 
technical exchange and joint studies. 
3. Training and capacity building in some 
identified areas of cooperation. 
 
2010 - 2013 
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3. Cooperation in developing 
national adaptation strategies to 
climate change impact. 
4. Enhance cooperation in the 
field of carbon capture and 
storage; and conduct joint 
studies in this connection. 
5. Enhance technical cooperation 
and exchange of studies as well 
as researches in the field of the 
environmental impact related to 
handling and use of chemicals, 
such as import, export, 
production, manufacturing, 
sale, transportation and storage. 
6. Cooperation in the field of 
disaster management and 
environmental crises.  
7. Cooperation in the field of 
water management and 
combating desertification. 
8. Cooperation in the field of 
preservation of biodiversity. 
9. Cooperation in the field of 
environmental aspects of water 
and waste water treatment. 
    
7. Industry 1. Support efforts of the GCC 
States in the development of 
- Jointly discuss the GCC Unified Industrial 
Strategy and provide the necessary technical 
2010 - 2013 
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their industrial production and 
diversification of their 
industrial base, taking into 
account the mutual interests of 
both parties. 
2. Benefit from the available EU 
programmes and mechanisms 
in the development and the 
updates of the GCC industrial 
structure, as well as increasing 
the competitive capacities of 
production sectors. 
3. Encourage and attract 
investment and set up joint 
projects 
4. Cooperate in the preparation of 
studies, consultation, and the 
joint industrial statistical 
surveys 
 
expertise in order to develop workable 
implementation mechanisms and common 
quantitative indicators measuring the progress 
in achieving the objectives of the GCC Unified 
Industrial Strategy and compare them with 
international indicators, and cooperation in the 
field of training the GCC specialists to carry 
out these tasks. 
- Exchange of expertise with centre 
establishments specializing in product 
orientation, industrial partnership and 
subcontracting. 
- Organisation of meetings and forums between 
industry policy-makers to discuss issues of 
mutual interest and encourage establishing new 
relations in the industry sector, consistent with 
the objectives of the EU-GCC Cooperation 
Agreement. 
- Urge businesses to organize GCC-EU industry 
forums, and consider industrial partnerships. 
- Cooperate in conducting studies and preparing 
reports, research and industrial surveys, as well 
as consultancy services required by either party, 
including the obtention of studies results or 
reports prepared for technical guidance. 
- Benefit from the EU expertise and best 
practices on issues of mutual interest on both 
sides.  
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8. Combating money 
laundering and 
terrorist financing
Enhance cooperation in the field of 
combating money laundering and 
terrorist financing 
- Continue holding annual joint EU-GCC 
workshops on combating terrorism financing; 
with a view to possibly setting up a joint 
working group which would submit its 
recommendations to the Joint Cooperation 
Committee. The main functions of the group 
would include, inter alia, organizing joint 
annual forums, exchanging expertise and visits 
and consultations on matters of mutual 
interest.  
2010 – 2013 
    
9. Intellectual 
Property rights 
Intellectual property rights and 
patenting 
- Exchange of views and experience in the area 
of intellectual property rights. 
- Establish cooperation between the EU and the 
GCC in the field of patents in order for the 
GCC to benefit from the EU experience. Such 
cooperation could include exchange of 
expertise and technical assistance in various 
fields such as capacity building, training, 
expert missions, patent databases, IT and 
seminars. In this respect, cooperation between 
the European Patent Office and the GCC 
Patent Office will be encouraged. 
2010 – 2013 
    
10. Telecommunicati
ons and 
Information 
Technology 
Sector 
1. Exchange expertise and 
information in the field of 
regulating telecommunications 
and Internet governance 
2. Exchange expertise in the field 
- To hold a joint meeting to develop a plan in 
this area. 
- To exchange visits of experts in the field of 
telecom and IT. 
- To review the EU experience in the field of the 
2010 – 2013 
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of E-commerce applications 
and E-transactions and benefit 
from IT training programmes. 
general policies of telecommunications and the 
role of the governments in the development of 
the Telecom and IT sector. 
    
11. Higher 
Education and 
Scientific 
Research 
(A). Cooperation in Higher 
Education  
 2010 – 2013 
 1. Continue cooperation between 
EU and GCC at senior expert 
level  
 
- Establishment of a joint GCC-EU expert group 
to follow up and coordinate on a regular basis. 
- Explore the possibility of cooperation between 
the European University Association and the 
GCC Committee of Heads of Universities. 
 
 2. Enhance GCC participation in 
ERASMUS MUNDUS and 
Marie Curie Scientific Mobility 
Programmes. Universities shall 
select the fields deemed most 
appropriate and compatible 
with their bylaws and rules of 
procedure of the relevant 
Ministry of Higher Education. 
- Promotion and awareness campaigns in the 
region. 
- Explore possibilities for partnership between 
GCC and EU universities. 
 
 
 
 3. Establish a sustained 
partnership between EU and 
GCC universities for 
cooperation in teaching Arabic 
language and Middle Eastern 
studies  as well as European 
languages and studies under 
- Study the possibility of increasing exchanges 
of students and faculty staff in Arabic language 
and Middle Eastern studies, as well as in 
European languages and studies. 
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which universities will be open 
to receive specific modules and 
training. 
 4. Establish and develop joint 
supervision programmes 
between GCC and EU 
universities through which 
scholarships would be granted 
to students of GCC universities 
to study in the EU in major 
fields that are important to the 
GCC States. 
- Enhance and facilitate existing cooperation 
between GCC universities and distinguished 
EU universities with regard to joint supervision 
in higher education programmes. 
- GCC Secretariat will provide the list of 
recognized public and private universities in 
the GCC countries. The EU will provide a 
similar list. 
 
 5. Cooperation with EU 
universities in developing 
academic programmes at GCC 
universities, focusing on new 
scientific specializations such 
as the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy, genetics, etc. 
- Organize a workshop at one of the GCC 
universities (coordination could be made with 
Bahrain University to organize this type of 
workshop as the electronic learning centre is 
based there) wherein concerned universities 
from both sides can participate. 
- Organize workshops on best practices on this 
subject. 
- Explore the EU’s opinion on the assistance that 
EU universities can provide to GCC 
universities in the cooperative education 
provided by the EU universities. 
- Organize a workshop at one of the GCC 
universities (coordination can be made with 
King Abdulaziz University, King Saud 
University or the Arab Gulf University) in 
which representatives from universities on both 
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sides can participate to identify cooperation 
opportunities. 
 5.1. Call on the EU countries to 
develop a mechanism for 
exchanging e-learning expertise 
with the GCC universities. 
- Organize workshops on best practices on this 
subject. 
 
 5.2. Call on the EU universities 
to establish partnerships with 
the GCC States in the field of 
cooperative education to enable 
exchange of expertise and give 
opportunities to the students 
from both sides to be exposed 
in the industrial and 
commercial training 
programmes. 
- Explore the EU’s opinion on the assistance that 
EU universities can provide to the GCC 
universities in the cooperative education 
provided by the EU universities. 
 
 5.3. Call for cooperation with the 
EU universities to upgrade 
academic performance 
(university leadership level, 
teaching staff level or 
administrative level) through 
participation of the GCC 
universities in sharing best 
practices 
- Organize a workshop at one of the GCC 
universities (coordination can be made with 
King Abdulaziz University, King Saud 
University or the Arab Gulf University) ) in 
which representatives from universities on both 
sides can participate to identify cooperation 
opportunities. 
 
 
 (B). Cooperation in Scientific 
Research  
 2010 – 2013 
 1. Achieve highest degree of 
cooperation between the GCC 
- Establish a GCC-EU science and technology 
policy dialogue to deal with the main issues of 
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and EU universities and 
research centers in the joint 
research projects of applied 
nature through which 
knowledge and modern 
technology can be transferred 
from the EU countries to the 
GCC States in areas of 
importance to GCC countries 
such as: water related 
technologies (i.e., solar 
techniques applied to 
desalination), renewable 
energies (solar and wind), 
environment, bio-technology, 
nano-technologies and 
petrochemicals.  
research, development and innovation 
- Develop ways and means to ensure benefits for 
the GCC researchers from the 7th EU Research 
Framework Programme, and activate their 
participation in obtaining the scholarships 
offered by the programme. 
- Provide opportunities to GCC researchers (via 
research cluster meetings) to participate in joint 
research projects undertaken by the EU with a 
view to upgrading their capacities and 
expertise. 
- Invite EU researchers to participate in certain 
research projects existing in the GCC States. 
 2. Open up the field for GCC 
universities and Research 
Centers to make use of the 
INCONET initiative for 
scientific research 
- Expand the participation of GCC universities 
and research centres to make use of this 
initiative. 
 
 3. Transfer of the EU expertise in 
the field of establishing 
financing and managing 
research programmes to the 
GCC universities and national 
research centers, and establish a 
long-term relationship to foster 
- EU will provide background documents about 
its experience in this area at the earliest joint 
meeting between the two sides and will also 
organize a thematic seminar on this subject. 
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those practices in research area. 
 (C). Meteorology  2010 – 2013 
 Encourage GCC-EU cooperation in 
the exchange of satellite 
meteorological data and training of 
GCC national manpower 
- Form a joint working group specialized in 
meteorology matters composed by 
representatives from the GCC secretariat, GCC 
member states and the EU. The group should 
also study mechanisms for the continued 
reception of data from EUMETSAT satellites 
positioned over the Arabian Sea and the 
Arabian Peninsula, support training of GCC 
cadres in meteorology, and research 
meteorological phenomena in the region to 
submit recommendations. 
 
    
12. Tourism Discuss possibilities of cooperation 
in tourism and joint projects that 
can be established in this area. 
 
- To encourage GCC and EU participation in 
tourism fairs in both EU and GCC. 
- To promote EU institutional presence on 
stands in tourism fairs in the GCC. 
- To promote a framework of cooperation and 
exchange of expertise and know-how in 
sustainable tourism development (national 
parks, protected areas, hot water springs, 
mountain and coastal areas, desert, eco and 
agri-tourism) in terms of  policy making; 
planning; investment and promotion; 
management and operation. 
- To encourage EU investors to explore 
investment opportunities in the GCC.   
- Exchange of good practices and know-how on 
- according to events 
- according to events 
 
- 2011-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- according to events 
 
- 2010-2011 
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protection and preservation of natural and 
cultural heritage (visual pollution, 
environmental hazards, etc) 
- Explore possible participation of GCC officials 
in the area of tourism in EU relevant training 
programmes. 
- 2010 
 
    
13. Culture and 
mutual 
understanding 
1. Cultural exchange and transfer 
of the real picture of GCC 
culture and acquaint the EU 
communities with the artistic 
and cultural creativity in the 
GCC States. 
 
2. Discuss issues of translation 
from/to European languages 
- Encourage the intensification of exchanges 
and dialogues between segments of the 
society, such as academia, universities, think-
tanks and cultural institutions from the EU and 
the GCC countries on subjects such as 
common values, history and culture, through 
workshops, and seminars (ex: Al-Jisr project). 
- EU to programme support to the promotion of 
EU cultural activities or events organized in 
GCC. 
- EU to help identifying contact points in EU-
Member States to promote GCC cultural 
events. 
- Urge the two sides to activate the role of the 
competent agencies from public and private 
sectors in translating certain important GCC or 
EU reference texts in the areas of tourism and 
culture 
- Promote cultural visits and exchanges between 
higher education students (ex: EPDOP).  
- 2010– 2013 
(ongoing) 
 
 
 
 
 
-2010-2013 
(ongoing) 
 
- according to events 
 
- upon 
establishment EU 
information center 
in GCC (2010) 
 
 
- 2010-2013 
(ongoing) 
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14. Antiquities and 
Museums 
To benefit from the EU expertise 
in this field 
 
 
- To encourage GCC and EU participation in 
cultural and antiquities events in both EU and 
GCC. 
- To promote a framework of cooperation and 
exchange of expertise and know-how in 
cultural tourism, antiquities, museums, in 
terms of policy making, planning, studies, 
investment and operation. 
- To explore possible participation of GCC 
officials in the areas of tourism, culture and 
antiquities in EU relevant programmes, 
including training. 
- Encourage existing cooperation in the above 
areas. 
- To encourage EU investors to explore 
investment opportunities in the GCC in 
cultural tourism. 
- Exchange of best practices and know-how on 
protection, preservation and rehabilitation of 
cultural heritage and antiquities. 
- according to events 
 
 
- 2010-2013 
 
 
 
 
- 2010 
 
 
 
- ongoing 
 
- according to events 
 
- 2010-2013 
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